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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 March 2016
Historical study of the Irish Civil War of 1922–3 has hitherto concentrated overwhelmingly on internal matters — the actual internecine struggle on the ground for ideological and political control. While the value of this approach is obvious, it has inevitably failed to focus on the continuing role of the British armed services; furthermore, an exclusive concern with land-army affairs, whether Irish or British, must result in a distorted picture. It is thus particularly unfortunate that the activities of the Royal Navy during the revolutionary period have been largely neglected. Here it is hoped to demonstrate that the Royal Navy, beyond its expected role of gun-running prevention, did have an influence on the early course of the Civil War, an influence that was, in part, determined by the wider protection of imperial interests once British troops had withdrawn from the localities in May 1922.
The fragmentation of southern Irish politics and society, in the wake of the treaty settlement of December 1921, came as a genuine surprise to the Admiralty. At the time, it had taken the promise of peace at face value, making it known that, pending negotiations on certain properties and signal stations, it had little future interest in Ireland provided the three southern ‘treaty ports’ (Cóbh/Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough Swilly) were safeguarded and visiting rights upheld. In such circumstances, there was seen to be no need for the standard Irish Patrol of three destroyers, naval forces being ‘ultimately’ reduced to just two fishery protection vessels. Nor, as future area command was to pass to C.-in-C. Plymouth, was there technical need or political advisability in the retention of the two flag officer commands at Buncrana (C.-in-C. Western Approaches) and Kingstown (Dún Laoghaire).
1 There are few comprehensive and academic accounts of Royal Navy policy and operations during the inter-war period. On policy, Roskill, S.W.’s Naval policy between the wars, i: The period of Anglo-American antagonism, 1919–1929 (London, 1968)Google Scholar remains the most authoritative work, while Clayton, Anthony’s The British Empire as a superpower, 1919–39 (London, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar is good on general operational matters and includes reference to Ireland. Ferris, J.R.’s The evolution of British strategic policy, 1919–26 (London, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar provides the most recent and important overview.
2 Memorandum, Admiralty to secretary, Provisional Government of Ireland (P.G.I.) Committee, 21 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O., CAB 21/245). These measures were approved by the P.G.I. Technical Sub-Committee on 14 Mar. 1922 (ibid).
3 Cipher, Admiralty to C.-in-C. Western Approaches, 20 May 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8652/253). On the same day, however, C.-in-C. Plymouth was advised of the postponement of his assumption of area command (ibid.).
4 For further comment on this incident see Coogan, T.P., Michael Collins: a biography (London, 1990), pp 314-15Google Scholar.
5 Memoranda: C.-in-C. Plymouth to Admiralty, 9 Apr. 1922; C.-in-C. Western Approaches to Admiralty, 29 Apr. 1922; ‘Admiralty List of Ships in Irish Waters’, as of 25 July 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8652/253).
6 Memorandum, Admiralty to C.-in-C. Atlantic Fleet, 29 Aug. 1922 (ibid).
7 Memorandum, Admiralty to under-secretary, Colonial Office, 10 Jan. 1924 (refers to Admiralty directive of May 1921) (P.R.O., CO 739/26).
8 Report, Commander, Wryneck to C.-in-C. Western Approaches, 9 May 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8632/173); reports of proceedings: Watchman to Admiralty, 27 May 1922; Dauntless to Admiralty, 20 May, 7 June 1922 (ibid.).
9 It is probable that the Donegal I.R.A. was too poorly organised and equipped to have contemplated such action: see Hopkinson, Michael, Green against green: the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), pp 161-2Google Scholar.
10 Report of proceedings, Danae to Admiralty, 14 June 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8632/173).
11 Reports of proceedings: Dunedin to Admiralty, 20 June 1922; Danae to Admiralty, 14 June, 13 July 1922 (ibid.).
12 Comparative research into coast/coastal defence systems seems a neglected area of study. When compiling data for the 1927 Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Irish Defence Department contrasted Britain (and the U.S.) with France, Germany and Italy, noting the difficulties that this had already presented to the conference’s ‘Budgetary Experts’ Report’ (N.A.I., Military Archives, box 2, Coastal Defence Archive 3: report, section 3, ‘Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference, 1927 — Bearing of possible decisions on Saorstát defence policy’, n.d.). Note that articles 6 and 7 of the 1921 Anglo-Irish treaty had to take account of Britain’s separation of command duties.
13 Hansard 5 (Commons), cliii, 2300–1 (10 May 1922); cliv, 210 (16 May 1922). Curzon was chairman of the Parliamentary Navy Committee.
14 Morning Post, 15 Aug. 1922.
15 Cipher, Admiralty to C.-in-C. Western Approaches, 20 May 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8652/253). The extent of Fox’s influence is problematic: no archive record has been found of correspondence either to or from his office. Two Admiralty documents (minute, 25 Sept. 1922 (ibid.); Admiralty to Admiral de Robeck, 29 Aug. 1922 (ibid.)) mention, respectively, his ‘close contact’ with the viceroy and ‘liaison’ with General Macready; but this was in any case a prerogative of rank.
16 Memorandum, Admiralty to Admiral de Robeck, 29 Aug. 1922 (ibid.).
17 Memorandum, Admiral de Robeck to Admiralty, 20 Sept. 1922 (ibid.).
18 Report of proceedings, Vanity to Admiralty, 31 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8632/173). The command structure and prescribed duties were repeated by ship’s commander; no general order to ships has been traced.
19 Memoranda: Army C.-in-C. to Minister for External Affairs, 17 Feb. 1923; Army C.-in-C. to ‘each member of Army Council’, 23 Feb 1923 (N.A.I., Military Archives, A 08295); dispatch, Devonshire to Governor-General, 23 Feb. 1923 (ibid., Department of the Taoiseach, S 2039). Note that these contacts were concerned with the formal position after the inauguration of the Free State; that the Civil War was still in progress was incidental.
20 Draft letter, Churchill to Collins, [July 1922], reminding the latter of his duty towards Valentia, which was in ‘immediate danger’ (P.R.O., CO 739/3). For the overall context of O’Connor’s operation see Hopkinson, Green against green, p. 166.
21 Situation reports, Senior Naval Officer to Admiralty, 12, 28 Sept., 18 Oct. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3).
22 Situation report, Senior Naval Officer to Admiralty, 1 Sept. 1922 (ibid.).
23 Report, Commander, Wryneck, 13 Oct. 1922 (ibid.).
24 That local National Army intelligence passed through H.M. ships to the S.N.O. is confirmed in at least two ciphers: S.N.O. to Admiralty, 14 Sept., 20 Oct. 1922 (ibid.). The latter gives details of General Lynch’s (republican C.-in-C.) ‘advance from Tralee to Dublin’.
25 Situation reports and cipher: S.N.O. to Admiralty, 1, 19 Sept., 9 Dec. 1922 (ibid.). The ferry service referred to here is probably that recorded in a brief memoir, entitled ‘Small ships’, by former R.N. officer ‘E.G.’ in Naval Review, Oct. 1972, p. 318.
26 Cipher, British army G.H.Q., Dublin, to War Office, 2 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/11). Collins had even sent an envoy, Timothy Healy, to London to plead the ‘moral’ imperative. See Collins to Churchill, 25 July 1922 (ibid.); Churchill to Collins, 4 Aug. 1922 (ibid.); memoranda: British army G.H.Q. to Macready, 1 Aug. 1922; Churchill to Cope, 3 Aug. 1922 (ibid.).
27 Younger, Calton, Ireland’s Civil War (London, 1988 ed.), pp 408-10Google Scholar; see also Hopkinson, Green against green, pp 163–4. The latter appears to assume that the landing was redirected because of British objections.
28 Linge, John, ‘British forces and Irish freedom: Anglo-Irish defence relations, 1922–1931’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Stirling, 1994), ch. 2Google Scholar.
29 Reported in The Times, 28 Sept. 1922.
30 Situation report and ciphers, S.N.O. to Admiralty, 28 Aug., 10 Sept., 20 Nov. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3); report of proceedings, Vanity to Admiralty, 31 Aug. 1922 (ibid., ADM 1/8632/173).
31 Report, Lt-Cmdr Campbell to Admiralty, 30 July 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/19); situation report, S.N.O. to Admiralty, 16 Nov. 1922 (ibid., CO 739/3). The former notes a landing visit to Maj. Hood at Dromore Castle, Kenmare; the latter a message by ship for Col. Heard, Kenmare.
32 Cipher, S.N.O. to Admiralty, [July 1922] (P.R.O., CO 739/3); report, Lt-Cmdr Campbell to Admiralty, 30 July 1922 (ibid., CO 739/19). The latter notes the coincident landing visit to Maj. Hood at Dromore Castle, Kenmare.
33 Conclusions to 25th meeting of P.G.I. Committee, 1 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O., CAB 21/245); cipher, S.N.O. to Admiralty, [July 1922] (ibid., CO 739/3).
34 Report of proceedings, Vanity to Admiralty, 31 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8632/173). The initial ambush was reported in The Times, 28, 29 Aug. 1922.
35 Situation report, S.N.O. to Admiralty, 6 Oct. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3); report of proceedings, Danae to Admiralty, 13 July 1922 (ibid., ADM 1/8632/173).
36 The Times, 10 Aug. 1922, notes Admiralty advice to Lloyds.
37 Memoranda: Admiralty to C.-in-C. Western Approaches, 15 May 1922; Admiralty to C.I.D. Sub-Committee on Ireland, [June 1922] (P.R.O., ADM 1/8652/253). This committee met eight times only between April and June 1922; its main task was to consider economic/military contingencies should a republic be declared.
38 Report of proceedings, Dunedin to Admiralty, 20 June 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8632/173). Dunedin relayed a similar appeal in July (proceedings, 18 July 1922 (ibid.)).
39 Memorandum, Admiralty to under-secretary, Colonial Office, 31 July 1922 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8652/253); minute of D.o.D. [Director of Deployment?], 24 July 1922 (ibid.). The start date for this count was probably late March or early April.
40 Memorandum, Admiralty to Curtis, 16 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3).
41 Several case histories of arrest are held in file P.R.O., CO 739/3.
42 Telegram, Curtis to Loughnane, Dublin, 31 Aug. 1922 (ibid.); letter, Curtis to secretary of state, 5 Sept. 1922 (ibid.).
43 Telegram, Sturgis to Cope, Dublin, 29 July 1922 (ibid.); memorandum, Admiralty to under-secretary, Colonial Office, 2 Aug. 1922 (ibid.); letter, Curtis to secretary of state, 13 Sept. 1922 (ibid.). For the effects on the Atlantic Fleet see Roskill, Naval policy, i, 196–200.
44 Minute, probably by Curtis, 3 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3); letter, Curtis to secretary of state, 13 Sept. 1922 (ibid.).
45 Memoranda: Curtis to secretary of state, 21 Sept., 2 Oct. 1922 (ibid.). Churchill annotated the earlier memo. He must, however, have given tacit approval to a staged withdrawal beyond the compromise figure: almost a week before the initial ‘agreement’ the Admiralty had informed Curtis of its (quoted) planned patrol strength as of 1 Oct. 1922 (memorandum, Admiralty to Curtis, 16 Sept. 1922 (ibid.)).
46 Telegram, Admiralty to S.N.O., 3 Oct. 1922 (ibid.).
47 Morning Post, Manchester Guardian and The Times, 5, 6 Oct. 1922.
48 Curtis advised Churchill in mid-September that he (Curtis) had asked Sir John Chancellor (secretary, standing committee of the C.I.D.) to arrange a meeting on naval reductions, to which Craig might be invited (letter, Curtis to secretary of state, 13 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3)). There is, however, no evidence that Churchill was about to sanction such a meeting. As for the Provisional Government, Curtis’s instructions to Cope were explicit (telegram, Curtis to Cope, 3 Oct. 1922 (ibid., CO 906/22)).
49 Memorandum, Admiralty to under-secretary, Colonial Office, 8 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3); conclusions to meetings of Technical Sub-Committee (of P.G.I. Committee), 19–20 Dec. 1922 (ibid.); memorandum, Admiralty to under-secretary, Colonial Office, ‘Report on the present powers of the Royal Navy in Irish waters’, 11 Jan. 1923 (ibid., CO 739/19).
50 Letter, Macready to James Masterton-Smith, 15 Nov. 1922 (P.R.O., CO 739/3). Macready’s memoir, Annals of an active life (2 vols, London, 1924), contains little informative comment on naval affairs in 1922–3.
51 One destroyer only was removed from the standard patrol in 1929; memorandum, C.-in-C. Plymouth to secretary, Admiralty, 27 Jan. 1929 (P.R.O., ADM 1/8737/100) refers to this ‘recent’ decision.