No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 July 2014
La. I clear it thus out of Sir Edw. Coke 1 Inst. Sect. 138. that this [Legal Reason] is to be understood of an artificial perfection of Reason gotten by long Study, Observation and Experience, and not of every Mans natural Reason; for Nemo nascitur Artifex. This Legal Reason is summa Ratio; and therefore if all the Reason that is to be dispersed into so many several heads were united into one, yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of England is, because by so many successions of Ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of Grave and Learned Men.
Ph. […] I grant you that the knowledge of the Law is an Art, but not that any Art of one Man, or of many how wise soever they be, or the work of one and more Artificers, how perfect soever it be, is Law. It is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law. […] That the Law hath been fined by Grave and Learned Men, meaning the Professors of the Law is manifestly untrue, for all the Laws of England have been made by the Kings of England, consulting with the Nobility and Commons in Parliament, of which not one of twenty was a Learned Lawyer.
Professor of Law, University of Vienna.
1 Hobbes, Thomas, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (1681), Cropsey, J., ed., (University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1971) 55 Google Scholar.
2 See VfGH 17.10 1997, G 169/96-36, G 285/96-22, and the precedent VfSlg. 12940/1992.
3 For an update of the reform process, see the information provided by the Minister for Family Affairs http://www.bmu.gv.at.
4 See, with further references, generally, Noll, Alfred J., Sachlichkeit statt Gleichheit? Eine rechtspolitische Studie über Gesetz und Gleichheit vor dem österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof (Springer, Vienna & New York, 1996)Google Scholar; Neisser, Heinrich, Schantl, Gernot and Welan, Manfried, “Betrachtungen zur Judikatur des Verfassungsgerichtshofes (Slg. 1967)”, (1969) 24 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 318–320, 645–654 Google Scholar; Walter, Robert, “Gleichheitsgrundsatz und Schadenersatzrecht”, (1979) 24 Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 33–44 Google Scholar; Kneucker, Raoul and Welan, Manfred, “Zur Entwicklung des Gleichheitsgrundsatzes in Österreich”, (1975) 4 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 3–22 Google Scholar; Klemenz, Claudia, Die Judikatur des Verfassungsgerichtshofes zum Gleichheitssatz und zum Recht auf ein Verfahren vor dem gesetzlichen Richter (Leykam, Graz, 1987)Google Scholar; Stoll, Gerold, “Das Sachlichgesetzlichkeitsprinzip als Ausformung des Gleichheitssatzes”, (1989) Österreichische Steuerzeitung 188–198 Google Scholar; Berchtold, Klaus, “Der Gleichheitssatz in der Krise?”, in Nowak, M. et al. , eds., Festschrift Felix Ermacora (Engel, Kehl, Strasbourg & Arlington, 1989) 327–347 Google Scholar; Rack, Reinhard and Wimmer, Norbert, “Das Gleichheitsrecht in Österreich”, (1983) 10 Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 597–613 Google Scholar. As in Italy, the principle of reasonableness in Austria, originally derived from the context of equal protection, assumes the role of the most fundamental principle of constitutional law. For Italy, see Cheli, Enzo and Donati, Filippo, “Methods and Criteria of Judgment on the Question of Rights to Freedom in Italy”, in Beatty, D., ed., Human Rights and Judicial Review. A Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) 227–265, at 261Google Scholar.
5 For an account of legal transplants as the source of legal change and development, see Watson, Alan, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1974) at 18–30 Google Scholar. For an illuminating discussion of Watson's ideas, see Ewald, William, “Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants”, (1995) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 489–510 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 For an attempt to come up with a coherent reconstruction, see Stelzer, Manfred, Das Wesensgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit (Springer, Vienna & New York, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stelzer, Manfred, “Stand und Perspektiven des Grundrechtsschutzes”, in Schefbeck, G., ed., 75 Jahre Bundesverfassung (Verlag Austria, Vienna, 1995) 585–615 Google Scholar.
7 For accounts see Grabenwarter, Christoph, Rechtliche und ökonomische Überlegungen zur Erwerbsfreiheit (Service Fachverlag, Vienna, 1994)Google Scholar; Schulev-Steindl, Eva, Wirtschaftslenkung und Verfassung. Gesetzgebungskompetenz und grundrechtliche Schranken staatlicher Wirtschaftslenkung (Springer, Vienna & New York, 1996)Google Scholar.
8 For an overview, see Somek, Alexander, “Conflicting Conceptions of Higher Law: Austria and the European Trend in Judicial Review of Legislation”, to appear in Rabello, A.M. et al, eds., Toward a European Ius Commune (The Sacher Institute, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem)Google Scholar.
9 On the following, see Kelsen, Hans, “Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit”, (1929) 5 Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer 30–88 Google Scholar, reprinted in Klecatsky, H. et al. , eds., Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule (Europaverlag, Vienna, 1969) 1813–1871, at 1852–1854Google Scholar. For an earlier articulation of the basic idea in the context of American constitutional law, see Justice Iredell (dissenting) in Colder v. Bull, 3 Dall (3 U.S.) 386 (1789) and Thayer, James B., “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law”, (1893) 7 Harv. L.R. 129–156, at 148–149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 The noteworthy exception is equal protection. See supra n. 4.
11 One of the relevant landmark decisions is VfSlg. 10179/1984, striking down a federal law establishing a public franchise system for businesses engaged in trading scrap iron on the ground of a disproportionate infringement of economic liberty.
12 For a general account, see von Brünneck, Alexander, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in den westlichen Demokratien (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1992)Google Scholar.
13 Welan, Manfried, “Constitutional Review and Legislation in Austria”, in Landfried, Ch., ed., Constitutional Review and Legislation. An International Comparison (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988) 63–80, at 72Google Scholar, correctly observes that the demise of the “formalist” approach implies the “upgrading” of basic rights and liberties.
14 See Watson, Transplants, supra n. 5, at 95: “[T]ransplanting is, in fact, the most fertile source of development. Most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing. This is so both for individual rules and for systematics […]”. For a case study including a basic heuristics of borrowings, see Somek, Alexander, “The Deadweight of Formulae, or: What Might Have Been the Second Germanization of American Equal Protection Review”, (1998) 1 Univ. Penn. J. Constit. L. (forthcoming)Google Scholar.
15 For examples, see Funk, Bernd-Christian, “Wer schützt die Verfassung vor dem Verfassungsgesetzgeber? Pladoyer für ein anderes Verfassungs”, (1993) 1 Journal für Rechtspolitik 91–98, at 92–93Google Scholar; Loebenstein, Edwin, “Das verfassungswidrige Verfassungsgesetz gezeigt am Beispiel der Gesamtänderung der Verfassung”, in Mayer, H., et al., eds., Festschrift Robert Walter (Manz, Vienna, 1991) 437–469 Google Scholar; Loebenstein, Edwin, “Von der Verfassungskultur zur Verfassungsunkultur. Nochmals das verfassungswidrige Verfassungsgesetz”, (1993) 48 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 433–437, at 435Google Scholar; Öhlinger, Theo, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit”, (1990) 45 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 2–9, at 4–5Google Scholar; Hiesel, Martin, Verfassungsgesetzgeber und Verfassungsgerichtshof (Manz, Vienna, 1995) at 16–21 Google Scholar; Adamovich, Ludwig K., Funk, Bernd-Christian and Holzinger, Gerhart, Österreichisches Staatsrecht (Springer, Vienna & New York, 1997) vol. 1, pp. 129–130 (RZ 10.011)Google Scholar.
16 See VfSlg. 12568/1990.
17 See Welan, “Review”, supra n. 13, at 72. The Court was not infrequently, however, able to discover infelicites in the way in which the relevant constitutional provisions were drafted and therefore still in a position to exercise control. See Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 5.
18 For a survey, see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 21-26.
19 If I understand Pizzorusso's remarks correctly, this conception seems to also be similiar in Italian constitutional law. See Alessandro Pizzorusso, “Constitutional Review and Legislation in Italy”, in Ch. Landfried, ed., Constitutional Review and Legislation, supra n. 13, 109-126, at 118. On the German “eternity clause” (art. 79 combined with art. 20 of the Basic Law), exempting the fundamental principles of German constitutional law from any revision, just see Jarass, Hans D. and Pieroth, Bodo, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kommentar (CH. Beck, Munich, 3rd ed., 1995) at 445–446, 724–725 Google Scholar.
20 See Adamovich, Funk and Holzinger, supra n. 15, at 128 (RZ 10.010).
21 For an introduction, see Griller, Stefan, Grundzüge des Rechts der europäischen Union (Springer, Vienna, 2nd ed., 1997) 64–66 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 See, e.g., Adamovich, Funk and Holzinger, supra n. 15, at 123-184; for further references see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 35.
23 Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 36, points out, there is no consensus about the criteria of fundamental principles. Apparently, everything hinges on the perceived quality of being “fundamental”.
24 See Öhlinger, Theo, “Stil der Verfassungsgesetzgebung — Stil der Verfassungsinterpretation”, in Funk, B. Ch. et al. , eds., Festschrift Ludwig Adamovich (Manz, Vienna, 1992) 502–523, at 513Google Scholar; Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 37.
25 See Noll, Alfred J., Verfassunggebung und Verfassungsgericht. Ein Essay zur rechtspolitischen Konzeption der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (Springer, Vienna & New York, 1994) 72, 108 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 See Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 41-42. During and after the great reform of the Austrian Constitution in 1929, there was a debate whether it amounted to a general revision. Kelsen did not want to have this ruled out, although he did not positively affirm it. For references, see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, ibid., at 31-32.
27 See Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 2. Austrian constitutional doctrine refers to this understanding of the general revision as the “formal” understanding. See Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, ibid., at 41. This formal understanding was defended by Hartwig, Werner, Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid im deutschen und österreichischen Staatsrecht (Bernard & Graefe, Berlin, 1930)Google Scholar.
28 See Kelsen, Hans, Rudolf Froehlich and Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Österreich, part 5: Die Bundesverfassung vom 1. Oktober 1920 (Deuticke, Vienna, 1922) 124 Google Scholar. See Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 28.
29 See Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 2; Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 28-29.
30 This was the ruling opinion during the First Republic (1920-1934). See Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 3; for a more detailed account see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 28-32. Hiesel (at 29) correctly remarks that since, according to Kelsen himself, the programmatic opening articles are devoid of any normative import, he could not rest his claim on those paragraphs. It remains unclear, therefore, how Kelsen could claim democratic republicanism and federalism to be the most eminent fundamental principles of Austrian constitutional law. In light of the function initially attributed to the Constitutional Court, namely, to act as the arbitrator between the federation and the states, restricting the scope of fundamental principles to democratic republicanism and federalism was not at all implausible. See Stelzer, Wesensgehaltsargument, supra n. 6, at 293.
31 See, again, Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 3; Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 33-40.
32 See, e.g., Adamovich, Ludwig, Grundriss des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts (Springer, Vienna, 4th ed., 1947) 71 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 See VfSlg. 2455/1952.
34 See, for example, Ermacora, Felix, “Die Bedeutung der Überprüfung von Bundesverfassungsgesetzen durch den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof”, (1953) 75 Juristische Blätter 537–539, at 537, n. 3Google Scholar.
35 See Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 34-36.
36 To mention one more paradox, many scholars assume that fundamental principles can be amended gradually, even without submitting relevant constitutional statutes to the referendum process. For references, see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 44.
37 See Welan, “Review”, supra n. 13, at 72; Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 39, Stelzer, “Stand”, supra n. 6, at 593-594.
38 See Adamovich, Funk and Holzinger, Staatsrecht I, supra n. 15, at 131 (RZ 10.041); Loebenstein, Edwin, “Nochmals: Von der Verfassungskultur zur Verfassungsunkultur — Ein Nachwort”, (1994) 49 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 361–368, at 346Google Scholar; Koja, Friedrich, “Parlament gegen Verfassungsgerichtshof? Sind Verfassungsgesetze zur Ausschaltung von Gesetzesaufhebungen durch den VfGH zulässig?”, (1992) 44 Austrian J. Public and Int'l L. 55–61, at 58Google Scholar.
39 See, e.g., Adamovich, Funk and Holzinger, Staatsrecht I, supra n. 15, at 49-50 (RZ 01.028, 03.022); Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 185.
40 I do not think that courts in general — except when engaged in processes of constitution building, such as the European Court of Justice — necessarily rely on a conception of what the constitution is, for example, as opposed to a treaty organization or another type of social organization. Rather, courts adopt a narrower stance: they rely on conceptions of what it is that makes a constitution the higher law vis-à-vis legislation. One may still understand the constitution as providing the basic rules of the strategic game of politics; however, the conception of what makes such rules a higher law can be changed.
41 It should be noted, in passing, that both of the following conceptions of reading constitutional law as the higher law stem from a principle of obscure authorization. Their basis is never reflected in the opinions of the Court.
42 In the following, I shall intermittently use the political language which was current in seventeenth century England. I can accept that one may charge me for adopting the Whig's position in the historiography of modern constitutional law. However, the references are meant to elucidate the relevant contrast between ideal types and not intended to establish a sound historical argument. What matters is to sketch out a recurrent alternative to viewing the constitution as the higher law. However, I assume that taking the historical background into account is eminently useful for that purpose. For a different account, drawing on the contrast between the Catholic and Protestant attitude toward religious authority, see Levinson, Sanford, Constitutional Faith (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988) 27–37 Google Scholar.
43 For an introductory sketch of the Austrian system, see Cappelletti, Mauro, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1971) at 54–66 Google Scholar.
44 See Hobbes, Dialogue, supra n. 1, at 71:
“La. How would you have a Law defin'd?
Ph. Thus; A Law is the Command of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, given to those that be his or their Subjects, declaring Publickly, and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do”.
45 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 135 (1803): “So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case”.
46 See generally, Davidson, Donald, “What Metaphors Mean”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984) 245–264 Google Scholar.
47 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). For the Kelsenian approach see above, at p. 570.
48 For a characterization of the relevant contrast, see Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing”, (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 943–1005, at 987CrossRefGoogle Scholar: “Balancing is undermining our usual understanding of constitutional law as an interpretive enterprise. In so doing, it is transforming constitutional discourse into a general discussion of the reasonableness of governmental conduct”.
49 For a similar perspective on the Italian court, see Cheli and Donati, “Methods”, supra n. 4, at 233-234; for France, see Maus, Didier, “The Birth of Judicial Review of Legislation in France”, in Smith, E., ed., Constitutional Justice under Old Constitutions (Kluwer, The Hague, 1995) 133–144, at 140Google Scholar; for Germany (the obvious case), see Grimm, Dieter, “Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany”, in Beatty, D., ed., Human Rights and Judicial Review. A Comparative Perspective (Matrinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) 267–295, at 274–285Google Scholar.
50 On the elusiveness and the different uses of the term in the seventeenth century, see Eusden, John Dykstra, Puritans, Lawyers, and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1958) 44–49 Google Scholar. My impression is that in the field of basic rights, Europe is indeed witnessing an emergence of a constitutional common law existing in countless variations. For an account of the proper role of the European Court of Human Rights in this process, see Weiler, Joseph H.H., “Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights”, in Neuwahl, N. et al. , eds., The European Union and Human Rights (Kluwer, The Hague, 1995) 51–76, at 53–56Google Scholar.
51 See Burgess, Glenn, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996) 192 Google Scholar. As Burgess explains (id.): “It was, thus, not analogous to a constitution; it was not a body of principles delineating public authority and its relation to the citizenry. Rather, fundamental law was the skeleton of the entire body of the common law itself”.
52 See, arguing from this perspective of the common law tradition, Fletcher, George P., “Two Modes of Legal Thought”, (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 971–1003, at 987–988, 1000–1001CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 See Hobbes, Dialogue, supra n. 1, at 69:
La. There is an Accurate Definition of Law in Bracton, Cited by Sir Edw. Coke ([2 Inst. P. 588, n. 14]) Lex est sanctio justa, jubens honesta, & prohibens contraria. Ph. That is to say, Law is a just Statute, Commanding those things which are honest, and Forbidding the contrary. From whence is followeth, that in all Cases it must be the Honesty, or Dishonesty that makes the Command a Law […].
For well-known recent expressions of this common law ideal, see Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass. & London, 2nd ed., 1978) 22–44 Google Scholar; Fletcher, “Two Modes of Legal Thought”, supra n. 52, at 977-978.
54 Hence, in areas different from constitutional law, the fundamental laws (e.g., fundamental principles) are but the final backdrop for an interpretative tinkering with norms whose validity must be taken for granted.
55 For a forceful re-articulation of the seventeenth century position, see Pollock, Frederick, The Expansion of the Common Law (Stevens and Sons, London, 1904) 126, 131–132 Google Scholar.
56 It goes without saying that “rationality review” may be taken to represent something like the prototype of that structure. For an elementary exposition, see Bennett, Robert W., “‘Mere’ Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory”, (1979) 67 Calif. L.R. 1049–1103 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
57 See, accordingly, for a defense of the “moral reading” of constitutional law, Dworkin, Ronald, Freedom's Law. The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996) 7–12 Google Scholar.
58 See Nagel, Robert F., Constitutional Cultures. The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989) 121, 147 Google Scholar.
59 See ibid., at 148.
60 The question of whether a certain conception of higher law is congruent or incongruent with the letter of constitutional law cannot be settled with reference to the constitutional text, since any interpretation of the Constitution would always have to presuppose such a conception of higher law.
61 See Somek, Alexander, Der Gegenstand der Rechtserkenntnis. Epitaph einesjuristischen Problems (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996)Google Scholar.
62 For a more detailed exposition, see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 116.
63 See Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 8; Stelzer, Wesensgehaltsargument, supra n. 6, at 293-294; Walter, Robert and Mayer, Heinz, Grundriss des österreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts (Manz, Vienna, 7th ed., 1992) 42 (Rz 95)Google Scholar.
64 See Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 50.
65 See Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 7-8.
66 See ibid., at 8.
67 See Noll, Alfred J., “Kontrolle des VfGH”, (1993) 1 Journal für Rechtspolitik 96–97, at 97 Google Scholar.
68 See Loebenstein, “Von der Verfassungskultur”, supra n. 15, at 436; Koja, “Parlament”, supra n. 38, at 59.
69 See Koja, “Parlament”, supra n. 38, at 59-60.
70 See, e.g., VfSlg. 11829/1988; 11916/1988; 13116/1992.
71 For an analysis of the irony in the Court's response, see Öhlinger, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung”, supra n. 15, at 5.
72 Hence, Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber, supra n. 15, at 50, correctly asserts that the Court treats fundamental principles as “in principle infringable”.
73 See VfSlg. 11.829/1988.
74 See Funk, “Wer schützt die Verfassung”, supra n. 15, at 94; Loebenstein, “Nochmals”, supra n. 38, at 365; Koja, “Parlament”, supra n. 38, at 59.
75 See above at p. 578.
76 It should be clear from our previous discussion that the ideal type of higher-law-as-the-structure-of-rationality-and-reasonableness is of a venerable age, too, at least if it is seen in juxtaposition to the seventeenth century common law tradition.
77 On such normative standards, see generally Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986) 219, 236–237 Google Scholar.
78 For an exposition of the contrast between, among other things, “juridical” and “strong” democracy, see Barber, Benjamin, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 1984) 142–143, 150–155 Google Scholar.
79 See Funk, “Wer schützt die Verfassung”, supra n. 15, at 94; Loebenstein, “Von der Verfassungskultur”, supra n. 15, at 434.
80 The Court has already alluded to this fact. See 11.756/1988; 11.829/1988. In fact, the President of the Court has criticized the legislature for the unlawful infringement of rights or, more precisely, that it created a formal backing for their violation. See Adamovich, Ludwig K., “Recht und Politik im Bereich der Grundrechte”, in Adamovich, L.K. et al. , eds., Festschrift Hans Klecatsky (Manz, Vienna, 1990) 1–11, at 9Google Scholar.
81 For that reason, the principle of equality plays an important role yet to be examined. For the special weight of equality, which is also seen to be an important component of the fundamental principle of democracy and the rule of law, see Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgebung, supra n. 15, at 170.
82 See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra n. 57, at 25.
83 For a general exposition of this ideal of coherence, see Dworkin, , Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. & London, 1986)Google Scholar. As Dieter Grimm, a prominent justice of the German Federal Constitutional Court, explained in a similar context, there can be no doubt that this leads to a loss of parliamentary power — but in the name of human rights. Adopting such a principle, therefore, it is more congruent with “the sort of freedom guaranteed by human rights than the sort of freedom guaranteed by democratic participation”. See Grimm, “Human Rights”, supra n. 49, at 295.
84 See the First President of the National Council, Heinz Fischer, quoted in Loebenstein, “Vor der Verfassungskultur”, supra n. 15, at 435, n. 21.
85 See Funk, “Wer schützt die Verfassung”, supra n. 15, at 95.