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Human Dignity in the Criminal Process: The Example of Truth-Finding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2013

Winfried Hassemer
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Abstract

The search for truth lies at the basis of German criminal procedure. Human dignity can be protected by basing criminal judgments on the truth, and human dignity must be protected against overreach by law enforcement agents in their effort to determine the truth. New instruments of investigation, including secret methods and measures affecting non-suspects, jeopardize human dignity. The same is true for plea bargaining, which signifies the abandonment of the search for the truth in the criminal process.

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Articles
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Israel Law Review , Volume 44 , Issue 1-2: Symposium: Human Dignity and the Criminal Law , 2011 , pp. 185 - 198
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2011

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References

1 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl.I], art. 103 § 2; Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I, § 1.

2 See 25 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 269 (284-85); 46 BVerfGE 188 (193).

3 Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBl. I at 1074, § 136 (granting suspects a right to silence) and § 136a (prohibiting certain measures of interrogation). These provisions are directly interrelated with the protection of human dignity in article 1(1) of the Basic Law.

4 GG art. 5 § 3.

5 See 42 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] [Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice in Criminal Matters] 139 (152) (1996)Google Scholar; 45 BGHSt 367 (2000)Google Scholar.

6 It is not a conclusive counterargument that defendants, as experience shows, tend to make false statements in order to protect themselves. Witnesses also do not necessarily volunteer to tell the truth if they testify under pressure or under the influence of personal interests, as is almost always the case. Professional lawyers are, after all, not entirely helpless when confronted with false statements.

7 StPO § 52.

8 Id. § 53.

9 Id. § 55.

10 Id. § 136a.

11 For a statement in favor of permitting torture in extreme cases, see Herzberg, Rolf-Dietrich, Folter und Menschenwürde, 60 Juristenzeitung 321 (2005)Google Scholar.

12 See 14 BGHSt 358(365)(1960)Google Scholar.

13 3 BGHSt 213 (215) (1952)Google Scholar; 14 BGHSt 162 (1960)Google Scholar. For a collection of case law on this issue, see Engelhardt, Harms, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung § 267, marginal notes 13–20 (Hannich, Rolf ed., 6th ed. 2008)Google Scholar.

14 The seminal monograph is by Beck, Ulrich, Risikogesellschaft. Auf Dem Weg In Eine Andere Moderne (1986)Google Scholar.

15 Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Feb. 1, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl.] 253. After many amendments, the Code of Criminal Procedure was repromulgated in 1987 as Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBl. I at 1074.

16 StPO § 99. According to § 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the seizure of mail requires a judicial order, and only a judge can open and read seized items, unless the judge has delegated that task to the prosecutor. The sender and the addressee of seized items have to be informed, but information can be delayed until the purpose of the investigation has been reached (StPO § 101, paras. 4 & 5).

17 Id. § 100f.

18 Id. §§ 100c & 100f.

19 Id. § 100g. The so-called contact data include the number called and the time and duration of the call.

20 Id. § 100i.

21 Id. § 100h. Secretly taking pictures of persons in private homes is not (yet) permitted.

22 Id. § 110a.

23 See, e.g., 109 BVerfGE 279 (323–25) (2004)Google Scholar (surveillance of conversations in homes); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Aug. 22, 2006, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 351, 2007Google Scholar (surveillance by using the location of mobile phone); BVerfG, Apr. 18, 2007, NJW 2749, 2007 (surveillance of a defense lawyer's mobile phone); 120 BVerfGE 274 (2008)Google Scholar (secret online surveillance of private computer).

24 StPO § 163b, para. 2.

25 Id. § 163e, para. 3.

26 See, e.g., StPO § 101, para. 8: “When personal data obtained through one of these measures are no longer necessary for criminal investigation or for a review of these measures, they shall be deleted without delay.” But see StPO § 477, para. 2, second sentence, which permits evidence found “by chance” in the course of an investigation to be used in any other investigation for which this evidence could have been lawfully obtained.

27 109 BVerfGE 279 (323–25) (2004)Google Scholar.

28 In implementation of the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the legislature adopted an amended version of StPO § 100c, para. 5, which reads: “The surveillance and recording [of conversations] shall be interrupted immediately when, during surveillance, indications appear that the surveillance covers utterings that are to be attributed to the core sphere of private life. Recordings of such utterings shall be deleted immediately. Information about such utterings shall not be used [as evidence].”

29 See StPO § 257c, para. 2.

30 According to StPO § 244, para. 3, the court can deny a party's motion to hear additional witnesses only on narrow grounds (redundancy, irrelevance, or illegality).

31 False confessions in “bargained” cases can also be induced by pressure from others, for example the defendant's employer.

32 For an overview and a discussion of this practice, see Die Praxis Der Absprachen in Wirtschaftsstrafverfahren (Altenhain, Karsten et al. eds., 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kempf, Eberhard, Gesetzliche Regelung von Absprachen im Strafverfahren? Oder: Soll Informelles formalisiert werden?, 2009 Strafverteidiger 269Google Scholar.

33 See Jahn, Matthias & Müller, Martin, Der Widerspenstigen Zähmung—Aktuelle Gesetzgebungsvorschläge zu den Urteilsabsprachen im Strafprozess, 2006 Juristische Ausbildung 681Google Scholar; Landau, Herbert & Bünger, Ralph, Urteilsabsprache im Strafverfahren, 2005 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 268Google Scholar; Widmaier, Gunther, Die Urteilsabsprache im Strafprozess—ein Zukunftsmodell? 2005 NJW 1985Google Scholar.

34 The first judgment of the Federal Court of Justice recognizing—within certain limits—judgment negotiations was rendered in 1997 in 43 BGHSt 195 (1997)Google Scholar.

35 The legislature introduced StPO § 257c in 2009. This new provision legalizes and purports to regulate judgment negotiations between the court, the prosecution, and the defense. For an overview of the German debate, see Weigend, Thomas, Plea Bargaining in Germany, in Current Trends in Criminal Procedure and Evidence: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Professor Eliahu Harnon 265 (Horovitz, Anat & Kremnitzer, Mordechai eds., 2009)Google Scholar.