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International humanitarian law's old questions and new perspectives: On what law has got to do with armed conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2017

Thomas Forster
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Abstract

The question of whether international humanitarian law (IHL) has an impact on how armed conflicts are conducted is a controversial one. Sceptics claim that the law is virtually irrelevant in determining State behaviour in armed conflict. Proponents point to its importance in mitigating the suffering caused by war. This paper looks at recent scholarship from historians, political scientists, economists and lawyers that challenges traditional narratives held dear by the law's sceptics and proponents alike. It then discusses implications of these approaches for a current understanding of the role of IHL in today's armed conflicts. The new perspectives allow for a broader understanding of IHL's central issues and permit us to ask more pertinent questions when looking at the law with the aim of putting it to use for the protection of civilians.

Keywords

international humanitarian lawarmed conflictcomplianceempirical studiesgame theorycritical approaches
Type
Selected articles in IHL and humanitarian action
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 98 , Issue 903: Detention: Addressing the human cost , December 2016 , pp. 995 - 1017
Copyright
Copyright © icrc 2017 

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References

1 If you tend to look dazed, you've read it someplace, you've got cause to be: given the number of articles in legal journals that have featured the “What's law got to do with it?” pun in one form or another, there is a strong chance for déjà vu. A book-length example can be found in Geyh, Charles Gardner (ed.), What's Law Got to Do with It? What Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What's at Stake, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2011 Google Scholar.

2 See Yves Sandoz, “The International Committee of the Red Cross as a Guardian of International Humanitarian Law”, December 1998, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm (all internet references were accessed in October 2017).

3 ICRC, “Rules of War (in a Nutshell)”, August 2014, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwpzzAefx9M. Comment posted in January 2016.

4 See, for example, the references given in Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul and Croco, Sarah, “Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War”, World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2006, p. 342 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Kinsella, Helen, The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2011, p. 198 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 See in this regard the fundamental points made by Hans-Peter Gasser, former Senior Legal Adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross, in “International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims”, November 1998, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jm93.htm.

7 This paragraph to a large extent paraphrases Benvenisti and Cohen's introduction in Benvenisti, Eyal and Cohen, Amichai, “War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of the Laws of War from a Principal-Agent Perspective”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 112, No. 8, 2014, p. 1365 Google Scholar.

8 Ibid ., p. 1366.

9 Posner, Eric, “Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity”, The Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2013, p. 152 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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12 J. Morrow, above note 10, p. 14.

13 As cited in Moorehead, Caroline, Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross, Carroll & Graf, New York, 1999, p. 47 Google Scholar.

14 E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1365.

15 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910).

16 H. Kinsella, above note 5, p. 112.

17 Lauterpacht, Hersch, “The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War”, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 29, 1952, pp. 363–364 Google Scholar.

18 A. Chilton, above note 11, p. 3.

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20 B. Valentino, P. Huth and S. Croco, above note 4.

21 Morrow, James, “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3, 2007 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 B. Valentino, P. Huth and S. Croco, above note 4, p. 340.

23 Ibid ., p. 368.

24 J. Morrow, above note 21, p. 570.

25 In this regard, empirical studies on armed conflict have paved the way. See, for example, Downes, Alexander, Targeting Civilians in War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2008 Google Scholar.

26 J. Morrow, above note 10, pp. 144–145.

27 The research undertaken for the updated ICRC study on “The Roots of Behaviour in War” gives a good example of such efforts; Francesco Gutierrez Sanin speaks of a “topology and typology” of compliance. See: www.icrc.org/en/event/roots-behaviour-war-revisited. For a broader view of empirical approaches to international law in general and IHL in particular, see Shaffer, Gregory and Ginsburg, Tom, “The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106, No. 1, 2012 Google Scholar.

28 J. Morrow, above note 10.

29 Ibid ., pp. 144–145.

30 Prorok, Alyssa and Appel, Benjamin, “Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Democratic Third Parties and Civilian Targeting in Interstate War”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2014 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Ibid ., p. 715.

32 See A. Chilton, above note 11, pp. 4–5; J. Morrow, above note 10, p. 272.

33 An exception in this regard is the work of Jo, Hyeran and Thompson, Catarina, “Legitimacy and Compliance with International Law: Access to Detainees in Civil Conflicts, 1991–2006”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2013 Google Scholar.

34 See A. Chilton, above note 11, p. 5; J. Morrow, above note 10, pp. 248, 251. Efforts to increase the precision of IHL and achieve a more specific prohibition against civilian targeting only took off in the second half of the twentieth century. Regarding the absence of specific rules in respect to the targeting of civilians, see, for example, Grayling, Anthony, Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity or a Crime?, Bloomsbury, London, 2006, pp. 221 ffGoogle Scholar.

35 A. Chilton, above note 11, p. 4.

36 The study by Valentino, Huth and Croco, above note 4, operates under the assumption that the rules of IHL regarding the targeting of civilians have been clearly set out and straightforward to apply since 1907. How to unambiguously identify to a legal standard applicable at the time of the events the exact number of civilians intentionally targeted seems more difficult than the authors suggest, to say the very least.

37 A. Chilton, above note 11, p. 5.

38 See, in this regard, Dickinson, Laura, “Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, No. 1, 2010 Google Scholar, with further references on p. 2.

39 Ibid., p. 1. In this regard, see also Downes’ results, suggesting that democracies are not likelier to comply with regard to targeting civilians: A. Downes, above note 25, pp. 246, 257.

40 A. Chilton, above note 11, p. 19. See also Bell, Andrew, “Leashing the ‘Dogs of War’: Examining the Effects of LOAC Training at the U.S. Military Academy and in Army ROTC”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 108, 2014 Google Scholar.

41 A. Chilton, above note 11, p. 19. See also the specific experiment described in Broude, Tomer, “Behavioral International Law”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 163, 2015, p. 1153 Google Scholar.

42 See van Aaken, A., “Behavioral International Law and Economics”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2014, p. 422 Google Scholar; T. Broude, above note 41, p. 1153.

43 See Anne van Aaken, above note 42, p. 424, for an account of the influence of rational choice approaches to international law.

44 Ibid., p. 423.

45 Ibid ., p. 441.

46 T. Broude, above note 41, p. 1103. The work of Daniel Kahneman has been fundamental in this respect: see Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 2011 Google Scholar.

47 See A. van Aaken, above note 42; T. Broude, above note 41. Broude and van Aaken are currently working jointly on a book project on behavioural economics and international law, to be published at the end of 2017. An early call for the analysis of violations of IHL from the angle of law and economics came from Dunoff, Jeffrey and Trachtman, Joel, “The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 2, 1999 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 A. van Aaken, above note 42, p. 441.

49 T. Broude, above note 41, p. 1150.

50 J. Brunnée and S. Toope, above note 10, p. 12.

51 Dill, Janina, Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 44–63 Google Scholar.

52 Ibid ., p. 47.

53 Ibid ., p. 47.

54 Ibid ., p. 48.

55 Ibid ., p. 52.

56 Ibid ., p. 53.

57 Ibid ., p. 54.

58 Ibid ., p. 28.

59 Ibid ., p. 55.

60 Ibid ., p. 53.

61 See, for example, the work of Thomas Shelling, one of game theory's most famous exponents: Shelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960 Google Scholar; and Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1966.

62 A. van Aaken, above note 42, p. 438.

63 E. Posner, above note 9, p. 170.

64 Ohlin, Jens, “Nash Equilibrium and International Law”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, 2010, p. 869 Google Scholar. See also the comments made by Scott Gates in a discussion at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMC-FxqPDWU (starting at 54:00). Gates makes the point that armed conflict presents a game so loosely defined that you might not even know what game you are playing, let alone what the possible outcomes might be.

65 In this regard, see also the work by Provost, René, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Compliance with the Laws of War”, in Perrin, Benjamin (ed.), Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations, and the Law , University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2012 Google Scholar.

66 J. Morrow, above note 10, p. 23.

67 Ibid ., p. 20.

68 Ibid ., p. 23. See also A. van Aaken, above note 42, pp. 434–435, with references to behavioural game theory.

69 J. Morrow, above note 10, p. 7.

70 Ibid ., p. 15.

71 Ibid ., p. 5.

72 Ibid ., p. 299.

73 Ibid ., p. 299.

74 In this regard, see the section on “Disaggregation” below.

75 For a review of the literature, see, for example, Oprisko, Robert and Kaliher, Kristopher, “The State as a Person? Anthropomorphic Personification vs. Concrete Durational Being”, Journal of International and Global Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, pp. 31 ffGoogle Scholar.

76 E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1368.

77 A. van Aaken, above note 42, p. 441.

78 E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1368.

79 J. Morrow, above note 10, pp. 70–71.

80 Kennedy, David, Of War and Law, Princeton University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 14 Google Scholar.

81 See D. Kennedy, above note 19, p. 170, who talks about the “remnants of discarded sensibilities that remain”.

82 See note 15 above. The first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 makes this explicit in its title: “relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts”.

83 Whether or not certain aims are pursued consciously is a separate question. See E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1385, fn. 83.

84 Ibid., pp. 1368–1369.

85 Ibid., pp. 1367, 1371.

86 D. Kennedy, above note 19, p. 160.

87 Ibid., p. 160.

88 H. Kinsella, above note 5, p. 193.

89 J. Morrow, above note 10, p. 307. Kennedy goes further in arguing that IHL can work as a mechanism of absolution for soldiers and humanitarian actors alike: “In the face of the irrationality of war, modern law has built an elaborate discourse of evasion, offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment. … The legal language has become capacious enough to give the impression that by using it, one will have ‘taken everything into account’ or ‘balanced’ all the relevant competing considerations.” D. Kennedy, above note 80, pp. 143, 169.

90 See, for example, the work of H. Kinsella, above note 5; Mégret, Frédéric, “From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law's ‘Other’”, in Orford, Anne (ed.), International Law and Its Others, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006 Google Scholar; Orly Stern, “The Principle of Distinction and Women in African Conflict”, doctoral thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015, available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3291.

91 As represented by the work of Anne Orford, Marti Koskenniemi and Anthony Angie, for example.

92 O. Stern, above note 90, pp. 110 ff, provides an account of early feminist critiques in this regard. See also Gardam, Judith, “A New Frontline for Feminism and International Humanitarian Law”, in Davies, Margaret and Munro, Vanessa E. (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory, Routledge, London, 2013, p. 222 Google Scholar, with further references.

93 Durham, Helen and O'Byrne, Katie, “The Dialogue of Difference: Gender Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 877, 2010, pp. 34, 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94 Ibid., p. 42.

95 J. Gardam, above note 92, p. 217.

96 H. Durham and K. O'Byrne, above note 93, p. 51, observe the development of the discourse in this way. See also J. Gardam, above note 92, p. 218: “IHL as a whole has not been subjected to a broader scrutiny by feminists.”

97 Ibid., p. 229. See, for example, the work of O. Stern, above note 90; Herrmann, Irène and Palmieri, Daniel, “Between Amazons and Sabines: A Historical Approach to Women and War”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 877, 2010 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 A development outlined in H. Durham and K. O'Byrne, above note 93, pp. 39, 51.

99 Gathii, James Thuo, “TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography”, Trade, Law and Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, p. 30 Google Scholar. In this regard, see also the seminal work of Anghie, Anthony, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007 Google Scholar.

100 J. T. Gathii, above note 99, p. 40, F. Mégret, above note 90, p. 2.

101 J. T. Gathii, above note 99, p. 38.

102 H. Kinsella, above note 5, pp. 107 ff.; F. Mégret, above note 90, pp. 11, 17.

103 F. Mégret, above note 90, p. 15; H. Kinsella, above note 5, p. 11.

104 Corri Zoli, “Islamic Contributions to International Humanitarian Law: Recalibrating TWAIL Approaches for Existing Contributions and Legacies”, AJIL Unbound, No. 109, 2016.

105 F. Mégret, above note 90, p. 34.

106 J. T. Gathii, above note 99, p. 30; H. Kinsella, above note 5, pp. 112, 152 ff.; F. Mégret, above note 90, pp. 4, 21 ff.

107 See the work of H. Kinsella, above note 5; O. Stern, above note 90; and F. Mégret, above note 90; see also Slim, Hugo, Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War, Hurst & Co, London, 2007, pp. 11 ffGoogle Scholar.

108 H. Kinsella, above note 5, p. 188.

109 F. Mégret, above note 90, p. 28.

110 H. Kinsella, above note 5, p. 196. Benvenisti and Cohen also analyze the concept of distinction, noting that while it is seen today as providing the framework for the protection of civilians, it was initially designed to prevent the participation of irregular fighters. See E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, pp. 1398–1399.

111 F. Mégret, above note 90, p. 34.

112 Kalyvas, Stathis, “Internal Conflict and Political Violence: New Developments in Research”, in Chenoweth, Erica and Lawrence, Adria (eds.), Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010, p. xiii Google Scholar.

113 Ibid., p. xii.

114 See also A. Bell, above note 40, pp. 371, 373.

115 See in this respect the remarks by Benvenisti and Cohen referred to in note 83 and Morrow's remarks referred to in note 79, above.

116 Sassòli, Marco, “Engaging Non-State Actors: The New Frontier for International Humanitarian Law”, in Call, Geneva (ed.), Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed Non-State Actors, Conference Report, Geneva, 2007 Google Scholar.

117 S. Kalyvas, above note 112, p. xii.

118 Kalyvas, Stathis, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 389 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

119 A. Downes, above note 25, p. 8.

120 See: www.icrc.org/en/event/roots-behaviour-war-revisited.

121 Notwithstanding the tendencies towards cynical simplification sometimes displayed by humanitarian workers. With regard to this phenomenon, see, for example, Terry, Fiona, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002, pp. 224 ffGoogle Scholar.

122 See www.icrc.org/en/event/roots-behaviour-war-revisited, including a recording of the panel discussion held on 28 April 2016; compare the comments by Francesco Gutierrez Sanin regarding a “typology and topology” of compliance.

123 H. Lauterpacht, above note 17, pp. 363–364.

124 Ibid., p. 382.

125 J. Brunnée and S. Toope, above note 10, p. 6.

126 D. Kennedy, above note 19, p. 158.

127 It is often assumed that international law can only be effective if it creates absolute obligations, the equivalent to State-backed sanctions in a domestic system. This puts aside the effect that IHL has in States through implementation and enforcement within their armed forces, and it neglects a whole range of mechanisms in which norms can be enforced in a decentralized system and which play an important role in the enforcement of international law. See, in this respect, A. van Aaken, above note 42, pp. 471 ff.

128 See, for example, R. Provost, above note 65, p. 37.

129 J. Morrow, above note 10, p. 317.

130 See Matthew Rosenberg, “Pentagon Details Chain of Errors in Strike on Afghan Hospital”, New York Times, 29 April 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/world/asia/afghanistan-doctors-without-borders-hospital-strike.html?_r=0.

131 See MSF, “Kunduz: Initial Reaction to Public Release of U.S. Military Investigative Report on the Attack on MSF Trauma Hospital”, 29 April 2016, available at: www.msf.org/en/article/kunduz-initial-reaction-public-release-us-military-investigative-report-attack-msf-trauma.

132 See, in this regard, the article by Catherine Harwood on the potential role of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission in the investigation of the attack. Catherine Harwood, “Will the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ Awaken? The Kunduz Hospital Attack and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission”, EJIL: Talk!, 15 October 2015, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/will-the-sleeping-beauty-awaken-the-kunduz-hospital-attack-and-the-international-humanitarian-fact-finding-commission/.

133 The International Criminal Court – with all its imperfections – embodies the same impulse. The frustration about the lack of traction for the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission is common among international lawyers; see, for example, Marco Sassòli's comments made at a panel discussion organized by the ICRC on 21 April 2016, available at: www.icrc.org/en/event/law-armed-conflict-crisis-and-how-recommit-its-respect.

134 This happens through the intermediary of US legislation in this case.

135 Cohen, Amichai, “Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Volume 26, 2011, p. 389 Google Scholar.

136 See, for example, Geoffrey Corn, “Legitimate Questions about Legitimate Targets”, EJIL: Talk!, 23 September 2015, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/13613-2/.

137 E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1410.

138 D. Kennedy, above note 80, p. 33.

139 Ibid., pp. 133–134.

140 A. Downes, above note 25, p. 1.

141 See Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “Pentagon: U.S. Bombing of Afghanistan Hospital not a ‘War Crime’”, CNN, 29 April 2016, at: http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/29/politics/u-s-airstrike-hospital-afghanistan-investigation/.

142 See the revealing account by H. Kinsella, above note 5, pp. 1–3.

143 D. Kennedy, above note 80, p. 24. It can take on this role internationally but also among actors within States: see E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1371.

144 D. Kennedy, above note 19, p. 166.

145 Ibid., p. 182.

146 Even though the format of legal measures and judicial review continues to be a means to gain or question legitimacy, of course. Kennedy speaks of a shift from validity to persuasiveness: see D. Kennedy, above note 80, p. 96. Dill makes a similar point when distinguishing behaviour in war permitted by law from behaviour that is perceived as legitimate: see J. Dill, above note 51. Going against this tendency, international criminal law lets people imagine a return to pure validity arguments and the clarity and sovereign-backed enforcement of national legal orders.

147 See H. Kinsella, above note 5, pp. 130–131, regarding the strategies adopted by the FLN during the French–Algerian War.

148 UK War Office, Manual of Military Law, 1914, p. 301, as quoted in E. Benvenisti and A. Cohen, above note 7, p. 1391.

149 D. Kennedy, above note 80, p. 25.

150 Helen Durham, “Atrocities in Conflict Mean We Need the Geneva Conventions More than Ever”, The Guardian, 5 April 2016.

151 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1974 UNTS 45, 13 January 1993 (entered into force 29 April 1997).

152 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 2056 UNTS 211, 18 September 1997 (entered into force 1 March 1999).

153 Kaul makes the same observation for international criminal law. See Kaul, Hans-Peter, “Abstrafung der Täter – ein Instrument zur Prävention”, in Heintze, Hans-Joachim and Ipsen, Knut (eds), Heutige bewaffnete Konflikte als Herausforderungen an das humanitäre Völkerrecht, Springer, Berlin, 2011, p. 158 Google Scholar.

154 See in this regard the comments made regarding the update of the ICRC's “Roots of Behaviour in War” study, which aims to examine compliance with IHL's norms, available at: www.icrc.org/en/event/roots-behaviour-war-revisited.

155 Baberowski, Jörg, Räume der Gewalt, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, p. 20 Google Scholar (author's translation).

156 Ibid., p. 27.

157 Ibid., p. 11. See also Kalyvas’ remarks referred to in note 112 above.

158 D. Kennedy, above note 19, p. 172.

159 Bellow, Saul, Herzog, Viking Press, New York, 1964, p. 238 Google Scholar.

160 J. Brunnée and S. Toope, above note 10, p. 47. Kennedy goes further and speaks about an “elaborate discourse of evasion”: D. Kennedy, above note 19, p. 169.