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The Rwanda Tribunal: A presentation of some legal aspects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2010

Frederik Harhoff
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Extract

If we look back to the diverse origins of the laws of warfare, one basic question which seems to have occupied the early lawmakers was: why, in fact, should there be legal limitations to belligerent actions aimed at destroying a foreign foe? At first glance, any such constraints would appear to be contrary to the very purpose of warfare and thus of no value to those who were either forced to resist an armed attack or who themselves wished to wage war against an enemy.

Type
The Rwanda Tribunal: its role in the African context
Information
International Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997) , Volume 37 , Special Issue 321: International criminal jurisdiction and international humanitarian law: the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda , December 1997 , pp. 665 - 673
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 1997

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Footnotes

*

Frederik Harhoff, LL.M. and Dr. jur. (Copenhagen University), is Senior Legal Officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The views expressed in this article are personal.

References

1 From Sun Tzu, The art of war (5th century BC), through Hugo Grotius, De Jure Bellis ac Pads Libri Tres (1625), to Clausewitz, On war (1832).

2 See e.g. Brownlie, Ian, Principles of public international law, 4th ed., Oxford, 1990. p. 561 Google Scholar, and Verdross, Alfred, Völkerrecht, 5th ed., Vienna, 1964, p. 216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Ross, Alf, Lærebog i Folkeret, 6th ed., Copenhagen, 1984, p. 37.Google Scholar

4 Surprisingly, this formulation is derived directly from the UN Secretary General's Report preceding the creation of the ICTY, whose Statute, nevertheless, maintained the traditional definition of crimes against humanity as being linked to an armed conflict. See UN Doc. S/25704 of 3 May 1993, para. 48.

5 Emphasis added. See the Appeals Chamber's decision of 2 October 1995, para. 70, p. 37.

6 FAR: Forces Armées Rwandaises. the Rwandan Army.

7 RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army, the Tutsi-led army which came down from Uganda.

8 Compared to the ICTY, which seems more inclined to apply common law approaches, the ICTR Chambers have frequently included models and styling techniques from both legal systems.

9 See, e.g., the Decision of 6 March 1997 on the Request for reexamination of an order of the Tribunal rendered by Trial Chamber 1 in the case against Georges Rutaganda; the concluding part of the Decision of 17 April 1997 on the Probative Value of Witness Testimonies rendered by Trial Chamber 2 in the case against Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana; the Decision of 18 June 1997 on the Tribunal's jurisdiction rendered by Trial Chamber 2 in the case against Joseph Kanyabashi, para. 42.