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Settling Criminal Cases Without a Trial

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

Bert Swart
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Extract

According to Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal charge against him. The essence of both provisions could be rephrased by saying that criminal sanctions may only be imposed on a person by an independent and impartial tribunal and only if that person has been able to defend himself against a charge during a hearing that satisfies all requirements of a fair trial.

Realities, of course, are rather different. In almost all national systems of justice there is an increasing tendency to develop procedures that allow for imposing sanctions without the necessity of a criminal trial. Their main purpose is usually to relieve the system of a burden of cases with which it cannot really cope. Basically, there are two strategies to reduce the workload of courts and public prosecutors. The first is to invite the suspect to waive his right to trial in exchange for certain favours. This usually occurs in the form of an agreement between the public prosecutor and the suspect, while quite often the cooperation of the court that would have tried the case is also required. The second solution is to grant sanctioning powers to administrative bodies and to allow individual persons an appeal against their decisions to an independent and impartial tribunal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 31 , Issue 1-3 , Winter-Summer 1997 , pp. 223 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1997

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Footnotes

*

Professor of International Criminal Law, University of Amsterdam.

References

1 ECHR 27 February 1980, Series A 35.

2 ECHR 21 February 1984, Series A 73.

3 Compare Damaška, Mirjan R., The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven, 1986) 224 Google Scholar.

4 All numbers concerning prusecutorial policies in this paper are based on the 1992 Annual Report of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service. See Jaarverslag Openbaar Ministerie 1992 (The Hague, 1993)Google Scholar.

5 See generally Osinga, P., Transactie in strafzaken (Arnhem, 1992)Google Scholar.

6 Supreme Court 19 June 1990, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991, 119.

7 Supreme Court 5 March 1991, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991, 694.

8 Supreme Court 22 October 1991, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992, 282.

9 See generally Franken, A.A., Voeging ad informandum in strafzaken (Arnhem, 1993)Google Scholar.

10 See especially Supreme Court 13 February 1979, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1979, 243.

11 Aanvulling van het Wetboek van Strafvordering met voorzieningen ten behoeve van een vereenvoudigde procedure in strafzaken. Rapport van de Commissie Herijking Wetboek van Strafvordering (Commissie Moons), (The Hague, 1992)Google Scholar.

12 Notably by Jörg, N., Een vereenvoudigde procedure in strafzaken: Accusatoire tendenties, Nederlands Juristenblad (1993) 199–205 Google Scholar. See also Hildebrandt, M. a.o., Een afzonderlijke procedure voor de bekennende verdachte? (Arnhem, 1993)Google Scholar.

13 According to the European Court of Human Rights a person cannot waive his right not to be deprived of his liberty. See ECHR 18 November 1970, Series A 12. Cf. also den Hartog, A., Artikel 6 EVRM: Grenzen aan het streven de straf eerder op de daad te doen volgen (Antwerpen, 1992) 158–160 Google Scholar.

14 Compare van Veen, Th.W., Het nieuwe artikel 74, een aardverschuiving, 13 Delikt en Delinkwent (1983) 541 Google Scholar.

15 See the 1992 Annual Report of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service, supra n. 4, at 56.

16 See Franken, supra n. 9, at 83.

17 ECHR, supra n. 1.

18 With the rare exception of a case study made by Chrisje Brants on fraud offences committed by high ranking employees of a national bank. See Brants, Chrisje, Slavenburg: een geslaagde transactie? (1987) 13 Recht en Kritiek 7–30 Google Scholar.

19 See Osinga, supra n. 5, at 66.

20 A good example is provided by Steenhuis, Dato W., “Coherence and Coordination in the Administration of Criminal Justice”, in Dijk, Jan van a.o., Criminal Law in Action (Arnhem, 1986) 229–245 Google Scholar.

21 Compare ECHR 21 February 1984, Series A 73.

22 Compare A. den Hartog, supra n. 13, at 40-46.

23 Dutch law does not permit conviction on the basis of the accused's uncorroborated confession.

24 I would, therefore, not simply agree with the European Court that “while the prospect of having to appear in court is certainly liable to prompt a willingness to compromise on the part of many persons (…) the pressure thereby brought to bear is in no way incompatible with the Convention”.