The notion of solidarity, although not new to the humanitarian sector, has re-emerged in recent discussions about effective and ethical humanitarian action, particularly in contexts such as Ukraine and Myanmar where the traditional humanitarian principles have been facing certain pressures. Because solidarity appears as a good but can also involve selectivity and privilege, and because it risks continued militarism and normalization of civilians participating within that militarism, the notion of solidarity merits rich and rigorous thinking. This article explores how the notion of solidarity is being utilized by those currently re-emphasizing its importance and what it might mean in practice in today's humanitarian contexts. The article argues that if solidary action involves not only a political stance but solidary working methods, the recent calls for solidarity demand respect for the variety of principles and practices within the humanitarian ecosystem, while nevertheless upholding mutual obligations owed within that professional community – that is, within careful limits as to what is considered humanitarian action.

With technological developments presenting tremendous opportunities, rapid developments in data-driven artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have the potential to significantly transform humanitarian forensic action. Yet, their role in the forensic identification of dead bodies remains unexamined. The correct and early identification of dead bodies is not only important to afford the deceased their honour and dignity and to ensure that their families know the fate of their loved ones, but also has broader implications for human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL). This article examines the opportunities and challenges of AI and ML in advancing honour and dignity in death for armed conflict victims in humanitarian forensic action under IHL. It argues that the application of AI and ML in humanitarian forensic action has the potential to revolutionize and support forensic practitioners in the identification of human remains. This will consequently guarantee that families know the fate of their loved ones and that the deceased are afforded dignified burials according to their religious and cultural rites. The article proposes recommendations for the future use of AI and ML in humanitarian forensic action, including the adoption of a legally binding international instrument governing their use, the development of guidelines for their use, the training of forensic actors in IHL and human rights law, and the use of new technologies in humanitarian action.

In times of armed conflict, disasters and violence, people may become separated from their families, go missing or die, or become victims of ill-treatment and sexual violence. Under international humanitarian law, States have obligations to prevent harm and address humanitarian needs. At State level, the medicolegal system is conventionally mandated to address these needs and fulfil related legal obligations. In practice, State responses can sometimes be non-existent, limited by the endemic functionality of existing systems, or degraded by crises of violence, natural disasters and migration. These conditions can, in turn, impede the establishment of peace, reparations, restorative justice efforts and post-conflict reconstruction. This paper explains what a medicolegal system is and the entities that encompass it. The paper highlights the importance of developing clear policies, regulation and procedures that ensure proper functioning of the system. It reviews common gaps and challenges that limit State prevention and response to issues of humanitarian concern. Finally, recommendations when developing and implementing humanitarian programmes to strengthen medicolegal systems are provided, with a particular focus on the content of protection dialogue in diplomatic fora.

How can humanitarians carry out their work during a genocide? Between April and June of 1994, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) faced that very question. After bloodshed broke out in Rwanda, the ICRC was the only remaining humanitarian organization in the country and continued its aid work while surrounded by brutal violence. Based on previously published materials,1 this article examines the strategies that enabled the ICRC to pursue its humanitarian mission in the face of the most basic inhumanity. In particular, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's Fundamental Principles of neutrality and impartiality were critical to establishing contact with all involved parties: dialogue, including with those perpetrating genocide, was key to ensuring the safety of ICRC staff, and to facilitating the organization's work on behalf of those affected by the violence. Additionally, the ICRC spoke out frequently as the violence was unfolding in Rwanda, and this article addresses the question of public communications, in both principle and practice, during a genocide.

Armed conflict presents a multitude of risks to civilians, prisoners of war and others caught in the middle of hostilities. Harmful information spreading on social media compounds such risks in a variety of tangible ways, from potentially influencing acts that cause physical harm to undermining a person's financial stability, contributing to psychological distress, spurring social ostracization and eroding societal trust in evidentiary standards, among many others. Despite this span of risks, no typology exists that maps the full range of such harms. This article attempts to fill this gap, proposing a typology of harms related to the spread of harmful information on social media platforms experienced by persons affected by armed conflict. Developed using real-world examples, it divides potential harm into five categories: harms to life and physical well-being, harms to economic or financial well-being, harms to psychological well-being, harms to social inclusion or cultural well-being, and society-wide harms. After detailing each component of the typology, the article concludes by laying out several implications, including the need to view harmful information as a protection risk, the importance of a conflict-specific approach to harmful information, the relevance of several provisions under international law, and the possible long-term consequences for societies from harmful information.

The information used for this typology is based entirely on open-source reporting covering acts that occurred during armed conflict and that were seemingly related to identified harmful information on social media platforms or messaging applications. The authors did not verify any reported incidents or information beyond what was included in cited sources. Throughout the article, sources have been redacted from citations where there is a risk of reprinting harmful information or further propagating it, and where redaction was necessary to avoid the impression that the authors were attributing acts to particular groups or actors.

In this iteration of the Review's “Beyond the Literature” series, we have invited Joël Glasman to introduce his recent book Humanitarianism and the Quantification of Human Needs, before then posing a series of questions to Bertrand Taithe, Léa Macias, Dennis Dijkzeul, Andrea Behrends and William Anderson. Bertrand Taithe is Professor of Cultural History at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom. Léa Macias is an anthropologist focusing on digital humanitarianism in the Middle East, currently working as an Evaluation Officer for the French Development Agency. Dennis Dijkzeul is Professor of Organization and Conflict Studies at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. Andrea Behrends is Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Leipzig University, Germany. William Anderson is the Executive Director for Sphere based in Geneva.

The Review team is grateful to all five discussants, and to Joël, for taking part in this engaging conversation.

Does targeting combatants really provide a military advantage during an armed conflict? The limitations on the use of force against civilians and means and methods of warfare are well developed under contemporary international humanitarian law (IHL), but the issue of targetability of adversary combatants remains underdeveloped. This paper builds on contemporary developments in international human rights law and moral just war theory to offer a revised lex ferenda look at the basic principles of IHL through the internalization of the value of the lives of combatants. It is argued that such a reading of IHL would allow for a rejection of the automatic necessity of targeting combatants, and hence give due consideration to the value of life of combatants (both adversary combatants and own combatants) in the evaluation of the use of force during armed conflicts, including through reduced military advantage, force protection, and adjusted proportionality analysis.

Conflict-related environmental damage remains a huge challenge. This article provides a brief overview of international humanitarian law (IHL) rules that protect the natural environment in armed conflict and notes some convergences with the rules developed by classical Islamic jurists (those who lived from the seventh century up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century) affording protection to the natural environment. Today, a significant number of International Committee of the Red Cross operations take place in Muslim-majority countries, and some Muslim interlocutors, in particular Islamic non-State armed groups, use Islamic law as their normative framework. For better respect for IHL in relevant Muslim-majority States or territories, considering an Islamic legal approach to the protection of the natural environment alongside IHL would allow the parties to conflicts in such countries to better understand their obligations and should enhance the protection of the natural environment in armed conflict.

Contemporary armed conflicts have increasingly been accompanied by belligerents’ calls for civilians to support their military efforts. This article investigates the legal consequences of civilians taking up arms provided by or with the tacit support of the State. It first looks at the implications of civilian involvement from the perspective of a State's international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law obligations, focusing on removing civilians from the vicinity of hostilities, informing and training civilians on the implications of directly participating in hostilities, and respecting and ensuring respect for the law. It then demonstrates that the broader fabric of public international law is tested when civilians are encouraged to engage in hostilities, through a close analysis of the challenge of attributing civilian acts to the State. The article closes with practical recommendations for States to ensure that they uphold their humanitarian and human rights obligations, and to render the law of international responsibility effective when civilians commit systemic violations of IHL.

The relationship between armed conflict, the environment and climate change is intricate and challenging to define. While international humanitarian law (IHL) includes some environmental protections, it did not anticipate the connection to climate change. Climate change can act as a risk multiplier, intensifying negative socio-economic impacts, and conflict-related environmental damage may contribute to climate change. Bridging these fields is crucial, and to this end, this article seeks to interpret IHL considering evolving understandings of armed conflict effects and progress under international environmental law (IEL). The article illustrates how existing norms can address climate change impacts in warfare, and explores how relevant IEL provisions, such as the Paris Agreement and the harm prevention principle, could be applied during armed conflicts to achieve similar goals.

This article explores the potential classification of decentralized armed groups in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Unlike centralized armed groups, decentralized groups consist of fluid alliances of small subunits or cells with loose coordination between them. The central question explored by the authors is whether such groups meet the minimum organizational criterion to be considered parties to an armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL). The authors argue that, while not possessing the same chain of command as centralized armed groups, decentralized armed groups can, under certain conditions, nevertheless fulfil the criteria for conflict classification. Judicial precedents and IHL interpretation point to this conclusion where the absence of a centralized command structure within the group can be compensated by the existence of other factors attesting to the group's organization, such as the exercise of operational command over armed subunits, with the intensity of violence being an additional element suggesting the overall organization of the group. Ultimately, this interpretation would ensure the applicability of a legal framework that would better reflect the intensity of armed confrontations on the ground, and bind both States and non-State parties to a NIAC alike.

International humanitarian law (IHL) does not address business entities, except in situations where they directly participate in hostilities, and there is no reference to business actors in the International Committee of the Red Cross's recent Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict. Yet, there has been an increasing reaffirmation of specific “duties”, “obligations” or “responsibilities” imposed on private companies operating in conflict zones. For instance, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights suggest that business entities should respect IHL rules in addition to human rights during armed conflicts, and the third revised draft of the international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises refers to IHL as an interpretative framework of human rights obligations of States and businesses. The International Law Commission's 2022 Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflicts are even more specific, providing that corporations should exercise due diligence concerning the protection of the environment when acting in conflict-affected areas. However, these references to IHL as applicable to business activities remain vague and lack elaboration. This paper intends to close this gap by clarifying whether and, if so, the extent to which IHL imposes environmental obligations upon private companies in conflict situations. It submits that business entities bear environmental duties during armed conflicts deriving from IHL rules and other complementary sources of international law. The paper further discusses the content of the obligation of business entities not to harm the environment as well as their due diligence obligation.

In this edition of the Review's “Beyond the Literature” series, we have invited George Dvaladze to introduce his recent book Equality and Non-Discrimination in Armed Conflict, before then posing a series of questions to Nelly Kamunde, Mona Rishmawi, Vanessa Murphy and Alexander Breitegger.

Nelly Kamunde is a lawyer in Kenya and has been working as an independent researcher, lecturer, and trainer with various institutions in international humanitarian law (IHL). Mona Rishmawi is the former Chief of the Rule of Law, Equality and Non-Discrimination Branch of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Vanessa Murphy is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Legal Adviser responsible for conflict-related legal issues regarding gender, the protection of children and the protection of the environment. Alexander Breitegger is a Senior Legal Adviser at the ICRC's Thematic Legal Advice Unit; he focuses on IHL and persons with disabilities as part of his thematic files and provides support for the implementation of the ICRC Vision 2030 on Disability.

The Review team is grateful to all four discussants, and to George, for taking part in this engaging conversation.

It is unquestionable that Colombian armed conflicts have had adverse impacts on the natural environment in the country. Current transitional justice mechanisms offer an opportunity to recognize harm and responsibility, establish restorative sanctions and reparations and adopt public policies for the recovery of ecosystems and prevention of further damage. This article focuses on how transitional justice mechanisms, especially the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, have addressed the effects of armed conflicts on the natural environment. Specifically, it analyzes the criminal characterization of environmental degradation, the question of whether amnesties and pardons could be granted for such conducts, precautionary measures and the implementation of restorative sanctions related to the environment. It presents some challenges regarding the preservation of the natural environment due to the persistence of armed conflicts after the 2016 Peace Accord between the government and the FARC-EP guerrillas, and the sustainability of reparations for victims and prevention of further damage. It also sustains that the developments of current transitional justice mechanisms may have significant influence on ongoing and future peace negotiations with other armed groups and the processes for establishing responsibility for environmental damages.

This article seeks to demonstrate the nexus between agent-related technology and the protection of the environment in armed conflicts, looking at how agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS) can be used as a tool to protect the environment in armed conflicts. It further analyzes the precautionary principle and due regard, as relevant rules, and explains the legal benefits of deploying ABMS to protect and preserve the natural environment. The article argues that the deployment of ABMS helps States to better understand the environmental effects of conflicts, reassess their military activities and comply with the relevant applicable rules and norms.

The outbreak and continuation of armed hostilities can sometimes cause harm to bordering States not directly involved in the hostilities. This has occurred in many military operations conducted during the last few decades. The scope of the provisions relating to the protection of the environment during armed conflict appears to be strictly limited to the territory in which the operations are taking place. It is therefore important to determine the extent to which a belligerent State at the origin of acts that have had devastating consequences on the territory of one or more States not involved in the conflict can be held internationally responsible for those acts based on the principle of international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, which is still under discussion. The argument put forward in this article is based on the hypothesis that this principle is at least implicitly recognized when it comes to environmental damage caused in the context of an armed conflict. In our view, this is grounded both in the principle of the inviolability of neutral States and in the no-harm principle, whereby a State cannot use its territory in a way that is harmful to other States not involved in the armed conflict. These principles are based on the notions of fault and risk.