Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T19:32:38.403Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Non Liquet: From Modern Law to Roman Law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

Alfredo Mordechai Rabello
Get access

Extract

1. May a Judge Refuse to Pronounce Judgment?: In modern legal systems, the judge cannot as a rule evade his basic duty, that of adjudicating. He has the option of either allowing or of rejecting the plaintiff's claims. Under the rules of criminal procedure adopted by several countries, he may acquit for insufficient evidence. But he cannot be released from exercising his function as a judge, claiming either that the facts of the case are not sufficiently clear to him (factual doubt), or that the norm to be applied in the specific case cannot be determined (judicial doubt), or even that there exists no fixed norm for the determination of the case (lacuna in the law).

Thus the Code Civil des Français (or Code Napoléon) lays down explicitly: “A judge who refuses to decide a case, on the pretext that the law is silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted as being guilty of denial of justice”. This article is the outcome of a long evolutionary process. Prior to the French Revolution, before the separation of powers, the main question was not that of lacunae but rather that of the directions given to the judge in order to help him carry out his functions.

Type
Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , January 1974 , pp. 63 - 84
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1974

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For the discussion of problems connected with dismissal for insufficient evidence, see the essay “L'Assoluzione per insufficienza di prove” by Maliverni, M., in Studi in onore di G. Grosso (Torino, 1970, in Italian) Vol. III p. 557Google Scholaret seq.

2 It is not our intention to examine here the important and interesting question of lacunae in general, but only insofar as they relate to the specific problem of non liquet; for the general question see Bobbio, N., “Lacune del Diritto” (1963) 9Google Scholar“Novissimo Digesto Italiano” (hereinafter referred to as NNDI) 419 et seq. and the anthological work “Le Problème des Lacunes en Droit”, C. Perelman ed. (Bruxelles, 1968).

3 Le juge qui refusera de juger sous prétexte du silence, de l'obscurité ou de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra être poursuivi comme coupable de déni de justice” (art. 4). See on the subject: Norman, J., L'office du juge et la contestation (Paris, 1965).Google Scholar Boileux, commenting on this article, observes among others: “Let us remark here that the judge appointed to solve a litigation must perforce pronounce (doit nécessairement prononcer); he is even forbidden to suspend sentence in order to consult with the legislator on the meaning of the law: such a consultation (référé) would amount to a denial of justice, and denial of justice is punished by a fine…”; (from Commentaire sur le Code Napoléon (Paris, 1866) vol. 1 p. 28); see also Bonnier, E., Traité Théorique et Pratique des Preuves en Droit Civil et en Droit Criminel (Paris, 1873) 49Google Scholaret seq., including a discussion of the principle actore non probante reus absolvitur as an obstacle to non liquet.

4 On God's judgment, see Benedetto, M.A., (1961) 7 NNDI 899Google Scholaret seq.; Gaudemet, J., “Les Ordalies au Moyen Age: Doctrine, Législation et Pratique Canoniques”, in Recueils de la Société J. Bodin, XVII, La Preuve, vol. II (Bruxelles, 1965) 99Google Scholaret seq.: Lévy-Bruhl, H., La Preuve Judiciaire (Paris, 1964) 59Google Scholaret seq.

5 On this point see Gilissen, J.: “Le Problème des Lacunes du Droit dans l'Evolution du Droit Médiéval et Moderne” in Le Problème des Lacunes, op. cit. supra n. 2 at p. 197Google Scholaret seq. (esp. p. 205)—main source of our present brief historical excursus. See also Pertile, A., Storia del Diritto Italiano dalla Caduta dell'Impero Romano alla Codificazione, vol. VI, part II, p. 199Google Scholar and n. 8 (multicopied edition, Bologna, 1966).

6 See J. Gilissen, op. cit. supra n. 5 at p. 202.

7 “He who knows not the commentaries, knows not the court”. On the many problems connected with that “Common Law” see Calasso, F., Medio Evio del Diritto, Le Fonti (Milano, 1954) vol. I, p. 345Google Scholaret seq. (for the dogmatic conception see in particular, p. 375 et seq.); see also Ermini, G., “Diritto Comune” (1960) 5 NNDI 826Google Scholaret seq.

8 “The will of the King is the will of the Law”.

9 From J. Gilissen, op. cit. supra n. 5 at p. 229.

10 From E. Wolf, “Les Lacunes du Droit et leur Solution en Droit Suisse”, in Le Problème des Lacunes … op. cit. supra n. 2 at p. 105 et seq.

11 A défaut d'une disposition légale applicable, le juge prononce selon le droit coutumier et, à défaut d'une coutume, selon les règles qu'il établirait s'il avait à faire acte de législateur. On this important issue see Meier Hayoz, A.; Der Richter als Gesetzeber. Eine Besinnung auf die von den Gerichten befolgten Verfahrensgrundsätze im Bereiche der freien richterlichen Rechtsfindung gemäss Art. 1 Abs. 2 des schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Zürich, 1951)Google Scholar especially at p. 221 et seq. with several (not always accurate) quotations from other codes. See also some observations by Chiovenda, G., Principi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Napoli, 4th ed., 1928) 74Google Scholaret seq. with bibliography; and Du Pasquier, G., Les Lacunes de la Loi et la Jurisprudence du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse sur l'art. 1 CCS (Bâle, 1951).Google Scholar

12 “Nell'applicare la legge non si può ad essa attribuire altro senso che quello fatto palese dal significato proprio delle parole secondo la connessione di esse e della intenzione del legislatore. Se una controversia non può essere decisa con una precisa disposizione, si ha riguardo alle deposizioni che regolano casi simili o materie analoghe; se il caso rimane ancora dubbio, si decide secondo i principi generali dell'ordinamento giuridico dello Stato. Art. 12 of Disposizioni sulla legge in generale: notwithstanding its location, its scope of application is not restricted to the Code.

13 For a wider study of this proposition see Messineo, F., Manuale di Diritto Civile e Commerciale (Milano, 1947) 58Google Scholaret seq. and esp. p. 65; see also Art. 55 of the Italian Codice di Procedura Civile. For some interesting critical notes to common places on the judge's functions, see Lazzaro, G., “La Funzione dei Guidici” (1971) 26 Rivista di Diritto Processuale 1Google Scholaret seq. See also, as examples, art. 7 of the ABGB, art. 6 of the Spanish Codigo Civil, arts. 5 and 7 of the Codigo Civil dos Estados Unidos do Brasil and art. 2 of the Albanian Civil Code; on this issue, see A. Meyer-Hayoz, op. cit. supra n. 11.

14 This tendency is found, for instance, in Austrian law: see Lorber, H., “Das Non Liquet” (1970) OJZ 537Google Scholaret seq. For a general view, including the historical evolution and present norms of civil law, see Pugliese, G.. “Giudicato Civile. Storia e Diritto Vigente” (1968) 18 Enciclopedia del Diritto 727Google Scholaret seq.

15 See Paton, G. W., A Textbook of Jurisprudence (Oxford, 3rd ed., 1964) 88Google Scholar, 168 et seq.

16 Vorbichik v. Schoengarten (1964) (III) 18 P.D. 95; Attorney General v. A Bach, Magistrate (1954) 9 P.D. 1056, 1064; this decision, criticized on appeal, was commented on with approval by E. Harnon, “How Should a Judge Act when He Cannot Choose Between the Credibility of either Plaintiff or Defendant? (1965) 21 HaPraklit 415 et seq. The decision was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court: see Harnon, E., Law of Evidence (Jerusalem, 1970, in Hebrew) 188–190.Google Scholar Such a decision has the validity of res iudicata. In some recent enactments, however (such as the Civil Procedure Rules, r. 490, (1963) K.T. no. 1477), a distinction is made between the rejection of a plaintiff's claims on the merits, effective as res iudicata, and the mere striking out of the action which does not preclude the filing of a new action on the same cause; see on this subject Ginossar, S., “Renewal of Actions” in Studies in Law, Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1958) Vol. 5, pp. 48Google Scholaret seq. See also Harnon, E., “Res Iudicata and Identity of Actions” (1966) 1 Is.L.R. 545Google Scholar: “In considering this problem, some emphasize the idea that a presumption of truth is attributed to the decisions of courts. Res iudicata provertiate accipitur. Relying on this rationale, the Supreme Court in Israel came to the conclusion that a former judgment should not have the effect of res iudicata as collateral estoppel if the court did not make any positive findings on the controversial issue.” (For frequent reliance on this idea by the Supreme Court in Israel see Felman v. Shachav (1952) 6 P.D. 313, 321, 323; Knopf v. Popper (1956) 10 P.D. 785, 793; Mugrabi v. Varaimon (1957) 11 P.D. 1242, 1250.) On the problem of lacunae in Israeli law, see Tedeschi, G., ‘Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council and the Existence of Lacunae” in Le Problème des Lacunes op.cit. p. 275Google Scholaret seq., and Tedeschi, G., “L'Insufficienza della Norma e la Fedeltà dell'Interprete” (1962) 7 Rivista di Diritto CivileGoogle Scholar (reprint) with some interesting considerations on Talmudic law. On the question of non-justiciability see also dissertation of Zemach, Y., Political Questions in Israel and the United States (University of Virginia, 1971, unpublished)Google Scholar; and, more generally Witkon, A., “Justiciability” (1966) 1 Is. L.R. 60Google Scholaret seq.

17 See Della Rocca, F., “Sentenza (Diritto Canonico)” (1969) 16 NNDI, 1104.Google Scholar Canon 1869 §4 provides that if a judge cannot reach (moral) certainty (through factual evidence), he must pronounce unproved the plaintiff's claim and release the defendant. See Jullien, A., Juges et Avocats des Tribunaux de l'Eglise (Rome, 1970) 471Google Scholaret seq.

18 See Onclin, W., “Les Lacunes de la Loi en Droit Canonique” Le Problème des Lacunes, op. cit. at p. 181Google Scholaret seq. (esp. p. 186); see also Van Hove, A.. De Legibus Ecclesiasticis (Rome, Malines, 1930) 321.Google Scholar

19 See Naz, R., “Juge” (1957) 6 Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique col. 205Google Scholaret seq.; see also A. Jullien, op. cit. at p. 471 et seq. “When the judge cannot reach moral certainty—a rare possibility—he must judge, but in accordance to Canon 1869, § 4. The judge … is nevertheless obliged to pronounce, because his is a public function from which he cannot exempt himself”. See also: Falco, M., Introduzione allo Studio del Codex Juris Canonici (Torino, 1925) 103–4Google Scholar and Connel, F. J., “Reflex Principles” (1966) 12 New Catholic Encyclopaedia 169.Google Scholar

20 F. Della Rocca, “Sentenza” op. cit.; R. Naz, “Juge” op. cit. col. 203 et seq. (I have been unable to obtain the recent volume by Musselli, L., II Concetto di Giudicato nelle Fonti Storiche del Diritto Canonico (dalle origini al secolo XVII) (Padova, 1972).Google Scholar

21 Stone, J., Legal Controls of International Conflict (London, 1954) 153Google Scholaret seq.; Stone, J., “Non Liquet and the function of Law in the International Community” (1959) British Yearbook of International Law 124Google Scholaret seq.; Stone, J., “Non Liquet and the International Judicial Function” in Le Problème des Lacunes op. cit. p. 304Google Scholaret seq.; Tammelo, I., “On the logical Openness of Legal Orders” (1959) 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 187CrossRefGoogle Scholaret seq.

22 It must be stressed that the two questions of legal lacunae and of non liquet, while they are strictly interconnected, are nevertheless two separate issues: a case of non liquet is perfectly possible without any lacuna in law, as has been clearly shown especially by Reuter, P., Droit International Public (Paris, 1958) 303.Google Scholar

23 See, for instance, Art. 42 § 2 of the Convention for the regulation of controversies relating to investment between States, providing that Le Tribunal ne peut refuser de juger sous prétexte du silence ou de l'obscurité du droit (“The courts cannot refuse to pass sentence owing to the silence or the obscurity of the law”): on this point see especially Salmon, J.J. A., “Quelques Observations sur les Lacunes en Droit International Public” in Le Problème des Lacunes, op cit. pp. 313–330.Google Scholar

24 See on this particular aspect Lauterpacht, H., “Some Observations on the Prohibition of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the Law” Symbolae Verzijl (The Hague, 1958) 197Google Scholaret seq.; Idem, International Law (Cambridge, 1970) 96 (this thesis was particularly attacked by Stone, in his essays cited supra, n. 21.

25 Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law (New York, 1952) 306Google Scholar; see also Akzin, B., “Kelsen—in Memoriam” (1973) 8 Is.L.R. 325.Google Scholar On the completeness of International Law see also Sereni, A. P., Diritto Internazionale (Milano, 1956) vol. I, p. 98Google Scholaret seq.

26 See N. Bobbio, Les Lacunes op. cit. at p. 423 et seq.

27 J. Stone, Legal Controls… op. cit. supra n. 20 at p. 153 et seq.; see also n. 1, p. 153, stressing the difference between non liquet in Roman Law and in International law: “The modern meaning of the term is thus different from that in Roman law, where the term ‘non lique’ originated. It there referred either to the mere deferment of a decision pending further information, or the personal non-participation of a particular member of the tribunal in the decision. Though these situations could arise internationally, the situation debated on the modern ‘non liquet’ involves a full non possumus of the tribunal, the refusal to decide being both absolute and institutional.” On the problem as it arose in Roman law see infra, text at n. 34 et seq. For the position in Jewish law, see text at n. 76 et seq.

28 For some observations on the functions of the judge, the affinities and differences between the functions of the judge and those of the historian, together with some remarks on “judicial truth”, see S. Ginossar, “Preuve Judiciaire” Encyclopaedia Universalis; see also H. Levy-Bruhl, La Preuve Judiciaire op. cit. supra n. 4 at p. 14 et seq.

29 Translated by F. Forte (Boston, 1956); the original edition was published as “Sui Principi Generali del Diritto” (1921) Archivio Giuridico, F. Serafini 85.

30 Ibid., p. 1 et seq.; we also quote n.l, p. 6: “This does not arise from ‘juridical megalomania’ (juristischer Grössenwahn), as was the opinion of Kantorowitz (Flavius, Gnaeus, Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg, 1906) 17)Google Scholar but from the practical necessity that each one must, in a certain way, coordinate his own behaviour with that of others. This is the essential basis or concept of law. A system of law which, though able to solve some problems in life, should prove itself incapable of solving all others would nullify itself ipso facto, since it fails in its primary function—that of creating order among human beings (hominis ad hominem proportio—the relation of man to man). Only in this practical sense is a jurist obliged to reach a conclusion regarding each question presented him; a line of demarcation between the lawful and the unlawful, between the exigible and the non-exigible, must be established; otherwise such a distinction will in some way be delineated in the facts, rebus ipsis dictantibus et humants necessitatibus (the facts themselves and human necessities being decisive); and the jurist must in the end recognize it. If the biologist, the philologist and the historian confess their inability to solve all the problems pertaining to their respective sciences, this is not because they are more modest than the jurist (as Kantorowitz, loc. cit., hints), but rather because limits and doubts in theoretical knowledge do not suspend the progress of life. When instead, as in legal science, one seeks to regulate human actions effectively, science merges to some extent with the necessarily continuous course of these actions, and, therefore, cannot fail to accompany them with its judgments, which are, however, only of immediate practical value. While it is indeed true that in its theoretical range jurisprudence also has doubtful points, its age-old problems, and can ad infinitum doctrinally debate even res iudicatae; nevertheless each new controversy, as it arises, although it may involve points scientifically unclarified, bears with it the concomitant necessity of the issuance of a judgment that will be definite and certain and which will have practical finality”.

31 Diritto e Processo (Napoli, undated) 118 et seq. in the series Trattato del Processo Civile: “Obbligo del Giudice” and “Obbligo del Giudice e Diritto della Parte”.

32 See also Chiovenda, G., Principi del Diritto Processuale Civile (Napoli, 1928) 43Google Scholaret seq., according to whom the action is an authoritative right. On the differences between the functions of the arbitrator and those of the judge, see ibid. at p. 108; on submission to arbitration by agreement, see Carnelutti, F., Istituzioni del Processo Civile Italiano vol. I, p. 68.Google Scholar

33 Levy-Bruhl, H., Aspects sociologiques du Droit (Paris, 1955), 114Google Scholaret seq.

34 On this point, see in particular Arangio-Ruiz, V., Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Naples, 14th ed., 1960) 112.Google Scholar F. La Rosa has recently confirmed that the selection of judges was not a matter of free private choice, but was limited by the lists of persons in the album iudicum, without claiming, however, to have found any explicit evidence of this custom: “La formula dell'Actio Iudicati (Contributo allo studio dei poteri del Index)” St. Grosso vol. 4 (1971) 240 et seq.; contra see Pugliese, G., Il Processo Civile Romano vol. 2—Il Processo Formulare Part I. (Milano, 1963) 228Google Scholaret seq. and also 235 et seq. and Biscardi, A., Lezioni sul Processo Romano Antico e Classico (Torino, 1968) 118Google Scholaret seq. and 410–11; Berger, A., Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia, 1953) 359Google Scholar, s.v. “album iudicum”; and finally, Collinet, P., “Le Rôle des Juges dans la Formation du Droit Romain Classique” (1936) Capitolium 5Google Scholaret seq. (reprint).

35 On this point, see Jolowicz, H. F., “Procedure In Iure and Apud Iudicem. A Suggestion.” Atti Congresso Bologna (1935) vol. II. p. 57Google Scholaret seq. (non vidi); Hoetink, H. R., “The Origin of the Dual Mode in Roman Procedure” (1947) 5 Seminar 16Google Scholaret seq.; Jolowicz, H.F., “The Index and the arbitral Principle” (1949) 2 RIDA 477Google Scholaret seq. (=Mel. De Visscher).

36 For some comparative remarks between Roman and English procedure, see Engelmann, A. and Others, A History of Continental Civil Procedure (Boston, 1927) 269Google Scholaret seq.; Buckland, W. W. and McNair, A., Roman Law and Common Law (Cambridge, 1936) 315Google Scholaret seq.; see also Cappelletti, M. and Perillo, J. M., Civil Procedure in Italy (The Hague, 1965) 26CrossRefGoogle Scholaret seq.

37 See justification in Luzzatto, G. I., Il Problema d'origine del processo extra ordinem (Bologna, 1965) 105.Google Scholar

38 Schulz, F., History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1953) 94.Google Scholar With regard to the term officium see Cervenca, G., “Sull'uso del termine officium nella legislazione post classica-giustinianea” St. Grosso (1970) vol. 3, p. 206Google Scholaret seq. with bibliography.

39 D. 5.1.79. 1: “Iudicibus de iure dubitandibus praesides respondere soient: de facto consulentibus non debent praesides consilium impartire, verum iubere eos prout religio suggerit sententiam proferre: haec enim res nonnumquam infamai et materiam gratiae vel ambitionis tribuit.”

40 It would appear that we concur neither with the excessive criticism of Beseler, who considers the whole phrase from the word solent to the end, as an interpolation (“Romanistische Studien” (1930) 50 ZSS 33), nor with Dell'Oro, A., who discards the point altogether: I Libri de Officio nella Giurisprudenza Romana (Milano, 1960) 142Google Scholar; see also the accurate remarks by Dell'Oro, ibid., n. 157. On this passage see also: Mommsen, T., “Aegyptischer Erbschaftsprozess vom J. 135” (1893) 14 ZSS 6Google Scholar; Weiss, E., Recitatio und Responsum im römischer Provinzial-prozess, ein Beitrag zum Gerichtsgebrauch” (1912) 33 ZSS 238Google Scholar; Vassalli, F., “Miscellanea Critica di Diritto Romano II, Ius e Factum Contrapposti come Oggetto di Conoscenza” (1914) Annali Perugia (=Scritti Giuridici Vol. III, 1, p. 388)Google Scholar who also argues successfully that the last part of the sentence (from haec enim res to the end) has been interpolated; Biondi, B., “Appunti intorno alla Sentenza nel Processo Civile Romano”, in St. Bonfante Vol. 4 (1930) 45 and 68Google Scholar; Steinwenter, A., “Rhetoric und römischer Zivilprozess”, (1947) 65 ZSS 88Google Scholar; Kaser, M., “Beweislast und Vermutung in römischer Formularprozess” (1954) 71 ZSS, 232Google Scholar, quoting Donatuti's essays—which we have been unable to obtain; idem. “Infamia und Ignominia in den römischer Rechtsquellen”, (1956) 73 ZSS 231.

41 From “Istituzioni” op. cit. at pp. 138–9; see also Broggini, G., “La Prova nel Processo Romano Arcaico” (1960) 11Google ScholarIus (=Coniectanea, (1966) 167 n. 90).

42 On evidence see especially: Levy, J. Ph., “La Formation de la Théorie Romaine des Preuves” St. Solazzi (1948) 418Google Scholaret seq.; Levy, E. “Beweislast im Klassischen Recht” (1952) 3 Iura 155Google Scholaret seq.; M. Käser, “Beweilast und Vermutung”, op. cit. at p. 221 et seq.; Pugliese, G., “L'Onere della Prova nel Processo per formulas” (1956) 3 RIDA 349Google Scholaret seq.; Arias Bonet, J.A., “Prueba Testificial y Obvagulatio en el Antiguo Derecho Romano”, St. De Francisci, (1956) vol. 1, p. 283Google Scholaret seq.; Longo, G., “L'Onere della Prova nel Processo Civile Romano” (1960) 11 Iura 149Google Scholaret seq.; G. Broggini, “La Prova nel Processo Romano Arcaico” op. cit. at p. 133 et seq.; Luzzatto, G.I., Il Problema d'Origine del Processo “extra ordincm” vol. I.Google Scholarop. cit. at pp. 106–07. We do not wish to take a stand in the controversy between J. Ph. Levy, E. Levy, M. Kaser on one hand, and G. Pugliese and G. Broggini, on the other, concerning the existence of rules of evidence. Luzzatto, after full examination, sustains the traditional opinion, according to which, while no strict norms of evidence can be assumed, there existed common sense rules generally and customarily acknowledged in practice; see on this point Cuq, E., Manuel 882Google Scholar; “the theory of evidence is the fruit of the rhetors' work rather than of case-law”, affirms Lemosse, , “Cognitio—Etude sur le Rôle du Juge dans l'Instruction du Procès Civil Antique” (Paris, 1944) 158et seq.Google Scholar

43 From “Cognitio—Etude sur Rôle …” op. cit. at p. 162 et seq.; see also Biondi, B., “Appunti intorno alla Sentenza nel Processo Civile Romano” St. Bonfante vol. 4, p. 34Google Scholaret seq. (=Studi Biondi vol. 2, pp. 435 et seq.); Luzzatto, G.I., Il Problema d'Origine, op. cit. at p. 109, n. 1.Google Scholar

44 On non liquet especially: Bethmann-Holwegg, , Der Römische Civilprozess (1864) vol. 1, p. 182Google Scholaret seq.; Keller-Wach, , Der Römische Civilprozess und die Actionen (1883) 338Google Scholar; Bertolini, , Appunti Didattici di Diritto Romano (Torino, 1914) vol. I, p. 314Google Scholar, and vol. 2, p. 152; Costa, E., Profilo Storico del Processo Civile Romano (Roma, 1918) 76Google Scholar; Wenger, L., Institutionen des Römischen Zivilprozessrechts” (München, 1925)Google Scholar; Leonhard-Weiss, , “Non Liquet” (1926) 13 PW-RE col. 726–7Google Scholar; Scialoia, A., Procedura Civile Romana (Roma, 1936) 183Google Scholaret seq.; Lemosse, M., “Cognitio—Etude …” op. cit. at p. 164Google Scholar; Monier, R., Manuel Elémentaire de Droit Romain (Paris, 1947) vol. I, p. 166Google Scholar; Duff, , “Non Liquet” (1956) 3 S.A.L.R. 39Google Scholaret seq.; Pugliese, G., Il processo civile— op. cit, at p. 252Google Scholaret seq. Greenidge, A.H.J., The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time, (1901) (New Reprint, New Jersey, 1971) 497Google Scholaret seq.

45 Petebatur apud me pecunia, quae dicebatur data numerataque, sed qui petebat neque tabulis neque testibus id factum docebat et argumentis admodum exilibus nitebatur (Nodes Atticae, XIV, 2, 4).

46 Virum esse firme bonum notaque et expectae fidei et vitae inculpatissimae … (Ibid.)

47 … non bonae rei vitaeque turpi et surdida convictumque vulgo in mendaciis plerumque esse perfidum et fraudum ostendebatur (Ibid.).

48 “If a defendant was sued maliciously, the plaintiff having full knowledge that his claim was unjust, and was absolved, he could bring an action against his adversary for a tenth of the amount claimed in the former trial, but he had to prove that the latter acted calumniae causa”. Sic Berger, A., Encyclopaedic Dictionary op. cit., at p. 520.Google Scholar It may be noted here that recently it has become more and more vital to introduce norms of loyalty and integrity of the parties and their legal representatives in court, “and especially the introduction of a pledge of loyalty (obbligo di verità) by the party (and his representative) not to adduce facts it knows to be false, and not to contest facts (adduced by the adversary) it knows to be true. A pledge of this sort was known to the classical Roman tribunal, together with institutions aimed at preventing acts of reciprocal deception and cheating (Cappelletti, M., Processo e Ideologie (Bologna, 1969) 216Google Scholaret seq.: nevertheless, there remain other serious dangers, as noted by Redenti, E., “L'Umanità nel Nuovo Processo Civile” (1941) 18 Rivista di Diritto Processuale Civile 30Google Scholaret seq.; and Calamandrei, P., Opere Giuridiche (Napoli, 1966) 306Google Scholaret seq. and 556 et seq.; see also Winfield, , The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure (1921)Google Scholar; Ginossar, S., “Nuisance Between Litigants” (1970) 2 Mishpatim 221Google Scholaret seq. and 553 et seq.

49 “…res enim de petunda pecunia apud iudicem privatum agi, non apud censorem de moribus”, (Gellius, N.A. XIV, 2, 8). See A. Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary op. cit., at p. 342 and Volterra, E., (1963) 9 NNDI 344.Google Scholar

50 Therefore we disagree with J. Ph. Levy, “La Formation de la Théorie Romaine des Preuves” op. cit. at p. 420 n. 10, when he affirms that Gellius was unable to find (in the law) a solution to the problem of burden of proof, and was forced to seek it in a purely pragmatical work (one of Cato's addresses). In fact Gellius was conscious that what his advisors suggested was the general prin ciple, which however did not satisfy his conscience in that specific case; on this see mainly G. Pugliese, “L'Onere della Prova” op. cit. at p. 356 and n. 6.

51 On this passage, and especially on this point, see Levy-Bruhl, H., Recherches sur les Actions de la Loi (Paris, 1960) 216–218Google Scholar; by the same author see also his review of Cecchini, A., in (1928) 7 RH 116–7Google Scholar and “Dissentiones Prudentium” in Synt. V. Agrangio-Ruiz (1964) vol. 1, pp. 537–8.

52 From the episode it appears that Gellius, not Favorinus, had been appointed index, and that the decision sibi non liquere was that of Gellius—not of Favorinus, contrary to what Volterra, E. writes (Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Roma, 1961) 235)Google Scholar“ciò risulta da un episodio narrato da Gellio, Noc. Att. 14.2.25, intorno ad un processo in cui era stato nominato iudex il filosofo Favorino” (this appears from an episode told by Gellius—Att. Nights, 14.2.25—about a trial in which the philosopher Favorinus had been appointed iudex).

53 “And therefore I swore ‘mihi non liquere’, and was thus delivered from the duty to pronounce”. In addition to the authors mentioned in n. 43, see also Bertolini, C., II Giuramento nel Diritto Romano (Torino, 1886) 177.Google Scholar Lemosse op. cit. secs in Gellius' words a justification of his attitude: “this passage shows the reason for the attitude adopted by the index. A powerful man whose integrity was beyond suspicion, could well judge regardless of the strict norms of the law, because no one would have dared to suspect him of having acted by self-interest or bias”.

54 See G. Pugliese: Il Processo Civile Romano, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 253: the obligation to judge did not necessarily entail the obligation to actually solve the controversy.

55 Nevertheless, see Schulz, F.: Classical Roman Law (Oxford, 1951) 14Google Scholar: “In civil, unlike criminal procedure it is not permissible to pronounce non liquet”. Schulz refers to the Römische Strafrecht by Mommsen, in which, however, the author does not deal with the question of non liquet in the framework of civil procedure. Against Schulz's opinion, and in favour of Buckland's and Jolowicz's, see Duff: “Non Liquet” op. cit. supra n. 44.

56 With explicit reference to legis actiones, see Franciosi, G., Il Processo di Libertà in Diritto Romano (Napoli, 1961) 68Google Scholaret seq.; contra, see Marrone, M. in his review of Franciósi's essay in (1962) 13 Iura 262Google Scholar; pro, see Pugliese, G.: “Processo Civile Romano” vol. I, p. 422Google Scholaret seq. (non vidi) and Kaser, M., Römischen Zivilprozessrecht op. cit. at p. 88 n. 3Google Scholar; see also Mole, M., “Sentenza (Diritto Romano)” NNDI p. 1085Google Scholar and n. 7, where, however, there is no distinction between sources relating to civil and to criminal procedure.

57 It may be useful to remark that Pothier introduced Gellius' passage in his Pandette, affirming explicitly: “nevertheless, if the given Judges did not grasp the question of the case, they swore that it was not clear to them (sibi non liquere)” (sub. D. 5.1.79.1).

58 On this point, see Costa, E., Profilo Storico op. cit. at p. 76.Google Scholar

59 “Cognitio—Etude” op. cit. at pp. 164–5.

60 On this important subject see especially: Pringsheim, F., “Die Archaistische Tendenz Justinians” in Gesammelte Albandlungen” (Heidelberg, 1961) 9et seq.Google Scholar and also “The Character of Justinian's Legislation”, ibid., p. 73 et seq.; Visscher, F. De, “Le Digeste, Couronnement de la Politique des Empereurs vis-à-vis des Prudents”, Conferenze per il xiv Centenario delle Pandette (Milano, 1931) 55et seq.Google Scholar; Archi, G.G., “Il Classicismo di Giustiniano” in Giustiniano Legislatore (Bologna, 1970) 169et seq.Google Scholar; ibid., p. IBI et seq. especially 1B6 et seq.; “La Valutazione Critica del Corpus Iuris”, ibid., p. 206 et seq.; Kaser, M., RPR, (1969) vol. 2, p. 20et seq.Google Scholar; Mayer-Maly, T., “Bemerkungen zum Aufbau der Digestentitel” in Synt. V. Arangio-Ruiz op. cit. at p. 884Google Scholar; see also Luzzatto's, G. I. view of Ziletti's work, in (1966) 32 SDHI 363et seq.Google Scholar, and Bonini, R., “Il Manuale Novellarum del Van Der Wal (con alcune Considerazioni sui Rapporti fra Novelle e Digesto)”, in Archivio Giuridico (1966) vol. 171, p. 26 est.Google Scholar See also Schindler, K.H., Justinianus Haltung zur Klassik (Köln-Graz, 1966)Google Scholar and reviews by Archi, G.G., (1969) 15 Labeo 84et seq.Google Scholar; Grosso, G., in (1970) 1 Index, International Survey of Roman Law, 206et seq.Google Scholar; and Mayer-Maly, T., (1968) 85, ZSS 556et seq.Google Scholar

61 See especially Biondi, B., “Intorno alla Romanità del Processo Civile Romano”, in Scritti Giuridici, op. cit. vol. II, p. 368et seq.Google Scholar, and especially 388; “Diritto e Processo nella Legislazione Giustinianea”, ibid. at 519 et seq.; “Il Processo Civile Giustinianeo”, ibid. at p. 567 et seq.

62 Si uni ex pluribus iudicibus de liberali causa cognoscenti, de re non liqueat; caeteri autem consentienti, si is iuraverit sibi non liquere, eo quiescente caeteros qui consentiant sententiam proferre: quia etsi dissentirei, plurium sententiam obtineret (D. 42.1.36).

63 See Index Interpolationum, col. 228; see also the corresponding passage in Basilica 9, 3, 36.

64 This principle is also found in Jewish law, where, however, contrary to the Roman system, it is provided that should one of the judges wish to abstain, a substitute must act in his place, in order to avoid a reduction of the judging college: see Mishna Sanhedrin, III, 6 and V, 5 and Rashi's commentary to the Sanhedrin treatise, 29 a.

65 “Proinde si forte urgeatur a praetore ad sententiam, aequissimum erit, si iuret sibi de causa nondum liquere, spatium ei ad pronuntiandum dari”.

66 In this sense see Costa, E., Profilo Storico, op. cit. at p. 153Google Scholar; Bassanelli, G., “La Legislazione Processuale di Giustino I (9 luglio 518—agosto 527)” (1971) 37 SDHI 119et seq.Google Scholar; “Such norms may be meaningful only if used to protect the parties against an imperial sentence, definitive for the whole matter; they would cease to be necessary if the imperial sentence were intended to solve exclusively a question of law” (p. 164, in Italian).

67 On this argument see Bethmann-Hollweg, , Der Römische Zivilprozess op. cit. at p. 91Google Scholar; Costa, E., Profilo Storico … op. cit. at p. 153et seq.Google ScholarAndt, E., La Procédure par Rescrit (Paris, 1920) 8Google Scholar; Francisco, P. De, “Osservazioni sulle Condizioni della Legislazione nei Secoli IV e V”, Scr. Salandra (Milano, 1928) 141et seq.Google Scholar; Collinet, P., La Procédure par Libelle (Etudes Historiques sur le Droit de Justinten) (Paris, 1932) vol. 4, p. 365Google Scholar; Gaudemet, J., “L'Empereur, Interprète du Droit” Fest. Rabel, (1954) vol. 2, p. 169et seq.Google Scholar; Zilletti, U., Studi sul Processo Civile Giustinianeo (Milano, 1965)Google Scholar; Kaser, M., Das Römische Zivilprozessrecht op. cit. at p. 501Google Scholar; and also G. Bassanelli, “La Legislazione Processuale”, op. cit. at 119 et seq.

68 On the corrector Lucaniae et Brittiorum see Rabello, A.M., “I Privilegi dei Chierici sotto Costantino” (1970) 16 Labeo 391 n. 13Google Scholar, with bibliography.

69 Super paucis, quae iuridica sententia decidi non possunt, nostrani debes consulere maiestatem, ne occupationes nostras interrompus, cum litigatoribus legitimum remaneat arbitrium a sententia provocandi.

70 From “L'Empereur, Interprète du Droit” op. cit.

71 For such an examination, see the essay by G. Bassanelli: “La Legislazione Processuale” op. cit., with rich bibliography.

72 “If any judge should suppose that a case ought to be referred to Us, he must pronounce no decision, but rather he shall consult Our Wisdom on the point on which he supposes that there is some doubt; but if he should render a decision, he must not thereafter deter litigants from appealing therefrom by promising to refer the matter to Us. Given on the fourth day before the ides of February at Sirmium in the year of the fifth consulship of Constantine Augustus and the consulship of Licinius Caesar. February 10, 319; February 7, 318”.

73 “…to examine the case with the utmost care and to pronounce in accordance with what appears to them fair and legitimate”. It will be recalled that around that time a theory of evidence was being formulated, providing the judge with additional criteria of judgment. On this point see Archi, G. G., “La Prova nel Diritto del Basso Impero” (1961) 12 Iura 1Google Scholaret seq.; idem., “Les Preuves dans le Droit du Bas Empire” Rec. Bodin op. cit. vol. 1, p. 389 et seq.; Zilletti, U., “Studi sulle Prove nel Diritto Giustinianeo” (1964) 68 BIDR 167et seq.Google Scholar; also M. Kaser, “Rom. Zivilprozessrecht” op. cit. at p. 485 et seq.; and now Simon, D., Untersuchungen zum Justinianischen Zivilprozess (München, 1969) 135Google Scholaret seq. and Provera's, G. review in (1970) 21 Iura 211Google Scholaret seq.

74 On Novella 125 and on the former Novella 113, see especially: Wal, N. Van Der, Manuale Novellarum Iustiniani (Amsterdam, 1964) 48Google Scholar and n. 4 and 147 n. 2: (“henceforth the judges are forbidden to consult with the emperor” (in French); Zilletti, U., Studi sul Processo—op. cit., at p. 46 and n. 103, p. 261 et seq.Google Scholar; G. Bassanelli, “La Legislazione Processuale” op. cit. at p. 162 et seq. and 214: “… But the codification of Justinian had even deeper repercussions in the history of trial, for it brought about radical changes in the relationship between the judge and the law to be administered by him. This is especially evident in the history of trial per relationem: regulated by Justinian in 529 (Cod. 1, 14, 12), it was entirely abolished after the codification by Novella 125”.

75 In the present article we have discussed the question mainly as it arises in civil law. For a study of its aspect in criminal law, see Mommsen, T., Römische Strafrecht (1899) 423et seq.Google Scholar; Hartmann, , “Ampliado” PW, RE (1894) vol. 1, col. 1979et seq.Google Scholar; Lanfranchi, F., Il Diritto nei Retori Romani (Milano, 1938), 553et seq.Google Scholar; Brasiello, U., “Processo Penale Romano” (1966) 13 NNDI 1159Google Scholar: (“At the completion of the evidence, the jury has the right to abstain from judgment, declaring sibi non liquere and ordering additional research. This leads to the ampliatio”). Ampliatio was in “Roman criminal pocedure the reiteration of all the evidence when the jury declared that the case has not been sufficiently elucidated and required further (amplius) investigation”, Berger, , Encyclopedic Dictionary op. cit. at p. 361.Google Scholar On Lex Acilia see Riccobono, S., FIRA vol. 1, p. 84et seq. and p. 94.Google Scholar

76 On this point see “Doubt in Jewish Law” in doctoral dissertation by Shifman, P., Uncertainty in the Validity of Marriage in Israeli Law (thesis, Jerusalem, 1972, in Hebrew, not yet published).Google Scholar

77 See also the Mishna Sanhedrin, 5, 5.

78 On this point see P. Shifman, op. cit., p. 14 et seq., where the author remarks that in the Middle Ages, due primarily to the influence of Rabbenu Asher (Rosh), there came a change in directives. If the judge has good reason to suspect fraud on the part of the plaintiff, he has to decide the case in favour of the defendant; and conversely, if his suspicions fall upon the defendant, he must pronounce in favour of the plaintiff (note the similarity with Gellius' problem, reported supra) Finally, a new principle makes its appearance, namely that if the judge deems the case to be objectively doubtful, and such that presumably another judge would reach the same conclusion, he must attempt to bring the parties to a compromise. Not directly relevant to our problem is the duty of the court to abstain from judgment when there is reason to think that later events may disprove the justice of the sentence: in such exceptional cases the legal position is to be kept in abeyance subject to subsequent evidence; on this point too, see P. Shifman, op. cit. at p. 15.

79 From Coulson, N.J., “Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law” (1956) 18 Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, pt. 2, p. 211CrossRefGoogle Scholaret seq. and 224 in particular.

80 On the concept of sentence see especially Windscheid, Diritto delle Pandette 123 et seq. and the notes to those paragraphs by Fadda and Bensa; Chiovenda, G., Principi di Diritto Processuale—op. cit. at p. 134et seq. and 891 et seq.Google Scholar; Pugliese, G., “Note sull'Ingiustizia della Sentenza nel Diritto Romano”, St. Betti, (Milano, 1962) Vol. 3, p. 725Google Scholaret seq.; Marrone, M., L'Effetto Normativo della Sentenza (Corso di Diritto Romano) (Palermo, 1960).Google Scholar For the discussion of delicate problems as to the distinction between efficacy and authority of judgments and as to unjust judgment, see, with abundant bibliography, Pugliese, G., “Giudicato Civile, Diritto Vigente”, Enciclopedia del Diritto, (1968) vol. XVIII n. 8 et seq.Google Scholar and n. 12 et seq.; Betti, E., “Res iudicata (Diritto Romano)” (1968) 15 NNDI 216et seq.Google Scholar; Guarneri, G., “Res iudicata” (Diritto Processuale Civile)” (1968) 15 NNDI 218et seq.Google Scholar; Lancellotti, F., “Sentenza Civile” (1969) 16 NNDI 1106et seq.Google Scholar, with bibliography.