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Economic dimensions of armed groups: profiling the financing, costs, and agendas and their implications for mediated engagements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2011

Achim Wennmann
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Abstract

This article introduces the various economic dimensions of armed groups and explores the implications of their engagement through mediation and dialogue. It looks specifically at the financing, operational costs, and economic agendas of armed groups and brings together examples from Angola, Kosovo, Sudan, Colombia, and other places. It emphasizes that information about available financing and operational costs is critical for assessing the financial and operational strength of an armed group. It also highlights the need to understand armed groups in the broader context of their evolution and the changes that organizational and territorial expansions require with regards to financing strategies. Overall, the economic dimensions of armed groups should be approached with an open mind so that issues such as financing, costs, and economic agendas can be perceived as opportunities, and not necessarily as a problem for peace.

Type
Todays Armed Groups: Structure, Actions and Strategic Options
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 93 , Issue 882: Understanding armed groups and the applicable law , June 2011 , pp. 333 - 352
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2011

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References

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26 The estimation tool is fully developed in Achim Wennmann ‘Grasping the financing and mobilization cost of armed groups: a new perspective on conflict dynamics’, in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2009, pp. 265–280.

27 The differences in these cost estimates are based on the use of different price ranges. Weapons prices range between USD 40 and USD 250, ammunition prices between USD 0.05 and USD 0.5, and income per soldier between USD 2,000 and USD 10,000 per year. See ibid., pp. 267–271.

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57 The following paragraphs have been inspired by a conversation with Thomas Biersteker and joint work on countering the financing of terrorism.

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