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Some Observations on the Arbitral Award in the Taba Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2016

Prosper Weil
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Extract

The following remarks do not constitute a detailed legal commentary on the 29 September 1988 Award delivered by the Arbitration Tribunal, which was established to resolve the dispute between Egypt and Israel regarding the Sinai frontier, particularly in the region of Taba. These remarks do not relate to the origin of the dispute or address the political context in which the arbitration took place. Nor do they dwell on the innovation of introducing, through the Compromis, a conciliation procedure entrusted to a Chamber of the Tribunal in the very midst of the arbitration proceedings. Still less do they make a detailed analysis of the claims of the two parties or of the Tribunal's opinion on each point in dispute. Leaving aside numerous other interesting aspects of the case, the modest purpose of these observations is to shed light on the originality of the position adopted by the Award in two aspects relating to the judicial function in border conflicts. When one considers the place occupied by this type of conflict in judicial disputes and in international arbitration, the interest which this Award deserves, beyond the specific circumstances which generated it, is obvious.

Type
Research Article
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , Winter 1989 , pp. 1 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1989

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Footnotes

*

Professor at l'Université de Droit, d'Économie et de Sciences Sociales de Paris, Director of l'Institut des Hautes Études Internationales de Paris, Member of l'Institut de Droit Internatiuonal.

References

1 See Virally, M., “Le champ opératoire du règlement judiciaire international” (1983) 87 Revue générate de droit international public 281, at 289 ff.Google Scholar

2 Unless otherwise noted, all the italics have been added by the author.

3 This latter argument is, to say the least, not convincing. It could, likewise, be asked why the Peace Treaty should be understood as referring to the demarcation in existence on the ground during the Mandate, if reference could just as well have been made directly to that demarcation. For other explanations of the Tribunal's position, see below, p. 13.

4 Cukwurah, A.O., The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (1967) 27ff.Google Scholar, de Visscher, Ch., Problèmes de confins en droit international public (1969) 28 Google Scholar. On the distinction, see, inter alia: de Lapradelle, P., La frontière (1928) 73 Google Scholar; Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (1960): Délimitation et Démarcation, pp. 195 and 199 Google Scholar; Rousseau, Ch., Droit international public (1977) vol. III, pp. 235 ff.Google Scholar; Munkman, A.L.W., “Adjudication and Adjustment – International Judicial Decisions and the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes” (1972–1973) 46 Br. Yrbk Int'l L. 1, at 114–115 Google Scholar.

5 In some cases, demarcation commissions have been given the task of removing certain uncertainties or making minor rectifications (cf. P. de Lapradelle, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 28–29; Ch. Rousseau, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 271).

6 Although the Tribunal is requested in the Compromis to decide the location of the boundary pillars to be erected, it is really the legal boundary line that it is asked to determine.

7 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), (1974) ICJ Reports 262, para. 29.

8 Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 140ff.

9 Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 25.

10 Bastid, S., “Les problèmes territoriaux dans la jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice”, (1962–III) 107 Recueil des Cows de l'Académie de droit international 360, at 434 and 445 Google Scholar.

11 Bardonnet, D., “Les frontières terrestres et la relativité de leur tracé (Problèmes juridiques choisis)”, (1967–V)153 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de droit international 9, at 48ff.Google Scholar

12 Aréchaga, E. Jiménez de, “The Work and the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 1947–1986” (1987) 58 Br. Yrbk. Int'l L. 1, at 23ff.Google Scholar

13 Ch. de Visscher, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 25.

14 Op. cit. supra n. 10, at 435. Cf. Grisbadarna case: “in the law of nations, it is a well-established principle that one should refrain as much as possible from modifying a long existing factual situation” ( Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XI, 147, at 161)Google Scholar.

15 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. II, 829, at 839 Google Scholar.

16 PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53.

17 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. II, 1105 Google Scholar.

18 (1953) ICJ Reports 57 Google Scholar.

19 Ibid., at 67 and 70.

20 de Visscher, Ch., Les effectivés en droit international public (1967) 106 and 108 Google Scholar.

21 Ch. de Visscher, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 26.

22 Reuter, P., Droit international public (5th ed., 1976)178 Google Scholar; see also his pleadings in the Temple case, vol. II, p. 545 Google Scholar.

23 See, e.g., Ch. de Visscher, op. cit. supra n. 20, at 111; S. Bastid, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 452ff.; D. Bardonnet, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 48 and 50; E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 23–24.

24 de la Rochère, J. Dutheil, “Les procédures de règlement des différents frontaliers”, in La frontière, Colloque de la Société française de droit international (1979) 144 Google Scholar.

25 (1959) ICJ Reports 227 and 229 Google Scholar.

26 Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 466.

27 Ch. de Visscher, op. cit. supra n. 20, at 112.

28 (1962) ICJ Reports 33 Google Scholar.

29 Ibid., at 34.

30 Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 488.

31 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), (1986) ICJ Reports 563, para. 17Google Scholar.

32 Cf. M. Virally, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 290.

33 See reasoning in paras. 218 and 237 (at end). On this aspect of the case, see infra, p. 21.

34 See para. 172: “as it was… consolidated…”.

35 Cf. Ch. De Visscher, op. cit. supra n. 20, at 102ff. and 107ff.

36 The Tribunal quickly points out, however, that “no such contradiction exists” (para. 210).

37 At the very most one may have doubts about the accuracy of an analysis based on the acceptance by both the Mandatory Power and Egypt of a boundary which may be different (although it is not so in reality) from the boundary of 1906, whereas according to the Award itself, the Mandate authorities have always stated in the clearest terms that the boundary of the Mandate was the line of 1906.

38 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) op. cit. supra n. 31, at 565, para. 20.

39 Ibid., at 566, para. 23.

40 Ibid., at 587, para. 63.

41 According to the dissenting opinion, this provision had been inserted at the request of Egypt (para. 6).

42 A considerable part of the Award is devoted to the question of the Parker Pillar (paras. 56, 105–108, 178–181,214–216).

43 (1984) ICJ Reports 246 Google Scholar.

44 Ibid., at 314, para. 161 (the text of the question is reproduced in the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, p. 362, para. 35).

45 Ibid., at 267 para. 27. Judge Gros criticizes the judgment for having left the problem unsolved (pp. 362ff).

46 Ibid., at 266, para. 23.

47 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XI, pp. 333–335 Google Scholar.

48 See Jessup, P.C., “El Chamizal” (1973) 67 Am.J. Int'l L. 423 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 Supra n. 15, at 832.

50 (1953) ICJ Reports 52 Google Scholar.

51 Op. cit. supra n. 11, at 129, n. 195.

52 de Lapradelle, A. and Politis, N., Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, vol. I (Paris, 1932) 227 Google Scholar.

53 La Fontaine, H., Pasicrisie internationale 340 Google Scholar.

54 A. de Lapradelle and N. Politis, op. cit. supra n. 52, at 355, with the commentary by T.M.C. Asser.

55 Ibid., at 391ff.

56 Ibid., at 398.

57 Ibid., at 399.

58 Ibid., at 399–400 (on this case, see H. La Fontaine, op. cit. supra n. 53, at 329).

59 Ibid., at 400.

60 Lotus case, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 10, p. 12; Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Application to Intervene, (1984) ICJ Reports 24, para. 36 and p. 28, para. 46Google Scholar.

61 On the distinction, cf. the dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth (para. 163), who attributes its origin to SirFitzmaurice, Gerald, “The Problem of Non Liquet: Prolegomena to a Restatement”, in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau (1974)89 Google Scholar. In his study, Sir Gerald cites several situations of “false non liquet” where the judge refuses to pass judgment “not necessarily because of the silence or obscurity of the law, or because the tribunal is unable to find some rule or principle that would cover the case, but for some other reason” (p. 92; cf. p. 95).

62 These terms were borrowed from the Agreement of 1906 in which, in Article 1, the administrative separating line was made to start “at the point of Ras Taba on the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba”.