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Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 April 2010
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- Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2000
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1 For an elaboration of the concept of international public policy, see Gowlland-Debbas, V., “The right to life and genocide: the Court and an international public policy”, de Chazournes, L. Boisson/Sands, P. (eds.), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 317Google Scholar. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports, 1996, p. 556 ff.
2 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
3 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), and Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), both of 8 June 1977.
4 See Condorelli, L./de Chazournes, L. Boisson, “Quelques remarques à propos de l'obligation des États de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’”, Swinarski, C. (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva/The Hague, 1984, p. 18Google Scholar. Written at a time when Article 1 was seen rather as a sort of stylistic clause devoid of real legal weight, this article attempted, through study of early developments in international practice and following a prospective logic, to bring to light the various implications and effects of the duty to “respect and ensure respect”. Fifteen years later, the present work re-examines this question, placing emphasis on aspects consonant with contemporary issues.
5 Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), Commentary, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p. 21Google Scholar.
6 As for case law, see in particular the in terminis precedent, infra, notes 9 and 23.
7 This is in contrast to the obligation arising under the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907). On the difference between the obligation discussed here and the one provided for in the 1907 Hague Convention, see op. cit. (note 4), p. 18.
8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports, 1996, para. 79.
9 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 220. This idea (already anticipated in Condorelli/Boisson de Chazournes, loc. cit. (note 4), pp. 20–22) led the Court to decide that a State commits an internationally wrongful act in breach of common Article 1 if it induces a party to a non-international armed conflict to act in a manner contrary to the humanitarian principles embodied in common Article 3.
10 See Roberts, A., “Implementation of the laws of war in late 20th century conflicts”, Part I, Security Dialogue (SAGE Publications, Oslo), vol. 29, no. 2, June 1998, p. 142Google Scholar.
11 See, e.g., Resolution 1 of the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Geneva, 1999), with annexed declaration “The power of humanity” and “Plan of action for the years 2000–2003”, in IRRC, No. 836, December 1999, pp. 878–895, or website: http://www.redcross.alertnet.org/en/conference/proceedings.asp.
12 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, The Hague, 15 July 1999, Case No. IT-94–1 See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) – Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 1, and Order of 13 September 1993, p. 325. On these, de Chazournes, L. Boisson, “Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans l'affaire relative à l'application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. XXXIX (1993), pp. 514–539.Google Scholar — In the human rights area see Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 8007/77, European Commission of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports 13 (1977), p. 85Google Scholar; Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995, Yearbook of the European Court of Human Rights, 38 (1995), p. 245. More generally see Condorelli, L., “L'imputation à l'État d'un fait internationalement illicite: solutions classiques et nouvelles tendances”, Recueil des cours de l'Académie de La Haye, tome 189 (1984-VI), pp. 9–222, esp. pp. 86–92Google Scholar.
13 Loc. cit. (note 9), paras 109 and 115–116.
14 See Condorelli, L., “Le statut des forces de l'ONU et le droit international humanitaire”, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, Anno 78, fasc. 4, 1995, pp. 881–906.Google Scholar Also sharing this view is Shraga, D., “The United Nations as an actor bound by international humanitarian law”, in Condorelli, L./La Rosa, A.-M./Scherrer, S. (eds.), Les Nations Unies et le droit humanitaire/The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, Éditions Pedone, Paris, 1996, p. 330 ffGoogle Scholar.
16 See Condorelli, op. cit. (note 14); also, by the same author, “Conclusions generates”, in Condorelli/La Rosa/Scherrer, op. cit. (note 14), pp. 445–474.
17 UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999; also available on the UN website (under “Peace and Security” heading): http://www.un.org/peace/st_sgb_1999_13.pdf. See Ryniker, Anne, “Respect du droit international humanitaire par les forces armées des Nations Unies”, IRRC, No. 836, December 1999, pp. 795–805Google Scholar, with text of the said UN document appended (in French and English).
18 See Articles 49, 50, 129, 146 common to the Geneva Conventions, and Article 85 of Additional Protocol I.
19 See La Rosa, A.-M., “Forces multinationales et instances pénales internationales: obligation de coopération sous l'angle de l'arrestation”, Ascensio, H./Décaux, E./Pellet, A. (eds.), Droit international pénal, Éditions Pedone, Paris (to be published shortly)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 A point already illustrated by Condorelli/Boisson de Chazoumes in op. cit. (note 4).
21 Loc. cit. (note 8), para. 79.
22 L. Condorelli, “Le droit international humanitaire, ou l'exploration par la Cour d'une terra à peu près incognita pour elle”, in L. Boisson de Chazournes/P. Sands, op. cit. (note 1), p. 234 ff. Also worthy of note is the fact that even when in “… an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which its survival is at stake”, a State could not justifiably transgress those fundamental humanitarian principles. The dubious formulation of the final part of the 1996 Advisory Opinion entitled Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons should not be given a contrary interpretation, Ibid., p. 239 ff.
23 The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and others, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, The Hague, 14 January 2000, Case No. IT-95–16-T, para. 517.
24 Ibid., para. 519.
25 See Condorelli, L., “L'inchiesta ed il rispetto degli obblighi di diritto internazionale umanitario”, Scritti degli allievi in memoria di Giuseppe Barile, Padova, CEDAM, 1995, pp. 225–308Google Scholar.
26 Op. cit. (note 4), p. 27 ff.
27 With regard to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Condorelli, L./Petrovic, D., “L'ONU et la crise yougoslave”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. XXXVIII, 1992, pp. 31–60Google Scholar.
28 See É. David, “Méthodes et formes de participation des Nations Unies à l'élaboration du droit international humanitaire”, pp. 87–113, and L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Les résolutions des organes des Nations Unies, et en particulier celles du Conseil de sécurité, en tant que source de droit international humanitaire”, Condorelli/La Rosa/Scherrer, op. cit. (note 14), pp. 149–173.
29 Article 89 of Protocol I reads as follows: “In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter.”
30 de Chazournes, L. Boisson, “The collective responsibility of States to ensure respect for humanitarian principles”, in Bloed, A. et al. (ed.), Monitoring Human Rights in Europe, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1993, pp. 247–260.Google Scholar
31 e.g., ONUSAL in El Salvador, UN Doc. S/RES/693 of 1991.
32 e.g., UNTAC in Cambodia, UN Doc. S/RES/745 of 1992.
33 Established by Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, with amendments to the Statute in Resolution S/RES/1166 (1998) of 13 May 1998.
34 Established by Security Council Resolution S/RES/955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, with amendments to the statute in Resolution S/RES/1165 (1998) of 30 April 1998.
35 In Resolution S/RES/681 (1990) of 20 December 1990, the Security Council, “gravely concerned at the dangerous deterioration of the situation of all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and at the violence and rising tension in Israel …, called upon:
5. the High Contracting Parties to the said Convention to ensure respect by Israel, the Occupying Power, for its obligations under the Convention in accordance with article 1 thereof; and requested:
6. the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to develop further the idea, expressed in this report, of convening a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the said Convention to discuss possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention and, for the purpose, to invite the Parties to submit their views on how the idea could contribute to the goals of the Convention, as well as on relevant matters, and report thereon to the Council.”
36 Loc. cit. (note 11).
37 For a thoughtful examination of this practice, see Österdahl, I., Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter, lustus Förlag (Juridiska Föreningen i Uppsala), Uppsala, 1998Google Scholar.
38 See, e.g., Security Council Resolutions 941 (1994) of 23 September 1994, 1019 (1995) of 9 November 1995, or 1034 (1995) of 21 December 1995.
39 See, e.g., Security Council Resolutions 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 17 November 1998, or 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999.
40 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.
41 Simma, B., “NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects”, European journal of International Law, vol. 10, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 Cassese, A., “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian counter-measures in the world community”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 10, no. 1, 1999, pp. 23–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of War, Preliminary Report for the Centennial Commemoration of the First Hague Peace Conference 1899, available at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website: http://www.minbuza.nl/English/sumconferences.html.
43 See in particular Bettati, M./Kouchner, B. (eds.), Le devoir d'ingérence, Denoël, Paris, 1987Google Scholar. For a critical appraisal of the notion, see Corten, O./Klein, P., Droit d'ingérence ou obligation de réaction?, 2nd ed., Bruylant/Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1996.Google Scholar
44 UN Doc. S/RES/688 of 5 April 1991. For a political and legal interpretation of Resolution 688, see Malanczuk, P., “The Kurdish crisis and allied intervention in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 2, no. 2, 1991, pp. 114–132CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
45 Nicaragua v. USA, loc. cit. (note 9), para. 243.
46 With regard to these principles, attention is drawn to the measures decided by the European Union in autumn 1999 to deliver fuel to the municipalities headed by political coalitions opposed to Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia.
47 UN Doc. S/1999/957, of 8 September 1999.
48 UN Doc. S/PRST/1999/6, of 12 February 1999.
49 Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999), of 17 September 1999.
50 This formula was used by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 9 April 1949. On humanitarian principles as equivalent to these “elementary considerations of humanity”, see Dupuy, P.-M., “Les ‘considérations élémentaires d'humanité’ dans la jurisprudence de la Cour international de Justice”, Dupuy, R.-J. (ed.), Droit et justice — Mélanges en l'honneur de Nicolas Valticos, Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 1999, p. 117Google Scholar.
51 According to this provision, in cases not covered by the Conventions, the Protocol or other international agreements, or in the case of denunciation of these agreements, “civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”– Protocol I, Art. 1; see also the Geneva Conventions I (Art. 63), II (Art. 62), III (Art. 142), and IV (Art. 158).
52 This remark was made during the open debate convened on 16 September 1999 by the Security Council to discuss issues concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. UN Doc. S/PV.4046 (summary), 17 September 1999.
53 See the proposals made by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. S/1999/957, of 8 September 1999.
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