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Authoritarian or Democratic: The Uncertain Future of Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sussan Siavoshi
Sussan Siavoshi*
Affiliation:
Trinity University
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Extract

The February 18, 2000 Parliamentary Elections in Iran Resulted in a clear victory for the groups associated with President Khatami's reform programs. The electorate was allowed to reject the forces of authoritarianism and conservatism through a free election, and the media and the experts considered this event to have historic significance. It seemed that the result of the elections convinced more and more people that democratic transition is possible in Iran through the reform of the system without first dismantling the Islamic republic. But soon after the elections there was a crackdown which included the closing down of a large number of newspapers and the arrest of a few prominent journalists, lawyers, and other political activists thus obscuring the future path of the Iranian polity. How are we to understand the character of this polity and is it possible to make educated guesses about its future?

Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , Summer 1999 , pp. 313 - 331
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 1999

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References

1. Modernization literature of the 1960s by theorists such as Lucien Pye, Daniel Lerner, and Gabriel Almond belongs to this category.

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14. The specific areas under the control of the supreme leader are spelled out in Article 160 of the Constitution.

15. The Guardian Council consists of twelve members, six of whom are from the ranks of the clergy and are appointed by the supreme leader. The other six are from the law profession and are nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majlis.

16. Siavoshi, Sussan, “Cultural Policies and the Islamic Republic: Cinema and Book Publication,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997): 511–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a more detailed account of factional politics and their development in the Islamic Republic, see Ahmad Ashraf, “Charisma, Theocracy, and Men in Power in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” in The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, ed. Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi; Siavoshi, Sussan, “Factionalism and Iranian Politics: The Post-Khomeini Experience,” Iranian Studies 25 (1992): 27–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Akhavi, Shahrough, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” The Middle East Journal 41 (1987): 181–201.Google Scholar

17. See two recent books on factions which were published in Iran, Zarifinia, Hamid Riza, Kālbud shekāfī jenāḥ-hā-yi seyāsī-ye Īrān (The anatomy of Iran's political factions) (Tehran:Azadi Andisheh Press, 1999)Google Scholar and Murtaji, Hujjat, Jenāḥ-hā-yi seyāsī-ye Īrān-e emrūz (Political factions in today's Iran), (Tehran: Naqsh-u Nigar Press, 1999).Google Scholar

18. At the time of this writing, there seems to be growing evidence that the powerful former president of the Islamic Republic, Hashemi Rafsanjani, is siding with the conservatives in their competition with the reformers.

19. Ever since the presidential elections of May 23, 1997 (dovvom-e Khordād in the Persian calendar) the broad alliance of forces behind Khatami has been called Dovvom-Khordādī.

20. One important ministry, the Ministry of Information, has not been under Khatami's control. The recently resigned minister, Dori Najafabadi, has been a member of the hardliner/conservative coalition. He was replaced by Ali Yunesi, who although also close to conservative circles, has played a key role on the investigating committee set up by the president to investigate the recent murders, the investigation led to an extraordinary and highly unusual admission of responsibility. The communiqué, released by the public relations office of the Ministry of Information, read in part:

“Unfortunately, a few irresponsible, evil-minded and willful colleagues of this ministry… were among those arrested [for the killings]. These criminal acts not only amount to treason (against fellow employees at the intelligence ministry) but they have also dealt a serious blow to the standing of the sacred governmental system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

21. After the convening of the Sixth Majlis, there appears to have been tension within the reformist coalition. There is indirect evidence that many members of the MCI will follow the lead of Hashemi Rafsanjani and disassociate themselves from the reformers close to President Khatami. Also, there are differences between members of the AMU who advocate a slower pace of reform on the one hand and the Islamic Iran Participation which pushes for a more rapid tempo on the other.

22. Salām, April 30, 1998, 2.

23. There have been many more daily and weekly newspapers associated with this coalition which are now banned. The fate of some of them, however, is still pending upcoming hearings.

24. The best-known spokesperson for these ideals is President Khatami, whose campaign promises revolved around the realization of these ideals. He has continued to emphasize the same themes ever since.

25. Resālat, March 4, 1998. The initial number of candidates was 229, of which 132 had been previously disqualified by the executive board of the interior ministry.

26. See Salām, March 9, 1998, 1, and March 28, 1998, 3.

27. See Salām, March 2, 1998, 2, for a letter written to the Guardian Council by Behzad Navabi, one of the disqualified candidates, in which he harshly criticized the council and threatened it with a lawsuit if the Council did not reverse its decision.

28. See the interview with Nuri in Hamshahrī, June 13, 1998, 6

29. Salām, January 30, 1999, p. 1.

30. See for example an interview with Abdollah Nouri in Salām, August 19, 1998, 1, and another interview with Mohammed Salamati, the general secretary of the Organization of the Warriors of the Islamic Revolution, in Salām, July 27, 1998, 2.

31. See Salām, August 30, 1998, 2, and August 16, 1998, 2.

32. In 1983, the Assembly of Experts selected Ayatollah Montazeri to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, upon the death of the latter, as the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. However, he was ousted as heir-apparent prior to Ayatollah Khomeini's death in 1987.

33. For a complete version of the text of the lecture, see the monthly Arzeshhā (Values), December 1997,44-48.

34. Ever since Khatami accepted the candidacy for the office of the president he has consistently raised the importance of people as the sovereign and the government as the servant of the people. His ministers and advisors, particularly the former minister of the interior, Nouri, and the minister of culture and Islamic guidance, Ataollah Mahajerani, have also addressed this point repeatedly in their statements and speeches.

35. See Khatami's inaugural speech before parliament, in the daily Hamshahrī internet version, August 5, 1997.

36. His sentence, initially five years in prison and a twenty-year ban from holding public office was reduced to two and ten years respectively. While in prison he enjoyed many privileges. He was pardoned by the Faqih just before the parliamentary elections of 2000.

37. For a complete text of the impeachment proceedings, including Nouri's defense and the final vote, see “Mashrūḥ-e Muẕākarāt-e Majlis-e Islāmī (Comprehensive Proceedings of the Islamic Consultative Assembly), (hereafter MMMSI) June 21, 1998, 14-75.

38. Salām, January 13, 1999, 1.

39. Salām, May 2, 1999, 1.

40. This is an interesting change of tone on the part of many conservatives. During the 1997 presidential campaign, some conservative deputies tried to make the slogan “melting into the supreme leader” a criterion for loyalty to the Islamic Republic, and therefore exclude or discredit any candidate who could not prove his total and unquestioning allegiance to Khamenei. In doing so they consciously tried to undermine the republican aspects of the constitution.

41. See, for example, his speech during the swearing-in ceremony for the new cadres of the judiciary branch, in Hamshahrī, internet version, March 4th 1999.

42. See, for example, the recent statements made by Javad Larijani, a member of the Fifth Majlis, and Amir Mohibian, one of the influential editors of the conservative daily, Resālat, published in ᶜAṣr-e Āzādegān, March 2, 2000, 3.

43. See for example, Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44. See daily ᶜAṣr-e Āzādegān, March 2, 2000, 3.

45. For a sample of these implicit criticisms of Khatami's actions and reactions by segments of the liberal coalition, see the weekly Tavāneh, no. 15, July 5, 1998, 2 and 7 regarding Nouri's ouster as Minister of the Interior; the daily Hamshahrī, June 29, 1998, 1, concerning the mayor of Tehran's arrest and trial; Jāmiᶜah, July 16, 1998, 1, voicing the accusation of some intellectuals who believe Khatami is retreating from his slogans on political development; the daily Tūs, on the trial of the mayor, the ousting of Nouri, the closing of the daily Jāmeᶜah, and what it considered hesitancy on the part of Khatami's administration; and last but not least, the anxiety expressed by the daily Salām, January 17, 1999, 2, regarding the results of the investigation into the murders of the intellectuals, and whether high officials (read Khatami) would resort to a bandaid policy or attempt a meaningful surgical procedure regarding the security forces.

46. See, for example, the statement made by the interior minister Nouri, denouncing the arrest in Hamshahrī, April 12, 1998. See also the statement made by the government spokesperson, Hamshahrī, April 6, 1998.

47. Hamshahrī, April 5, 1998.

48. One may, however, question the effectiveness of this control. A section of the police acts autonomously and independently of the Ministry of the Interior. Some argue that Khamenei's decision was more harmful than beneficial because the independent section of the police can act illegally at the direction or encouragement of hard-liners, while the reformist minister can then be accused by the same people of incompetence.

49. See the internet version of daily Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, March 27, 2000.