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Encountering perceptions in parts of the Muslim world and their impact on the ICRC's ability to be effective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2010

Andreas Wigger
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Abstract

The growing and intensified manifestations of religion in politics and vice versa are part of the environment of ICRC operations in Muslim countries and mark especially the interaction with Islamists. Different perceptions held by Muslims are examined, problem areas regarding interaction with the ICRC are analysed and aspects are mentioned which, in the opinion of the author, can help the ICRC improve its activities in Muslim countries. The conclusions of the examination could be relevant in any relationship with conservative movements within other religions.

Type
Religion
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 87 , Issue 858: Religion , June 2005 , pp. 343 - 365
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2005

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References

1 Jihadi is used in this article to denote any individual or group that has declared a jihad, i.e. war, on occupiers of Muslim land, Muslim or non-Muslim rulers, or any unbelievers. The declared war may comply with the strict criteria of Islamic law or it may be an individual interpretation of that law.

2 For descriptions of the humanitarian situation around the world, together with planned ICRC operations, see Emergency Appeals 2005, ICRC, Geneva, December 2004Google Scholar.

3 For a definition of Islamism, see for example E.G. Fuller, “Islamists in the Arab world: The dance around democracy,” Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2004, Number 49, p. 3: “An Islamist is anyone who believes that the Koran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet's life, actions, and words) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement these principles in some way.” In accordance with this proposed definition, in the present article the terms “Islamist” or “Muslim activist” are used to mean a broad range of individuals, groups and parties, be they radical or moderate, violent or not, traditional or modern, democratic or undemocratic.

4 See Humanitarian Engagement with Armed Groups: The Central Asian Islamic Opposition Movements, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 2003Google Scholar.

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6 Ibid., p. 62.

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10 See ter Haar, Gerrie, “Religion: Source of conflict or resource for peace”, in ter Haar, Gerrie and Busuttil, James J. (eds), Bridge or Barrier: Religion, Violence and Visions for Peace, Brill, Leiden, 2005, p. 7Google Scholar.

11 Tibi, Bassam, Die Krise des modernen Islam: Eine vorindustrielle Kultur im wissenschaftlich-technischen Zeitalter, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, p. 28Google Scholar.

12 William Shepard, op. cit. (note 5), p. 86.

13 E.G. Fuller, op. cit. (note 3), p. 3.

14 See Küng, Hans, Der Islam: Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft, Piper Verlag, Munich, 2004, p. 768Google Scholar.

15 The Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb put it thus: “Behind the materialistic thinking that dominates the West, reduces ethics to utility and urges cut-throat competition for markets and profits, behind this thinking which banishes the spiritual factor from life and banishes faith in anything but scientific experiments and laboratories, which disdains pure ideals and defines things only in terms of functions, as does the philosophy of pragmatism, behind this thinking there is only Marxist materialism in a different form.” See Shepard, William E., Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam. Brill, Leiden, 1996, p. 349Google Scholar.

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18 Jacques Waardenburg, op. cit. (note 16), p. 282.

19 See for instance Pew Global Attitudes Project, A Year after Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists. A Nine-Country Survey, Washington, March 2004.

20 Ummah: “Muslim community. A fundamental concept in Islam, expressing the essential unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings. In the Quran, designates people to whom God has sent a prophet or people who are objects of a divine plan of salvation.” See Esposito, op. cit. (note 17), p. 327.

21 Center for Strategic Studies, Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from Within, University of Jordan, Amman, February 2005Google Scholar.

22 Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

23 Ijtihad is an Islamic legal term meaning ‘independent reasoning’ and it is one of four sources of Sunni law. Utilized where the Quran and Sunnah are silent it requires a thorough knowledge of theology. It should be practiced by means of analogical or syllogistic reasoning. Its results may not contradict the Quran, and it may not be used in cases where consensus (ijma) has been reached. Sunnis believe Ijtihad is fallible since more than one interpretation of a legal issue is possible. Islamic reformers call for a revitalization of Ijtihad in the modern world. See Esposito, op. cit. (note 17), p. 134.

24 Pew Global Attitudes Project, A Year after Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists. A Nine-Country Survey, Washington, March 2004Google Scholar.

25 See e.g. the results of the Pew Report, in which the majority of respondents in Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey were of the opinion that the real reason for the war on terror was American interest in the region's oil. Ibid., p. 18.

26 Ter Haar, op. cit. (note 10), p. 5.

27 Huntington, Samuel P., “The clash of civilisations?”, Foreign Affairs 72, 1993, No. 3, pp. 22–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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29 Ter Haar, op. cit. (note 10), p. 8.

30 Slim, Hugo, “Violent beliefs,” RUSI Journal, April 2005, pp. 20–23Google Scholar.

31 Understanding Islamism: Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, International Crisis Group (ICG), March 2005, pp. 1–3.

32 See the very detailed discussion by Ameur Zemali in his book Combattants et prisonniers de guerre en droit Islamique et en droit international humanitaire, Éditions A. Pedone, Paris, 1997, pp. 43–58Google Scholar.

33 Bassam Tibi, op. cit. (note 8), p. 19.

34 Würth, Anna, Dialog mit dem Islam als Konfliktprävention? Zur Menschenrechtspolitik gegenüber islamisch geprägten Staaten, Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, Berlin, 2003, p. 9Google Scholar.

35 Ibid., pp. 21 and 22.

36 See Mériboute, Zidane, La fracture islamique: demain, le soufisme?, Fayard, Paris, 2004, p. 12Google Scholar. Mériboute speaks of a breakdown in communication between western and Muslim civilizations and paints a bleak picture of the future if the two camps persist in their ignorance and rejection of each other.

37 The International Crisis Group proposes a definition of Islamism as broad as that put forward by Graham E. Fuller above (note 3). It appears to me equally valid: “Islamism is defined … as synonymous with “Islamic activism”, the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.” See Understanding Islamism, op. cit. (note 31), p.1.

38 Certain points can, however, be extrapolated to the Muslim communities of the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan, central Asia, Iran and parts of East and West Africa.

39 As regards the Arab world, see the detailed UNDP study, Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations.

40 Understanding Islamism, op. cit (note 31), p. 3.

41 Between 80% and 90% of Muslims worldwide are Sunni. The majority of remaining Muslims are Shiite.

42 International humanitarian law is one sphere in which academics point out the superiority of the Islamic system and the fact that it pre-dates European progress in this field. Without questioning the universality of existing international humanitarian law, they see it as European humanitarian law. They emphasize that Muslim international law (siyar) is free of the shortcomings that afflict European international humanitarian law, has existed for longer and actually forms the basis of international humanitarian law. They do not question the compatibility of the two bodies of law. Rather, they point out that the West could certainly learn from Islam in this respect and that in Muslim countries Islamic law should also — and indeed primarily — be the reference. For a good example, see the introduction by Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi in Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al -Shaybani, The Shorter Book on Muslim International Law, edited, translated and annotated by Dr Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, Islamabad, 1998, pp. 1–39.

43 Charity in Islam is mainly ruled by Zakah, the “required almsgiving that is one of the five pillars of Islam…Zakah is used for the needy, for propagation of the faith, to free slaves, to relieve debtors, to help travelers…” See Esposito, op. cit. (note 17), p. 345.

44 See Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, “Helping the ‘brothers’, the medic, the militant and the fighter”, in Benthall, Jonathan and Bellion-Jourdan, Jérôme, The Charitable Crescent, I.B Tauris, New York, 2003, pp. 69–84Google Scholar.

45 In his pamphlet published in Peshawar in the 1980s, Abdallah Azzam described humanitarians as mubashirun, or missionaries. Ibid., p. 74.

46 Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, Humanitarianism, Islam and the West: Contest or Cooperation?, article on the website of the HPN Humanitarian Practice Network <www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2582> (visited on 10 March 2005).

47 Ghandour, Abdel-Rahman, Jihad humanitaire. Enquête sur les ONG islamiques., Flammarion, Paris, 2002, pp. 318–341Google Scholar.

48 For an up-to-date assessment of al Qaeda, see Adam Ward (ed.), James Hackett (assistant ed.), “Combating transnational terrorism,” IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 10, Issue 10, December 2004 <www.iiss.org/stratcom> (visited on 10 March 2005).

49 “Salafi is derived from salaf, ‘pious ancestors.’ The name was given to a reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh at the turn of the twentieth century. Emphasized restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Quran and Sunnah, rejection of the authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah.” See Esposito, op. cit. (note 22), p. 275.

50 See Lewis, Bernard, “License to kill: Usama bin Ladin's declaration of jihad”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, p. 14 ffGoogle Scholar.

51 Takfir: “Pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and no longer Muslim. Takfir is used in the modern era for sanctioning violence against leaders of Islamic states who are deemed insufficiently religious. Mainstream Muslims and Islamist groups reject the concept as a doctrinal deviation.” See Esposito, op. cit. (note 17), p. 312.

52 Olivier Roy, L'Islam mondialisé, Editions du Seuil, Paris, September 2002, pp. 34 and 35.

53 See Understanding Islamism, op. cit. (note 31), p. 14.

54 See People on War: Country Report Somalia. ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War, a report compiled for the International Committee of the Red Cross, Greenberg Research, Inc., Geneva, October 1999, p. 24Google Scholar.

55 Boisard, Marcel A., Guide pratique à l'intention des collaborateurs du CICR en terres d'Islam, Geneva, 1989Google Scholar.

56 Ibid., pp. 192 and 193.

57 See Krähenbühl, Pierre, “The ICRC's approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, September 2004, pp. 505–514CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 See the short article by Nusrat, Hadia, “Humanitarian law and Islam”, Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, No. 1, 2005, pp. 24 and 25Google Scholar.

59 See Pfanner, Toni, Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857, March 2005, pp. 149–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60 Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action. Programmes and Practices Gathered from the Field, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Geneva 2002, pp. 63–73Google Scholar.

61 See the excellent discussion of relations between Islam and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in Cockayne, James, “Islam and international humanitarian law: From a clash to a conversation between civilizations”, International Review of the Réd Cross, No. 847, September 2002, pp. 597–625CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 See Bugnion, François, “Towards a comprehensive solution to the question of the emblem,” International Review of the Red Cross, No. 838, June 2000, pp. 427–478Google Scholar. A revised third edition of this article has been published by the ICRC.