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What Human Rights Law Could Do: Lamenting the Absence of an International Human Rights Law Approach in Boumediene & Al Odah

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2012

Fiona de Londras
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Abstract

In December 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in its latest Guantánamo Bay cases, Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States. Interestingly, the argumentation offered in this litigation was almost exclusively domestic—international human rights law did not feature in spite of its capacity to add significantly to the weight and persuasiveness of the arguments petitioners' In respect of both the geographic scope and the content of constitutional standards, international human rights law has a well-developed body of jurisprudence that, this Article argues, ought to have been advanced by counsel for the petitioners. This Article both exposes the potentially significant international human rights law arguments that could have been advanced, and explores some possible reasons for the marginalization of this body of law. The Article concludes that this strategic decision on the part of counsel for the petitioners robbed the U.S. Supreme Court of an opportunity to assert the relevance of human rights law to the “War on Terrorism,” and to expand on the relationship between international and domestic constitutional standards and, for those reasons, is to be lamented.

Type
A Symposium on Constitutional Rights and International Human Rights honoring Professor David Kretzmer
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , Winter 2008 , pp. 562 - 595
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2008

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References

1 For an acceptance of the difficulty of identifying the cessation of hostilities in the “War on Terrorism” see, e.g., the Press Briefing of Tony Snow, June 12, 2007 when the following exchange took place: Reporter: “How do you declare an end to the War on Terror?” Snow: “I don't know,” available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070612-3.html.

2 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.—(2008).

3 For an argument in favor of an “emergency constitution” see Ackerman, Bruce, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (2006)Google Scholar; for an analysis of “models of accommodation” in times of crisis see Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní & Gross, Oren, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (2007)Google Scholar.

4 For a critical perspective on the emergency-ready design of international human rights law see Gearty, Conor, Reflections on Civil Liberties in an Age of Counter Terrorism, 41 Osgoode Hall L. J. 185, 202–204 (2003)Google Scholar.

5 Amann, Diane, ‘Raise the Flag and Let it Talk’: On the Use of External Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2(4) Int'l J. Con. L. 597 (2004)Google Scholar.

6 Bush, Rasul v., 542 U.S. 466 (2004)Google Scholar; Rumsfeld, Hamdan v., 548 U.S. 557 (2006)Google Scholar.

7 Rasul v. Bush, id., 497-99 (Scalia J., dissenting); See also Sands, Philippe, Lawless World 144 (2005)Google Scholar.

8 339 U.S. 763,777-78 (1950).

9 U.S. Const, art. I, §(9)(2) “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”

10 28 USC § 2243 (2004).

11 Rasul v. Bush, supra note 6.

12 See, e.g., Sloss, David L., Rasul v. Bush, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 788 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 6.

14 See, e.g., Spiro, Peter J., Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 888 (2006)Google Scholar.

15 Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United states, supra note 2.

16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

17 Rasul v. Bush, supra note 6.

18 Infra Part II (B).

19 Constitutional jurisprudence makes it clear that the right to habeas corpus secured in art. I. §(9)(2), see supra note 9 [the Suspension Clause] is satisfied by the provision of an adequate alternative, Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).

20 There is also some consideration of whether Sect. 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus in violation of Article I (9)(2) but lower federal courts have already found the statute not to suspend constitutional habeas corpus for the lack of express suspending words; a convincing argument that is likely to prevail in the Supreme Court—Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89933 (Dec. 13, 2006). For that reason, this element of the litigation is not considered in detail in this Paper although it is considered in de Londras, Fiona, Hamdan v Rumsfeld. 54 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 539 (2007)Google Scholar.

21 Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al., at 16-19 available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/probono-AlOdah_Abdah.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al.]; Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et al., at. 16-17 and n.16 available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/probono_Boumediene_Petitioners_Merits.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et al.] (both sites last visited June 25,2008).

22 Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al., supra note 21, at 31-39 (in which alleged inadequacies of the available review are frequently assessed by reference to the traditional, common law operation of habeas corpus); Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et al., supra note 21, at 18-33

23 Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art, III Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418; Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May. 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S., No. 866.

24 See Oral Transcript, Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States, Dec. 5, 2007,28-32, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-1195.pdf.

25 Rasul v. Bush, supra note 6, at 487.

26 See, especially, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). For general commentary on The Insular Cases see, e.g., Burgess, John, The Decisions of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, 16 Pol. Sci. Q. 486 (1901)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 For a full consideration of this “territorial approach” see de Londras, Fiona, In the Shadow of Hamdan v Rumsfeld: Habeas Corpus Rights of Guantánamo Bay Detainees, 17 Irish Crim. L. J. 8 (2007)Google Scholar. For a political science consideration of whether Guantánamo Bay can be described as being within the United States see, e.g., Kaplan, Amy, Where is Guantánamo?, 57 Am. Q. 831 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United states, supra note 2,38-39 (noting the particular leasehold status of Guantánamo Bay).

29 Chesney, Robert, Judicial Review, Combatant Status Determinations, and the Possible Consequences of Boumediene, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. Online 62, 67 (2007)Google Scholar.

30 It does not, in fact, appear that there are any places over which the United States has an analogous leasehold proprietorship at the moment. This is reflected by the comment of Justice Bader Ginsburg in the oral argumentation in Rasul that “I think Guantánamo, everyone agrees, is an animal, there is no other like it” – Oral Transcript, Rasul v. Bush, Apr. 20,2004, 51, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-334.pdf.

31 Infra Part III (A).

32 Oral Transcript, Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States, supra note 24, at 39.

33 Infra Part III (B).

34 See, e.g., Press Conference by President Bush, July 7, 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060707-1.html.

35 Put relatively simply, the originalist position is that the text of the Constitution binds the future and the Constitution means what it meant when originally introduced in 1789. The debate between originalists and non-originalists rages in U.S. periodicals, but an excellent overview of both positions and critique of originalism itself is offered in Goldford, Dennis, The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Infra Part III (2).

37 By means of comparison, the Israeli Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, S.H. (2002) allows incarceration where there is reasonable cause to believe that a person being held by the state authorities is an unlawful combatant and that his release will harm state security. In this case, however, the incarceration order comes before a judge within 14 days for the detainee to challenge the lawfulness of the order and, by implication, the detention.

38 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 16.

39 See supra note 6.

40 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740 (codified at 10 USC § 801(2005))

41 Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, Enc. (1), § B, July 29,2004 (regarding Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba) [hereinafter England Memorandum], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf, (last visited June 25,2008).

42 Memorandum from Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defence, to the Secretary of the Navy, July 7, 2004Google Scholar (regarding ‘Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal’) [hereinafter Wolfowitz Memorandum]. Section a. available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last visited June 25, 2008).

43 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, id. at section e.

44 England Memorandum, supra note 41.

45 Id. at sect. G(11).

46 Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42, at section G(9).

47 Id.

48 England Memorandum supra note 41, at section F(6).

49 Denbeaux, Mark & Denbeaux, Joshua, No-Hearing Hearings—CSRT: The Modern Habeas Corpus?, Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 951245 (2006)Google Scholar, available at http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf.

50 The review must take place within 30 days of the detainee being given notice—England Memorandum, see supra note 41, at section d.

51 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 49, at 16.

52 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42 at section c.

53 See England Memorandum, supra note 41, at enclosure (3) 3.

54 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42, at section c.

55 See supra note 50.

56 Detainee Treatment Act, supra note 40, at section 1005 (e)(2)(a).

57 Id. at section 1005 (e)(2)(c)

58 Military Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006) Section 5 of the Act provides that:

No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories.

59 Detainee Treatment Act, supra note 40, at Sect 1005(e).

60 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 6.

61 See supra note 58.

62 Section 7 amends Section 1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742, to read:

No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

63 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

64 See supra note 2.

65 Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al., supra note 21.

66 Id. at 16-23.

67 Id. at 38,41.

68 Available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/probono_El-BannaBrief_Final.pdf, (last visited June 25,2008).

69 Id. at 48-49.

70 Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et al., supra note 21.

71 Id. at 37-42.

72 Available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/probono_Reply_Brief_al_Odah.pdf (last visited June 25.2008).

73 Id. at 6.

74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23. 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].

75 In Hamdi the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had a habeas corpus right notwithstanding his status as a suspected terrorist “enemy combatant,” see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 16. International institutions have consistently held that one's status as a suspected terrorist is not relevant to one's human rights entitlements, see jurisprudence considered infra in Part III (B).

76 U.S. Constitutional law clearly acknowledges that non-US citizens are entitled to habeas corpus, see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). IHRL has a consistent and unwavering commitment to rights flowing from one's humanity and without any reference whatsoever to citizenship—see, e.g., Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st. plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 71 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].

77 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

78 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 16, at 529.

79 de Londras, Fiona, The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An International Perspective on U.S. Detention of Suspected-Terrorists, 12 J. Conflict Sec. L. 223 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80 First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 74.

81 Supra note 23.

82 General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,(May 26, 2004).

83 See Masslotti and Baritussio v. Uruguay, Communication No. 25/1978 R.6/25, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 187 (1982); Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, Communication No. 110/1981; Montero v. Uruguay, Communication No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) at 186 (1983); Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984); Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979, No. R.13/56, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 185 (1981).

84 See, e.g., Montero v. Uruguay; Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay; and Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 83.

85 Supra note 83.

86 Id.

87 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 83, ¶ 12.1-12.3; Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 83, ¶ 10.1-10.3.

88 But c.f. Individual Opinion of Christian Tomuschat in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay and Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 83. It should be noted that some elements of this individual opinion are subject to criticism including Tomuschat's focus on the citizen and nonsensical distinction between “wilful and deliberate violations” of the ICCPR and “objective impediments to implementation.” A good review of the opinion is available in Ben-Naftali, Orna & Shany, Yuval, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 37 Isr. L. Rev. 17, 71–74 (2003–2004)Google Scholar.

89 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003).

90 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3/CRP.4 (July 28,2006).

91 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), art. II, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992).

92 Resolution XXII of the Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965 resolves

to authorize the Commission to examine communications submitted to it and any other available information, so that it may address to the government of any American State a request for information deemed pertinent by the Commission, and so that it may make recommendations, when it deems appropriate, with the objective of bringing about more effective observance of fundamental human rights.

Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 1965, Final Act. OEA/Ser. C/I.13, 32-4

93 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 91, art. 1(1).

94 The Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case No. 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEN/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 550 (Mar 13, 1997).

95 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989).

96 See, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. (1999); Armando Alejandre Jr et. al. v.. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 586 (1999). Inter American Commission on Human Rights, 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002)Google Scholar (on which see Titternore, Brian, Guantánamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 378 (2006))Google Scholar.

97 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Sep. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.

98 Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 95, at 86.

99 See, e.g., X v. Federal Republic of Germany (1965) 8 Hum. Rts. Y.B. 158; Hess v. United Kingdom (1975) 2 D.R. 72; Cyprus v. Turkey (1975) 2 D.R. 125; X & Y v. Switzerland (1977) 9 D.R 57.

100 The categorization of these cases reflects that used by Gondek, Michal in Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 349 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101 Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513 (1997); Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 11 BHRC 45; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 95-99.

102 See, e.g., Stocké v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, at 166 (1991).

103 (2001) 11 BHRC 435; see Banković v. Belgium 12 Eur. Ct. H. R. 353 (2001), Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 (GC).

104 Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 95.

105 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 103, at 71.

106 Id. at 80.

107 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 101.

108 Öcalan v. Turkey. Eur. Ct. H.R. 46221/99 (2005).

109 See Coard v. United States, supra note 96, at 467.

110 Id.

111 See Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 95, at 87.

112 See Banković v. Belgium supra note 103, at 51.

113 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, (2004) 17 BHRC 141.

114 Id.

115 Supra note 108.

116 On the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens norms see, e.g., Furundžija, Prosecutor v., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2002, 121 Int'l L. Rep. 213 (2002)Google Scholar.

117 See Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 11 Eur. H.E. Rep. 33 (1987)Google Scholar.

118 Swain v. Pressley, supra note 19.

119 UDHR, supra note 76, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 9; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 91, art. XXV; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7, July. 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, Sep. 3, 1953 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 5, Sep, 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 Hum. Rts. L.J. 151; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 6, June 27, 1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58; Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States, art. 5, May 26, 1995 [hereinafter CIS].

120 ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 9(4); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 119, art. 5(4); ACHR, supra note 119, art. 7(6); CIS, supra note 119, art. 5(3).

121 Arbitrariness in this context can be taken to mean detention that is unjust or incompatible with the principles of justice and human dignity see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (A v. Australia Complaint No. 560/1993), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997).

For more on international's law concern with preventing arbitrary deprivations of liberty see, e.g., Jayawickrama, Nihal, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Approaches, Chapter 13 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

122 Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Commonwealth of Independent States [hereinafter CIS] (May 25, 1995).

123 Earlier drafts of the ICCPR expressly refer to habeas corpus but these references were removed out of deference to non-common-law legal systems (U.N. Doc. A/2629).

124 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Smirnova v. Russian Federation Complaint No. 712/1996), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/712/1996 (Aug. 18, 2004).

125 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Baban v Australia Complaint No. 1014/2001), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (Sept. 18,2003).

126 For example, in Boumar v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1989), the European Court of Human Rights held that “the scope of the obligation … is not identical in all circumstances or for every kind of deprivation of liberty,” id. at ¶ 60. This matter is considered more fully in de Londras, Fiona, The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An International Perspective on U.S. Detention of Suspected-Terrorists, 12 J. Conflict Sec. L. 223, 246–47 (2007)Google Scholar.

127 De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373,¶ 76 (1971).

128 Boumar v. Belgium, supra note 126, at ¶ 57.

129 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Shafiq v Australia, Complaint No. 1324/2004), ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 2006).

130 Saimijon & Bazaro v. Uzbekistan, ¶ 8.3, Communication No. 959/2000, Views adopted 8 August 2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/959/2000; Kulomin v. Hungary, ¶ 11.3, Communication No. 321/1992, Views adopted 22 March 1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/521/1992.

131 Boumar v. Belgium, supra note 126, at ¶ 60.

132 Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 71 (1986).

133 Toth v. Austria, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 551 (1991)Google Scholar; Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Bousroual v Algeria Complaint No. 992/2001), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001 (Apr. 24, 2006); Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Politica1 Rights (de Morais v Angola Complaint No. 1128/2002), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Apr. 18.2005).

134 See supra note 129 and infra note 142 and accompanying text.

135 Id.

136 Leandro Despouy, Fourth Annual Report and List of States which, since 1 January 1985, have Proclaimed, Extended or Terminated a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/28/Rev.1,44-46 (1991); Kooijmans, Pieter, Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Pursuant to HRC Res. 1985/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, 26–28, 20-25Google Scholar; Chernichenko, Stanislav & Treat, William, Third Report on the Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and Measures Necessary for its Strengthening, Addendum: Right to Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and Similar Procedures, U.N. DOC. E/CN/Sub.2/1992/24/Add.3, 11Google Scholar; General Recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, U.N. Doc. A/56/156. Indeed, incommunicado detention itself is now becoming accepted as a violation of international law—see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Complaint No. 440/1990), sec. 5.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990(Mar, 24, 1994).

137 Working Paper: Preliminary Framework Draft of Principles and Guidelines Concerning Human Rights and Terrorism, Principle D.14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/47 (Aug. 11, 2004) (prepared by Kalliopi Koufa); see also The Right to a Fair Trial: Brief Report Prepared by Mr.Chernichencko, Stanislav and Treat, William in Accordance with Resolution 1989/27 of the Subcommission UN ESCOR HRC 42nd Session Provisional Agenda Item 10(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34 (1990)Google Scholar recommending the non-derogability of habeas corpus and equivalent writs as essential to the effective guarantee of a right to a fair trial.

138 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Communication No. 1126/2002: Peru, Jurisprudence), ¶ 3.3 ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002 (Nov. 25, 2005).

139 Decree Law 25659, el Peruano, Aug. 12, 1992.

140 The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reached the same conclusion on this law in Eleuterio Zarate Lujám v. Peru, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 75 (2000).

141 See generally General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶ 16 (Aug 31, 2001); See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, ¶ 21 CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug 18, 1998).

142 Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33, ¶ 20 (1987)Google Scholar; see also Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 3, Dec. 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 3,; amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States “Protocol of Buenos Aires,” Feb. 27, 1970, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, O.A.S. T.S, No. 1-A,; amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States “Protocol of Cartagena de Indias,” Nov. 16, 1988, O.A.S.T.S, No. 66, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 527, amended by Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States “Protocol of Washington,” Sept. 25, 1997, 1-E Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1005; amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States “Protocol of Managua,” Jan. 29, 1996, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1009.

143 Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 142, ¶ 24.

144 Id. ¶¶ 29,35.

145 Id. ¶ 140.

146 See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 200 (1979-1980)Google Scholar; Brogan, & Ors v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1989)Google Scholar; Campbell, Fox & Hartley v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157 (1991)Google Scholar; Brannigan, & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539 (1994)Google Scholar.

147 Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, supra note 146; for a concise consideration of the case see, e.g., Finnie, Wilson, Anti-Terrorist Legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights, 54 Modern L. Rev. 288 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

148 Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, supra note 146, ¶¶34-36.

149 This is particularly evident in the recent decision of the House of Lords in R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State [2007] 3 WLR 33. For an argument that the House of Lords approach in Al-Skeini ought to be adopted as a template for future decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court see de Londras, Fiona, Guantánamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 Modern L. Rev. 36 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

150 U.S. Const. art. VI

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

151 See Murphy, John F., The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs 74–75 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

152 27 U.S. 253 (1829), at ¶ 254.

153 § 111 (3) (1987).

154 See Henkin, Louis, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

155 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (1992).

156 S. Exec. Rep., No. 102-23, at 15 (1992).

157 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), per Gray J., at 700.

158 This position is by no means without controversy or endorsed by all. See, e.g., Bradley, Curtis & Goldsmith, Jack, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 850 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Henkin, Louis, International Law as Law of the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1556–57 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Part I, Chapter 2, introductory note 41 (1987).

159 The Paquete Habana, supra note 157, at 700.

160 The last-in-time rule is hotly contested with most scholars disapproving of its continuing application. See, e.g., Vasquez, Carlos, Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sachs, David, Is the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 Tax L. 867 (1994)Google Scholar; Paust, Jordan, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 Va. J. Int'l L. 393 (1988)Google Scholar. For a rare defense of the rule, see Ku, Julian, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 Ind. L. J. 319 (2005)Google Scholar.

161 Amann, supra note 5, at 598.

162 Henkin, Louis, Foreign Affairs and the United States 322 (2nd ed. 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

163 For an excellent summary of the original position and the shift to a more complimentary relationship between the two bodies of law see Prud'homme, Nancie, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying A More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?. 40 Isr. L. Rev. 355, 358–66 (2007)Google Scholar.

164 Pauwelyn, Joost, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law 410 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

165 Id.

166 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; for more on this decision see, e.g., Burroughs, John, The (Il)Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of The International Court of Justice (1997)Google Scholar.

167 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Req. for an Advisory Opinion) (Dec. 19,2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1497.pdf; for concise commentary on the decision see, e.g., Susan Breau & Malcolm Evans, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, 54 I.C.L.Q. 1003 (2005). The decision is frequently critiqued for its shallow consideration of international humanitarian law (see, especially, Kretzmer, David, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 88 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar) but is nevertheless notable in the context of this Article for its reiteration of the principle that international human rights law retains its relevance in times of conflict.

168 See, e.g., Abella v Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, doc. 38 (1997); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 37/00 OEA/Ser. C 70 (2000).

169 See, e.g., Ergi v. Turkey, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (2001).

170 Supra note 6.

171 It should be noted that the Supreme Court's decision that international humanitarian law applies to the “War against Al Qaeda” and that Al Qaeda detainees are entitled to the protections of Common Article 3 is not without controversy from within the international humanitarian law field itself. For an excellent critical consideration of the decision from this ‘insider’ IHL perspective see Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get it Right?, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1523 (2007)Google Scholar.

172 Critics of the Supreme Court's intervention in the War on Terrorism frequently cite to the Founders in order to support their position that decision in “wartime” ought to be taken by the Executive alone, or perhaps sometimes with the compliance of Congress, and that the judiciary ought to remove itself from such considerations. Two major critics of the Hamdan decision (supra note 6)—John Yoo and Julian Ku—make this and other arguments in Yoo, John & Ku, Julian, Hamdan v Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 Con. Com 179 (2006)Google Scholar. This argument suffers from many of the same deficiencies levelled at originalist constitutionalism: the world is not the same now as it was when the U.S. constitution was introduced—among other things sophisticated international organizations have been developed and standards have become constitutionalized within the concept of an international Rule of Law. In addition, although the authors are quick to quote from Hamilton and Madison's contributions to The Federalist Papers in this section of their work, they selectively ignore the second half of the Madisonian vision of wartime/emergency law making, namely reliance on international standards. James Madison argued that the American political branches should abstain from lawmaking in times of war and fall back on international standards instead: to his mind stress does not make for good law and individual liberties suffer as a result see Madison, James, An Examination of the British Doctrine Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade Not Open in Time of Peace (1806)Google Scholar. The Framers' intent with which so many commentators are concerned is more complex than it is often represented to be: Madison may have advocated judicial restraint in times of emergency or war but he did so with an internationalist and temperate political system in mind. In other words, for Madison at least there was only to be judicial restraint if there was accompanying legislative and executive restraint.