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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2017
1 Although the international law literature normally refers to “non-State armed groups”, “armed opposition groups”, “armed groups” or “armed non-State actors” indistinctively, this book review will use the term “rebel groups”, as chosen by Jo. According to her, this term is used to highlight “the fact that these groups are fighting government forces inciting rebellion, and to remind us that they usually ‘rebel’ against a set of existing norms, potentially including international rules”. Compliant Rebels, p. 37.
2 Krieger, for instance, affirms that “[a]ctual decisions to obey a legal norm result from a complex mixture of diverse motivations. Power relations as well as historical, political, social and anthropological conditions determine these motivations so that compliance is context-dependent.” Krieger, Heike (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 4–5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Bangerter, Olivier, “Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 882, 2011, p. 357 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law – ICRC Expert Seminars, October 2003, pp. 20–21, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/improving_compliance_with_international_report_eng_2003.pdf (all internet references were accessed in August 2017); Heffes, Ezequiel and Kotlik, Marcos, “Special Agreements as a Means of Enhancing Compliance with IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts: An Inquiry into the Governing Legal Regime”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, No. 895/896, 2014, p. 1201 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Due to the potential vastness of the subject, Jo cleverly narrows her analysis to rebel groups active in civil conflicts between 1989 and 2009. This is deliberate, and reflects the increasing amount of conflicts in which rebel groups have played a role in the last few decades.
5 Compliant Rebels, pp. 4–5.
6 See, among others, H. Krieger, above note 2; Rondeau, Sophie, “Participation of Armed Groups in the Development of the Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 883, 2011 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sassòli, Marco, “Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law”, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O. Bangerter, above note 3, p. 357; Olivier Bangerter, “Internal Control: Codes of Conduct within Insurgent Armed Groups”, Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper No. 31, November 2012, pp. 4 ff., available at: www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP31-internal-control.pdf; Geneva Call, In Their Words: Perceptions of Armed non-State Actors on Humanitarian Action, 2016, available at: genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2016/09/WHS_Report_2016_web.pdf.
7 Compliant Rebels, p. 5.
8 See, for instance, the issue on “Generating Respect for the Law” of the International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, No. 895/896, 2014 Google Scholar; Arjona, Anna, Kasfir, Nelson and Mampilly, Zachariah (eds), Rebel Governance in Civil War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fortin, Katharine, The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mastodorimos, Konstantinos, Armed Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law: Foundations and Framework of Obligations, and Rules on Accountability, Routledge, London, 2016 Google Scholar. Also, in 2011 the International Review of the Red Cross published two standing issues on the role of armed groups in the international sphere: see International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, Nos 882 and 883, 2011 Google Scholar. For further literature, see Heffes, Ezequiel, “Armed Opposition Groups”, in Carty, Anthony (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in International Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016 Google Scholar.
9 Zakaria Daboné has also recently explored the role of rebel groups, but addresses this topic exclusively within the international law realm. See Daboné, Zakaria, Le droit international public relatif aux groupes armés non étatiques, Schulthess, Geneva, 2012 Google Scholar.
10 Compliant Rebels, p. 6
11 Ibid . Although the lack of participation in the creation of customary international law is not particularly explored in the book, Jo refers later to the benefits of including rebel groups in the drafting of rules and laws. According to her, “[f]rom the rebel perspective, an opportunity to participate in this drafting process may serve as a powerful incentive and rationale to change behavior. The basic idea is that rights and obligations under the law must be balanced: if armed groups are to be subjected to certain obligations and responsibilities under international humanitarian law, then they should have rights to participate in law-making too.” Ibid., p. 256.
12 Ibid ., p. 13.
13 Ibid ., p. 19.
14 Ibid ., p. 27.
15 Ibid ., p. 36.
16 Ibid ., p. 48.
17 Ibid ., p. 46.
18 For an analysis of the participation of non-State armed groups in the conclusion of special agreements, see E. Heffes and M. Kotlik, above note 3.
19 For instance, in an excellent contribution, before discussing whether non-State armed groups are subject to direct international obligations, Daragh Murray has thoroughly explored whether they can possess international legal personality to be bound by these rules. Murray, Daragh, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, OR, 2016, pp. 23–81 Google Scholar.
20 Compliant Rebels, p. 39. There, Jo affirms that “[a] rebel group's organizational structure will have implications for behavior regarding human rights in rebel groups. Depending on its level of authority, rebel leadership can order and incite rebel soldiers to commit violations of the laws of war.” For a similar approach, see ibid., p. 45.
21 Ibid ., pp. 46–47.
22 Ibid ., pp. 64–65.
23 Ibid ., p. 70.
24 Ibid ., p. 93.
25 Ibid .
26 Jan Willms, “Courts of Armed Groups – a Tool for Inducing Higher Compliance with International Humanitarian Law?”, in H. Krieger, above note 2, p. 150. For a practical approach to the provision of education by non-State armed groups, see PEIC/Geneva Call, Workshop on Education and Armed Non-State Actors: Towards a Comprehensive Agenda, 2015, available at: www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2015/12/Geneva_Call_Paper1.pdf.
27 Compliant Rebels, pp. 110–111.
28 Ibid ., p. 24.
29 Ibid ., pp. 83 ff. When building her database, it shall be noted that Jo takes different sources into account. For instance, as explained by her, “Their Words”, the database of Geneva Call that compiles the commitments made by rebels, “was essential in the analysis of rebel commitment to international law”, see p. 279.
30 Jo also acknowledges the possible lack of information related to some specific issues, such as detention access. As she recognizes, “[s]everal difficulties complicate accurate observation and measurement of detainee treatment. Some rebel groups rarely detain, opting instead to kill or conduct hit-and-run operations; others detain, but do so in remote places.” Ibid., p. 188.
31 Ibid ., p. 238.