Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 July 2014
In all societies disputing parties have similar reasons for choosing to arbitrate rather than to use the regular legal process as a means of resolving their differences. Arbitration may be conducted in private, so that the publicity inevitably attendant on the public hearing which is part of the regular legal process is avoided. Arbitration may be speedier, since the parties do not have to wait until the court is ready; arbitration will normally be less beset by formalities than the legal process and it may be cheaper. These considerations apply whatever the character of the regular legal process.
During the formative periods of Roman law and English law, however, disputing parties had a particular reason for preferring to arbitrate and that derives from the nature of a legal action in Rome and in England. Both in the classical Roman procedure and in the classical common law procedure the plaintiff was constrained to bring his claim within one of a number of specified forms of action. These forms of action were set out in the praetor's edict in Rome and the Register of Writs in England. They specified the circumstances in which a legal action could be brought, and directed the plaintiff to the appropriate formula or writ which was required to set the action on the way to a trial.
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2 De Beneficas, 3.7.5:… quaecumque in cognitionem cadunt comprendi possunt et non dare infinitam licentiam iudici; ideo melior videtur condicio causae bonae si ad iudicem quam si ad arbitrum mittitur, quia illum formula incluait et certos quos non excedat terminos ponit, huius libera et nullis adstricta vinculis religio et detrahere aliquid potest et adicere et sententiam suam, non prout lex aut iustitia suadet sed prout humanitas et misericordia impulit regere.
3 Symbolaeographia, Part II, 164.
4 Broggini, G., Iudex arbitene. Prolegomena zum officium des römischen Privatrichters (1957) 40.Google Scholar
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6 For English developments, I have used a Cambridge M.Litt. dissertation by my pupil D. H.Yarn: The Changing Role of English Arbitration (1990).
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