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Non-State actors’ pursuit of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2016

Stephanie E. Meulenbelt  and
Maarten S. Nieuwenhuizen
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Abstract

This paper discusses non-State actors’ motivation and capacity to develop and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) improvised weapons in attacks, as well as the possible consequences of such use. Six types of groups have been identified as potential CBRN weapons users that may increasingly be able to acquire relevant CBRN weapons-related knowledge, skills and possibly materials. As technical barriers still form a gap between the theoretical possibility and the operational reality, any potential future CBRN attacks would most likely be crude, low-level attacks, including chemical or radiological materials. CBRN attacks carried out by non-State actors in the future are likely to be more disruptive than destructive.

Keywords

CBRNnon-State actorsweaponizationhumanitarian consequences
Type
Selected Articles
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 97 , Issue 899: The human cost of nuclear weapons , September 2015 , pp. 831 - 858
Copyright
Copyright © icrc 2016 

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References

1 In August 2013, the nerve agent sarin was used on a relatively large scale in the outskirts of Damascus –resulting in numerous casualties predominantly among civilians, including children – and there is compelling evidence that chlorine was used “systematically and repeatedly” as a weapon in villages in northern Syria from April to August 2014. United Nations (UN) Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, UN Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553, 16 September 2013, p. 8; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “OPCW Fact Finding Mission: OPCW, ‘Compelling Confirmation’ that Chlorine Gas Used as Weapon in Syria”, press release, 10 September 2014, available at: www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-fact-finding-mission-compelling-confirmation-that-chlorine-gas-used-as-weapon-in-syria/ (all internet references were accessed in November 2015); OPCW, Third Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria, S/1230/2014, 18 December 2014.

2 The terms “CBRN weapons” and “WMD” are often used interchangeably. The latter term is particularly used in official texts (e.g. by the UN since 1947), defined as “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”. UN Convention on Conventional Armaments (CCA), UN Doc. S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, as quoted in UN, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN Publication 67.I.8, 1967, p. 28. The term “WMD” is sometimes considered to be misleading, as CBRN weapons are not necessarily massively destructive while non-CBRN weapons can be massively destructive. In this paper, therefore, the term “CBRN weapon” is used rather than “WMD”. For an elaboration on the history of the WMD definition and further developments of the terminology, see, e.g., Seth Carus, “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’”, Occasional Paper No. 8, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, DC, January 2012.

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5 See, e.g., Adam Withnal, “Paris Attacks: Isis ‘Chemical Weapons’ Warning Issued by French PM Manuel Valls”, The Independent, 20 November 2015, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attacks-french-pm-manuel-valls-issues-isis-chemical-weapons-warning-a6740156.html; Philippe Wojazer, “French PM Valls Says Chemical Warfare Risk Not Ruled Out”, Reuters, 19 November 2015, available at: www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/19/us-france-shooting-chemicalweapons-idUSKCN0T80W220151119.

6 The Monterey WMD Terrorism Database provides an overview of worldwide incidents involving the acquisition, possession, threat and use of weapons of mass destruction by sub-State actors, based on open sources. Available at: http://wmddb.miis.edu/.

7 See, e.g., Robyn Pangi, “Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway System”, Discussion Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2002, available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/consequence_management_in_the_1995_sarin_attacks_on_the_japanese_subway_system.pdf.

8 See, e.g., FBI, “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation”, Famous Cases & Criminals, available at: www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-amerithrax.

9 For information about the Bhopal incident, see Jackson B. Browning, Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal, report, 1993, available at: www.environmentportal.in/files/report-1.pdf; “1984: Hundreds Die in Bhopal Chemical Accident”, BBC On this Day: 3 December, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/newsid_2698000/2698709.stm.

10 Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary Ackerman, Recommendations on the Development of Methodologies and Attributes for Assessing Terrorist Threats of WMD Terrorism, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2005, p. 39.

11 RFI, “Gunmen Attack French Uranium Plant in Central African Republic – Army”, RFI English, 25 June 2012, available at: www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120625-gunmen-attack-french-uranium-plant-central-african-republic.

12 In June 2015, an employee of a chemical plant in south-eastern France decapitated his boss, took photographs of himself with the head and an IS flag, and caused an explosion by driving his van into a warehouse containing chemicals. “France Put on High Alert after Attack on Chemical Plant”, Al Jazeera, 26 June 2015, available at: www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/attack-reported-factory-southeastern-france-150626091038049.html. In July 2015, two explosions at a petrochemical plant took place that were believed to be a malicious act due to the distance between the two tanks. Rebecca Trager, “Failed Terror Attack Raises Alarms about Chemical Plant Security”, Chemistry World, 2 July 2015, available at: www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2015/07/failed-terrorist-attack-chemical-plant-security; Henry Samuel, “Two Blasts in French Chemical Plant Caused by ‘Malicious Act’”, The Telegraph, 14 July 2015, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11739009/Two-blasts-in-French-chemical-plant-caused-by-malicious-act.html.

13 Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital Weapon”, Wired, 11 March 2014, available at: www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/; Mike M. Ahlers, “Inside a Government Computer Attack Exercise”, CNN News, 17 October 2011, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/17/tech/innovation/cyberattack-exercise-idaho/.

14 In fact, there are strong suspicions that the anthrax letters case of 2001 was due to the actions of a single person with access to a US biological defence laboratory. “FBI Concludes Investigation into 2001 Anthrax Mailings”, CNN News, 19 February 2010, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/19/fbi.anthrax.report/.

15 Bartosz H. Stanislawski, “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and WMD”, in Blum, Andrew, Asal, Victor and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (eds), “Nonstate Actors, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, in International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 7, 2005, p. 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Christian Leuprecht and Kenneth Hall, “Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function”, in Anthony J. Masys, Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security, Lecture Notes in Social Networks, SpringerLink, 2004, p. 86.

16 Due to the lack of (statistical) studies, empirical analysis of CBRN attacks is virtually impossible and it is difficult to comprehend the potential extent of attacks by non-State groups using CBRN weapons. Kazi, Reshmi, “The Correlation Between Non-State Actors and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2011, p. 2Google Scholar.

17 Amuary Vergely, “CBRN Weapons and Non-State Actors”, Theriskyshift.com, 13 May 2013, available at: http://theriskyshift.com/author/amaury-vergely/.

18 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 19.

19 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 7.

20 Charles D. Ferguson, “WMD Terrorism”, in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner (eds), Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy, Studies in Security and International Affairs, University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA, 2009, p. 40.

21 Andy Oppenheimer, “A Sickening Episode: Nuclear Looting in Iraq and the Global Threat From Radiological Weapons”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 73, October–November 2002; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union”, Arms Control Today, 1 July 2007, available at: www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/CoverStory.

22 A. Oppenheimer, above note 21; S. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, above note 21.

23 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 39.

24 Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychology of WMD Terrorism”, in A. Blum, V. Asal and J. Wilkenfeld (eds), above note 15, p. 149.

25 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 8.

26 Steve Coll, “Nuclear Nightmares: What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima”, Washington Post, 6 February 2005, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A365-2005Feb5.html.

27 See, e.g., Damien McElroy, “Islamic State Seeks to Use Bubonic Plague as a Weapon of War”, The Telegraph, 29 August 2014, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11064133/Islamic-State-seeks-to-use-bubonic-plague-as-a-weapon-of-war.html.

28 C. D. Ferguson and W. C. Potter, above note 20, p. 39.

29 See, e.g., Amy E. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo”, in Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy (eds), Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 1999, available at: www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/atxchapter3.pdf; Richard Danzig, Marc Sageman, Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosford, Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons, 2nd ed., Center for a New American Security, December 2012, available at: www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf.

30 For more information, see Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism. Macmillan, New York, 2000.

31 C. D. Ferguson and W. C. Potter, above note 18, p. 20.

32 “Green Anarchism: Towards the Abolition of Hierarchy”, Freedom, 29 August 2014, available at: http://freedomnews.org.uk/green-anarchism-towards-the-abolition-of-hierarchy/; Nick Harding, “Eco Anarchists: A New Breed of Terrorist?”, Independent, 18 May 2010, available at: www.independent.co.uk/environment/eco-anarchists-a-new-breed-of-terrorist-1975559.html.

33 Frost, Robin M., “Terrorist Psychology, Motivation and Strategy”, The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 45, No. 378, 2005, p. 46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 8.

35 J. M. Post, above note 24, p. 150.

36 Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland, “Right-Wing Extremist Terrorism as Deadly a Threat as Al Qaeda?”, CNN News, 8 August 2012, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/07/opinion/bergen-terrorism-wisconsin/.

37 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 8.

38 J. M. Post, above note 24, p. 149.

39 With regard to fear relating to terrorist attacks with a focus on CBRN materials, see, e.g., Rogers, Brooke, Amlot, Richard, Rubin, G. James, Wessely, Simon and Krieger, Kirstian, “Mediating the Social and Psychological Impacts of Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Risk Perception and Risk Communication”, International Review of Psychiatry, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2007, pp. 279–288CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 21.

41 Ibid., pp. 11–12. Arguably, given the frequency of bombings resulting in mass casualties, it could be argued that only conventional attacks which result in hundreds or thousands of deaths and injured (9/11-style attacks) are likely to have a similar psychological impact as successful acts of CBRN terrorism, even those that are small in scale.

42 For more information on the “worried well” phenomenon, see Fred P. Stone, “The Worried Well Response to CBRN Events: Analysis and Solutions”, The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 40, USAF Counterproliferation Centre, June 2007, pp. 6–7, available at: https://fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/worried.pdf.

43 Fran Pilch, The Worried Well: Strategies for Installation Commanders, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, 2004, p. 12.

44 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 31.

45 Lizzie Dearden “Isis ‘Manufacturing and Using Chemical Weapons’ in Iraq and Syria, US Official Claims”, The Independent, 11 September 2015, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-manufacturing-and-using-chemical-weapons-in-iraq-and-syria-us-official-claims-10496094.html.

46 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 35.

47 Lara Logan, “Child Suicide Bombers”, CBS News, 12 May 2015, available at: www.cbsnews.com/news/child-suicide-bombers-lara-logan-60-minutes/; “Nigerian City of Maiduguri ‘Attacked by Five Child Bombers’”, BBC News, 2 October 2015, available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34423311; Marisol Seibold, “Child Suicide Bombers: ‘They Told Us the Bombs Would Not Kill Us …’”, Jihad Watch, 14 January 2012, available at: www.jihadwatch.org/2012/01/child-suicide-bombers-they-told-us-the-bombs-would-not-kill-us-only-the-americans-would-die-and-you.

48 Jim Garamone, “Terrorists Using Chlorine Car Bombs to Intimidate Iraqis”, American Forces Press Service, 6 June 2007, available at: http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46311.

49 Tim Ballard, Jason Pate, Gary Ackerman, Diana McCauley and Sean Lawson, “Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo's CBW Activities”, CNS Reports, 2001.

50 See, e.g., The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, Future Issue: The Future of CBRN, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2010, pp. 7–8.

51 For example, IS took control of the Al Muthanna facility, a former chemical weapons complex of Saddam Hussein's, in July 2014. Most of the remaining chemicals are no longer intact, and experts therefore believe that transforming them into military-grade weapons and delivery systems may be beyond the facility's current capability. “Isis Seizes Former Chemical Weapons Plant in Iraq”, The Guardian, 9 July 2014, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/09/isis-seizes-chemical-weapons-plant-muthanna-iraq.

52 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 69.

53 Ibid., p. 51.

54 Amy E. Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes, Report No. 32, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, December 1999.

55 Ted Robert Gurr, “Which Minorities Might Use Weapons of Mass Destruction?”, in A. Blum, V. Asal and J. Wilkenfeld, above note 15, p. 144.

56 Ibid., pp. 144–145.

57 See, e.g., Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing, OECD, Paris, 29 February 2008, available at: www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf.

58 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., Pearson, Harlow, 2010, p. 901.

59 Financial Action Task Force, The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering, October 2013, available at: www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/role-hawalas-in-ml-tf.html.

60 Ibid.

61 A. Blum, V. Asal, J. Wilkenfeld, above note 15, pp. 135–136.

62 Cyrus Miryekta, “Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America”, Small Wars Journal, 10 September 2010.

63 Gary Ackerman, “WMD Terrorism Research: Whereto from Here?”, in A. Blum, V. Asal and J. Wilkenfeld, above note 15, pp. 142–143.

64 UNSC Res. 1373, 28 September 2001, para. 2.

65 Christopher Szechenyi, “Inside the Village of Aum Shinrikyo”, Moscow Times, 22 April 1995, available at: www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/inside-the-village-of-aum-shinrikyo/340092.html.

66 Francis Marlo, “WMD Terrorism and US Intelligence Collection”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1999.

67 “‘ISIS Branch’ Seeking to Produce Chemical Weapons – Iraq and US Intel”, RT, 19 November 2015, available at: www.rt.com/news/322726-ISIS-chemical-weapons-intel/.

68 Chris Summers, “Questions Over Ricin Conspiracy”, BBC News, 13 April 2005, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4433499.stm.

69 Edwin Bakker, “CBRN Terrorisme”, in Erwin R. Muller, Uri Rosenthal and Rob de Wijk (eds.), Terrorisme: Studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding, Kluwer, Deventer, 2008, p. 135; “The Ricin Case Timeline”, BBC News, 13 April 2005, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4433459.stm.

70 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 50.

71 Asal, Victor H., Ackerman, Gary A. and Rethemeyer, R. Karl, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2012, p. 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 US Department of State, Clinton in Geneva at Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, December 2011, available at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/12/20111207104803su0.7202352.html?distid=ucs#axzz32iEEcrh1.

73 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 43.

74 Gerechtshof's-Gravenhage, Strafzaak Van Anraat, Case No. 2200050906-2, 9 May 2007, para. 8, available in Dutch at: http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2007:BA4676.

75 Ian Anthony, “Exports of Dual-Use Chemicals to Syria: An Assessment of European Union Export Controls”, Non-Proliferation Paper No. 35, January 2014.

76 For example, for information on illegal trade in nuclear components, see David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker, “Detecting and Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade after A. Q. Khan”, Washington Quarterly, April 2010, pp. 85–106.

77 R. Pangi, above note 7.

78 Marc-Michael Blum, Andre Richardt and Kai Kehe, “Preparedness”, in Andre Richardt, Birgit Hülseweh, Bernd Niemeyer and Frank Sabath (eds), CBRN Protection: Managing the Threat of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Weapons, Wiley-VCH Verlag, Weinheim, 2013, p. 442.

79 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 28.

80 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, 1998, pp. 102, 106, cited in J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 52.

81 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 27.

82 J. Garamone, above note 48.

83 D. McElroy, above note 27.

84 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 29.

85 Jeffrey R. Ryan and Jan F. Glarum, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats, Elsevier, Burlington, MA, 2008, pp. 140–142.

86 A. Vergely, above note 17.

87 See, e.g., the work of Raymond A. Zilinskas, Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1998.

88 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 55.

89 See B. H. Stanislawski, above note 15; C. Leuprecht and K. Hall, above note 15.

90 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 54.

91 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, pp. 31–32.

92 In the context of weaponization, tacit knowledge potentially plays an important role as a “barrier to optimising and creating effective bioweapons”. The important sociotechnical aspects of biotechnology, including the role of tacit knowledge, are described in Revill, James and Jefferson, Catherine, “Tacit Knowledge and the Biological Weapons Regime”, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2014, p. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/46723.

93 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 52.

94 US Department of State, above note 72.

95 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 32.

96 R. Danzig et al., above note 29, pp. 14–26.

97 J. R. Ryan and J. F. Glarum, above note 85, pp. 140–142.

98 R. M. Frost, above note 33, p. 54.

99 D. McElroy, above note 27.

100 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 33.

101 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, pp. 57–58.

102 Jessica Varnum, “CNS Releases Annual Nuclear Trafficking Report, 153 Incidents in 2013 Reported”, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 19 March 2014, available at: www.nonproliferation.org/cns-releases-annual-nuclear-trafficking-report-153-incidents-in-2013-reported/.

103 Benjamin Pack and Bryan Lee, CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database: Tracking Publicly Reported Incidents Involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, 2014 Annual Report, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2015, available at: www.nti.org/media/pdfs/global_incidents_and_trafficking2015.pdf?_=1429915567.

104 John Pichtel, Terrorism and WMDs: Awareness and Response, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2011, p. 176.

105 Lexi Krock and Rebecca Deusser, “Chronology of Events”, in Nova: Dirty Bomb, February 2003, available at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/dirtybomb/chrono.html.

106 Ibid.

107 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 35. A permissive action link is a security device that prevents unauthorized detonation of the weapon.

108 E. Bakker, above note 69, p. 146.

109 David E. Sanger, “The Khan Network”, Conference Paper, Conference of South Asia and the Future, Stanford University, 4–5 June 2004.

110 D. Albright, P. Brannan and A. Scheel Stricker, above note 76, pp. 85–106.

111 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 36.

112 For a more technical discussion, see Wirtz, Christophe and Egger, Emmanuel, “Use of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons by Terrorists?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 8, No. 859, 2005Google Scholar, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-859-p497.

113 R. Kazi, above note 16, p. 4.

114 William J. Broad, “Seismic Mystery in Australia: Quake, Meteor or Nuclear Blast?”, New York Times, 21 January 1997, available at: www.nytimes.com/1997/01/21/science/seismic-mystery-in-australia-quake-meteor-or-nuclear-blast.html.

115 C. D. Ferguson, above note 20, p. 40.

116 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, pp. 10–11.

117 See R. Pangi, above note 7.

118 J. M. Bale and G. Ackerman, above note 10, p. 56.

119 Ibid., p. 14.

120 Coupland, Robin and Loye, Dominique, “International assistance for victims of use of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons: time for a reality check?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874, June 2009, p. 333CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

121 Ibid., p. 334.

122 Ibid.

123 National Resource Council, Reopening Public Facilities after a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework, National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2005, p. 1.

124 J. Rehman, above note 58, p. 908. However, inducing “attacks” on innocent victims in an attempt to eradicate terrorists could lead to the reverse effect. Terrorism often thrives in environments in which human rights are violated. Non-State actors may exploit such violations to gain support for their cause and motivate new generations of militants to seek revenge. Thus, regimes may end up in a vicious circle in which terrorism is met with terrorism.