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Neurobiology: A case study of the imminent militarization of biology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2010

Mark Wheelis  and
Malcolm Dando
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Abstract

The revolution in biology, including advances in genomics, will lead to rapid progress in the treatment of mental illness by advancing the discovery of highly specific ligands that affect specific neurological pathways. The status of brain science and its potential for military application to enhance soldier performance, to develop new weapons and to facilitate interrogation are discussed. If such applications are pursued, they will also expand the options available to torturers, dictators and terrorists. Several generic approaches to containing the malign applications of biology are shown, and it is concluded that success or failure in doing so will be significantly dependent on the active involvement of the scientific and medical communities.

Type
Means of Warfare
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 87 , Issue 859: Means of warfare , September 2005 , pp. 553 - 571
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2005

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