Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-11T01:48:33.056Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2010

Jean-Marie Henckaerts
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article explains the rationale behind a study on customary international humanitarian law recently undertaken by the ICRC at the request of the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. It describes the methodology used and how the study was organized and summarizes some major findings. It does not, however, purport to provide a complete overview or analysis of these findings.

Type
Selected articles on international humanitarian law
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 87 , Issue 857: Detention , March 2005 , pp. 175 - 212
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 30 August-1 September 1993, Final Declaration, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 296, 1993, p. 381.

2 Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 23–27 January 1995, Recommendation II, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 310, 1996, p. 84.

3 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 3–7 December 1995, Resolution 1, International humanitarian law: From law to action; Report on the follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of Wrar Victims, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 310, 1996, p. 58.

4 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 volumes, Volume I. Rules, Volume II. Practice (2 Parts), Cambridge University Press, 2005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(b).

6 International Court of Justice, Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 29–30, § 27.

7 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgment, 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3.

8 The importance of these conditions was stressed by the International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 254–255, §§ 70–73.

9 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(d).

10 The expression “dense” in this context comes from Sir Waldock, Humphrey, “General Course on Public International Law”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 106, 1962, p. 44.Google Scholar

11 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, op. cit. (note 7), p. 43, § 74.

12 See International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 98, § 186.

13 International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London, 2000, Principle 14, p. 734 (hereinafter “ILA Report”).

14 Ibid., commentary (d) and (e) to Principle 14, pp. 736–737.

15 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, op. cit. (note 7), p, 43, § 74.

16 ILA Report, op. cit. (note 13), commentary (e) to Principle 14, p. 737.

17 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit. (note 4), Vol. I, commentary to Rule 144.

18 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Mendelson, Maurice H., “The Formation of Customary International Law”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 272, 1998, pp. 227–244Google Scholar.

19 ILA Report, op. cit. (note 13), commentary (b) to Principle 15, p. 738.

20 Ibid., commentary (b) to Principle 12, p. 731.

21 Ibid., p. 718, § 10(c). For an in-depth analysis of this question, see Haggenmacher, Peter, “La doctrine des deux éléments du droit coutumier dans la pratique de la Cour internationale”, Revue générate de droit international public, Vol. 90, 1986, p. 5.Google Scholar

22 See, e.g., Permanent Court of International Justice, Lotus case (France v. Turkey), Judgment, 7 September 1927, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10, p. 28 (the Court found that States had not abstained from prosecuting wrongful acts aboard ships because they felt prohibited from doing so); International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, op. cit. (note 7), pp. 43–44, §§ 76–77 (the Court found that States that had delimited their continental shelf on the basis of the equidistance principle had not done so because they felt obliged to); ILA Report, op. cit. (note 13), Principle 17(iv) and commentary.

23 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, op. cit. (note 7), p. 42, § 73.

24 International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, op. cit. (note 12), pp. 99–100, § 188. Another important factor in the decision of the Court was that relevant UN General Assembly resolutions had been widely approved, in particular Resolution 2625 (XXV) on friendly relations between States, which was adopted without a vote.

25 International Court of Justice, Continental Shelf case, op. cit. (note 6), p. 33, § 34. (The Court considered that the concept of an exclusive economic zone had become part of customary international law, even though the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea had not yet entered into force, because the number of claims to an exclusive economic zone had risen to 56, which included several specially affected States.)

26 International Court of Justice, Continental Shelf case, op. cit. (note 6), pp. 29–30, § 27.

27 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, op. cit. (note 7), p. 42, § 73; see also ILA Report, op. cit. (note 13), Principles 20–21, 24, 26 and 27, pp. 754–765.

28 The Steering Committee consisted of Professors Georges Abi-Saab, Salah El-Din Amer, Ove Bring, Eric David, John Dugard, Florentino Feliciano, Horst Fischer, Françoise Hampson, Theodor Meron, Djamchid Momtaz, Milan Sahovic and Raul Emilio Vinuesa.

29 Africa: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Zimbabwe; Americas: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, United States of America and Uruguay; Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Syria; Australasia: Australia; Europe: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

30 Principle of distinction: Professor Georges Abi-Saab (rapporteur) and Jean-François Quéguiner (researcher); Specifically protected persons and objects: Professor Horst Fischer (rapporteur) and Gregor Schotten and Heike Spieker (researchers); Specific methods of warfare: Professor Theodor Meron (rapporteur) and Richard Desgagne (researcher); Weapons: Professor Ove Bring (rapporteur) and Gustaf Lind (researcher); Treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat: Françoise Hampson (rapporteur) and Camille Giffard (researcher); Implementation: Eric David (rapporteur) and Richard Desgagne (researcher).

31 Africa: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Chad-Libya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea-Yemen, Ethiopia (1973–1994), Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria-Cameroon, Rwanda, Senegal, Senegal-Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Somalia-Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Western Sahara; Americas: Guatemala and Mexico; Asia: Afghanistan, Cambodia, India (Jammu and Kashmir), Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Yemen and Yemen-Eritrea (also under Africa); Europe: Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Cyprus, Former Yugoslavia (conflict in Yugoslavia (1991–1992), conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1996), conflict in Croatia (Krajinas) (1992–1995)), Georgia (Abkhazia), Russian Federation (Chechnya) and Turkey.

32 The following academic and governmental experts participated in their personal capacity in this consultation: Abdallah Ad-Douri (Iraq), Paul Berman (United Kingdom), Sadi Clayey (Turkey), Michael Cowling (South Africa), Edward Cummings (United States of America), Antonio de Icaza (Mexico), Yoram Dinstein (Israel), Jean-Michel Favre (France), William Fenrick (Canada), Dieter Fleck (Germany), Juan Carlos Gómez Ramirez (Colombia), Jamshed A. Hamid (Pakistan), Arturo Hernandez-Basave (Mexico), Ibrahim Idriss (Ethiopia), Hassan Kassem Jouni (Lebanon), Kenneth Keith (New Zealand), Githu Muigai (Kenya), Rein Müllerson (Estonia), Bara Niang (Senegal), Mohamed Olwan (Jordan), Raul C. Pangalangan (Philippines), Stelios Perrakis (Greece), Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Brazil), Arpád Prandler (Hungary), Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao (India), Camilo Reyes Rodriguez (Colombia), Use E. Sagay (Nigeria), Harold Sandoval (Colombia), Somboon Sangianbut (Thailand), Marat A. Sarsembayev (Kazakhstan), Muhammad Aziz Shukri (Syria), Parlaungan Sihombing (Indonesia), Geoffrey James Skillen (Australia), Guoshun Sun (China), Bakhtyar Tuzmukhamedov (Russia) and Karol Wolfke (Poland).

33 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit. (note 8), pp. 257–258, §§ 79 and 82 (with respect to the Geneva Conventions) and Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, op. cit. (note 12), p. 114, § 218 (with respect to common Article 3).

34 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit. (note 4), Vol. I, Rules 1 and 7.

35 Ibid., Rules 11–13.

36 Ibid., Rule 14.

37 Ibid., Rules 15–24.

38 Ibid., Rules 25 and 27–30.

39 Ibid., Rules 31–32.

40 Ibid., Rule 34.

41 Ibid., Rule 26.

42 Ibid., Rules 36–37.

43 Ibid., Rules 46–48.

44 Ibid., Rule 53.

45 Ibid., Rule 54.

46 Ibid., Rules 57–65.

47 Ibid., Rules 87–105.

48 Ibid., Rule 117.

49 Ibid., Rules 134–137.

50 Ibid., Rule 1.

51 Ibid., Rules 25 and 27–30.

52 Ibid., Rule 26.

53 Ibid., Rule 53.

54 Ibid., Rule 54.

55 Ibid., Rules 87–105.

56 Ibid., Rules 109–111.

57 Ibid., Rules 112–113.

58 Ibid., Rules 118–119, 121 and 125.

59 Ibid., Rule 129.

60 Ibid., Rules 134–137.

61 See, e.g., Ibid., Rules 7–10 (distinction between civilian objects and military objectives), Rules 11–13 (indiscriminate attacks), Rule 14 (proportionality in attack), Rules 15–21 (precautions in attack); Rules 22–24 (precautions against the effects of attack); Rules 31–32 (humanitarian relief personnel and objects); Rule 34 (civilian journalists); Rules 35–37 (protected zones); Rules 46–48 (denial of quarter); Rules 55–56 (access to humanitarian relief) and Rules 57–65 (deception).

62 See Additional Protocol I, Article 70(1) and Additional Protocol II, Article 18(2).

63 See Sandoz, Yves, Swinarski, Christophe, Zimmermann, Bruno (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987Google Scholar, § 4885; see also § 2805.

64 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit. (note 4), Vol. I, Rule 3 (combatants), Rule 4 (armed forces) and Rule 5 (civilians and civilian population).

65 Additional Protocol II, Articles 13–15 and 17–18.

66 See, e.g., Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Article 3(7)–(11); Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Article 2; Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines, preamble; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2)(e)(i), (iii) and (viii).

67 See, e.g., Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, Report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, September 2003, available on www.icrc.org.

68 Additional Protocol I, Article 56(1) (followed, however, by exceptions in paragraph 2) and Additional Protocol II, Article 15 (with no exceptions).

69 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit. (note 4), Vol. I, Rule 45.

70 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit. (note 8), § 30.

71 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit. (note 4), Vol. I, Rule 44.

72 Ibid., Rule 33.

73 See, e.g., International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Case of the Major War Criminals, Judgment, 1 October 1946, Official Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 253–254.

74 See Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court, Pillage as a war crime (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court).

75 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit. (note 4), Vol. I, Rules 67–69.

76 This rule incorporates a reference to a number of other rules of customary international law, namely the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons; the prohibition of attacks against vegetation that is not a military objective; the prohibition of attacks that would cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which may be expected to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and the prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. See Ibid., Rule 76.

77 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit. (note 8), p. 226.

78 Ibid.; see also United Nations General Assembly, 51st session, First Committee, Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, UN Doc. A/C.1/51/PV.8,18 October 1996, p. 10, reproduced in International Review of the Red Cross, No. 316, 1997, pp. 118–119 (“the ICRC finds it difficult to envisage how a use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of international law”).

79 These rules include the fundamental guarantees that civilians and persons hors de combat be treated humanely and without adverse distinction; the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; the prohibition of corporal punishment; the prohibition of mutilation, medical or scientific experiments; the prohibition of rape and other forms of sexual violence; the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; the prohibition of hostage-taking; the prohibition of the use of human shields; fair trial guarantees; the prohibition of collective punishments; and the requirement to respect the convictions and religious practices of civilians and persons hors de combat. See Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 4, Vol. 1, Rules 87–94, 96–97 and 100–104.

80 Ibid., Rules 95, 98–99 and 105.

81 See Ibid., Introduction to Chapter 32, Fundamental Guarantees.

82 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, § 106.

83 Additional Protocol II, Article 1(1).