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Taking prisoners: reviewing the international humanitarian law grounds for deprivation of liberty by armed opposition groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2012

Deborah Casalin
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Abstract

While detention by armed opposition groups in non-international armed conflict is a reality that is foreseen and not prohibited by international humanitarian law, the grounds upon which it may take place are not defined. This article looks more closely at the customary international humanitarian law prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and how it can apply to armed opposition groups in a manner that makes compliance realistic. It focuses on the legal bases upon which armed opposition groups may detain persons who are taken into custody in order to remove them from hostilities or for security purposes. An approach to detention by armed opposition groups based on the principles of international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflicts is explored and its limitations defined.

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Articles
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 93 , Issue 883: Engaging armed groups , September 2011 , pp. 743 - 757
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2012

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References

1 Karim Faheem, ‘In the cradle of Libya's uprising, the rebels learn to govern themselves’, in New York Times, 24 February 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/africa/25benghazi.html (last visited 30 April 2011). Quotes are used for illustrative purposes only, and do not reflect a position on the individual cases or situations to which they refer.

2 As set out in Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules’, ICRC and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Rule 99: ‘Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited’.

3 E.g. where members of an armed opposition group are suspected of war crimes and the commander must discharge his or her responsibility to investigate and punish such crimes. See Marco Sassòli, Possible legal mechanisms to improve compliance by armed opposition groups with IHL and IHRL, paper delivered at the Armed Opposition Groups Conference, Vancouver, 13–15 November 2003, available at: http://www.genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-other-documents-studies/2001-2010/2003-13nov-sassoli.pdf (last visited 22 November 2011); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 28(a)(i); ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 153, available at: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule153 (last visited 22 November 2011).

4 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 2, Rule 99.

5 Ibid., p. 347.

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9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 9(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, Art. 6; American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, Art. 7(3); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222, Art. 5(1).

10 A situation such as that envisaged in Marco Sassòli, ‘Le droit international humanitaire, une lex specialis par rapport aux droits humains? (IHL, a lex specialis in respect of human rights?)’, in Andreas Auer, Alexandre Flückiger, and Michel Hottelier (eds), Les droits de l'homme et la constitution: Études en l'honneur du Professeur Giorgio Malinverni, Schulthess, Geneva 2007, p. 390.

11 ICCPR Art. 4(1); ACHR Art. 27(1); ECHR Art. 15(1); International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 106.

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13 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 2, p. xxxi.

14 Ibid., pp. 347–352.

15 ICCPR, Art. 9(1). Similar provisions exist in ACHR, Art. 7 and ECHR, Art. 5, although the ECHR does not use the criterion of arbitrariness, but sets out defined exceptions to the prohibition on deprivation of liberty.

16 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ‘Fact sheet No. 26, Annex IV, Revised methods of work’, Art. 8(a), available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet26en.pdf (last visited 15 November 2011).

17 Ibid., Art. 8(b).

18 ACHPR, Amnesty International v. Sudan, Communication Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, ACHPR 13th Annual Activity Report, 1999, p. 124, para. 59.

19 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 2, p. 348. See e.g. the UN Human Rights Committee's finding in William Torres Ramirez v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 1/4, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/35/40), p. 121 (1980), para. 18.

20 ICCPR, Art. 9(1).

21 Ibid., Art. 9(3).

22 Ibid., Art. 9(4).

23 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention, UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988), Principle 2.

24 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, above note 16, Art. 8(c).

25 Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994), para. 9.8.

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27 E.g. special agreements envisaged by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GCs); declarations under Additional Protocol I (AP I), Art. 96(3); the law of treaties pertaining to third-party obligations (i.e. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 35). See Cassese, Antonio, ‘The status of rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 30, April 1981, p. 423Google Scholar.

28 E.g. textual interpretation of Common Article 3 (applying to ‘parties to a conflict’); contextual interpretation of Additional Protocol II (AP II) in the light of the territorial control requirement in Art. 1(1); the application of basic general principles of international law (ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 218); assumption of state responsibility through the fact of claiming to represent a territory (ICRC, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, p. 51, available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-570006?OpenDocument (last visited 21 November 2011)); succession to state responsibility (International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (with Commentary), 2001, Art. 10). On the concept of legislative jurisdiction, see Sivakumaran, Sandesh, ‘Binding armed opposition groups’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 55, April 2006, p. 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See further Kleffner, Jann, ‘The applicability of international humanitarian law to armed groups’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 882, June 2011, pp. 443–461Google Scholar.

29 ICJ, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, above note 28, p. 14, paras. 113–114.

30 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara (Jurisdiction), Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT-060, 13 March 2004, para. 47; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 2005, para. 172.

31 A detailed discussion of the legislative jurisdiction theory, as well as a critical analysis of the above methods of binding armed opposition groups, is to be found in S. Sivakumaran, above note 28.

32 Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, UN Commission on Human Rights, CHR Res. 1993/66 (1993), para. 15.

33 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Press Release No. 5/98, 1 April 1998, available at: http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/1998/Press3-9.htm (last visited 15 November 2011).

34 IACHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 26 February 1999, Chapter 4, para. 13, available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/colom99en/chapter-4.htm (last visited 15 November 2011).

35 Bouvier, Antoine and Sassòli, Marco, How Does Law Protect in War? Vol. I, ICRC, Geneva, 2006, p. 81Google Scholar and n. 12.

36 Ibid., p. 82.

37 Somer, Jonathan, ‘Jungle justice: passing sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-international armed conflict’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 867, September 2007, p. 686Google Scholar.

38 Willmott, Deidre, ‘Removing the distinction between international and non-international armed conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, 2004, p. 200Google Scholar.

39 On the killing of captured persons, see Common Article 3(d); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2(c). On the denial of quarter, see AP II, Art. 4(1); ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 46, available at: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule46 (last visited 19 November 2011); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(e)(x).

40 For an example of an armed opposition group differentiating between hostage-taking and other types of detention, in writing at least, see the statement of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), ‘Resolution to reiterate MILF policy of strongly and continuously condemning all kidnap for ransom activities in Mindanao and everywhere, and to take drastic action against the perpetrators of this heinous crime in all MILF areas’, 26 February 2002, available at: http://www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2002-26feb-milf.htm (last visited 4 May 2011).

41 M. Sassòli, above note 10, p. 391.

42 Zegveld, Liesbeth, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 53–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 Ibid., p. 152.

44 ICJ, above note 12, para. 26.

45 ICCPR, Art. 4; ECHR, Art. 15; ACHR, Art. 27.

46 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, Professional Training Series No. 7, United Nations, New York/Geneva, 2001, p. 329, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7part1618en.pdf (last visited 3 May 2011).

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48 L. Zegveld, above note 42, p. 65.

49 Common Article 3(1)(b); AP II, Art. 4(2)(c).

50 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 2, p. 336.

51 Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, UN Commission on Human Rights, CHR Res. 1993/66 (1993), para. 8.

52 L. Zegveld, above note 42, p. 65.

53 Schmitt, Michael, Garraway, Charles, and Dinstein, Yoram, Manual on the Law of Non-international Armed Conflicts with Commentary, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 2006Google Scholar, Rule 1.2.4(g) and (h).

54 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 2, p. 336.

55 Pejic, Jelena, ‘Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of armed violence’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 858, June 2005, p. 376Google Scholar.

56 ICRC, Annual Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1992, p. 53.

57 ICRC, Annual Report, ICRC, Geneva, 2002, p. 114.

58 ICRC, ‘Mali: two soldiers freed under the auspices of the ICRC’, Press Release 08/159, 25 August 2008, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/mali-news-250808.htm (last visited 19 November 2011).

59 ICRC, Annual Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1992, p. 48.

60 Ibid., p. 51.

61 Abeer Tayel, ‘Rebel head urges all Libyans to join revolt as rebels attack pro-Qaddafi Tripoli hideout’, in Al Arabiya, 25 August 2011, available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/25/164050.html (last visited 19 November 2011).

62 L. Zegveld, above note 42, pp. 65–66.

63 Sassòli, Marco and Olson, Laura, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, September 2008, pp. 423–424Google Scholar.

64 M. Sassòli, above note 10, p. 387.

65 Ibid.

66 GC III, Art. 5 indicates that POWs whose status is in doubt should have their status determined by a competent tribunal. This is rephrased in a more universally applicable manner by Pejic, who holds that, as a minimum, all persons under any type of administrative detention should have their detention checked by an independent and impartial body. J. Pejic, above note 55, pp. 386–387. ‘Quasi-POW’ detention would still qualify as a form of administrative detention, as POW status would not apply de jure.

67 Common Article 3(2).

68 Othman bin Othman (Libyan rebel commander), quoted in Hadeel Al-Shalchi and Karin Laub, ‘Foreigners claim harassment by Libya rebels’, in Associated Press, 4 September 2011, available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44393896/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/foreigners-complain-harassment-libya-rebels/ (last visited 16 November 2011).

69 L. Zegveld, above note 42, p. 69.

70 Sivakumaran raises a similar question with regard to the establishment of courts, and indicates that, at a minimum, armed opposition groups must hold territorial control to meet the requisite standards to constitute a court. Sivakumaran, Sandesh, ‘Courts of armed opposition groups: fair trials or summary justice?’, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2009, pp. 489–513CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 While security detention of civilians (particularly of enemy aliens) is also possible in a party's own territory in international armed conflicts (GC IV, Art. 42), this would not be an appropriate analogy for non-international armed conflicts. This is because an armed opposition group cannot be said to have its ‘own’ sovereign territory with a differentiation between its own nationals – towards whom it would have clear legal obligations – and aliens who require extra protection through IHL when they fall into the group's hands. An armed group can only be in control of territory that it has captured (occupied) from the territorial state. In such a case, all persons living under the group's control are subject to the exercise of power by an entity other than their state of nationality, and should thus be considered as equally requiring international legal protection from that entity, as would occur in a situation of occupation by another state.

72 In parallel with GC IV, Arts 78 and 132.

73 For example, rather than stating that laws promulgated by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador were invalid, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador scrutinized these for compliance with IHL. See S. Sivakumaran, above note 70, where this example is discussed and a convincing argument given that IHL does not exclude the possibility of armed opposition groups applying their own law.

74 See GC IV, Arts 64 and 65.

75 Ibid., Art. 76.

76 Ibid.

77 A range of such basic safeguards is outlined in J. Pejic, above note 55.

78 See A. Clapham, above note 26, pp. 498–508.