Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T09:52:12.889Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

International law: armed groups in a state-centric system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2012

Zakaria Daboné
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

What is the position of non-state armed groups in public international law, a system conceived for and by states? This article considers the question, mainly in the light of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It shows that, while armed groups essentially trigger the application of jus ad bellum, they are not themselves endowed with a right to peace. Jus in bello confers rights and obligations on armed groups, but in the context of an unequal relationship with the state. This inequality before the law is strikingly illustrated by the regulation of detention practised by armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. Despite the significant role that they play in modern-day conflicts, armed groups constitute an ‘anomaly’ in a legal system that continues to be state-centric.

Type
Armed Groups and International Law
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 93 , Issue 882: Understanding armed groups and the applicable law , June 2011 , pp. 395 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Conflits armés non internationaux’, in Le droit international humanitaire en devenir, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston, 1988, p. 252.

2 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, ‘Le droit international à la recherche de ses valeurs: paix, développement, démocratie’, in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye, Vol. 286, 2000, p. 17Google Scholar.

3 The United Nations Secretary-General explains this by the fact that the state occupies almost all of the international stage. In addition, the United Nations dealt almost from the outset exclusively with interactions between member states. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, UN Doc. S/2001/331, 30 March 2001, pp. 14–15.

4 This is evident, for example, in the following texts: Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the event of Civil Strife, of 20 February 1928, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CXXXIV, 1932–1933, pp. 45 ff; Protocol (signed by the Plenipotentiaries on various dates between May and December 1957, in accordance with Article 11 of the Protocol) to the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the event of Civil Strife, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 284, 1957–1958, pp. 201 ff.

5 Michelet's comment – ‘Those who look no further than the present, what is current, will not understand the present’ – is justified when it comes to international law, which, more than any other branch of law, is ‘inseparable from its past because it is essentially constantly changing’. See Daillier, Patrick, Forteau, Mathias, and Pellet, Alain, Droit international public, 8th edition, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 2009, p. 51Google Scholar (ICRC translation).

6 Lejbowicz, Agnès, Philosophie du droit international: L'impossible capture de l'humanité, PUF, Paris, 1999, p. 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 According to Christian Dominicé, for example, ‘to say that the individual does not have the status of subject of the law in international public law is not to curb development or progress but simply to note the fundamental structure of the international legal order, which, for as long as it exists, will be based on the juxtaposition of sovereign states.’ Dominicé, Christian, ‘L’émergence de l'individu en droit international public’, in Soixante ans de relations internationales: Contrastes et parallèles, 1927–1987, Annales d’études internationales, Vol. 16, 1987–1988, p. 16Google Scholar (ICRC translation).

8 A. Lejbowicz, above note 6, p. 292 (ICRC translation).

9 Emmanuel Decaux, ‘La contribution des organisations non gouvernementales à l’élaboration des règles du droit international des droits de l'Homme’, in Gérard Cohen-Jonathan and Jean-François Flauss (eds), Les organisations non gouvernementales et le droit international des droits de l'Homme, Bruylant, Brussels, 2005, p. 24.

10 A. Lejbowicz, above note 6, p. 277 (ICRC translation).

11 Joe Verhoeven, ‘The normative and quasi-normative activities of international organizations’, in René-Jean Dupuy, A Handbook on International Organizations, 2nd edition, Hague Academy of International Law, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1998, p. 413; Clémentine Olivier, ‘Les organisations non gouvernementales et la répression pénale internationale’, in G. Cohen-Jonathan and J.-F. Flauss, above note 9, p. 123.

12 B. Boutros-Ghali, above note 2, p. 19 (ICRC translation).

13 Marco Sassòli, ‘Ius ad bellum and ius in bello – the separation between the legality of the use of force and humanitarian rules to be respected in warfare: crucial or outdated?’, in Michael Schmitt and Jelena Pejic (eds), International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2007, p. 257.

14 Bugnion, François, ‘Just wars, wars of aggression and international humanitarian law’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 84, No. 847, 2002, pp. 523–546CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M. Sassòli, above note 13, p. 242.

15 ‘As the monopoly on the use of force for State organs is inherent in the very concept of the Westphalian State, we may assume that the national legislation of all States prohibits anyone under their jurisdiction to wage an armed conflict against governmental forces or, except State organs acting in said capacity, anyone else.’ M. Sassòli, above note 13, p. 255.

16 Additional Protocol II, Art. 6, para. 5.

17 In current constitutional law, certain basic laws provide that citizens have the right to bear arms. Such is the case of the Constitution of Argentina, Article 21 of which provides that Argentine citizens must take up arms to defend the Constitution. In the Tablada case, the insurgents invoked this provision, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report of 18 November 1997, para. 7, available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm (last visited 6 October 2011).

18 Art. 35.

19 Kolb, Robert, Ius contra bellum. Le droit international relatif au maintien de la paix, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel/Geneva/Munich, Bruylant, Brussels, 2009, p. 247Google Scholar; Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘Remarques politico-historiques sur l’étiologie des guerres civiles’, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-Debbas (eds), L'ordre juridique international: Un système en quête d’équité et d'universalité. Liber amicorum Georges Abi-saab, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 2001, pp. 464, 476; Luigi Condorelli, ‘Conclusions’, in Jean-François Flauss (ed.), Nouvelles frontières du droit international humanitaire, Proceedings of the colloquium of 12 April 2002, University of Lausanne Institute of International Law, Nemesis/Bruylant, Brussels, 2003, p. 178; Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘Le droit humanitaire à l’ère des ruptures des consensus nationaux et internationaux’, in La guerre aujourd'hui, défi humanitaire: Rapport à la Commission indépendante sur les questions humanitaires internationales, Bernard-Levrault, Geneva, 1986, p. 40.

20 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Art. 3, para. 4.

21 Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, 1958, p. 44Google Scholar.

22 Additional Protocol II, Art. 3, para. 1.

23 International Criminal Court (ICC), Rome Statute, Art. 8, para. 3.

24 R. Kolb, above note 19, p. 247.

25 Migliazza, Alessandro, ‘L’évolution de la réglementation de la guerre à la lumière de la sauvegarde des droits de l'homme’, in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, Vol. 137, 1972, p. 211Google Scholar.

26 The exceptions to the prohibition to use force in international relations are: ‘individual and collective self-defence, a decision or an authorization of the UN Security Council and, most people would add, national liberation wars in which a people is fighting in the exercise of its right to self-determination …’. Marco Sassòli, ‘Collective security operations and international humanitarian law’, in Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium, Relevance of International Humanitarian Law to Non-state Actors, 25 and 26 October 2002, Collegium special edition, No. 27, Spring 2003, p. 79, available at: http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=pub_collegium (last visited 6 October 2011).

27 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, paras. 82–83, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (last visited 16 January 2012).

28 A. Migliazza, above note 25, p. 213.

29 For example, Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, Haiti in 1994.

30 R. Kolb, above note 19, pp. 326–329.

31 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 246.

32 Mohamed Bennouna, Le consentement à l'ingérence militaire dans les conflits internes, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1974, p. 214.

33 Antonio Cassese, ‘Le respect des normes humanitaires dans les conflits armés non internationaux’, in La guerre aujourd'hui, défi humanitaire, above note 19, p. 145.

34 ‘In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The principle of self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court …; it is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. ICJ, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, para. 29.

  • •

    • Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation

  • •

    • Inter-state conflict

  • •

    • Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities

  • •

    • Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons

  • •

    • Terrorism

  • •

    • Transnational organized crime

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, p. 2, available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf (last visited 6 October 2011).

36 Ibid.

37 Olivier Corten and François Dubuisson, ‘L'hypothèse d'une règle émergente fondant une intervention militaire sur une “autorisation implicite” du Conseil de Sécurité’, in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2000, p. 897.

38 Ibid., pp. 898–899.

39 UNSC Res. 1973, 17 March 2011, para. 4.

40 Ibid., para. 6.

41 Cot, Jean-Pierre, Pellet, Alain, and Forteau, Mathias (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire article par article, 3rd edition, Économica, Paris, 2005, p. 1330Google Scholar.

42 Olivier Corten and François Dubuisson, ‘Opération “liberté immutable”: une extension abusive du concept de légitime défense’, in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2002, pp. 64, 70.

43 Éric David, ‘Sécurité collective et lutte contre le terrorisme: guerre ou légitime défense?’, in Les métamorphoses de la sécurité collective. Droit, pratique et enjeux stratégiques, A. Pedone, Paris, 2005, p. 145.

44 Luigi Condorelli, ‘Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suites: où va le droit international?’, in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2001, pp. 838–839 (ICRC translation).

45 Maurice Kamto, L'agression en droit international, A. Pedone, Paris, 2010, pp. 145–146 (ICRC translation).

46 Ibid., pp. 146–147.

47 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, above note 31, para. 195.

48 This view was criticized by Judge Rosalyn Higgins in her separate opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, paras. 32–34, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1680.pdf (last visited 6 October 2011). Judge Higgins had criticized a similar position by the Court in the Nicaragua judgment. See Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 250–251Google Scholar.

49 Annex 1 to RC/Res. 6, of 11 June 2010, Official Records, Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May–11 June 2010, ICC, The Hague, 2010.

50 African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact of 31 January 2005, Article 1.c.viii: ‘The following shall constitute acts of aggression, regardless of a declaration of war by a State, group of States, organization of States, or non-State actor(s) or by any foreign entity: … (viii) the sending by, or on behalf of a Member State or the provision of any support to armed groups, mercenaries, and other organized trans-national criminal groups which may carry out hostile acts against a Member State …’.

51 Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘Le Pacte de non-agression et de défense commune de l'Union africaine: entre unilatéralisme et responsabilité collective’, in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2009, p. 136.

52 African Union Pact, above note 50, Art. 1.c.ii: ‘The following shall constitute acts of aggression, regardless of a declaration of war by a State, group of States, organization of States, or non-State actor(s) or by any foreign entity: … (ii) the invasion or attack by armed forces against the territory of a Member State, or military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such an invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of a Member State or part thereof …’.

53 UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, Art. 3, para. a.

54 In fact, and in keeping with the general definition of aggression used, the following acts by armed groups are also considered as acts of agression: use of armed force against a member state; bombardment of the territory or the use of any weapon against the territory of a member state; blockade of the ports, coasts, or airspace of a member state; attack on the land, sea, or air forces, or marine and fleets of a member state; acts of espionage that could be used for military aggression against a member state; technological assistance of any kind; intelligence and training provided to another state for the same purpose; encouragement of, support for, harbouring of, or provision of any assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent transnational organized crimes against a member state. Under the Pact, the following types of aggression are the preserve of states: use of the armed forces of a member state that are within the territory of another member state with the agreement of the latter, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the Pact; and the action of a member state in allowing its territory to be used by another member state for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state.

55 R. van Steenberghe, above note 51, p. 139.

56 African Union Pact, above note 50, Art. 1, para. w.

57 International Independent Fact-finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Vol. II, 2009, pp. 229 ff, available at: http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html (last visited 17 January 2012).

58 ‘Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples … of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter’. UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.

59 J.-P. Cot, A. Pellet, and M. Forteau, above note 41, pp. 1356–1357.

60 See Meyrowitz, Henri, Le principe de l’égalité des belligérants devant le droit de la guerre, A. Pedone, Paris, 1970, p. 127Google Scholar.

61 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 3 April 2008, para. 60, in which it is presumed that the government armed forces are sufficiently organized.

62 Konstantin Obradovic, ‘Les mécanismes d'enquête et de constatation des violations du droit humanitaire: quelques suggestions sur les possibilités d'améliorer leur fonctionnement’, in La guerre aujourd'hui, défi humanitaire, above note 19, p. 190.

63 David, Éric, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 4th edition, Bruylant, Brussels, 2008Google Scholar, esp. p. 132.

64 Stewart, James G., ‘Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: a critique of internationalized armed conflict’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 850, 2003, pp. 344Google Scholar ff.

65 É. David, above note 63, p. 132: ‘of 161 rules, [the study] identifies only 17 that are only relevant in international armed conflicts, 7 that apply in international armed conflicts or internal armed conflicts, and 137 that are applicable in both types of conflict’ (ICRC translation).

66 ‘[I]nternational armed conflicts are much more straightforward because no specific level of armed violence between States is required. As soon as there is any armed violence between States, as soon as the first shot is fired, there is armed conflict, international humanitarian law applies and the States involved have an interest in its application’. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Binding armed opposition groups through humanitarian treaty law and customary law’, in Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium, above note 26, p. 129.

67 Except in the case of an armed conflict in which an NLM is participating.

68 J.-M. Henckaerts, above note 66, p. 123.

69 The Rome Statute must nevertheless be mentioned here, for it broadens the range of acts likely to be committed by an armed group and prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. This is not as ideal as it might seem at first sight, however, given the Statute's limited field of application and the repressive nature of the institution thus created (it is naturally easier for states to punish the greatest number of acts possible by armed groups than to give them more rights under international law).

70 On this point, see Sassòli, Marco and Bouvier, Antoine, How Does Law Protect in War?, 2nd edition, ICRC, Geneva, 2005, Vol. I, p. 266Google Scholar.

71 Christian Walter, ‘Subjects of international law’, in Max Planck Institute Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, May 2007, para. 26.

72 François Rubio, ‘Perspectives historiques de l'impact des acteurs non étatiques sur la rédaction des traités internationaux’, in Rafâa Ben Achour and Slim Laghmani (eds), Acteurs non étatiques et droit international, A. Pedone, Paris, 2007, pp. 63–78.

73 Markus Wagner, ‘Non-state actors’, Max Planck Institute Encyclopedia of Public International Law, above note 71, paras. 18 and 21.

74 Hatem M'rad, ‘La participation des acteurs non étatiques aux conférences internationales’, in R. Ben Achour and S. Laghmani (eds), above note 72, pp. 79–99.

75 These comprised the African National Congress (ANC), the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANCZ), the Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Panafricanist Congress (PAC), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). See Marco Sassòli, ‘Legal mechanisms to improve compliance with international humanitarian law by armed groups’, in Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium: Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 11–12 September 2003, Collegium special edition, No. 30, Winter 2004, p. 98.

76 NLMs were invited to attend the negotiations of the 1977 Additional Protocols as observers. See J.-M. Henckaerts, above note 66, p. 127.

77 Working group chaired by Anthony Rogers, ‘Améliorer le respect du DIH pendant les conflits armés non internationaux: une responsabilité globale’, in Collegium, above note 75, p. 132, available at: http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=pub_collegium (last visited 17 January 2012).

78 ‘Article 96 – Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Protocol: … 3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary. Such declaration shall, upon its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that conflict the following effects: (a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; (b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; and (c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.’

79 ‘Article 7 – Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Convention: … 4. This Convention, and the annexed Protocols by which a High Contracting Party is bound, shall apply with respect to an armed conflict against that High Contracting Party of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims: (a) where the High Contracting Party is also a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority referred to in Article 96, paragraph 3, of that Protocol has undertaken to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 3, of the said Protocol, and undertakes to apply this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict; or (b) where the High Contracting Party is not a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority of the type referred to in subparagraph (a) above accepts and applies the obligations of the Geneva Conventions and of this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict. Such an acceptance and application shall have in relation to that conflict the following effects: (i) the Geneva Conventions and this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are brought into force for the parties to the conflict with immediate effect; (ii) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols; and (iii) the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are equally binding upon all parties to the conflict. The High Contracting Party and the authority may also agree to accept and apply the obligations of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on a reciprocal basis.’

80 Plattner, Denise, ‘La portée juridique des déclarations de respect du droit international humanitaire qui émanent de mouvements en lutte dans un conflit armé’, in Revue Belge de Droit International, Vol. 18, 1984–1985, p. 299Google Scholar (ICRC translation).

81 Above note 78.

82 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Les sources du droit international: essai de déconstruction’, in Le droit international dans un monde en mutation. Liber Amicorum en hommage au Professeur Eduardo Jiménez de Arechaga, Vol. I, Fundación, Montevideo, 1994, pp. 38–39.

83 See ICJ, Case concerning the Factory at Chorzòw (claim for indemnity, merits), Judgment, 13 September 1928, Series A, No. 17, p. 29, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf (last visited 6 October 2011).

84 Richard R. Baxter, ‘The duties of combatants and the conduct of hostilities (Law of The Hague)’, in Henry Dunant Institute and UNESCO (eds), International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1988.

85 IHL forges a link of legitimacy between an armed group, the NLM, and the population of a territory by speaking of ‘the authority representing a people’, as it does in Additional Protocol I, Art. 96, para. 3.

86 For example, some Algerians allied themselves with France against the FLN (Front de libération nationale) during the war in Algeria (1954–1962). They served as back-up troops recruited by the French Army and are usually referred to as ‘harkis’.

87 Fatsah Ouguergouz, ‘Guerres de libération nationale en droit humanitaire: quelques clarifications’, in Frits Kalshoven and Yves Sandoz (eds), Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 346: ‘As to the representative nature of the NLM, it is most resoundingly proven by the very terms of the struggle. Its asymmetrical nature implies that both the individual combatant … and the people as a whole have a “superior motivation”. In a war of national liberation, the hostilities can be pursued, even at a very low level of intensity, only if the combatant is totally immersed in the population; the support of the people (or more specifically of the people at war) for the NLM can therefore be interpreted as a clear manifestation of the latter's ability to represent the people’ (ICRC translation).

88 ICRC, ‘Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 872, December 2008, p. 1001Google Scholar.

89 Queguiner, Jean-François, Le principe de la distinction dans la conduite des hostilités. Un principe traditionnel confronté à des défis actuels, University of Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 2006, p. 339Google Scholar.

90 See, in this issue, the debate between Professors Shany and Sassòli on the question of equality of the belligerents, and the comments on their discussion by Professor Provost.

91 It being understood that the parties to an NIAC can nonetheless decide to apply the rules of IHL applicable to persons deprived of their freedom in IACs.

92 Preferable, for example, to the elimination pure and simple of persons who should be detained, in keeping with either a ‘take-no-prisoners’ attitude or another attitude dictated by the circumstances.

93 The expression used in Additional Protocol II, Art. 5, para. 2.

94 ‘In fact, some experts have argued that it is unlikely that a court could be ‘regularly constituted’ under national law by an insurgent party. Bearing these remarks in mind, the ICRC proposed an equivalent formula ‘which was accepted without opposition’. See Sandoz, Yves, Swinarski, C., and Zimmermann, B. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 1987Google Scholar, para. 4600, p. 1398.

95 Additional Protocol II, Art. 6, para. 4.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid., para. 2.

98 Akin to the concept of a competent, impartial, independent tribunal established by law (as required, for example, by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)). See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann, above note 94.

99 It is usually best not to overstress the criterion of territorial control. If the provisions of Additional Protocol II are applied to deprivation of liberty, the armed group should be of some consequence, given that the Protocol itself stipulates that it applies only in intense NIACs.

100 For an identical but more nuanced position (because it refers rather to a lack of clarity), see Sassòli, Marco and Olson, Laura M., ‘The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, 2008, p. 618CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101 Article 6 of Additional Protocol II, in particular paragraph 5, stipulates no obligation but requires the authorities to endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty.

102 The ICRC study on customary law claims that persons deprived of their liberty in relation to an NIAC must be released as soon as the reasons for their detention cease to exist. It nevertheless goes on to say that the persons referred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal proceedings are pending against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed. Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ICRC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 451Google Scholar ff.

103 See Wilhelm, René-Jean, ‘Problèmes relatifs à la protection de la personne humaine par le droit international des conflits armés ne présentant pas un caractère international’, in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, Vol. 137, 1972, pp. 393Google Scholar ff.

104 ‘The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention’. 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Art. 3.

105 Third Geneva Convention, Art. 4: ‘A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: … (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war’.

106 Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1960, p. 40Google Scholar.

107 Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, ICRC, Geneva, 1952, p. 56Google Scholar.

108 Ibid.

109 M. Sassòli and L. M. Olson, above note 100, p. 618.

110 See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 102, pp. 453 ff.

111 Ibid., pp. 551 ff.

112 If the armed group is victorious, it seems unlikely that any of its members will continue to be detained.

113 R.-J. Wilhelm, above note 103, esp. p. 391.

114 Deprivation of liberty may be arbitrary if committed without respect for the grounds for detention and procedures set out in international law. See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 102, pp. 344 ff.

115 M. Sassòli and L. M. Olson, above note 100, p. 618.

116 Ibid.

117 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 42. The case of civilians interned in occupied territory for imperative security reasons is set out in Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, with procedures that are on the whole similar to those for the internment of civilians who are citizens of the enemy state.

118 Additional Protocol I, Art. 75, para. 3.

119 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 43.

120 Additional Protocol I, Art. 75, para. 3.

121 Third Geneva Convention, Art. 118.

122 Ibid., Art. 109.

123 IHL does not make it obligatory to take prisoners of war and detain them until the end of the hostilities. A party to the conflict can therefore decide to allow the prisoners of war to leave because, for example, the detaining armed forces are needed elsewhere or no longer have the material means of detaining prisoners of war. The main idea underlying all this is that one cannot get rid of prisoners of war by killing them.

124 ICCPR, Art. 9.

125 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 6.

126 See also Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, of 4 November 1950, or Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights, of 22 November 1969.

127 Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988.

128 Principle 2: ‘Arrest, detention or imprisonment shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose.’ Principle 10: ‘Anyone who is arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.’ Principle 32: ‘1. A detained person or his counsel shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic law before a judicial or other authority to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in order to obtain his release without delay, if it is unlawful. 2. The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present principle shall be simple and expeditious and at no cost for detained persons without adequate means. The detaining authority shall produce without unreasonable delay the detained person before the reviewing authority.’

129 Resolution adopted at the 32nd ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 23 October 2002, Banjul, Gambia.

130 ‘B. Safeguards during the Pre-trial Process. States should: … 25. Ensure that all detained persons are informed immediately of the reasons for their detention. 26. Ensure that all persons arrested are promptly informed of any charges against them. 27. Ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are brought promptly before a judicial authority, having the right to defend themselves or to be assisted by legal counsel, preferably of their own choice. …’

131 Sudre, Frédéric, Droit international et européen des droits de l'homme, 5th edition, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2001, pp. 165–166Google Scholar.

132 It can in fact be asked whether NIACs do not call into question almost exclusively the existence of the governing classes and political regimes in place rather than the existence of the nation. In the case of several recent conflicts in Africa, it was inter alia to combat the imminent demise of the nation that certain citizens launched an armed conflict. Examples are Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sudan.

133 Keba M'Baye does not entirely agree, but sees a hard core of African human rights (Articles 2 to 7 of the African Charter) in the peremptory form of the wording. See M'Baye, Keba, Les droits de l'homme en Afrique, Pedone, Paris, 1992, pp. 167Google Scholar ff.

134 Fatsah Ouguergouz, ‘La charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples. Historique, portée juridique et contribution à la protection des droits de l'homme en Afrique’, Dissertation, University of Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1991, p. 305.

135 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 12 May 2004, p. 187, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ca12c3a4ea8d6c53c1256d500056e56f/$FILE/G0441302.pdf (last visited 17 January 2012).

136 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1), and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8-87 of 30 January 1987 (Requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), in International Legal Materials, No. 2, 1988, p. 512. The American Convention on Human Rights, for its part, is silent and prohibits the right of derogation only in respect of the following rights (Art. 27): the right to juridical personality (Art. 3), the right to life (Art. 4), the right to humane treatment (Art. 5), freedom from slavery (Art. 6), freedom from ex post facto laws (Art. 9), freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 12), the rights of the family (Art. 17), the right to a name (Art. 18), the rights of the child (Art. 19), the right to nationality (Art. 20), and the right to participate in government (Art. 23). It is also prohibited to suspend the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of these rights.

137 M. Sassòli and L. M. Olson, above note 100, pp. 622 ff.

138 O'Donnell, Daniel, ‘Trends in the application of international humanitarian law by United Nations human rights mechanisms’, in International Review of the Red Cross, No. 324, 1998, pp. 481–504CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

139 E. David, above note 63, p. 613.

140 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3, final sentence.

141 The point is illustrated by the following example relating to deprivation of liberty: ‘Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and shall ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences. Exceptional circumstances including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions. Such executions shall not be carried out under any circumstances including, but not limited to, situations of internal armed conflict, excessive or illegal use of force by a public official or other person acting in an official capacity or by a person acting at the instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence of such person, and situations in which deaths occur in custody. This prohibition shall prevail over decrees issued by governmental authority’. Principle 1, Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, recommended by UN Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989.