Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 February 2016
Should judges have discretion in sentencing? The answer cannot be “yes” or “no” but only the further question “how much?”. The bulk of this statement will be devoted to this second question, but I will first explain why there is no absolute answer to the issue of judicial discretion in sentencing.
Most legal systems grant the sentencing judge (practically) unlimited freedom to choose among a vast array of dispositions in any given case. Legal standards guiding their decision-making are typically non-directive, vague, or non-existent. The result, not unexpectedly, is a great disparity in sentencing outcomes. This state of affairs can best be explained in terms of unquestioned tradition and judicial self-image.
1 German constitutional doctrine has developed a “theory of essentiality”, according to which essential decisions, especially those affecting citizens' civil rights, must be made by the legislature; see Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (1978) vol. 49, p. 89, at 126 ff.Google Scholar; Hesse, , Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (16th ed., 1988) 197Google Scholar, with further references.
2 Complaints about inequality of criminal sentences are frequent; see Streng, , Strafzumessung und relative Gerechtigkeit (1984) 5–13Google Scholar. Yet few writers emphasize the constitutional dimensions of such complaints — surely the constitutional principle of equal application of the law relates to sentencing. See Weigend, , “Richtlinien für die Strafzumessung”, in Festschrift der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät zur 600-Jahr-Feier der Universität zu Köln (1988) 579, 580–581Google Scholar.
3 See, for Germany, Grundgesetz Art. 103 sec. 2 and Penal Code, sec. 1. See also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (1969) vol. 25, p. 269, at 287Google Scholar; (1977) vol. 45, p. 363, at 371; Maiwald, , “Bestimmtheitsgebot, tatbestandliche Typisierung und Technik der Regelbeispiele”, in Festschrift für Gallas (1973) 137, at 147Google Scholar; Tröndle, , in Jescheck, /Russ, /Willms, , eds., Strafgesetzbuch (Leipziger Kommentar, 10th ed., 1978)Google Scholar sec. 1, n. 17.
4 See, e.g., secs. 5-18 of the German, Jugendgerichtsgesetz (Juvenile Court Act) of 1974Google Scholar, providing for sanctions ranging from simple educative measures to 5 years imprisonment applicable, at the discretion of the court, to any criminal offence committed by a juvenile. The classic German statement on “purpose-oriented” (and hence indeterminate) sentencing is von Liszt, , “Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht” (1883) 3 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 The story of the decline of the rehabilitative ideal has often been told: for seminal statements, see Morris, , The Future of Imprisonment (1974) 12–57Google Scholar; von Hirsch, , Doing Justice (1976)Google Scholar; Allen, , The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal (1981)Google Scholar.
6 Feuerbach, , Revision der Grundsätze und Grundbegriffe des positiven peinlichen Rechts (1799) vol. I, pp. 132–137Google Scholar.
7 California Penal Code, secs. 1170 et seq.
8 Cf. von Hirsch, /Mueller, , “California's Determinate Sentencing Law” (1984) 10 New England J. on Criminal and Civil Confinement 253, at 272–274Google Scholar.
9 See, e.g., Frisch, , Prognoseentscheidungen im Strafrecht (1983) 330Google Scholar; Maurach, /Zipf, , Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (7th ed., 1988) vol. 2, pp. 619–622Google Scholar.
10 Accord, Streng, supra n. 2, at 296-304.
11 See Blumstein, /Cohen, /Martin, /Tonry, , eds., Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform (1983) vol. I, p. 141Google Scholar.
12 See Wasik, /Pease, , “Discretion and Sentencing Reform” in Wasik, /Pease, , eds., Sentencing Reform — Guidance or Guidelines? (1987) 2–3Google Scholar; Weatherburn, , “Sentencing Principles and Sentence Choice” [1987] Crim. L. J. 213–215Google Scholar.
13 See, e.g., California Penal Code, sec. 1170(a); Italian Penal Code, sec. 133; Austrian Penal Code, sec. 32.
14 von Hirsch, “Guidance by Numbers or Words? Numerical versus Narrative Guidelines for Sentencing” in Wasik/Pease, supra n. 12, at 55-56.
15 See Hirsch, in Jescheck/Russ/Willms, supra n. 3 (1979) vol. 2, sec. 46, nn. 13-17; Horn, , in Rudolphi, /Hom, /Samson, , Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (5th ed., 1991) vol. I, sec. 46, nn. 16, 17Google Scholar.
16 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen (1970) vol. 24, p. 132Google Scholar; Schaffstein, “Spielraum-Theorie, Schuldbegriff und Strafzumessung nach den Strafrechtsreformgesetzen”, in Festschrift für Gallas, supra n. 3, at 99, 105; Hirsch, supra n. 15, at sec. 46, n. 16. But see, contra, Roxin, , Festschrift für Bockelmann (1978) 304Google Scholar.
17 Hirsch, supra n. 15, at sec. 46, n. 11; Maurach/Zipf, supra n. 9, at 584-586; Horn, supra n. 15, at sec. 46, n. 30. But see, contra, Jescheck, , Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil (4th ed., 1988) 787Google Scholar; Dreher, /Tröndle, , Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze (45th ed., 1991)Google Scholar sec. 46, nn. 6, 6a.
18 See Stratenwerth, , Tatschuld und Strafzumessung (1972)Google Scholar; von Hirsch, /Jareborg, , Strafmass und Strafgerechtigkeit (1991) 66–67Google Scholar.
19 Take the following examples from the German Penal Code: extortion (sec. 253) — sentence range 5 day fines to 15 years imprisonment; forgery (sec. 267) — same; voluntary homicide (secs. 211-213) — sentence range six months imprisonment suspended to life imprisonment.
20 For a similar system, with reference to Swedish law, see von Hirsch/Jareborg, supra n. 18, at 35-39.
21 Robinson, , “A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?” (1987) 66 Texas L. R. 1Google Scholar.
22 On this subject, see von Hirsch, , ”Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From ‘Why Punish?’ to ‘How Much?’” in this issue, at p. 549, at 572–578Google Scholar.
23 Based on the mandate of 28 U.S. Code, sec. 994 (m); see Parker, /Block, , “The Sentencing Commission, P. M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?” (1989) 27 Am. Crim. L. R. 289, at 298Google Scholar.
24 See, e.g., von Hirsch, , Past or Future Crimes (1986) 75Google Scholar; Robinson, supra n. 21, at 14-16; Wilkins, “Disparity in Dispositions: The Early Ideas and Applications of Guidelines”, in Wasik/Pease, supra n. 12, at 15-17.
25 Such as the one proposed by von Hirsch, supra n. 22.
26 von Hirsch, supra n. 22, at 564-571, insists that penalties should be proportionate to desert (harm and blameworthiness) rather than to deterrent need, although he regards general prevention as the general justifying idea of criminal punishment. This “hybrid” theory is an acceptable compromise which makes a deterrent theory of punishment more palatable than it would be if sanctions were to be determined solely according to their deterrent value.
27 See, e.g., Albrecht, , Strafzumessung und Vollstreckung bei Geldstrafen unter Berücksichtigung des Tagessatzsystems (1980)Google Scholar; Albrecht, /Fehérváry, /Pallin, , Strafe und Strafzumessung bei schwerer Kriminalität in Österreich (1989)Google Scholar.
28 For a discussion of these factors' influence under German law, see Bruns, , Das Recht der Strafzumessung (2nd ed., 1985) 230–242Google Scholar.
29 See Maurach/Zipf, supra n. 9, at 603.
30 For problems resulting from manipulation of facts through bargaining between prosecutors and defendants under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see, e.g., Schulhofer, /Nagel, , “Negotiated Pleas under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months” (1989) 27 Am. Crim. L. R. 231Google Scholar.
31 Accord, Günther, , Systematische Grundlagen der Strafzumessung (Juristenzeitung, 1989) 1025, at 1026Google Scholar.
32 See von Hirsch, /Knapp, /Tonry, , The Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines (1987)Google Scholar.
33 This was one of the arguments against the constitutionality of the legislation creating the U.S. Federal Sentencing Commission; see the discussion in Mistretta v. U.S., 109 S. Ct. 647, at 654-662 and 675-683 (Scalia J., dissenting).