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Rule of Law: A Comparison between Ancient Persia and Ancient Greece

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Haideh Salehi-Esfahani
Haideh Salehi-Esfahani*
Affiliation:
University of Washington
*
haideh@u.washington.edu
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Abstract

The ancient Persian empires are denoted as despotic, practicing arbitrary rule while Greece, Persia's archrival during the sixth to fourth century BC, exercised rule of law. This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze some of the geographical and environmental underpinnings of the existence of rule of law in the city-states of ancient Greece and its absence in Persia. I discuss the role of geographical conditions of land (open plains versus mountains), population pressure, proximity to the sea and form of trade (overland versus overseas) as factors conducive to rule of law in the city-states of ancient Greece and to despotism in ancient Persia. Specifically, the role of trade via land in Persia prior to the fifth century BC is compared to the role of sea trade (alongside with piracy) in ancient Greece. I argue that in ancient Persia monarchs could tax or expropriate much of the gains from overland trade, preventing the accumulation of an independent form of wealth by merchants. In Greece, sea trade alongside the practice of piracy led to gains from trade that could not be easily expropriated by the monarchs and acted as a balancing force vis-à-vis the power of the monarchs, creating a basis for rule of law in the Greek city-states.

Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 41 , Issue 5 , December 2008 , pp. 629 - 644
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2008

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Footnotes

She acknowledges helpful comments and suggestions by Yoram Barzel, Khodadad Kaviani, Fahad Khalil, Djavad Salehi-Esfahani and Roxanne Varzi on an earlier draft of this paper, as well as the research assistance of Michael Zeman.

References

1 Oxford's online Dictionary of the Social Science, http://www.oxfordreference.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t104.e1465, defines rule of law as, “The principle that power should be exercised according to mutually understood rules and procedures that are applicable to all members of a polity, including officers of the state. The rule of law requires an independent judiciary capable of enforcing laws against even the highest-ranking agents of the state.” See Craig, Calhoun, ed., Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Oxford, 2002)Google Scholar. Texts on the ancient Greek political system refer to the direct participation of citizens in the governance of the Greek city-states. In the courts of law, for example, judgments were carried out by jury made up of citizens. Rule of law in this paper follows the characterization by Barzel, Y., A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State (Cambridge, 2002)Google Scholar, discussed in the next section of the paper.

2 The rivalry between the Persians and the Greeks of antiquity originates from competition to control the states and regions of Asia Minor along the Aegean Sea. The states of this region had Greek populations but were under the control of the Achaemenid kings of the fifth century BC. J. M. Cook describes the rivalry in shifting alliance of the Greeks of Asia Minor with Persians and the Greek city-states. See Cook, J. M., The Persian Empire (London, 1983), 91–100Google Scholar. Ghirshman notes that the cities of Asia Minor were desirable territories for Persians as they had “skilled technicians as well as excellent soldiers.” See Ghirshman, R., Iran (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1954), 130–131Google Scholar. Additionally, the port cities of the coast of Aegean were important venues in providing access to sea trade in the Aegean for the Persian Empire.

3 Barzel, Y., “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State,” Economics of Governance, 1 (2000): 25–51Google Scholar; and Barzel, A Theory of the State.

4 The literature on rule of law in ancient Greece include: Rostovtzeff, M., The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford, 1941)Google Scholar; Jones, J. W., The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks, An Introduction (Oxford, 1956)Google Scholar; Hignett, C., A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1958)Google Scholar; MacDowell, D. M., The Law in Classical Athens (Thames and Hudson, 1978)Google Scholar; Gagarin, M., Early Greek Law (University of California Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Garner, R., Law and Society in Classical Athens (St. Martin's Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Todd, S. C., The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford, 1993)Google Scholar; Sealey, R., The Justice of the Greeks (University of Michigan Press, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Foxhall, L. and Lewis, A., Greek Law in its Political Setting (Oxford, 1996)Google Scholar; Arnaoutoglou, I., Ancient Greek Laws (Routledge, 1998)Google Scholar; Robinson, E. W., Ancient Greek Democracy (Blackwell Publishing, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gagarin, M. and Cohen, D., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 In ancient Greece, women, slaves and foreigners were excluded from citizenship status.

6 The literature on ancient Persia include: Herodotus (by Sayce, A. H.), The Ancient Empires of the East, I–III (MacMillan and Co., 1883)Google Scholar; Herzfeld, E. E., Archaeological History of Iran (Oxford University Press, 1934)Google Scholar; Cameron, G. G., History of Early Iran (Chicago, 1936)Google Scholar; Olmstead, A. T., History of Persian Empire (Chicago, 1948)Google Scholar; Frye, R. N., The History of Ancient Iran (Munchen, 1983)Google Scholar; Pollock, S., Ancient Mesopotamia, The Eden That Never Was (Cambridge, 1999)Google Scholar; Pirnia, H., Tarikh-e Iran-e Bastan (Tehran, 2001)Google Scholar.

7 Wittfogel, K. A., Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (Cambridge, MA, 1957)Google Scholar.

8 Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, 27.

9 Katouzian, H., Iranian History and Politics, The Dialectic of Sate and Society (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003)Google Scholar.

10 Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics, 73.

11 Barzel, “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State,” and Barzel, A Theory of the State.

12 Barzel, A Theory of the State.

13 In fact, the cost of having such a protector may be so high that many early societies may have forgone its formation altogether, such as many isolated village economies in the rain forests of the Amazon region. These must have been societies without the fear of outside threat so that a military force—provided by the state—was not needed.

14 The collective action mechanism would include provisions for limiting the term of the enforcer's rule or limiting the resources the state can extract. A separation of powers (also separation of military force into several independent forces) is a proxy to the collective action mechanism. In ancient Greece, the collective action mechanism involved direct participation of the majority of citizens—the native male population—in the governance of their city-states.

15 The Cold War may be seen as a modern analogy to the long term threat of aggression between two former adversaries: the US and the former Soviet Union.

16 Barzel, “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State,” 26.

17 Barzel, “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State,” 39.

18 From Barzel, A Theory of State, 200: “Consider states that lie within uniform land areas. When the size of such an area exceeds the size for a single state, I expect that states will reach their ‘optimal’ size; scale economies to protection may have already been exhausted.”

19 By the above arguments the vast plains of present day Iran, Central Asia and the Arabian Peninsula, would be the grounds for a single “empire” state in various points in history.

20 Barzel, A Theory of State, 200.

21 Jameson, M. H., Runnels, C. N. and van Andel, T. H., A Greek Countryside: The Southern Argolid from Prehistory to the Present Day (Stanford, CA, 1994), 16Google Scholar.

22 Also heights in the Peloponnese area “trend east and west and valleys descend to either one or the other shore but seldom provide convenient access across the peninsula.” Jameson et al., A Greek Countryside, 16.

23 Finer, S. E., The History of Government from the Earliest Times (Oxford, 1997), I: 322Google Scholar.

24 Jameson et al., A Greek Countryside, 265 and 312.

25 Michell, H., The Economics of Ancient Greece (New York, 1957), 40Google Scholar.

26 Gagarin and Cohen, The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 301.

27 Starr, C. G., The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 800–500 B.C. (Oxford, 1977)Google Scholar.

28 Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 51.

29 Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece, 306.

30 The act of piracy took place outsides of the physical boundaries of the Greek city-states where laws against theft would be upheld. Technically, therefore, the use of the term “lawful” versus “un-lawful” is redundant here. However, it is used in order to emphasize the contribution of such wealth creating activities—outside of the geographical boundaries of the city-states—to the evolution of rule of law in ancient Greece.

31 Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 48. Starr also point out that such pursuit of wealth was not limited to the aristocracy but also, “on the level of potters and other craftsmen, hurrying after wealth,” 48. Additionally, among many groups enriched by trade and plunder in the sea, the aristocracy in Greece, “usually gained control of the machinery of government and justice, and as is the way of the world, wrung every advantage they could from their power,” Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 52.

32 According to Starr, in the earlier part of the seventh century BC, “the distinction between overseas pillage and long distance trade was a delicate one; men took by force where they could, and bartered where they could not. Greek expansion by sea, however, eventually became more law-abiding.” Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 51.

33 It should be mentioned that agriculture was the other important economic activity in ancient Greece. However, the rugged and rocky interior led much of the land unsuitable for production of cereals and grains. According to Finer, for Greeks, “Their subsistence came from the farms around them, but their riches came from trade. Thus, by its great fifth century B.C. Greece was the trading center of the western hemisphere.” Finer, The History of Government, 322.

34 White, K. D., Roman Farming (Ithaca, NY, 1970), 111Google Scholar.

35 One more reason for the strengthening of the rule of law in ancient Greece may have been its long run rivalry with the Persian Empire. We discussed the theoretical underpinning of this outcome in Barzel's model in the previous section of this paper. The Greeks fought many wars with the Persians during fifth and fourth centuries BC, notably the battle of Marathon under the Achaemenid king, Darius, and another battle with his successor, Xerxes, some nine years later. These wars were fought in intervals of some years and with much preparation on both sides. The Greeks, fearing the return of the Persian army, embarked on major ship building projects and strengthening their army and navy. Following their victory over Persians, the Greeks formed the Dalian League in 478 BC. This league fell apart with the first Peloponnesian War of 460 BC. This period marks the beginning of a long-term political and military rivalry between Sparta and Athens in ancient Greece.

36 Ghirshman, Iran, 26.

37 Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, 77.

38 The archaeological work of Ghirshman shows presence of cave type life in pre-historic times in Persia since around the tenth millennium BC. Early settlements in the form of small villages seem to have existed since the fourth millennium BC. While the sparsely scattered populations lived in relative peace, by the third millennium BC signs of penetration of a culture of new people from plains of Southern Russia (and possibly Central Asia) appeared. According to Ghirshman, Persia experienced constant struggle between rival groups and tribes from this time on. For example, there were frequent wars between the rival kingdoms of Elam, the Kassites, the Lullubi and the hill tribes of Guti in the third millennium BC. See Ghirshman, Iran, 50–52.

39 Frye, The History of Ancient Iran, 25.

40 The nomadic lifestyle is observed in the modern day southwestern province of Fars in Iran.

41 Pollock, Ancient Mesopotamia, 69.

42 Pollock, Ancient Mesopotamia, 39.

43 Ghirshman, Iran, 56.

44 Frye, The History of Ancient Iran, 3.

45 See Barzel, “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State.” Barzel analyzes the importance of stability to the formation of long term agreements between the ruler and his subjects, leading to the beginnings of a rule of law system. Agreements between ruler and subjects are necessarily self-enforced and instability hinders the agreement process. Barzel explains, “I argue that the ability to form agreements and subsequently to form contracts and to enforce them is a condition for the success of the rule of law. Exogenous shocks induce the abrogation, outright confiscation, and the return to dictatorial rule.” Barzel, “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State,” 38.

46 See Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics, and Katouzian, H., “Legitimacy and Succession in Iranian History,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 23/1–2 (2003): 234–245CrossRefGoogle Scholar; as well as Katouzian, H., “The Short-term Society: A Study in the Problems of Long-term Political and Economic Development in Iran,” Middle Eastern Studies, 40/1 (2004): 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In These works, Katouzian analyzes the problem of long term development in Persia due to the lack of continuity of rights to property, the short term nature of the Persian regime and the issue of succession in its system of arbitrary rule.

47 See footnote 45 above and Barzel, “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State,” 39.

48 This is not universally true. On a portion of Kharakhurom highway in Pakistan—part of the ancient silk route—there were passes where bandits would attack trade caravans, kill the crew and steal their goods. One such pass has a Persian name, “The Khunjerab (river of blood) Pass.”

49 The analysis of arbitrary rule in Persia by Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics, provides a similar conclusion. In contrast to Europe where the state was dependent on the landed class, in Persia, different sectors of the society were all dependent on the state.

50 Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, S. and Robinson, J., “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review, 95 (2005): 546–579CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 Acemoglu et al., “The Rise of Europe,” 2.

52 Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, S., “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of Political Economy, 113 (2005): 949–995CrossRefGoogle Scholar.