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Human Dignity as a Protected Interest in Criminal Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2013

Tatjana Hörnle  and
Mordechai Kremnitzer
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Abstract

Human dignity can be a protected interest in criminal law. This paper starts with some reflections about the meaning of human dignity and then examines offense descriptions in the German Penal Code and the Israeli Penal Code. These codes are used as sources for identifying possibly relevant prohibitions. One can indeed find numerous examples of offense descriptions that can be justified by pointing to human dignity, either as a main protected interest or as a protected interest in addition to other interests. The protected interest can be either the individual victim's right to human dignity or human dignity as an objective value. Offense descriptions that can be connected to “protection of human dignity” should, for analytical purposes, be divided into three groups: violations of the dignity of individual human beings through acts other than speech; violations of the human dignity of individuals through speech; and media content that does not contain statements about individuals but shows scenes of severe humiliation (e.g., fictional child pornography). Questions that need further discussion primarily concern the second group (what role should free speech play in cases of human dignity violations?) and the third group (does the acknowledgement of human dignity as an objective value mean to endorse a re-moralization of the criminal law?).

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Articles
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Israel Law Review , Volume 44 , Issue 1-2: Symposium: Human Dignity and the Criminal Law , 2011 , pp. 143 - 167
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2011

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References

1 See Lagodny, Otto, Human Dignity and Its Impact on German Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 33 Isr. L. Rev. 575, 577 (1999)Google Scholar.

2 Id. at 583; 1 Roxin, Claus, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil. § 2 (4th ed. 2006)Google Scholar. The Rechtsgut could be either an individual good or a public good. The German Constitutional Court sees it as a legitimate goal of criminal law to protect collective interests. See 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 145 (1994)Google Scholar.

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7 See Kant, supra note 4, at 556-59.

8 “Recht ist also der Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter denen die Willkür des einen mit der Willkür des anderen nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann.” Kant, supra note 4, at 337.

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17 64 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] [Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court] 274 (1981)Google Scholar.

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21 Id. at 803-807.

22 German law and Israeli law both go beyond this core element. See § 177(1)(3) of the German Penal Code and § 345 of the Israeli Penal Code. However, to outline the role of human dignity, it is not necessary to cover all the details of the offense descriptions.

23 Kamir, Orit, A Different Kind of Sex: Rape Law Between Equality, Dignity, and Honor, 7(2) Mishpat Umimshal 669, 745 (2004) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

24 Id.

25 In Germany: imprisonment for two to fifteen years and three or five to fifteen years under aggravating circumstances (§177(2)-(4) of the German Penal Code). In Israel: imprisonment for four to sixteen years for rape and five to twenty years for aggravated rape (§§ 345 & 355 of the Israeli Penal Code).

26 For a Kantian approach to the wrongdoing of rape, see John, Gardner & Shute, Stephen, The Wrongness of Rape, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 193–217 (Horder, Jeremy ed., 2000)Google Scholar.

27 See Noelle Quénivet, Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law (2005).

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32 Hörnle, supra note 30, § 184b, nr. 2.

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34 See, e.g., Francione, Gary L., Introduction to Animal Rights (2000)Google Scholar.

35 See Klaus Miebach & Jürgen Schäfer, in Münchener Kommentar, supra note 30, § 131, nr. 1.

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37 CrimA 7542/00 Arthur Khanukov v. the State of Israel (Oct. 27, 2000), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

38 CrimA 291/01 Reuven Rabi'i v. the State of Israel (Jan. 22,2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

39 CrimA 460/01 Sergey Matatov v. the State of Israel (Jan. 25, 2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

40 This stance may also be found in Rabi'i. The Court stated:

There can be no doubt in my mind that the offence attaches no relevance to the question whether the person trafficked consents to the sale or not. The premise of this provision is this: once a person pays to “buy” another for the purpose of prostitution, the buyer acquires an interest that the object of sale perseveres with that occupation for a long period, in order to return the investment and make profit on the transaction. The seller has a similar interest, for if the buyer cannot realize the transaction, he may demand the money back from the seller. This creates a situation where the buyer would do the utmost to prevent the prostitution from coming to an end; if the “object” initially agrees to prostitute, he or she loses the option to cease that occupation at any time. The need to protect human dignity and freedom dictates that a person who chooses to take up prostitution is also entitled to change his or her lifestyle; creating a situation where the seller has an interest to preserve the existing situation presents a serious risk to the “object's” freedom. Moreover, the legislator regards the very existence of a transaction to sell a person as an act of humiliation and injury to the victim's human image, because that person becomes an object, akin to a slave; the circumstances of this case demonstrate this, since Aliona has been examined in a manner which can be compared with nothing except the physical inspection of a beast being sold in the market.

41 The classification of the prohibition does not conclusively determine what the protected interest is, particularly when dealing with Mandate-period legislation in a law characterized by overall inaccurate classification. Nonetheless, the classification does provide certain guidance. Together with the required mens rea considered above, it appears that the legislator did not have the dignity of the deceased in mind as a protected interest.

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43 Kammergericht Berlin [KG Berlin] [Higher Regional Court of Berlin], Nov. 20, 1989, Neue Jurlstische Wochenschrift [NJW] 782 (783), 1990Google Scholar; 50 Entsche1Dungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt ] [Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice in Criminal Matters] 80 (89).

44 CrimA 176/71 Rabbi Shmuel Baruch v. the State of Israel 26(2 ) PD 667 [1972].

45 Id. at 676.

46 CrimA 8469/99 Avigdor Askin v. the State of Israel 55(2) PD 65 [2001].

47 KG Berlin, supra note 43.

48 50 BGHSt 80 (89).

49 Askin, supra note 46.

50 Id. at 85-86.

51 Section 130(2) of the German Penal Code contains prohibitions relating to media content.

52 Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich], Mar. 25, 1985, NJW 2430, 1985; Lenckner, Theodor & Sternberg-Lieben, Detlef, in StGB-Kommentar § 130, nr. 1(a ) (Schönke, Adolf & Schröder, Horst eds., 27th ed. 2006)Google Scholar.

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55 CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira 43(3) PD 840 [1989].

56 40 BGHSt 97 (100)Google Scholar, approved by Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Sept. 6, 2000, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht [NStZ] 26 (27), 2001Google Scholar. This is the case, for example, if the offender adopts national socialist theories about race.

57 For descriptions of the cultural divide, see Carmi, Guy, Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. Int'l L.J. 277–374 (2008)Google Scholar; Whitman, James, Enforcing Civility and Respect, 109 Yale L. J. 1279–398 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 On the defense of honor, see, for example, Kriele, Martin, Ehrenschutz und Meinungsfreiheit, 1994 NJW 1897–905Google Scholar; Isensee, Josef, Grundrecht auf Ehre, in Festschrift Für Martin Kriele 5–48 (Kästner, Karl-Hermann et al. eds., 1997)Google Scholar.