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Liar's war: Protecting civilians from disinformation during armed conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2021

Eian Katz
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Abstract

Disinformation in armed conflict may pose several distinctive forms of harm to civilians: exposure to retaliatory violence, distortion of information vital to securing human needs, and severe mental suffering. The gravity of these harms, along with the modern nature of wartime disinformation, is out of keeping with the traditional classification of disinformation in international humanitarian law (IHL) as a permissible ruse of war. A patchwork set of protections drawn from IHL, international human rights law and international criminal law may be used to limit disinformation operations during armed conflict, but numerous gaps and ambiguities undermine the force of this legal framework, calling for further scholarly attention and clarification.

Keywords

disinformationfake newsinfluence operationsinternational humanitarian lawinternational human rights lawinternational criminal lawruse of wararmed conflict
Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 102 , Issue 914: Emerging Voices , August 2020 , pp. 659 - 682
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC

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References

1 World Risk Poll, “Fake News Is the Number One Worry for Internet Users Worldwide”, Lloyd's Register Foundation, 2020, available at: https://wrp.lrfoundation.org.uk/explore-the-poll/fake-news-is-the-number-one-worry-for-internet-users-worldwide/ (all internet references were accessed in September 2021).

2 See, for example, Danielle Abril, “Facebook Reveals that Massive Amounts of Misinformation Flooded Its Service during the Election”, Fortune, 19 November 2020, available at: https://fortune.com/2020/11/19/facebook-misinformation-labeled-180-million-posts-2020-election-hate-speech-prevalence/.

3 See, for example, Rebecca Heilweil, “Facebook Is Finally Cracking Down Hard on Anti-Vaccine Content. It Is Facing an Uphill Battle”, Vox, 9 March 2021, available at: www.vox.com/recode/22319681/vaccine-misinformation-facebook-instagram-spreading.

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6 See, for example, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, para. 1324; Louisa Loveluck, “Russian Disinformation Campaign Targets Syria's Beleaguered Rescue Workers”, Washington Post, 18 December 2018, available at: https://tinyurl.com/zk9x8cjt.

7 See, for example, Patel, Sonny S., Moncayo, Omar E., Conroy, Kristina M., Jordan, Doug and Erickson, Timothy B., “The Landscape of Disinformation on Health Crisis Communications during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Ukraine: Hybrid Warfare Tactics, Fake Media News, and Review of Evidence”, Journal of Science Communication, Vol. 19, No. 5, 2020CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Evan Lawson and Natia Seskuria, “Disinformation Should Be the Final Straw in the Targeting of Medical Facilities”, The Russia File, 17 August 2020, available at: www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/disinformation-should-be-final-straw-targeting-medical-facilities; Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Houthis Risk Civilians’ Health in Covid-19”, 1 June 2021, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/01/yemen-houthis-risk-civilians-health-covid-19.

8 Rachel Xu, “You Can't Handle the Truth: Misinformation and Humanitarian Action”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 15 January 2021, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/01/15/misinformation-humanitarian/.

9 Sheera Frenkel, “Lies on Social Media Inflame Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, New York Times, 14 May 2021, available at: www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/technology/israel-palestine-misinformation-lies-social-media.html; “Fake News War: In Libya, Battles Also Rage on Social Media”, France 24, 18 April 2019, available at: www.france24.com/en/20190418-fake-news-war-libya-battles-also-rage-social-media; Mel Bunce, “Humanitarian Communication in a Post-Truth World”, Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2019; Fatima K. Abu Salem, Roaa Al Feel, Shady Elbassuoni, Mohamad Jaber and May Farah, “FA-KES: A Fake News Dataset around the Syrian War”, American University of Beirut, 2019, available at: https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/3254/3122; Margarita Jaitner, Russian Information Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2020, available at: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ch10_CyberWarinPerspective_Jaitner.pdf; Can Kasapoglu and Mariam Fekry, Iran's Proxy War in Yemen: The Information Warfare Landscape, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, January 2020, available at: https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/cuploads/pfiles/web_stratcom_coe_iran_proxy_war_against_yemen_13-02-2020.pdf?zoom=page-fit.

10 Filippo Menczer, “Fake Online News Spread through Social Echo Chambers”, Scientific American, 28 November 2016, available at: www.scientificamerican.com/article/fake-online-news-spreads-through-social-echo-chambers/.

11 Cf. Peter Roudik et al., Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Comparative Summary, US Library of Congress, April 2019, available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/scholcom/179/.

12 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Art. 37(2); Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013 (Tallinn Manual), Rule 61, para. 2.

13 Milanovic, Marko and Schmitt, Michael N., “Cyber Attacks and Cyber (Mis)Information Operations during a Pandemic”, Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2020Google Scholar; Gary Corn, “Coronavirus Disinformation and the Need for States to Shore Up International Law”, Lawfare, 2 April 2020, available at: www.lawfareblog.com/coronavirus-disinformation-and-need-states-shore-international-law.

14 Irene Khan, Disinformation and Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. A/HRC/47/25, 13 April 2021.

15 “Disinformation”, Dictionary.com, available at: www.dictionary.com/browse/disinformation.

16 “Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.” US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13.2: Psychological Operations, 27 January 2010, p. GL-7.

17 “Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.” Ibid., p. GL-8.

18 “The coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and postconflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences that further [partisan] interests and objectives.” Eric V. Larson et al., Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities, RAND Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, CA, 2009, p. xii.

19 “Any coordinated or individual deployment of digital resources for cognitive purposes to change or reinforce attitudes or behaviours of the targeted audience.” Dapo Akande et al., “Oxford Statement on International Law Protections in Cyberspace: The Regulation of Information Operations and Activities”, Just Security, 2 June 2021, available at: www.justsecurity.org/76742/oxford-statement-on-international-law-protections-in-cyberspace-the-regulation-of-information-operations-and-activities/.

20 “The application of destructive force on a large scale against information assets and systems, against the computers and networks that support the four critical infrastructures (the power grid, communications, financial, and transportation).” Brian C. Lewis, “Information Warfare”, Federation of American Scientists, available at: https://fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/infowarfare.htm.

21 “Manoeuvres in the cognitive domain to establish a predetermined perception among a target audience in order to gain advantage over another party.” Paul Ottewell, “Defining the Cognitive Domain”, Over the Horizon, 7 December 2020, available at: https://othjournal.com/2020/12/07/defining-the-cognitive-domain/.

22 AP I, Art. 37(1).

23 Ibid., Art. 37(1).

24 Ibid., Art. 37(2).

25 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), Rule 57, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1.

26 AP I, Art. 37(2).

27 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987 (ICRC Commentary on APs), para. 1516.

28 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2: Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study (Practice)), Practice relating to Rule 57, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2.

29 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 61, para. 2; Rule 31, para. 5.

30 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 25, Rule 57.

31 See Hollis, Duncan B., “Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations”, Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2007Google Scholar; Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Tactical Level PSYOP and MILDEC Information Operations: How to Smartly and Lawfully Prime the Battlefield”, The Army Lawyer, July 2007, pp. 67–70; Smyczek, Peter M., “Regulating the Battlefield of the Future: The Legal Limitations on the Conduct of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) under Public International Law”, Air Force Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2005Google Scholar.

32 It is possible that the term “enemy” might encompass non-combatants – IHL sources use “enemy civilians”, “enemy nationals” and “enemy aliens” without necessarily referring to combatants. “Adversary” is more narrowly confined to a military context.

33 See Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 31, para. 5.

34 AP I, Art. 37(2).

35 R. Xu, above note 8.

36 “Infodemic”, Dictionary.com, available at: www.dictionary.com/browse/infodemic.

37 See Lisa M. Cohen, “The New Era of Disinformation Wars”, Völkerrechtsblog, 30 November 2020, available at: https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-new-era-of-disinformation-wars/.

38 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 1514.

39 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/01, 2011, pp. 55–58. See also International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 106.

40 UN Human Rights, above note 39, p. 58.

41 See the above section “Disinformation in Armed Conflict”.

42 Notable exceptions include the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 39 ILM 1285, 25 May 2000, Art. 4(1), available at: www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb180.html; African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 52 ILM 397, 23 October 2009, Art. 7, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/4ae572d82.html

43 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, para. 106.

44 W. Paul Gormley, “Book Review: The Right to Life in International Law”, Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2020; Christof Heyns and Thomas Probert, “Securing the Right to Life: A Cornerstone of the Human Rights System”, EJIL: Talk!, 11 May 2016, available at: https://tinyurl.com/pj63erfs.

45 Anyssa Bellal, Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, December 2016, p. 26.

46 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 2019, p. 54, available at: www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/challenges-report_ihl-and-non-state-armed-groups.pdf.

47 See, for example, ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, paras 179, 216–217; European Court of Human Rights, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment, July 7, 2011, para. 137.

48 Milanovic, Marko, “Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2015Google Scholar.

49 Shany, Yuval, “Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights”, The Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Banda, Maria L., “Regime Congruence: Rethinking the Scope of State Responsibility for Transboundary Environmental Harm”, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 1, 2019Google Scholar (positing a theory of extraterritorial application of human rights based on their “direct effects”).

50 Golovchencko, Yevgeniy, Hartmann, Mareike and Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, “State, Media and Civil Society in the Information Warfare over Ukraine: Citizen Curators of Digital Disinformation”, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5, 2018Google Scholar.

51 See, for example, Wolfram Lacher, “Drones, Deniability, and Disinformation: Warfare in Libya and the New International Disorder”, War on the Rocks, 3 March 2020, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/drones-deniability-and-disinformation-warfare-in-libya-and-the-new-international-disorder/; Mona Alami, “Russia's Disinformation Campaign Has Changed How We See Syria”, Atlantic Council, 4 September 2018, available at: www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/russia-s-disinformation-campaign-has-changed-how-we-see-syria/; Andrei Soshnikov, “Inside a Pro-Russian Propaganda Machine in Ukraine”, BBC News, 13 November 2017, available at: www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-41915295; “Online Trolls and Fake Accounts Poison Arab Social Media”, BBC News, 31 August 2018, available at: www.bbc.com/news/technology-45372272.

52 AP I, Art. 50; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 25, Rule 5.

53 AP I, Art. 52; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 25, Rule 9.

54 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, Geneva, 2009 (ICRC Interpretive Guidance), Part 2.B.V, available at: https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/icrc-interpretive-guidance-notion-direct-participation-hostilities. See also Federal Republic of Germany, On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace, March 2021, p. 8, available at: https://tinyurl.com/4v5kcste.

55 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 54, Part 2.B.V.2.a.

56 Ibid., Part 2.b.V.2.a.

57 Ibid., Part 2.B.V.1.b.

58 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 8 June 2000, paras 55, 76.

59 Iphigenia Fisentzou, “Social Media in Armed Conflict”, Justis, 15 April 2019, available at: www.justis.com/blurred-lines/#_ftnref20.

60 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 35, paras 10–11.

61 AP I, Art. 51; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II), Art. 13.

62 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 32, paras 5–6.

63 AP I, Art. 51(4).

64 Ibid., Art. 75; AP II, Art. 4; common Art. 3.

65 AP I, Art. 49(1).

66 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 30, para. 3; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016 (ICRC Commentary on GC I), paras 255–256 (on common Article 2).

67 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 30.

68 See above notes 5–6.

69 International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, Art. 8.

70 The operative standard of control is a matter of debate, but is not likely to encompass disinformation even when viewed in the most generous light. See Milanovic, Marko, “Special Rules of Attribution of Conduct in International Law”, International Law Studies, Vol. 96, 2020, pp. 317–324Google Scholar.

71 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 54, Part 2.b.V.2.b.

72 Ibid.: “Therefore, individual conduct that merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, is excluded.”

73 Corn, Geoffrey S., “Beyond Human Shielding: Civilian Risk Exploitation and Indirect Civilian Targeting”, International Law Studies, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020Google Scholar.

74 ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 66, para. 150.

75 Ibid., para. 151.

76 Ibid., para. 164.

77 Ibid., para. 158.

78 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 26 Nov 1984, paras 118–119, 122.

79 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195, 21 December 1965, Art. 4; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 20(2). While these provisions only address incitement to violent speech on the basis of a few protected categories, a preeminent advocacy group has argued that they should be read broadly to include “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status”, as in other articles of the ICCPR. Article 19, Prohibiting Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility, or Violence, London, December 2012, pp. 19–22.

80 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, “Article 6: Right to Life”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 59, 3 September 2019.

81 ICRC Customary Law Study (Practice), above note 28, Practice relating to Rule 89.

82 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Expert Workshops on the Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial, or Religious Hatred, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 11 January 2013, para. 29.

83 Ibid., para. 29(c).

84 Ibid., para. 29(f).

85 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statue), Art. 25(3)(e).

86 Michail Vagias, “The Territorial Jurisdiction of the ICC for Core Crimes Committed through the Internet”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2016.

87 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 25(3)(b).

88 ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 12 June 2014, para. 243.

89 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 19 October 2016, para. 77.

90 Ibid., para. 76.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid., para. 81.

93 Ibid., para. 82. See also Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 30(2)(b).

94 ICC, Bemba, above note 89, para. 854; ICC, Gbagbo, above note 88, para. 246.

95 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, para. 155.

96 ICC, Gbagbo, above note 88, paras 117–119, 237.

97 Ibid., paras 111–116, 237.

98 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 25(3)(c).

99 ICC, Bemba, above note 89, para. 86.

100 Ibid., para. 88.

101 Ibid., para. 89.

102 Ibid., paras 93–94.

103 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 25(3)(c).

104 ICC, Bemba, above note 89, paras 864–893; ICC, Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 11 December 2014, paras 168–171.

105 ICC, Bemba, above note 89, paras 867–868.

106 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 25(3)(d).

107 ICC, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 278.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid., paras 283–284 (setting forth a set of factors for the assessment of significance).

110 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 25(3)(d)(i–ii); ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, para. 351.

111 ICC, Ruto, above note 110, para. 53.

112 ICC, Mbarushimana, above note 107, para. 304.

113 Ibid., paras 311–315.

114 AP I, Art. 75; AP II, Art. 4; common Art. 3.

115 AP I, Art. 10; AP II, Art. 7.

116 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 4521, 4523.

117 Jakob Kellenberger, “International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence”, statement to the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, 6 September 2003, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/5rfgaz.htm.

118 Human Rights Committee, above note 80, para. 26; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14, “The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 16.

119 CESCR, above note 118, para. 12(b)(4).

120 Ibid., para. 50.

121 Viviane Lucia Fluck, Managing Misinformation in a Humanitarian Context, Internews, 2019, Part 1, pp. 7–9; M. Bunce, above note 9, p. 49.

122 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966 (ICESCR), Art. 11(1); CESCR, General Comment No. 15, “The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, para. 3.

123 Maria Giovanna Pietropaolo, “A Human Rights-Based Approach to Humanitarian Assistance”, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2016; Yoram Dinstein, “The Right to Humanitarian Assistance”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000.

124 ICCPR, Art. 19(2).

125 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, “Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, para. 18.

126 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 33; AP I, Art. 75(2)(d); AP II, Art. 4(2)(b).

127 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, paras 4535–4536.

128 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judgment, 20 June 2007, para. 676; SCSL, Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, 28 May 2008, para. 224.

129 AP I, Art. 52; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 25, Rule 7.

130 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 30.

131 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, Geneva, 2015, p. 41.

132 See M. Milanovic and M. N. Schmitt, above note 13, p. 269, equating physical disablement of public health services with “a misinformation campaign that fatally undermines public confidence” in them.

133 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 30, para. 10.

134 See, for example, Federal Republic of Germany, above note 54, p. 4.

135 French Ministry of Armed Forces, Droit international appliqué aux opérations dans le cyberespace, 19 September 2019, p. 13, available at: www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/droit-internat-appliqu%C3%A9-aux-op%C3%A9rations-cyberespace-france.pdf.

136 AP I, Art. 54; AP II, Art. 14.

137 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICRC, Geneva, 2003, pp. 254–255.

138 Article 54 of AP I is limited in scope to acts taken “for the specific purpose of denying [indispensable objects] for their sustenance value”. The protection for indispensable objects in Article 14 of AP II is linked textually to the prohibition of starvation by the word “therefore”.

139 AP I, Art. 54 (“foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works”); AP II, Art. 14.

140 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, paras 2011, 4801.

141 AP I, Art. 54; AP II, Art. 14; ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 2100.

142 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, UN Doc. A/HRC/48, 25 September 2009, paras 1318–1320.

143 AP I, Art. 48 (the ICRC Commentary instructs that “operations” in this article is to be read as “military operations”: ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 1875); AP II, Art. 13.

144 AP I, Art. 48.

145 Ibid., Art. 57.

146 Ibid., Art. 51(1); AP II, Art. 13(1).

147 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 4770.

148 International Law Association Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st Century (ILA Study Group), “The Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare”, International Law Studies, Vol. 93, 2017.

149 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 1875.

150 Ibid., para. 1875.

151 Ibid., para. 4769.

152 Ibid., para. 2070: “An act of hostility must be understood as any act arising from the conflict which has or can have a substantial detrimental effect on … protected objects.”

153 Rome Statute, above note 85, Arts 8(2)(b)(i–iii), 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(i–iv).

154 AP I, Art. 49.

155 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 7(1).

156 ICC, Elements of Crimes, 2011, p. 5.

157 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 28 November 2007, para. 916, citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 12 June 2002, para. 86.

158 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 27 September 2006, para. 706.

159 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 September 1998, para. 581.

160 Rome Statute, above note 85, Arts 7(1), 7(2)(a).

161 Ibid., Art. 7(1)(k).

162 Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Prosecutor v. Leite, Case No. 04a/2001, Judgment, 7 December 2002, paras 156–162; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 29 May 2013, Vol. 3, paras 1059–1067; Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Prosecutor v. Nuon and Khieu, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 7 August 2014, paras 456–458.

163 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).

164 Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 30.

165 Ibid., para. 8.

166 ILA Study Group, above note 148, pp. 359–360.

167 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 August 2001, para. 245.

168 ICJ, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment, 26 February 2007, paras 290–291; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 8 April 2015, para. 206.

169 Quebec Superior Court, R. v. Munyaneza, Judgment, 22 May 2009, para. 89.

170 Milaninia, Nena, “Understanding Serious Bodily or Mental Harm as an Act of Genocide”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2018Google Scholar.

171 ILA Study Group, above note 148, pp. 359–360.

172 AP I, Art. 51; AP II, Art. 13. See also ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 25, Rule 2.

173 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 1940 (“In the second sentence the Conference wished to indicate that the prohibition [on attacks directed against the civilian population] covers acts intended to spread terror”); Tallinn Manual, above note 12, Rule 36, para. 2.

174 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 25, Rule 2.

175 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 27, para. 1940.

176 Rome Statute, above note 85, Art. 6(b).

177 Ibid., Art. 7(1)(k).

178 Ibid., Art. 8(2)(a)(iii).

179 Ibid., Art. 8(2)(c)(i).

180 ICC, above note 156, Art. 8(2)(c)(i)–(3).

181 ICESCR, Art. 12.

182 See AP I, Art. 75(2); AP II, Art. 4(2); common Art. 3(1).

183 Lieblich, Eliav, “Beyond Life and Limb: Exploring Incidental Mental Harm under International Humanitarian Law”, in Jinks, Derek, Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya and Solomon, Solon (eds), Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies: International and National Aspects, Asser Press, The Hague, 2014, p. 187Google Scholar.

184 D. Akande et al., above note 19.