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Complementing Occupation Law? Selective Judicial Treatment of the Suitability of Human Rights Norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2012

Ralph Wilde
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Abstract

This Article offers a critical evaluation of the treatment of the suitability of applying human rights law to occupation situations offered by the English House of Lords in the Al-Skeini judgment of 2007. Al-Skeini concerned the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the United Kingdom in Iraq. In the decision, the majority asserted that the application of human rights law would amount to a form of “imperialism” in requiring an occupying State to impose culturally inappropriate norms in occupied territory. They also found that its application would undermine the status quo norm contained in occupation law, by obliging an occupying State to transform the legal system in occupied territory in order to bring it in line with the human rights standards in play. This Article argues that these two assertions are based on a mistaken understanding of the substantive meaning of human rights obligations in occupation situations, and the effect on this meaning of the interface with other areas of international law. It is suggested that the fear of “human rights imperialism” is, as articulated here, misconceived; that applying human rights law to occupation situations may not actually involve breaching the law of occupation; and that in any case a more sophisticated approach to the question of clashes in normative regimes needs to be adopted.

Type
Symposium on Complementing International Humanitarian Law: Exploring the Need for Additional Norms to Govern Contemporary Conflict Situations
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , 2009 , pp. 80 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2009

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References

1 On the extraterritorial application of human rights law generally, for the relevant provisions of treaty law in the field of civil and political rights, see European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 1 & 56, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. For judicial/expert body comment, see, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9), para. 112 [hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall]. 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2 See Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 1, para. 10.3; López Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 1, para. 12.3, in which the Committee noted that “… it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory”; see also Issa v. Turkey, supra note 1, para. 71; Al-Skeini, supra note 1, paras. 72-74 (per Lord Rodger).

3 Al-Skeini, supra note 1.

4 On the law of occupation, see the sources cited infra note 27. On the obligation concerning preserving the status quo, see the sources cited infra note 28.

5 On these obligations, see, e.g., the sources cited in infra note 28.

6 Geneva Convention (I) relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GCI]; Geneva Convention (II) relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GCII]; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII]; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV].

7 See the sources cited supra note 1.

8 See the sources cited supra note 1. Some obligations are limited to the State's territory: see, e.g., Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, Sept. 16, 1963, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 46, art. 3. Note also that the ECHR and its Protocols have separate provisions on applicability to overseas territories; see, e.g., ECHR, supra note 1, art. 56. The ICCPR provision on applicability, by including the word “territory” in addition to “jurisdiction,” might be read to suggest that jurisdiction is limited to territory, thereby ruling out extraterritorial applicability. This position is difficult to sustain given the affirmation of extraterritorial applicability by the International Court of Justice and the United Nations Human Rights Committee in the cases, communications, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall and General Comment No. 31, supra note 1.

9 On the “spatial” connection, see, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 1, paras. 107-13; General Comment No. 31, supra note 1, para. 10; Loizidou (Preliminary Objections), supra note 1, para. 62; Loizidou (Merits), supra note 1, para. 52; Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 1, paras. 75-77; Banković, supra note 1, generally, and in particular paras. 70 & 75; Issa v. Turkey, supra note 1, paras. 69-70; Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 1, paras. 314-16; CAT: USA Report, supra note 1, para. 15. On the “personal” connection, see, e.g., General Comment No. 31, supra note 1, para. 10; López Burgos V. Uruguay, supra note 1, para. 12.3; Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 1, para. 10.3; Banković, supra note 1, generally, and in particular para. 75; Issa v. Turkey, supra note 1, para. 71; Solomou v. Turkey, supra note 1, paras. 45, 50-51; CAT: USA Report, supra note 1, para. 15. For commentary, see the academic sources listed in supra note 1.

10 This brief summary is based on Wilde, Case Note, R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of state for Defence (The Redress Trust intervening), supra note 1, with the permission of the Editors-in-Chief of the American Journal of International Law.

11 Al-Skeini, supra note 1, para. 1.

12 Id. paras. 109 & 127.

13 For more commentary on this finding, and the finding on the alternative trigger for jurisdiction, see, e.g. Wilde, Case Note, R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence (The Redress Trust intervening, supra note 1.

14 Banković, supra note 1. For an explanation of the facts of the case, see id. paras. 6-13. Many of the academic commentators cited supra note 1 address this case.

15 Id. para. 46.

16 Id. para. 75.

17 Al-Skeini, supra note 1, para. 75 (Lord Brown) and para. 69 (Lord Rodger).

18 Al-Skeini v. Sec. of State for Defence [2005] EWCA 1609 (Civ.), para. 126 (Lord Justice Brooke) [hereinafter Al-Skeini Appeal Decision].

19 In the Golder dictum, the word “States” is in title case, and reference is made to the “Council” not “Country” of Europe, which denotes the regional grouping under whose aegis the ECHR operates. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975), at para. 14 (App. No. 4451/70).

20 Al-Skeini Appeal Decision, supra note 18, para. 126 (Lord Justice Brooke).

21 Al-Skeini, supra note 1, para. 129 (Lord Brown).

22 Iraq ratified the ICCPR, supra note 1, on Jan. 25, 1971. See the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at http://www.ohchr.org. The events at issue in Al-Skeini took place between August and November 2003. See Al-Skeini, supra note 1, para. 6.

23 On the relevant principles of treaty interpretation, see, e.g. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

24 The Preamble to the ECHR, supra note 1 states:

[t]he governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, … [b]eing resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration …

ECHR jurisprudence frequently references this “common heritage” when construing the meaning of treaty provisions. See, e.g., Golder v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 34; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others Turkey, v., 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121 (1998)Google Scholar, at para. 45 (App. 19392/92); for academic commentary, see, e.g., Greer, Steven, Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 O.J.L.S. 405 (2003)Google Scholar.

25 Banković, supra note 1, para. 80.

26 Al-Skeini, supra note 1, para. 78 (Lord Rodger).

27 On the law of occupation generally, see Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Hague Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts 42–56; July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (Series 2), 949 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1899], The 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts. 42-56, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. GCI, supra note 6, art. 2; GCII, supra note 6, art. 2; GCIII, supra note 6, art. 2; GCIV, supra note 6, arts 2, 27–34 &and 47–78. For commentary, see Benvenisti, Eyal, The International Law of Occupation (paperback ed. 2004)Google Scholar, passim; Roberts, Adam, What is Military Occupation?, 55 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 249 (1984)Google Scholar; Commentary on Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (Pictet, J.S. ed., 1958), Commentary to Art. 2 (2), 21–2Google Scholar; von Glahn, Gerhard, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law, ch. 25 (7th ed. 1995)Google Scholar; Gerson, Allan, Israel, the West Bank and International Law (1978)Google Scholar; Kretzmer, David, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (2002)Google Scholar; UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004)Google Scholar; Wilson, Arnold, The Laws of War in Occupied Territory, 18 Transactions of the Grotius Society 17 (1932)Google Scholar; Gerson, Allan, Trustee Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (1973)Google Scholar; Thürer, Daniel, Current Challenges to the Law of Occupation, speech delivered at the 6th Bruges Colloquium, Oct. 20-21, 2005Google Scholar, available at http://www.icrc.org; Gasser, Hans-Peter, Protection of the Civilian Population, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts ch. 5, see especially 240–79 and sources cited therein (Fleck, Dieter ed., 1995)Google Scholar; Scheffer, David, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 842 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bhuta, Nehal, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 721 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ratner, Steven R., Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 695, 696 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roberts, , Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1, at 580Google Scholar; Wilde, Ralph, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went away 21, 23–6, 39, 45, 90, 142 n. 200, 144, 157 n. 23, 158, 171–2, 178, 180–2, 214, 246, 249, 290, 295, 297, 299, 308–11, 313–14, 316–17, 318 n. 106, 319–20 n. 108, 322–6, 328–9, 334, 342–4, 346, 353–7, 363, 369, 373, 384–5, 395, 408, 411–12, 416 n. 510, 427 n. 554, 429, 430, 440–1, 455 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Wilde, International Territorial Administration].

28 See Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 27 and Hague Regulations, supra note 27, art. 43. For commentary, see, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 27, at 7, n.1. In his survey of occupations published in 1984, Adam Roberts describes how many, in their transformatory activities, “went beyond the letter of the Hague regulations, yet fell short of annexation or assumption of sovereignty,” Roberts, , What is Militay Occupation?, supra note 27, at 269Google Scholar. In both that survey and a later piece written in the context of the occupation of Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Roberts takes a fairly expansive view of what is possible under occupation law, but also, in the latter article, accepts that this normative framework can be supplemented from other sources in the case of so-called ”transformatory” occupations; see Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1. Eyal Benvenisti states that “[t]he occupant's powers have expanded through time to cover almost all the areas in which modern governments assert legitimacy to police, a far cry from the turn of the century laissez-faire conception of minimal governmental intervention”; Benvenisti, supra note 27, at 6. Discussing SC Res. 1483 of May 22, 2003, which, it is claimed, authorized the political and economic transformation of Iraq by the CPA, Benvenisti states that the resolution:

[e]nvisions the role of the modern occupant as the role of the heavily involved regulator, when it calls upon the occupants to pursue an “effective administration” of Iraq. This call stands in contrast to the initial orientation of the Hague Regulations, which envisioned the disinterested occupant who does not intervene in the lives of the occupied population.

Id. at x. David Scheffer's broad thesis about the inadequacies of occupation law alone to govern the conduct of transformative occupations includes the argument that the law is sometimes at odds with the transformation agenda; see Scheffer, supra note 27. In general, Scheffer argues that transformation “requires strained interpretations of occupation law,” id. at 843. The law of occupation in GCIV is “far more relevant to a belligerent occupation than to an occupation designed to liberate a society from its repressive governance and transform it as a nation guided by international norms and the self-determination of its liberated populace,” id. at 849. Discussing peacekeeping in particular, he argues that the full operation of occupation law may be “inappropriate and even undesirable in many situations,” id. at 848. Discussing Adam Roberts' broad conception in his 1984 article of what is possible under occupation law, Scheffer argues that the attempt to square occupation law with the realities of modern occupations is “increasingly artificial and begs for an alternative legal framework that more accurately reflects the development of key areas of international law and that recognizes… the political realities of modern practice”; Scheffer, id. at 848-49, footnote omitted.

29 Al-Skeini, supra note 1, para. 129 (Lord Brown).

30 See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 1; Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), supra note 1; Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 1.

31 On the territorial control test triggering occupation law, see the Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 27, art. 42 which states: “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” See also the Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 27, art. 42: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.” Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, refers to “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant.” See also 43 of the Hague Regulations 1899: “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant.” According to Adam Roberts, the test in Article 42 Hague Regulations “consists of direct control” by the “armed forces” of the occupying state (see Roberts, , What is Military Occupation?, supra note 27, at 251Google Scholar) and has an “implicit assumption that an occupant exercises authority directly, through its armed forces, rather than indirectly, through local agents” (id. at 252), a position that “is also evident” in Article 43 and “also seems to be taken for granted” in Articles 48, 49, 51–53 and 55 (id.). Roberts concludes that “[a]n open and identifiable command structure is thus a central feature of the Hague definition of military occupation” (id.). On the Hague test for applicability, see also Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber Judgment, (Mar. 31, 2003), para. 217. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, makes the Conventions applicable to “all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” See also GCIV, supra note 6, arts. 27–34 & 47–78. On the test in occupation law generally, Roberts states that: “[a]t the heart of treaty provisions, court decisions and legal writings about occupations is the image of the armed forces of a state exercising some kind of domination or authority over inhabited territory outside the accepted international frontiers of their State and its dependencies”; see Roberts, , What is Military Occupation?, supra note 27, at 300Google Scholar. Benvenisti defines occupation as “effective control of a power (be it one or more states or an international organization, such as the United Nations) over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory”; Benvenisti, supra note 27, at 4.

32 Banković, supra note 1, at para. 75.

33 Under human rights treaties states are permitted to impose limitations on certain individual rights in order to protect the rights of others and the broader interests of the community or the state. Under the ECHR, supra note 1, for instance, states parties may impose limitations on the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (art. 8(2)), on the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs (art. 9(2)), on the right to freedom of expression (art. 10(2)) and on the freedom of peaceful assembly and association (art. 11(2)). Rights which are not qualified by limitation clauses under the ECHR are the right to life, the right to be free from torture and ill-treatment, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security, the right to fair trial, the prohibition of retroactive criminal legislation, the right to marry, the right to a remedy and the right to enjoy all the rights guaranteed in the Convention on a non-discriminatory basis. In addition to the possibility for limiting rights, human rights treaties also enable states to derogate from their rights obligations in times of war or other public emergencies. Under the ECHR, supra note 1, the right to life (art. 2), the right to be free from torture and ill-treatment (art. 3), the prohibition of slavery and compulsory labour (art. 4) and the prohibition of retroactive criminal legislation (art. 7) can never be the object of derogation (art. 15). Other rights in the ECHR are not covered by this exclusion. On derogations under the other major human rights instruments, see ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4; ACHR, supra note 1, art. 27. On this area of the law, see, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (App. No. 21987/93); Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (App. Nos 14553/89 & 14554/89); Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (App. No. 11209/84); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (App. No. 5310/71); Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos 6780/74 & 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1976), 4 Eur. H.R. Rep.482 (1976); Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands v. Greece, App. Nos 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67,3344/67, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep., 12 Y.B. the Eur. Conv. on H. R. 1 (1969); Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. CT. H.R. (ser. A), (1961); Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. A, No. 9 (1987); Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. A, No. 8 (1987); Human Rights Committee, Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay, Communication No. 34/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978 (1981)Google Scholar; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, para. 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001); Harris, D.J., O'Boyle, Michael, Ed Bates, , Buckley, Carla, Harris, , O'Boyle and Warbrick: Law of European Convention on Human Rights, ch. 16 (2nd ed. 2009)Google Scholar; Higgins, Rosalyn, Derogations under Human Rights Treaties, 48 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 281(1976–1977)Google Scholar; Marks, Susan, Civil Liberties at the Margin: the UK Derogation and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 O.J.L.S. 69 (1995)Google Scholar. On derogations in relation to extraterritorial situations, see the comment by the European Court of Human Rights in Banković, supra note 1, para. 62. On the “margin of appreciation” approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, which can be viewed as having the effect of introducing an additional possibility for rights to be limited, see, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) (App. No. 5493/72); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (App. No. 7525/76); Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights [GC], 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. NO. 28957/95). For criticism, see e.g. Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin, id.

34 On the relationship between human rights law and the law of armed conflict, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), para. 25 [hereinafter Legalify of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 1, paras. 105-06; DRC v. Uganda, supra note 1, para. 216; General Comment No. 31, supra note 1, para. 11; Coard v. United States, supra note 1; Salas and Others v. United States of America, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85,doc.9rev (1993), reprinted in 123 I.L.R. 1. For commentary, see e.g. Provost, René, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Quest for Universality (Warner, Daniel ed., 1997)Google Scholar; Doswald-Beck, Louise & Vité, Sylvain, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 94 (1994)Google Scholar; Frowein, Jochen, The Relationship Between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation, 28 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 1 (1998)Google Scholar; Hampson, Francoise, Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law of Armed Conflicts, 31 Revue de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 119 (1992)Google Scholar; 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 324 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 1 (1998)Google Scholar; Prud'homme, Nancie, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 356 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gross, Aeyal M., Human Proportions, 18 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schabas, William, Lex Specialis? Belts and Suspenders? The Parallel Application of Human Rights Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 592 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On self-determination in international law generally, see, e.g., UN Charter, arts. 1 (2) & 55; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993Google Scholar U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 1960), Annex; G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); Reference re Secession of Quebec, Supreme Court of Canada, Aug. 28, 1998, [1998] 2 RCS 217, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998). The academic commentary is voluminous. See, e.g., the works contained in Wilde, International Territorial Administration, supra note 27, List of Sources, section 5.4. On the legal significance of Security Council mandates, see, e.g., R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58 and Behrami and Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. Nos 71412/01 & 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., Admissibility Decision (May 31, 2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int. On the relationship between obligations under the UN Charter and human rights obligations more generally, see Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415-05 P Kadi and Al-Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, European Court of Justice, (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm. On the relationship between different areas of international law, see Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, Apr. 13, 2006; Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, keynote speech delivered at the Spring Meeting of the International Law Association, British Branch (Mar. 4, 2006), reproduced in 55 I.C.L.Q. 791 (2006)Google Scholar; David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream, paper delivered at the Spring Meeting of the International Law Association, British Branch (Mar. 4, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/speeches/LegalOrder.pdf.

35 On self-determination see the relevant sources cited supra note 34.

36 On the right of individual petition to the Human Rights Committee, see the (First) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR First Optional Protocol]. For a list of states which have accepted the competence of the Human Rights Committee to hear individual communications under the First Optional Protocol, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/5.htm. A number of those States are also parties to the ECHR, namely Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, and Ukraine. For the status of ratification of the ECHR, see the website of the Council of Europe Treaty Office, available at http://conventions.coe.int/.

37 See ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 36, art. 5(2)(a): “The Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that: (a) The same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement …”; ECHR, supra note 1, art. 35(2)(b): “The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that … (b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.”

38 See supra note 36.

39 On the relationship between different areas of international law, see the relevant sources cited supra note 34.

40 Al-Skeini Appeal decision, supra note 18, at 196-97.