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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 February 2016
1. This Conference was originally planned to honour Professor Julius Stone on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. It is my sad duty to open it tonight by honouring his blessed memory. He was not only one of the greatest philosophers of law, not only a brilliant jurist and an inspiring teacher, but also a longstanding and faithful friend who defended Israel's claim to a rightful place among the nations with deep conviction and persistent involvement. He taught at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem — as at dozens of universities all over the free world — as a visiting professor, and graced the Truman Institute for Peace at the Hebrew University as its first director. His monumental work on The Province and Function of Law, written almost fifty years ago, still ranks as one of our leading and indispensable textbooks, and I shall not enumerate to you the now famous titles of the many books which followed it. Not only his own fora, first the University of Sydney and later the University of New South Wales, but the whole academic world, suffered a grievous loss when he died last year; and for the organizers of the Conference, it is a sad disappointment that the cathedra honoris causa which had been reserved for him had to remain empty.
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1931) 285 US 262, quoted by Stone, , The Province and Function of Law (2nd ed., 1950) 646Google Scholar.
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7 Pincoffs, supra n. 6, at 133.
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11 Jones, , Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (1956) 164Google Scholar: “In omni fictione inest aequitas naturalis”.
12 Cf. the famous dispute between Devlin, Lord, The Enforcement of Morals (1961)Google Scholar, and Hart, H.L.A., Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963)Google Scholar, and The Morality of the Criminal Law (1964). For a new discussion see MacCormick, , Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982) 18–38Google Scholar: “Against Moral Disestablishment”. And cf. Cahn, , The Moral Decision (1955) 35 ffGoogle Scholar.
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35 Patterson, , An Introduction to Jurisprudence (2nd ed., 1946) 210Google Scholar, derisively speaks of “gastronomical jurisprudence”. In Muslim law, a judge was not to sit in court when hungry; in Roman law, he was disqualified when drunk or gluttoned.
36 Quoted by Frank, supra n. 25, at 163.
37 Sobeloff, quoted by Pincoffs, supra n. 6, at 61.
38 If, as Frankel (supra n. 2) suggests, “the commission would have the function of actually enacting rules, i.e. making law”, the dictum of Mr. Justice Cardozo would apply, and that would mean “exchanging a process of trial and error at the hands of judges who make it the business of their lives, for a process of trial and error at the hands of a legislative committee … Substitute statute for decision, and you shift the center of authority, but add no quota of inspired wisdom”: supra n. 22, at 245.
39 Sec. 80, Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 1984 (38 L.S.I. 271, at 293).
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42 Secs. 213 and 215, Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 1982 (36 L.S.I. 35, at 71, 72).
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