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Organized crime and gang violence in national and international law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2010

Pierre Hauck  and
Sven Peterke
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Abstract

Organized crime and gang violence are global phenomena that often emerge in urban areas. Although they are not new, states only recently began to perceive them as serious threats to public security. Laws specifically designed to combat them have consequently been enacted. This article outlines the difficulties of dealing adequately in legal terms with these phenomena and analyses the different approaches adopted so far at the national and international level.

Type
Urban violence
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 92 , Issue 878: Urban violence , June 2010 , pp. 407 - 436
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2010

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References

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14 Hagan proposes ‘that “Organized Crime” be used to refer to crime organizations, while “organized crime” will refer to activities, crimes that often require a degree of organization on the part of the committing them’ and notes ‘that not all “organized crime” is committed by “Organized Crime” groups’. See Hagan, Frank E., ‘“Organized Crime” and “organized crime”: indeterminate problems of definition’, in Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2006, p. 134CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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17 For a comprehensive list of definitions, see Klaus von Lampe's compilation, available at: http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm (last visited 15 February 2010).

18 Peter-Alexis Albrecht, Kriminologie: Eine Grundlegung zum Strafrecht, Beck, Munich, 2005, pp. 343–352.

19 Sobotkiewiz, Nicole and Klopfstein, Matthias, ‘Organisierte Kriminalität: bestehende Bedrohung – trotz definitorischer Unbestimmtheit’, in Angewandte Sozialforschung, Vol. 22, Nos 3 and 4, 2002, pp. 151–154Google Scholar; Hofmann, Katarina, ‘The impact of organized crime on democratic governance: focus on Latin America and the Caribbean’, in FES Briefing Paper, No. 13, 2006, pp. 2–8Google Scholar; John T. Picarelli, ‘Transnational organized crime’, in Paul D. Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 464.

20 For a description of Rio de Janeiro's urban violence, see Sven Peterke, Rio de Janeiro's ‘Drogenkrieg’ im Lichte der Konfliktforschung und des Völkerrechts, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp. 5–22; Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, a New Urban World, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 253–270.

21 For details see ‘Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights including the right to development’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, and arbitrary executions, Mr Philip Alston, Addendum, ‘Mission to Brazil’, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, 23 March 2009, p. 9.

22 For an instructive analysis and photos, see Luke Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade: A Case Study of Children in Organized Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro, 7Letras, Rio de Janeiro, 2003. See also Jailson de Souza e Silva and André Urani, Brazil: Children in Drug Trafficking – A Rapid Assessment, International Labour Office (ed.), International Programme against the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva, 2002, pp. 5–8.

23 L. Dowdney, above note 22, pp. 46–51.

24 Although many refer to them as ‘gangs’, their classification as criminal organizations does not seem to be controversial. See Roberto Porto, Crime organizado e sistema prisional, Atlas, São Paulo, 2006, p. 86; Ana Luiza Almeida Ferro, Crime organizado e organizações criminosas, Juruá, Curitiba, 2009, p. 545.

25 In favour of such differentiation: Dieter Schwind, Kriminologie: eine praxisorientierte Einführung mit Beispielen, Kriminalistik Verlag, Heidelberg, 2008, p. 620; S. Peterke, above note 20, p. 9.

26 The numerous theories attempting to explain the phenomenon outlined cannot be presented here. For a general overview, see Larry J. Siegel and Brandon C. Welsh, Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice, and Law, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA 2009, pp. 312–315; Morash, Merry, ‘Gangs, groups and delinquency’, in British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1989, pp. 309–331CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Scott H. Decker and Barrik van Winkle, Life in the Gang: Family, Friends, and Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 23–25; A. Wright, above note 7, p. 44.

28 M. W. Klein, Gang Cop: The Words and Ways of Officer Paco Domingo, Alta Mira Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2004, p. 59; Ulrich Eisenberg, Kriminologie, Beck, Munich, 2005, p. 920; D. Schwind, above note 25, p. 583.

29 See Francis A. Ianni with Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1972, p. 53; A. Wright, above note 7, pp. 38–39.

30 See Celinda Franco, The MS–13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Threats?, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 6; Deborah L. Weisel, ‘The evolution of street gangs: an examination of form and variation’, in Winifred L. Reed and Scott H. Decker (eds), Responding to Gangs: Evaluation and Research, US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC, pp. 25–65.

31 Irving A. Spergel, The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, p. 129.

32 Ball, Richard A. and Curry, G. David, ‘The logic of definition in criminology: purposes and methods for defining “gangs”’, in Criminology, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1995, p. 225CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Matusitz, Jonathan and Repass, Michael, ‘Gangs in Nigeria: an updated examination’, in Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 52, 2009, p. 496CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. Wright, above note 7, p. 31.

33 Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, Art. 2(e), available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/maharashtra1999.htm (last visited 30 March 2010).

34 Ley Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizado, DOF 23–01–2009, available at: http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/101.pdf (last visited 30 March 2010).

35 Ibid., Art. 2.

36 Austrian Penal Code, Art. 278a, available at: http://www.ibiblio.org/ais/stgb.htm (last visited 30 March 2010).

37 Ibid., Art. 278(2): ‘A criminal association is a confraternity of more than two people established for a longer period of time and for the commitment by one or more of its members of one or more felonies [Verbrechen], other serious crimes [Gewalttaten] against life or limb, not only minor damage to property, thefts, frauds, or offences [Vergehen] under Articles 104a, 165, 177b, 233 to 239, 241a to 241c, 241e, 241f, 304 or 307 [of the Penal Code] or under Articles 114(2) or 116 of the Aliens Police Law [Fremdenpolizeigesetz]’. Conversely, the formation of a gang (Bandenbildung) only required a loose confraternity of more than two people to commit an ‘undetermined multitude’ of crimes, according to Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Österreich’, in Walter Gropp and Arndt Sinn (eds), Organisierte Kriminalität und kriminelle Organisationen: präventive und repressive Massnahmen vor dem Hintergrund des 11. September 2001, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007, pp. 262ff.

38 Austrian Penal Code, Arts. 278b and 279.

39 German Penal Code, Arts. 129, 129a, 129b, available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (last visited 30 March 2010).

40 Ibid., Arts. 244(1)2, 244a, 250(1)2, and (2)2.

41 See ibid., Art. 224(1)2, No. 3.

42 See, also for the following analysis, Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 5th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 163, with further references in note 29.

43 Código Penal, Art. 288, available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL/Decreto-Lei/Del2848.htm (last visited 30 March 2010).

44 Law No. 9.034 (1999), modified by Law No. 10.217 (2001), available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9034.htm (last visited 30 March 2010).

45 For details, see Peterke, Sven, ‘Die Strafbarkeit krimineller Vereinigungen nach brasilianischem Recht’, in Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, Vol. 3, No. 5, 2008, p. 259Google Scholar, available at: http://www.zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2008_5_237.pdf (last visited 30 March 2010).

46 California Penal Code, Section 186.22.(f), available at: http://law.justia.com/california/codes/pen.html (last visited 30 March 2010). For further analysis, see François Haut and Stéphane Quéré, Les bandes criminelles, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2001, pp. 13ff.

47 For the three distinct forms of conspiracy under English law, see Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, A6.39ff.

48 Criminal Law Act 1977, Section 1(1).

49 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 452. For the ambivalent nature of conspiracy, see ibid., p. 451.

50 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1961, p. 609.

51 For the debate on the justification for the offence, see A. Ashworth, above note 49, pp. 448–452; G. Williams, above note 50, p. 710.

52 Coulson, Chris, ‘Criminal conspiracy law in Japan’, in Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, 2007, p. 864Google Scholar.

53 Public Order Act 1986, Section 2(1). German law provides for a very similar concept in Section 125 of the Penal Code.

54 In German law, there is a similar restriction for what is termed ‘act from out of a crowd’ (Menschenmenge), i.e. an act by fewer than a crowd.

55 See e.g. German Penal Code, Art. 244(1)2 (from a fine to imprisonment from six months to ten years), Art. 250(1)2 (from at least one year's to at least three years' imprisonment) and Art. 224(1)2 No. 4 (from a fine to at least six months' and up to ten years' imprisonment), increasing the mandatory range of punishment for theft, robbery, and bodily harm in cases of group or gang conduct.

56 David Felsen and Akis Kalaitzidis, ‘A historical overview of transnational crime’, in Philip Reichel (ed.), Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, SAGE Publications, London, 2005, p. 12; Robert Esser, Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht, DeGruyter, Berlin, 2002, p. 22.

57 Although bilateral agreements undoubtedly have been and still are of great relevance, often containing special rules or closing important legal gaps, these international treaties cannot be dealt with in the present article.

58 See in general Nikos Passas (ed.), Transnational Crime, Ashgate, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1999; Raimo Väyrynen, Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, 2003; Gargi Bhattacharyya, Trafficked: The Illicit Movement of People and Things, Pluto, London, 2005; Kimberley L. Thachuk (ed.), Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2007; David Kyle and Rey Koslowski (eds), Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2001.

59 Boister, Neil, ‘‘Transnational criminal law’?’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2003, p. 954CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nikos Passas, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2003, pp. xiii–xiv.

60 The UNODC estimates the global value of the illicit drug trade at US$ 322 billion, and that of human trafficking at US$ 32 billion; see UNODC (ed.), 2007 World Drug Report, UNODC, New York, 2007, p. 170.

61 Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz, Nomos, Basel, 2005, p. 411. For an instructive historical overview, see David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary Forms, New York and Geneva, 2002 (UN Doc. HR/PUB/02/04), pp. 3–8.

62 See Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 267ff.; Michael Haas, International Human Rights: A Comprehensive Introduction, Routledge, New York, 2008, pp. 47–50.

63 Brazil formally abolished slavery in 1888. See Luiz Flávio Gomes and Valério de Oliveira Mazzuoli, Comentários à Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos: Pacto de San José da Costa Rica, Editora Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, 2009, p. 46.

64 See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, GA Res. 217A (III), Art. 4; and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 8 (entered into force 23 March 1976).

65 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32; Treblincock, Anne M., ‘Slavery’, in Bernhardt, Rudolf (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. IV, 2000, p. 422Google Scholar; Rassam, A. Yasmin, ‘Contemporary forms of slavery and the evolution of the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade under customary international law’, in Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 1999, p. 303Google Scholar.

66 Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade, 8 February 1815, 63 Consol. TS 473, adopted during the Peace Conference in Vienna.

67 1926 Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention, 25 September 1926, 212 UNTS 17, Art. 1 (entered into force 9 March 1927). The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 UNTS 3 (entered into force 30 April 1957) broadened its scope of application.

68 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 18 May 1904, 11 LNTS 83 (entered into force 18 July 1905); succeeded by the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 4 May 1910; both instruments were supplemented by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 30 September 1921 (entered into force 15 June 1922), which abolished the limitation to white persons.

69 See e.g. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 7(2) (entered into force 1 July 2002); Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ‘Enslavement as international crime’, in New York University Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, 1991, p. 448Google Scholar.

70 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/45/49), Vol. I (entered into force 25 December 2003).

71 Sandeep Chawla and Thomas Pietschmann, ‘A historical overview of transnational crime’, in P. Reichel, above note 56, p. 161; Bayer, Istvan and Ghodse, Hamit, ‘The evolution of international drug control, 1945–1995’, in Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. 51, Nos 1 and 2, 1999, p. 1Google Scholar.

72 International Opium Convention, 23 January 1912, 8 LNTS 187 (entered into force 19 February 1915).

73 Ibid., Art. 8–16 and 19–21.

74 To name a few: Second International Opium Convention, 19 February 1925, 81 LNTS 318 (entered into force 25 September 1928); Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, 13 July 1931, 139 LNTS 301 (entered into force 9 July 1933); Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 26 June 1936, 198 LNTS 299 (entered into force 26 October 1939); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 520 UNTS 204 (entered into force 13 December 1964); Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 25 March 1972, 976 UNTS 3 (entered into force 8 August 1975); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 21 February 1971, 1019 UNTS 175 (entered into force 16 August 1976). Yet some issues, such as the status of coca, still remain unclear. See Thoumi, Franciso E., ‘A modest proposal to clarify the status of coca in the United Nations conventions’, in Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 42, 2004, pp. 297–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 See Patrick Robinson, ‘The missing crimes’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R. W. D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002 pp. 498–499 and 523–524, listing the thirteen most important conventions.

76 This convention was – like many others – signed in 1936 by the more or less particularly affected states, such as China, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

77 Adopted on 20 December 1988, entered into force on 11 November 1990 (reprinted in 28 ILM 493 (1988)).

78 In January 2010, it had 184 states parties: see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/illicit-trafficking.html (last visited 29 January 2010).

79 For a comprehensive study, see David McClean, Transnational Organized Crime: A Commentary on the UN Convention and its Protocols, Oxford, 2007.

80 UNCTOC, Art. 1.

81 Independently from organized crime, corruption is dealt with in a series of universal and regional instruments, and in particular in the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 43 ILM (2004) 37 (entered into force 14 December 2005). For an instructive overview of pertinent instruments, see Wolf, Sebastian, ‘Internationale Korruptionsbekämpfung: Anmerkungen zum zehnjährigen Jubliläum des OECD-Bestechungsübereinkommens’, in Kritische Justiz, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2008, pp. 367–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 Similarly, money laundering and asset recovery are dealt with independently from organized crime in a series of instruments such as the above-mentioned United Nations Convention against Corruption or the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, 8 November 1990, Council of Europe, CETS No. 141. However, the 1988 UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances already obliged states to criminalize the laundering of profits obtained from drug offences.

83 UNCTOC, Arts. 5, 6, 8, and 23.

84 See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html (last visited 25 March 2010). Major countries that still have not ratified the UNCTOC include the Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam.

85 See UNODC (ed.), Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, United Nations, New York, 2006, p. xxi.

86 UNCTOC, Art. 2.

87 See e.g. Orlova, Alexandra W. and Moore, James W., ‘“Umbrellas” or “building blocks”: defining international terrorism and transnational organized crime in international law’, in Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2005, pp. 282–287Google Scholar; J. O. Finckenauer, above note 12, p. 68. The UNCTOC treaty is also criticized for other reasons: see e.g. Enck, Jennifer L., ‘The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: is it all that it is cracked up to be? Problems posed by the Russian mafia in the trafficking of human beings’, in Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 30, 2003, pp. 394Google Scholar.

88 For the struggle to reach a definition in the travaux préparatoires, see D. McClean, above note 79, pp. 38ff.

89 Betti, Stefano, ‘New prospects for inter-state co-operation in criminal matters: the Palermo Convention’, in International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, 2003, p. 152CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 UNODC (ed.), Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol thereto, United Nations, New York, 2004, para. 26.

91 Recent studies convincingly demonstrate the continuing need to distinguish between these phenomena. See e.g. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, Brookings, Washington, DC, 2010; also Björnehed, Emma, ‘Narco-terrorism: the merger of the war on drugs and the war on terror’, in Global Crime, Vol. 6, Nos 3–4, 2004, p. 315CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 Valsamis Mitsileges, ‘From national to global – from empirical to legal: the ambivalent concept of transnational organized crime’, in Margaret E. Beare (ed.), Critical Reflections on the Concept of Transnational Organized Crime, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2003; A. W. Orlova and J. W. Moore, above note 87, p. 284.

93 Peterke, Sven and Lopes, Silvia Regina Pontes, ‘Crime organizado e legislação brasileira à luz da Convenção de Palermo: algumas observações criticas’, in Verba Juris, Vol. 7, 2008, p. 413Google Scholar.

94 See UNCTOC, Arts. 11–21.

95 Ibid., Arts. 20, 24–30.

96 Ibid., Art. 31.

97 Ibid., Art. 34(1); UNODC, above note 90, para. 36.

98 UNCTOC, Art. 32(1).

99 Ibid., Arts. 33(1), (2)(a) and (b).

100 Its last session was held in Vienna, 8–17 October 2008. The numerous documents produced are available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/CTOC-COP.html?ref=menuside (last visited 22 February 2010).

101 Decision 4/2, ‘Implementation of the provisions on international cooperation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in its Fourth Session, UN Doc. CTOC/COP/2008/19, 1 December 2008, sub-para. II(i).

102 Decision 4/1, ‘Possible mechanisms to review implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto’, in ibid., sub-para. (f).

103 For an overview of the work done by UNODC, see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html?ref=menuside (last visited 22 February 2010).

104 Thilo Marauhn, ‘Völkerrechtliche Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung von organisierter Kriminalität und Terrorismus’, in W. Gropp and A. Sinn, above note 37, pp. 485ff.

105 UNCTOC, Art. 34(2). With regard to the involvement of an organized criminal group, the article makes it clear that Article 5 (participation in an organized criminal group) logically presupposes such an association.

106 For this, ‘substantial effects in another State’ are sufficient (UNCTOC, Art. 3(2)).

107 Vincenzo Militello, ‘The Palermo UN Convention: a global challenge against transnational organised crime’, in Jan C. Joerden et al. (eds), Vergleichende Strafrechtswissenschaft: Frankfurter Festschrift für Andrzej Szwarc zum 70. Geburtstag, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2009, p. 365.

108 Adopted on 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003, UN Doc. A/Res/55/25.

109 Adopted on, 15 November 2000, entered into force 28 January 2004, UN Doc. A/Res/55/25.

110 Adopted on 31 May 2001, entered into force 3 July 2005, UN Doc. A/Res/55/255.

111 Firearms Protocol, Art. 1. For a discussion of the drafting history, see Marjorie Anne Brown, ‘The United Nations and “gun control” ’, in Marylin F. Swartz (ed.), United Nations in Focus: Issues and Perspectives, Nova, New York, 2007, pp. 61–67.

112 Based on a broad definition of ‘firearm’ (Art. 3(a)), Articles 8 and 9 in particular of the Firearms Protocol contain important minimum standards for record-keeping and marking.

113 See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html (last visited 25 February 2010).

114 For an instructive list of countries, see http://www.iansa.org/un/firearms-protocol.htm (last visited 29 April 2010).

115 Besides numerous plans or actions and pertinent soft law, there are, for instance, the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, 14 November 1997; the Southern African Development Community's Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, 14 August 2001; and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 24 November 2000.

116 For a discussion of the difficulties in regulating the trade in small arms, see Marsh, Nicholas, ‘Two sides of the same coin? The legal and illegal trade in small arms’, in The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002, p. 217Google Scholar.

117 Trafficking Protocol, Art. 3(a), supplemented by sub-paras (b) und (c). The details of this definition are not easy to understand and are subject to criticism. See Scarpa, Silvia, ‘Child trafficking: international instruments to protect the most vulnerable victims’, in Family Court Review, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2006, p. 434CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heintze, Hans-Joachim and Peterke, Sven, ‘Inhalt und Bedeutung des VN-Protkolls zur Verhütung, Unterdrückung und Bestrafung des Menschenhandels’, in Humanitäres Völkerrecht-Informationsschriften, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2008, pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

118 Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Art. 3(a).

119 Gallagher, Anne, ‘Trafficking, smuggling and human rights: tricks and treaties’, in Forced Migration Review, No. 12, 2002, pp. 25–27Google Scholar.

120 Bhaba, Jacqueline and Zard, Monette, ‘Smuggled or trafficked?’, in Forced Migration Review, No. 25, 2006, p. 8Google Scholar.

121 For a listing of the pertinent instruments, see Irena Omelaniuk, Trafficking in Human Beings, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Migration and Development, 6–8 July 2005, UN Doc. UN/POP/MIG/2005/15, 1 July 2005, p. 8. See also the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CETS No. 197, 16 May 2005 (entered into force 1 February 2008).

122 See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html (last visited 25 February 2010).

123 C 115/47 (entered into force 1 December 2009), Official Journal of the European Union, 9 May 2008. See Arndt Sinn, ‘Das Lagebild der organisierten Kriminalität in der Europäischen Union: Tendenzen, rechtliche Initiativen und Perspektiven einer wirksamen OK-Bekämpfung’, in W. Gropp and A. Sinn, above note 37, pp. 506ff.

124 ‘Towards a European strategy to prevent organised crime’, Commission Staff Working Paper, joint report from Commission services and EUROPOL, SEC (2001) 433, Annex, p. 42, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/forum_crimen/documents/sec_2001_433_en.pdf (last visited 29 April 2010).

125 See Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:300:0042:0045:EN:PDF (last visited 30 March 2010).

126 As explained above, criminal organizations can metamorphose into terrorist organizations. When this point is reached is difficult to say. It is clear that criminal organizations also pursue political interests, but their primary motivation is material benefit and not an ideology.

127 See David Southwell, Die Geschichte des organisierten Verbrechens, Fackelträger, Cologne, 2007, p. 283.

128 See Carlos Amorim, CV-PCC: A Irmandade do Crime, Record, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 2005, p. 380.

129 Three policemen died. See E. Luiz, ‘PM não resiste a queimaduras’, in Correio Braziliense, 20 October 2009. At least thirty-nine people were killed in the wave of violence that followed.

130 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNCIO XV, 355 (entered into force 24 October 1945).

131 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, pp. 14ff., para. 147.

132 Ibid., para. 100; Georg Dahm, Jost Delbrück, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, Vol. I/2, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2002, p. 822; Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, Beck, Munich, 2004, para. 58, margin note 29.

133 Seemingly: see Bruha, Thomas and Bortfeld, Matthias, ‘Terrorismus und Selbstverteidigung: Voraussetzungen und Umfang erlaubter Selbstverteidigungsmassnahmen nach den Anschlägen des 11. September 2001’, in Vereinte Nationen, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2001, p. 163Google Scholar.

134 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2008, pp. 732ff.; Stefan Hobe, Einführung in das Völkerrecht, UTB, Köln, 2008, p. 328; Joachim Wolf, Die Haftung der Staaten für Privatpersonen nach Völkerrecht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1997, pp. 456ff.

135 ICJ, above note 131, para. 191.

136 See Dario Azzellini, ‘Kolumbien: Versuchslabor für privatisierte Kriegsführung’, in Dario Azzelini and Boris Kanzleiter (eds), Das Unternehmen Krieg: Paramilitärs, Warlords und Privatarmeen als Akteure der Neuen Kriegssordnung, Assoziation A, Berlin, 2003, p. 32.

137 See Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Juris Publishing, New York, 2008, p. 93.

138 For an overview of the discussion, as well as references, see S. Hobe, above note 134, pp. 341ff.; Stahn, Carsten, ‘International law at a crossroads? The impact of September 11’, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 62, 2002, pp. 183Google Scholarff.

139 Matthias Herdegen, Völkerrecht, Beck, Munich, 2006, p. 240; See also Malanczuk, Peter, ‘Countermeasures and self-defence as circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility’, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 43, 1983, p. 797Google Scholar.

140 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 136ff., para. 139.

141 See Wolf, Joachim, ‘Terrorismusbekämpfung unter Beweisnot: völkerrechtliche Informationsanforderungen im bewaffneten Konflikt’, in Humanitäres Völkerrecht-Informationsschriften, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2001, pp. 210Google Scholarff.; S. Hobe, above note 134, pp. 341f.

142 Greenwood, Christopher, ‘The development of international humanitarian law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 2, 1998, p. 114Google Scholar; Robert Heinsch, Die Weiterentwicklung des humanitären Völkerrechts durch die Strafgerichtshöfe für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und Ruanda, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2007, p. 92. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(f).

143 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion to Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT–94–1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 70.

144 With regard to Rio de Janeiro, see S. Peterke, above note 20, pp. 6–22; for the situation in parts of Mexico, see Hoffmann, Karl-Dieter, ‘Regierung contra Kartelle: der Drogenkrieg in Mexiko’, in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 2, 2009, pp. 56–77Google Scholar.

145 Other, in particular transnational, constellations will not be examined here. For a brief discussion of armed conflicts and transnational armed groups, see e.g. Dieter Fleck, ‘The law of non-international armed conflicts’, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, margin note 1201.

146 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 6 December 1999, para. 91.

147 Whether and how exactly the element of ‘protracted armed violence’ has to be interpreted is controversial, but cannot be discussed here. See e.g. Jinks, Derek, ‘September 11 and the laws of war’, in Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2003, p. 28Google Scholar; Kai Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht: Strafanwendungsrecht: Völkerstrafrecht: Europäisches Strafrecht, Beck, Munich, pp. 235–237.

148 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., Judgement (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT–04–84, 3 April 2008, para. 49.

149 Ibid.: ‘Trial Chambers have relied on indicative factors relevant for assessing the “intensity” criterion, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish that the criterion is satisfied.’

150 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 25; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 106; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, ‘The nature of the general legal obligations imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 11.

151 Kretzmer, David, ‘Targeted killing of suspected terrorists: extra-judicial executions or legitimate means of defence?’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2005, p. 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hadden, Tom and Harvey, Colin J., ‘The law of internal crisis and conflict’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 81, No. 833, 1999, p. 119CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

152 For detailed discussion, see Krieger, Heike, ‘A conflict of norms: the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law in the ICRC Customary Law Study’, in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, pp. 265–291CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lubell, Noam, ‘Challenges in applying human rights law to armed conflict’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 860, 2005, pp. 737–754CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

153 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., above note 148, para. 60.

154 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977), 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978).

155 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Judgement (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT–03–66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 89.

156 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Judgement and Sentence (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR–96–13-IT, 27 January 2000, para. 257.

157 L. Dowdney, above note 22, pp. 47ff.; S. Peterke, above note 20, pp. 8f.

158 S. Peterke, above note 20, p. 10; Eugênio J.G. de Aragão, Strategien zur Durchsetzung der völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtung zur Strafverfolgung der Folter am Beispiel Brasiliens: eine Untersuchung zum Verhältnis zwischen Völkerstrafrecht und Staatenverantwortlichkeit, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2007, p. 43.

159 For a discussion of the level of organization required by IHL, see Rosa, Anne-Marie La and Wuerzner, Carolin, ‘Armed groups, sanctions and the implementation of international law’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 870, 2008, pp. 329–330Google Scholar; Christian Schaller, Humanitäres Völkerrecht und nichtstaatliche Akteure: neue Regeln für asymmetrische bewaffnete Konflikte, SWP-Studie, Berlin, 2007, pp. 20f.

160 Pfanner, Toni, ‘David gegen Goliath oder asymmetrische Kriegsführung’, in Humanitäres Völkerrecht-Informationsschriften, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2005, p. 171Google Scholar; Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the International Framework of International Law, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 222.

161 Rona, Gabor, ‘Interesting times for international humanitarian law: challenges from the “war on terror”’, in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2003, p. 60Google Scholar; Marco Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, Harvard University, Occasional Papers Series, No. 6, Winter 2006, p. 11.

162 Phil Williams, ‘Terrorist financing and organized crime: nexus, appropriation, or transformation?’, in Thomas J. Bierstecker and Sue E. Eckert (eds), Countering the Financing of Terrorism, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 134.

163 Organized criminal groups often pose serious threats to fundamental human rights too. International human rights law usually comes into play if the state does not fulfil its duty to protect individuals against such non-state entities. The premises that trigger state responsibility will not be explained here. See e.g. W. Kälin and J. Künzli, above note 61, pp. 107–113. Evidently, weak and failed states are often unable to effectively investigate powerful criminal collectives, hold their members responsible, and protect their victims and those who defend them. Yet holding organized criminal groups directly responsible for human rights violations is still considered difficult to reconcile with the traditional notion of human rights, i.e. as guarantees against the state, although the theoretical bases to justify the horizontal effect of human rights already exist. See e.g. y González, Javier Mijangos, ‘The doctrine of the in Drittwirkung der Grundrechte in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in InDret, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 1–25Google Scholar, available at: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1371114 (last visited 25 February 2010).

164 See K. Ambos, above note 147, p. 99.

165 See, with special reference to that subject, Claus Kress, ‘Völkerstrafrecht der dritten Generation gegen transnationale Gewalt Privater?’, in Gerd Hankel (ed.), Die Macht und das Recht: Beiträge zum Völkerrecht und Völkerstrafrecht zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2008, pp. 323ff.

166 For further analysis, see Ambos, Kai, ‘What does “intent to destroy” in genocide mean?’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 876, 2009, p. 833–858CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

167 Rome Statute, Art. 7(2)(c).

168 See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, above note 143, paras. 654–655.

169 See Cherif M. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Law, Kluwer International, The Hague, 1999, p. 275; Gil, Alicia Gil, ‘Die Tatbestände der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und des Völkermordes im Römischen Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs’, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, Vol. 112, No. 2, 2000, pp. 391–393CrossRefGoogle Scholar; K. Ambos, above note 147, p. 215.

170 See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, margin note 982.

171 Whether Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute establishes a threshold that differs from that of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions has been subject to discussion in legal literature. See D. Fleck, above note 145, p. 610. That discussion is of no relevance for the purposes of the present analysis.

172 For further details, see the court's website, available at: http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=3&id=3&jezik=e (last visited 30 March 2010).

173 Freely adapted from C. Kress, above note 165, pp. 323ff., who speaks of an ‘international criminal law of the third generation’ (emphasis added); for further details, see Kai Ambos, ‘International criminal law at the crossroads: from ad hoc imposition to treaty-based universal jurisdiction’, in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, TMC Asser Press/Cambridge University Press, The Hague, 2010, pp. 161–177.

174 See C. Kress, above note 165, p. 411.