Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T14:29:14.123Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Domestic politics, reputational sanctions, and international compliance*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2013

Jong Hee Park  and
Kentaro Hirose
Jong Hee Park*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Korea
Kentaro Hirose
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and Department of Politics, University of Chicago and Princeton University, USA
*
E-mail: jongheepark@snu.ac.kr
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The argument that reputational concerns promote compliance is at the center of the literature of international cooperation. In this paper, we study how reputational sanctions affect compliance when domestic parties carry their own reputations in international negotiations. We showed that the prospect of international cooperation varies a lot depending on who sits at the negotiation table, how partisan preferences for compliance are different, and how much international audiences discriminate between different types of noncompliance. We illustrate implications of our model using episodes from the negotiations between the United States and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Keywords

commitment problemcompliancenuclear weaponsNorth Koreareputational sanctions
Type
Original Papers
Information
International Theory , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , July 2013 , pp. 300 - 320
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

We thank John Balz, Dong-Joon Jo, Duncan Snidal, Sebastian Schmidt, and participants of PIPES for their helpful comments.

References

Abbott, Kenneth W.Snidal, Duncan. 2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” International Organization 54:421–456.Google Scholar
Botelho, Greg. 2013. “North Korea: Nuclear Program not a Bargaining Chip.” CNN.com, March 16.Google Scholar
Brewster, Rachel. 2009a. “The Limits of Reputation on Compliance.” International Theory 1:323–333.Google Scholar
Brewster, Rachel 2009b. “Unpacking the State's Reputation.” Harvard International Law Journal 50:231–269.Google Scholar
Downs, GeorgeMichael, Jones. 2002. “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law.” Journal of Legal Studies 31:S99–S114.Google Scholar
Goldsmith, Jack L.Posner, Eric A.. 2005. The Limits of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldsmith, Jack L., Posner, Eric A. 2006. The New International Law Scholarship. The Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 126.Google Scholar
Grieco, Joseph M., Gelpi, Christopher F.Warren, T. Camber. 2009. “When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance.” International Organization 63:341–355.Google Scholar
Guisinger, AlexandraAlastair, Smith. 2002. “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:175–200.Google Scholar
Guzman, Andrew T. 2008. How International Law Works. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jentleson, Bruce W.Whytock, Chrstopher A.. 2005/2006. “Who Won Libya?” International Security 30:47–86.Google Scholar
Jo, Dong-Joon. 2012. Libiaeui Bihaekhwa Suntaek Yeongu (On the Denuclearization of Libya's Nuclear Program). The Sejong Institute.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kydd, Andrew. 2000. “Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective.” American Journal of Political Science 44:228–244.Google Scholar
McGillivray, FionaAlastair, Smith. 2000. “Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments.” International Organization 54:584–607.Google Scholar
McGillivray, FionaAlastair, Smith 2006. “Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility.” Journal of Politics 68:248–258.Google Scholar
Milgrom, Paul R., North, Douglass C.Weingast, Barry R.. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2:1–23.Google Scholar
Phelan, William. 2009. State Reputation as a Public Good. Trinity College, Dublin, IIIS Discussion Paper No. 275.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization 60:169–203.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Charles L. 2007. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Satori, Anne. 2005. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Saundry, Peter. 2006. Encyclopedia of Earth. Washington, DC: Environmental Information Coalition; National Council for Science and the Environment chapter Kyoto Protocol and the United States.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1942. Party Government. New York: Rinehart.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. “The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?” International Organization 59:1–38.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94:819–835.Google Scholar
Tomz, Michael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wolford, Scott. 2007. “The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 51:772–788.Google Scholar