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The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Paul W. van der Veur
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Extract

UNTEA served the important function of buffer between contending forces and in general accomplished a remarkably smooth transfer. In this regard the United Nations operation was a major success. The smooth transfer was achieved, however, at the cost of rights specifically guaranteed in the agreement—the rights of free speech and assembly. Furthermore, the United Nations preparatory task and responsibility in the future “act of self-determination” was minimized.

It may be argued that UNTEA policy in West Irian merely reflects the weakness of the United Nations in a nation-state world. Lack of UNTEA power certainly was an important aspect. The explanation, however, is more complex. It is significant to recall that the United Nations assumed its task under severe handicaps: It was given no time for adequate recruitment and preparation; from the start it was confronted with the legitimized presence of Indonesian troops; the status of the “Papuan flag” was never mentioned in the agreement; and general Papuan primitivity along with political naïveté and schisms among the small and newly created Papuan élite influenced UNTEA's approach.

UNTEA also met continuous Indonesian pressure aimed at shortening the period of its administration and weakening its authority in general. Statements by Indonesian officials cast doubt on Indonesia's willingness to adhere to the wording of the agreement. In trying to interpret Indonesian feelings it might be conceded that most Dutch-Indonesian agreements have imposed conditions which could be considered obnoxious to Indonesia. The rights of self-determination for the Papuan inhabitants—stipulated in the August 15 agreement—fall into this category.

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Information
International Organization , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , Winter 1964 , pp. 53 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press 1964

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References

1 Article 2 of the “Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty” in Secretariat-General of the Round Table Conference, Round Table Conference: Results as Accepted in the Second Plenary Meeting (The Hague, 1950), P. 3.Google Scholar

2 Duynstee, F. J. F. M., Nieuw Guinea als SchaRel tussen Nederland en Indonesië (Amsterdam, 1961), pp. 190–198, 353–374.Google Scholar

3 Pauker, Guy J., “General Nasution's Mission to Moscow,” Asian Survey, 03 1961 (Vol. 1, No. 1), pp. 13–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Mohammad, Hatta, “Colonialism and the Danger of War”, Asian Survey, 11 1961 (Vol. 1, No. 9), pp. 10–14.Google Scholar

4 The following relies on Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Zestiende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties: September–December 1961 ('s-Gravenhage, 1962). This publication contains a verbatim account of the speeches, declarations, and resolutions dealing with West Irian in the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.Google Scholar

5 Statement by Netherlands Prime Minister Quay, J. de in the Netherlands Second Chamber on September 7, 1962. Handelingen Staten-Generaal (1961–1962), pp. 1272–1273.Google Scholar

6 UN Document A/5170, Annex, pp. 1–21.Google Scholar

7 The failure to inform the Netherlands negotiators was later attributed to “an administrative oversight”. See Handelingen Staten-Generaal (1961–1962), 6803 (R 296), No. 3, p. 6 and No. 7, p. 6.Google Scholar See also the Aide-Memoire of the Acting Secretary-General on this subject in UN Document A/5170, Annex, pp. 20–21.Google Scholar

8 Articles XVI–XXI (inclusive).

9 Article XXIV.

10 Verslag van de Studiecommissie Nieuw-Guinea (Batavia, 1949), p. 80.Google Scholar

11 van der Veur, Paul W., “Political Awakening in West New Guinea”, Pacific Affairs, Spring 1963 (Vol. 36, No. 1), pp. 54–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For Machiavellian overtones of this drastic speed-up in political development, see especially footnote 37 (pp. 64–65) in this article.Google Scholar

12 Gouvernementsblad van Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea, 1961, Nos. 68 and 70. The official flag ceremony was held on December 1, 1961. It has been alleged that the Netherlands negotiators did not raise the issue of the Papuan flag in the hope that it would be accepted as a territorial flag. Shortly before the assumption of the UNTEA administration, in several towns of West Irian, third flagpoles were erected next to the ones for the Dutch and Papuan flags.Google Scholar

13 Article XVIII, section (c).

14 The Indonesian Parliament approved the agreement unanimously on September 1. The Netherlands Parliament approved it 129–9 m tne Second Chamber on September 7 and 63–3 in the First Chamber on September 13. It was included as a supplementary item in the agenda of the General Assembly's seventeenth session and approved on September 21, 1962. Although the vote was 89 in favor and none against, there were 12 abstentions and five Members absent. Abstaining were several African Members who had spon sored the Brazzaville resolution in the General Assembly in November 1961.

15 New YorR Times correspondent A. M. Rosenthal reported from Kota Baru on October 4:

At the moment there are only about 20 non-Indonesian members of the United Nations staff on hand, including secretaries and at least five information aides. The United Nations found it was impossible to get quickly enough skilled specialists willing to serve in a dreary climate on a job that would last longer than several months.

Article IX of the agreement states: “The United Nations Administrator will replace as rapidly as possible top Netherlands officials….” Author's italics. It took until the end of October to fill fifteen of the eighteen key posts and until the end of December to fill them all. (UNTEA, “Administrator's Press Conference”, 04 30, 1963, p. 2.Google Scholar)

16 On September 1, 1962, the administration was manned by 2,540 Netherlands officials and 7,618 local employees. By October 1, these figures were down to 775 and 7,032 respectively. (UNTEA, “Administrator's Press Conference”, 04 30, 1963, p. 2.)Google Scholar

17 UNTEA, Department of Information, News Bulletin No. 20 (Hollandia/Kotabaru), 04 24, 1963, P. 1Google Scholar

18 This criticism does not apply to the divisional commissioners, most of whom did have close contact with the people in their respective areas.

19 UNTEA, Department of Information, News Bulletin No. 18 (Hollandia/Kotabaru), 04 20, 1963, p. 1.Google Scholar

20 UNTEA, Department of Information, News Bulletin No. 20, p. 4.Google Scholar

21 UNTEA, Department of Information, “International Interim: A Radio Documentary on the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority”, 04 1963, p. 13.Google Scholar

22 Indonesia's official exchange rate is 45 rupiahs to the dollar. In March 1963, the blackmarket rate ranged between 1,300 to 1,500 to the dollar. For a brief elaboration, see Paul W. van der, Veur, “West Irian in the Indonesian Fold”, Asian Survey, 07 1963 (Vol. 3, No. 7), pp. 332–333.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 In November 1962, the number of unemployed in Biak was placed at “more than 2,000” and in Japan Island at “more than 1,000”. See the “Memo Betreffende Werkeloosheid Residentie Geelvinkbaai” (Memorandum Concerning Unemployment in the Geelvink Bay Residency), Appendix A, Overdrachts-raffort Residentie Waterstaatsdienst Afdeling Geelvinkbaai-Biak, 04 9, 1963.Google Scholar

24 The author can recall only one “public utility” project which was initiated under UNTEA. An extensive Dutch survey dealing with the opening up of the interior of Biak for economic development included a road construction program connecting Biak town with Sjabes in the interior and continuing from there to Wardo to the west and Sor in the north. Initiation of this program fitted into the need to find employment for thousands of Biakkers who had become unemployed locally or had returned to their infertile island.

25 Article X. Author's italics.

26 UNTEA, Department of Information, Broadcast talks nos. 2 and 7 (early 12 1962). From a typewritten copy of Michel Tombelaine, head of press bureau and visual services. Author's italics.Google Scholar

27 As was noted before, the issue of the nationality of the inhabitants was not touched upon in the agreement. A joint letter (dated 08 15, 1962)Google Scholar from the representatives of Indonesia and the Nether lands to the Acting Secretary-General “concerning the issue of passports and consular protection during the UNTEA administration” merely stated that UNTEA “shall have the authority at its discretion to issue travel documents to Papuans (West Irianese) applying therefor [sic] without prejudice to their right to apply for Indonesian passports instead” and that the governments of Indonesia and Netherlands “shall at the request of the Secretary General furnish consular assistance and protection it being for the person concerned to determine to which consular authority he should apply”. (UN Document A/5170, Annex, p. 17.Google Scholar)

28 Tahun Kemenangan (A Year of Triumph), Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1962 (Editorial dan Ulasan oleh Hadji Achmad Notosoetardjo), (Djakarta: 1962), p. 41.Google Scholar

29 Ibid., p. 44.

30 “‘Plebisciet niet waarshijnlijk’ zegt Indonesiër in Hollandia”, Trouw, 12 18, 1962.Google Scholar

31 Italics added. The author also uses this quotation in loc. cit, p. 334.Google Scholar

32 “Hei Kaum Imperialis, Tunkjuhkan Hidungmu Sekarangl” Warta BhaRti, 03 22, 1963.Google Scholar

33 Legge, J. D., “Indonesia After West Irian”, Australian Outlook, 04 1963 (Vol. 17, No. 1), p. 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34 UNTEA, Department of Information, News Release No. 249 (Hollandia/Kotabaru), 02 9, 1963.Google Scholar

35 Ibid.

36 “Irian Takeover Date Remains May 1, Says UN”, The Straits Times, 02 8, 1963.Google Scholar

37 The author was in Biak in early April 1963 when pressure to withdraw this resolution had begun behind the scenes. The account is based on interviews and pertinent documents in the author's possession. He also discussed the Biak-Numfur case in loc. cit, pp. 334–335.Google Scholar

38 “Resolusi” addressed to “Chairman of United Nations General Assembly, New York, U.S.A.,” dated Biak, 12 3, 1962.Google Scholar

39 It appears that during the first few months of administration UNTEA did not hesitate to remind Indonesian officials of their oath of loyalty to UNTEA. The task became impossible, however, when Indonesian UNTEA officials did nothing before consultation with or instruction from the Indonesian Liaison Office in Kota Baru. Exclaimed one Indonesian official: “It is not easy to be both an UNTEA and an Indonesian official”.

40 Article XVIII deals with the arrangements granting the people of the territory “the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice”. Article XX stipulates that the “act of self-determination will be completed before the end of 1969”.

41 Dick, Sarwom, “Gerombolan pengatjau memukul siswa-siswa Sekolah Guru Atas di Hollandia/Kotabaru”, Document No. 2/1963, 01 22, 1963.Google Scholar

42 “Cargo cults” have been described as a native reaction to the destruction of the old way of life and a desire to share in the riches (the “cargo”) of the “Western” way of life. For an excellent account and political interpretation of the various cults, see Worsley, Peter, The Trumpet Shall Sound: a Study of “Cargo” Cults in Melanesia (London, 1957).Google Scholar

43 A brief account of the council and the 1961 elections is given by Paul W. van der, Veur in “West Irian: a New Era”, Asian Survey, 10 1962 (Vol. 2), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

44 Article XXIII states:

Vacancies in the representative councils caused by the departure of Netherlands nationals, or for other reasons, will be filled as appropriate consistent with existing legislation by elections, or by appointment by the UNTEA. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the appointment of new representatives.

Perhaps this article was somewhat unfair to Indonesia in light of the fact that Indonesia's first and only national elections took place in 1955 and its President has held his self-appointed position since 1945.

45 “Dewan Papua Dibuburkan”, Pengantara, May 4/11, 1963 (No. 18/19), PP.1, 4.Google Scholar

46 In late August 1963 this council passed a resolution which declared that as West Irian was an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia there was no need for any act of self-determination.

47 “Dewan Papua Dibuburkan”, op. cit., p. 4. It should be noted, however, that an elected member (Eliezer Jan Bonaij) had become the newly appointed Governor and that one odier elected member (Alex S. Onim) had been appointed to the council's executive committee.Google Scholar

48 Banner headings included: “UNTEA, UNTBA, UNTEA, tetggal melindung hak Papual” (UNTEA, UNTEA, UNTEA, hold firm to the protection of Papuan rights!); “Kami Rakjat Papua Tetap Mendjundjung Plebisit sebelum 1969” (The Papuan people continue to demand a plebiscite before 1969); “Tentu-Tentu-Tentu, Subandrio-Van Royen Akui Hak Papua!” (Surely Subandrio and Van Roijen acknowledge the rights of the Papuans!).

49 UNTEA, Department of Information, “International Interim”, p. 8.Google Scholar

50 UNTEA's director of internal affairs seems to twist the facts. The point is that this “anti-Indonesian party” would not have objected to West Irian being “handed over” if it was done in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the agreement.

51 “Agreement” by the “more responsible leaders” seems to understate the case. These leaders were told in no uncertain terms that if they proceeded with the demonstration the Pakistani contingent of the United Nations security force would be used if necessary.

52 Article XXII.

53 UNTEA, Department of Information, News Bulletin No. 18, p. 2.Google Scholar

54 The Secretary-General repeated this statement in his October report to the General Assembly (UN Document A/5578) regarding the implementation of the August 15 agreement. Several of the delegates in “taking note” of the report made statements in which they specifically referred to the “remaining parts” of the agreement. Mr. Adlai Stevenson of the United States, for example, declared: My Government looks forward to the implementation of the remaining part of the Agreement, particularly the exercise of self-determination by the people of the territory by the end of 1969 and the appointment by the Secretary-General of a United Nations Representative and appropriate staff to assist and participate in the arrangements for self-determination