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Political Contracts*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2016

Itzhak Zamir
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Extract

A new creature has been welcomed into Israel's family of law. While some refer to it as a political agreement, and others a public agreement, I prefer to call it a political contract.

It was greeted with curiosity, suspicion, and even disapproval. And, although much has been written about it of late, its character has as yet to be determined. What distinguishes it from other agreements? Is it legally binding, or does it merely draw upon the force of public opinion? Is it justiciable? If binding, does it fall within the scope of private law or of public law? And what consequences attach to breach of the agreement?

In this article, I will examine the primary questions regarding political agreements, present the existing case law and opinions, and express my views on the subject.

Type
Political Agreements
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1992 , pp. 461 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1992

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References

1 On political agreements, see Barak, D., The Contractual Liability of Public Authorities, (Tel Aviv, 1990, in Hebrew), 41–51Google Scholar; Political Agreements, (Symposium following a lecture by State Comptroller Miriam Ben-Porath), (Jerusalem, Israel Association for Parliamentarism, 1991, in Hebrew)Google Scholar; Rubinstein, A., The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, Vol. I, (1991, 4th ed., in Hebrew) 441–446Google Scholar; Shalev, G., “Political Agreements”, in this issue, p. 442Google Scholar; Friedmann, D. and Cohen, N., Contracts, Vol. I (Jerusalem, 1991, in Hebrew), 359–366Google Scholar; Cohen, N., “The Political Agreement”, in this issue, p. 499Google Scholar.

2 In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, (1991) 45(i) P.D. 749, at 836, Barak J. states that a political agreement is “an agreement among political parties or factions as to the policy and structure of government and the exercise of governmental authority”. Also see per Elon D.P. at 775. For a definition of political agreements, see N. Cohen, supra n. 1; D. Barak, supra n. 1, at 41-42; G. Shalev, supra n. 1.

3 Shalit v. Peres, (1990) 44(iii) P.D. 353, at 363 per Barak J. Also see per Shamgar P. at 358. On the nature of a coalition agreement, see Ressler v. The Minister of Defence, (1988) 42(iv) P.D. 411, at 507.

4 Rubin v. Berger, (1987) 41(i) P.D. 73, treats of a coalition agreement made in regard to Bar Association elections. In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 836, Barak J. referred to the coalition agreement in the Bar Association as a political agreement.

5 Shalit v. Peres, supra n. 3. Absent a law governing coalition agreements or requiring their publication, the Court inferred the duty from a number of fundamental principles: the nature of the democratic process, the public's right to know, and the fiduciary duty of public figures. This is a clear example of judicial law making. Also see the Directives of the Attorney-General no. 21.481A of 30 Dec. 1991, in the matter of disclosing political agreements. The question remains as to the scope of the duty. The reasoning of the decision would require that it apply even to the coalition agreements of municipal authorities. Indeed, the Court ruled to that effect in Nathanson v. The Mayor of Holon (1992) 46(ii) P.D. 194. The Court went so far as to hold that a coalition agreement in a municipality which has not been duly published is null and void. But does the publication requirement apply to other coalition agreements, such as in the Histadrut Labour Federation or the Jewish Agency?

6 Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 12), (1991) S.H. no. 1345, p. 90. Sec. 3 of that law (adding sec. 13B to the Basic Law: The Government) establishes a duty to publish coalition agreements.

7 See Axelrod v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, (1968) 22(i) P.D. 80, at 83. Witkon J., considering the coalition agreement between the Labour Alignment and the National Religious Party, under which the religious parties were ensured an absolute majority on all religious councils in the country, stated that “such a political agreement is non-justiciable”. For an interpretation of that statement, see Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4, at 77-78, per Barak J. Also see Zo'abi v. Abu Rabia, (1981) 35 (ii) P.D. 262, in which the Court considered a rotation agreement among Knesset members. Cohn J. tended toward the position that the agreement was non-justiciable. However, having some reservations, he stated that “I intend to leave the question of justiciability for the appropriate time”, ibid., at 264.

8 Supra n. 4.

9 Ibid., at 78.

10 Supra n. 2.

11 Also see Levi v. The Prime Minister, (1990) 44(ii) P.D. 213; Biton v. The Prime Minister, (1991) 45(ii) P.D. 827.

12 D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, Contract, supra n. 1, at 359. And see N. Cohen, “The Political Agreement”, supra n. 1.

13 On the history of political agreements, also see D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, Contracts, supra n. 1, at 359-361; D. Barak, supra n. 1, at 42 ff.

14 Shalev, G., Contract Law (Jerusalem, 1990, in Hebrew) 89Google Scholar. On the formation of a contract, in general, see ibid., at 89 ff. Also see D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 325 ff. However, there seem to be exceptions in which the intention of the parties is insufficient for the formation of a contract, as where that intention contravenes mandatory legislation or public policy.

15 The full text of the agreement appears in Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 802-804. This agreement formed the basis for several petitions to the High Court of Justice. See Levi v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11; Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2.

16 In fact, prior to the elections to the 13th Knesset, disagreements arose between the parties to the agreement in regard to whether the Likud had to reserve specific places on its list for candidates from the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea. The provisions of the agreement were invoked, and the matter was brought to arbitration before Dr. Amnon Goldenberg. Parts of the arbitral award were published in Ha'aretz of 13 April 1992. On the arbitral award, see infra nn. 74 and 88.

17 In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 846, Barak J. said of this coalition agreement: “The form of the agreement, its drafting, and the mechanisms employed by the parties (such as arbitration), all point to the great seriousness that the parties attached to the agreement and to their desire to view themselves bound by it. They did not consider themselves to be concluding merely a gentlemen's agreement”.

18 For the text of the agreements, see Ha'aretz of 10 July 1992.

19 See supra n. 15.

20 See Political Agreements, supra n. 1, at 452.

21 Ibid., at 460.

22 See the Directives of the Attorney-General, no. 21.483 of 1 Feb. 1986, regarding a no-confidence motion by a coalition partner. The Directive states that: “The coalition agreement does not have the power to deny or limit a lawfully conferred power or right, including the right to propose a motion of no-confidence against the government, in accordance with the Knesset rules”. However, a no-confidence motion by a coalition partner “is inconsistent with the coalition agreement”. If so, what are the consequences of the breach of the coalition agreement? The sanction is to be found on the political level: “The question is of a political nature, and the decision will therefore be the result of political considerations”.

23 An agreement, as generally understood, can be either a legally binding agreement or one that is not binding. A contract, on the other hand, is clearly a legally binding agreement. In my opinion, in referring to a legally binding coalition agreement, it is therefore preferable to employ an unambiguous term that expresses its character, i.e., a political contract.

24 D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 361 and also see at 359. A political agreement is not binding in private law because “governmental authority is not a subject for commerce, and cannot be the subject of a contract”. Also see N. Cohen, supra n. 1.

25 See Zamir, I., “Gabriela Shalev: Government Contracts in Israel” (1987) 16 Mishpatim 543Google Scholar.

26 N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 513.

27 See, e.g., Miller v. Minister of Transport (1968) 15 P.D. 1989, at 2004-2005; Kupat Holim of the Histadrut v. Be'er Skeva Municipality, (1989) 43(iv) P.D. 488, at 492.

28 The first step toward recognizing the legal validity of political agreements was made by Cohn J., obiter dictum, in Zo'abi v. Abu Rabia, supra n. 7, where he applied sec. 30 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, (27 L.S.I. 117) to a political agreement. In Ressler v. Minister of Defence, supra n. 3, Barak J. stated: “A coalition agreement may confer an obligation, in the public-law sphere, to act for its performance”. Full acknowledgement of the status of a political agreement as a legal agreement was given by the Court, after careful consideration, in Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4, and more recently in Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2. Elon D.P. Stated (see 781 ff.) that a political agreement derives its legal force from Jewish heritage, on the basis of the Foundations of Law Statute, 1980, (34 L.S.I. 181). According to Elon D.P., other legal systems do not recognize the legally binding force of political agreements (see at 802). In this regard, also see per Barak J. at 838. Barak J. would seem to infer the legal force of a political agreement from the intention of the parties to the agreement.

29 Also see Shalev, supra n. 14, at 647 ff.; Shalev, supra n. 1, at 453. Cf. the Directives of the Attorney-General no. 21.480 of 1 Aug. 1985, in regard to racial discrimination in a coalition agreement between factions in the Kiryat Arba municipal council. The directive tends toward the view that a coalition agreement is a contract, and that sec. 30 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, can therefore be applied.

30 Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 12), supra n. 6. Sec. 3 of the Law added secs. 13A and 13B to Basic Law: The Government.

31 See Shalev, supra n. 14, at 422, taking exception to the view that only agreements in regard to economic and commercial matters can properly be deemed contracts.

32 On non-justiciable contracts, see Shalev, supra n. 14, at 419 ff.; D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 324 ff.

33 See D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 360, 366.

34 See Ressler v. Minister of Defence, supra n. 3. In the opinion of Barak J., no matter is normatively non-justiciable, though some matters are institutionally non-justiciable. In the opinion of Shamgar P., a matter that is of a predominantly political character is non-justiciable. On justiciability in public law, see Bendor, A., “Justiciability in the High Court of Justice” (1987–1988) 17 Mishpatim 592Google Scholar; and Kretzmer, D., “Judicial Review of Knesset Decisions” (1988) 8 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 95Google Scholar. Also see, more recently, C.R.M. Faction v. Acting Speaker of the Knesset, (1990) 44(ii) P.D. 31.

35 Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 761.

36 See, e.g., The Israel Labour Party v. Levine, (1977) 31(ii) P.D. 265. A significant number of decisions have been handed down by the District Court in intra-party matters, such as matters connected with the establishment of party institutions or the holding of meetings in such institutions, but few of these decisions have been published. See, e.g., The Likud Faction in the Histadrut v. The Central Elections Committee, (1979) (ii) P.M. 151.

37 Histadrut Agudat Yisrael v. Schwartz, (1991) 45(iii) P.D. 320.

38 Supra n. 2, at 760.

39 I. Galnoor, “Political Agreements and Culture in Israel”, Political Agreements (Symposium), supra n. 1, at 18. Also see A. Rubinstein, supra n. 1, at 23. And see Zamir, I., “Ethics in Politics” (1988) 17 Mishpatim 250Google Scholar.

40 Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4.

41 Shalit v. Peres, supra n. 3.

42 Levi v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11. Shamgar P. noted that the Court would have issued an order nisi had not the Attorney-General notified the Court of his opinion that the guarantee was unlawful, and that the demand for a guarantee had been dropped.

43 Supra n. 2. See the position of Elon D.P. at 765 ff., and that of Barak J. at 843-844.

44 Even Goldberg J., who had meant to refrain from considering the legal force or justiciability of the coalition agreement, joined Elon D.P. and Barak J. in regard to the voidance of the provision waiving financial claims (ibid., at 867).

45 Biton v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11.

46 Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 12), supra n. 6, sec. 3.

47 The Court's intervention in political contracts is consistent with its recent tendency toward increased involvement in other political matters. See Zamir, I., “Courts and Politics in Israel”, 1991 Public Law 523Google Scholar. For criticism of this trend, see Landau, M., “On Justiciability and Reasonableness in Administrative Law”, (1989) 14 Iyunei Mishpat 5Google Scholar.

48 It should be noted that, to date, political contracts have been brought only before the High Court of Justice. Surprisingly, the Court considers such contracts on the merits, as if there were no question of its being the proper forum. The Court has never asked whether it is necessary or more appropriate that a political contract — because it is a contract — be brought before the District Court.

49 Supra n. 3, at 496.

50 Cf., e.g., Vegetable Growers Association v. The Vegetable Production and Marketing Board, (1991) 45(ii) P.D. 576. This case concerned the smuggling of agricultural produce from Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip to the State of Israel, and an order was requested forbidding the granting of permits for transfering produce from the Gaza Strip to Judea and Samaria. The petition was denied. Shamgar P. stated that the question, “in terms of its dominant character”, was not a legal subject.

51 The case of Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, can serve as an example of this. The Court preferred a narrow construction of the provisions of the agreement treating of the exercise of statutory authority, thus allowing the provisions to stand. A literal reading of the provisions would probably have led to their annulment.

52 See Shalev, supra n. 14, at 645 ff.

53 Supra n. 4.

54 Ibid., at 77-78.

55 In Levi v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11, he adopts the term public agreement in regard to a coalition agreement. In Shalit v. Peres, supra n. 3, at 359, Shamgar P. says of the coalition agreement: “Such an agreement is planted in the field of public law … an agreement in the field of public law … is not necessarily governed by the general contract law, but that does not in itself withdraw it from judicial review of its terms”.

56 Supra n. 2. See per Elon D.P. at 785, 798, 822, and per Barak J. at 836 ff.

57 In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 836, Barak J. notes that in Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4, he stated that “I tend to the opinion” that the contract law does not apply to a political contract. He then adds: “I have not recanted that view. I continue to favour the view that contract law — and at its core, the Contracts (General Part) Law, and the Contracts (Remedies For Breach) Law — does not apply to a political agreement”. In regard to the application of private law to a public agreement, Barak J. subsequently adds (at p. 853) that “I prefer to continue to leave it for further consideration”. He notes (loc. cit.) that “I need not decide it in the petition before us, as my conclusions can be based both upon public law and upon private law”.

58 Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 838.

59 See Shalev, supra n. 14, at 652.

60 Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4, at 78, per Barak J.

61 This also follows from Barak J.'s ruling in Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 846: “I tend to think that the very desire of the parties to a political agreement to deem themselves bound under the rules of private law is neither here nor there. The parties cannot, by their own will, make the Contracts (General Part) Law apply to areas to which it is not applicable by virtue of its own content. Political agreements are governed by public law, and it establishes their rules”.

62 Supra nn. 4 and 2.

63 Among the problems, we should note at least two. The first, that of the definition of a public agreement, and the second, that of jurisdiction over public agreements. These are complex questions, and inasmuch as the answers are not necessary to the examination of the central issue — the content of the applicable law — I shall suffice in making a few observations about the two issues. Regarding the matter of definition, if a public agreement is subject to a special legal regimen, different from contract law, it is important to define what constitutes a political agreement in order to decide which agreements are subject to the special laws. Does the term include agreements between the factions of a political party? Every agreement between parties? Coalition agreements in municipalities? In the Histadrut Labour Federation? In the Jewish Agency? In university student unions? See supra n. 4. The lack of clarity brings with it uncertainty. As for the matter of jurisdiction, see supra n. 48. Since administrative contracts are subject to contract law, they generally fall within the jurisdiction of the District Court. But what of a public agreement? In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 843, Barak J. states: “The law is public law. The judge is the High Court of Justice. In my view, this result is desirable”. Nevertheless, the question remains whether that result is, indeed, correct and desirable. Firstly, the basis for the High Court's jurisdiction over public agreements is unclear. What is clear is that the concluding of such an agreement does not constitute the carrying out of a public function under law, as defined in sec. 15(d)(2) of Basic Law: The Judicature (38 L.S.I. 101). What then is the source of the High Court's jurisdiction? We should also take note of the High Court's heavy case load, the vast number of coalition agreements and other political agreements in the municipalities and other bodies, the current trend toward transferring various matters from the High Court to the District Court, and the fact that the District Court treats of intra-party disputes as a matter of course (see supra n. 36). Bearing this in mind, is it preferable that the High Court review public agreements? And how will jurisdiction be resolved in cases where a political agreement comprises elements of an intra-party or administrative agreement? Also see infra nn. 79-80.

64 Supra n. 4, at 79.

65 Supra n. 2, at 839.

66 Ibid.

67 Such absorption is possible via sec. 61(b) of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, or by analogy in accordance with the Foundations of Law, 1980, or by virtue of the approach requiring harmony within the system. See Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4, at 79; Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 839-840.

68 Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, ibid.

69 Shalev, supra n. 1, at 457.

70 Ibid. However, in my opinion, even if an administrative contract comprises elements of private law and elements of public law, it is preferable to categorize it as belonging to public law. See I. Zamir, supra n. 25, at 546-548.

71 See Shalev, supra n. 1, at 458. See Zo'abi v. Abu Rabia, supra n. 7; Levi v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11. In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, there was disagreement on this point between Elon D.P. (791, 818) and Barak J. (845, 862).

72 See Shalit v. Peres, supra n. 3.

73 See Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 786, per Elon D.P. See also D. Barak, supra n. 1, at 42, 47-48; D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 362.

74 Supra n. 2. Elon D.P. stated (807) that he sees a difference, in this regard, between a governmental contract and a political agreement, which suffices to justify rescission of a political agreement due to “a change of circumstances”, as opposed to a governmental contract where rescission can be justified by “vital public needs”. Barak J. states (845) that in the case of a political agreement “the possibility of rescission exists whenever governmental fairness so justifies”, for which purpose he adopts the reasonableness test. The arbitral award between the Likud and the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea (see supra n. 16), examined whether, under the circumstances, the Likud was allowed to release itself from its undertaking to reserve places on its list for candidates of the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea. The arbitrator stated that a “substantial consideration” was required in order to be freed of the agreement. He ruled that the circumstances did not reveal sufficient reason to justify releasing the Likud from the agreement.

75 See Zo'abi v. Abu Rabia, supra n. 7, at 267. Also see Shalev, supra n. 1, at 458. In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 790, Elon D.P. stated that the voidance of an illegal political agreement is derived by analogy from the law of contracts, or by virtue of sec. 61(b) of the Contracts (General Part) Law, or by virtue of applying the rules of administrative law. In my opinion, such voidance can properly be based directly upon sec. 30 of the Contracts (General Part) Law.

76 See supra nn. 67-68 and the related text.

77 See Shalit v. Peres, supra n. 3.

78 See supra n. 63.

79 The scope of the exceptional rules may depend, with regard to each rule, on the reason for the rule as applies by the Court to the circumstances of the case. For example, what is the scope of the rule requiring publication of coalition agreements? The Court did not expressly say whether it applies to all coalition agreements, including those of bodies in the private-law field, such as the Histadrut Labour Federation (see supra n. 5). The answer may depend on the reason for the rule.

80 See supra nn. 48 and 63.

81 The text is quoted in Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 804.

82 Supra n. 2, at 797.

83 Cf. D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 365: “This approach manifestly demonstrates the non-contractual character of political agreements, as an agreement in which a monetary sanction for breach is inapplicable, cannot properly be considered a contract”.

84 See Shalev, supra n. 14, at 426; D. Friedmann and N. Cohen, supra n. 1, at 332 ff. Also see Moscowitz v. The Assessors Council, (1990) 44(ii) P.D. 236.

85 See Albaz v. Minister of Religion, (1964) 18(iv) P.D. 603, at 610; Ressler v. Minister of Defence, supra n. 3, at 507; Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 847. Also see the Directives of the Attorney-General No. 21.480 of 1 Aug. 1985, in regard to racial discrimination in a coalition agreement. In this context, a distinction can be made between a political contract between parties or political factions and a political contract to which an administrative agency is party. Parties or factions may agree among themselves as to the manner in which an administrative agency, which is not a party to the contract, will exercise its authority. But it is also possible for the administrative agency itself to be a party to such a contract, e.g., where the Prime Minister signs a political contract that provides that the Prime Minister will refrain from exercising his authority to dismiss a particular minister by virtue of sec. 21A of Basic Law: The Government. Such a provision could legally obligate the administrative agency, although it may be released from the undertaking under certain circumstances. See Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 805 ff. per Elon D.P., and 846 ff. per Barak J. As opposed to this, a political contract concluded between parties or factions to which the agency is not party, does not obligate the agency on the legal plane, as distinguished from possible obligation on another plane. On the distinction between the two types of contracts, see ibid., at 850.

86 See Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2. Elon D.P. stated (797): “It seems to me that, in general and in the vast majority of cases, even where the Court finds it proper to intervene in a political agreement, the only appropriate relief will be declaratory”. Barak J. stated (846): “I see rescission of the agreement as the primary remedy”. Barak J. added (846) that it is possible “to think of additional remedies, unique to political agreements, such as notifying the public of the breach of the agreement, apology, and other such acts that are effective in the public sphere”.

87 Cf., in the area of review of Knesset decisions, C.R.M. Faction v. Acting Speaker of the Knesset, supra n. 34, at 36.

88 Supra n. 2. In the arbitral award given by Dr. Amnon Goldenberg in the arbitration between the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea and the Likud (supra n. 16), a declaration was made (at p. 18 of the award) that the Likud breached the agreement between the factions in regard to reserving places in the Likud list for members of the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea.

89 See, e.g., Biton v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11. Also see Etzion v. Minister for Religious Affairs et al., (unpublished): The Minister for Religious Affairs is not permitted to rely upon a coalition agreement in a municipality in order to refrain from fulfilling his duty to renew the appointment of the members of the Religious Council.

90 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Minister of Defence, (1970) 24(i) P.D. 365, at 369; Yotbin, Engineers and Contractors Ltd. v. State of Israel, (1980) 34(ii) P.D. 344.

91 As opposed to this, the declaration in the arbitral award between the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea and the Likud — by which the Likud had breached the agreement to reserve places for members of the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea without justifiable cause (see supra n. 88) — was not honoured and the agreement to reserve places was not performed. This teaches us something about the limitations of declaratory relief. However, it is possible that the Likud would have deemed itself obligated to act in accordance with the declaration had it been issued by the Court.

92 Supra n. 2, esp. at 849-851.

93 In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at Blon D.P. stated (798) that it can be inferred from the character of political agreements that, “in general”, the Court will refrain from granting a restraining order or other interim order. And Barak J. stated (845) that: “There will no doubt be an exceptional case in which enforcement will seem a reasonable remedy”.

94 In the arbitration between the Likud and the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea (see supra nn. 16 and 88), the arbitrator, Dr. Amnon Goldenberg, considered the possibility of enforcing the agreement's provisions regarding reserving places on the Likud list for members of the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea. In the end, the arbitrator decided that the circumstances showed that the Party for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea had, in effect, waived enforcement, and thus “there is no reason to order its enforcement” (p. 17 of the arbitral award).

95 See Shalev, supra n. 1, at 459.

96 See Zerzevaky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2; Levi v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 11.

97 In Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 797, Elon D.P. compared a political agreement to a wagering contract which, under sec. 33 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, does not constitute grounds for enforcement or damages. According to him, the remedies of enforcement and damages are inappropriate to the special character of political agreements.

98 See secs. 10 ff. of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 1970 (25 L.S.I. 11).

99 See Miller v. Minister of Transport, supra n. 27. On this ruling, also see Shalev, supra n. 14, at 662 ff.

100 Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2. See supra n. 74.

101 See Rubin v. Berger, supra n. 4, at 79.

102 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, (1969) 23(ii) P.D. 477, at 521, 530.

103 Dwikat v. Government of Israel, (1980) 34(i) P.D. 1, at 4.

104 Landau, M., “Trends in the Decisions of the Supreme Court”, (1981) 8 Iyunei Mishpat 500, at 510Google Scholar. Also see, Landau, M., “The Court's Power and Its Limitations”, (1980) 10 Mishpatim 196Google Scholar; M. Landau, “On Justiciability and Reasonableness in Administrative Law”, supra n. 47.

105 See, e.g., Zerzevsky v. The Prime Minister, supra n. 2, at 762 ff. per Elon D.P.