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World Jewry and the Ballot: The Defence of Democracy at the World Zionist Federation and its Potential Impact on Israel's Constitutional Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2016
Extract
The World Zionist Federation (hereafter W.Z.F.) was founded in 1897 at the First Zionist Congress as the structural framework of the organised Zionist Movement. Its contemporary members are Zionist organisations, whose aim is the implementation of the Zionist Programme as defined by its constitution. As such, the W.Z.F. is an inter-territorial organisation, not limited by national frontiers. It is known to command impressive financial resources and considerable international influence. In Israel, the W.Z.F. was also recognised and given a special status by law. Sec. 4 of the World Zionist Organisation—Jewish Agency (Status) Law provides that:
The State of Israel recognises the World Zionist Organisation as the authorised agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants … and the coordination of activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organisations active in those fields.
The W.Z.F. operates through three governing bodies: the Zionist Congress, the Zionist General Council and the Executive.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1977
References
1 The following description is based on the discussion of “Zionist Organisations” in the Encyclopaedia Judaica vol. 16, and on the W.Z.F. Constitution.
2 The 25th and 26th Congresses (1960 and 1964, respectively) made efforts to broaden the basis of the W.Z.F. by the admission of associate members, i.e., Jewish bodies which endorse the Zionist programme but are not organised Zionists. The Zionist programme is defined in Art. 25 (1) of the W.Z.F. Constitution: “The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Eretz Israel secured by public law”.
3 Another characteristic of the W.Z.F. is its voluntary basis. It lacks the capacity to enforce its decisions and its gravest sanction is expulsion of a member from its ranks.
4 (1952) 7 L.S.I. 3.
5 Chapter Two V, W.Z.F. Constitution.
6 For the powers of the Congress and the Council see Chapter Two I, II, of the W.Z.F. Constitution, respectively.
7 Art. 30, sec. 1., W.Z.F. Constitution.
8 Chapter Two IV, W.Z.F. Constitution.
9 That is so because the Congress had increasingly delegated its powers to the other organs. Even the 1960 Constitution was adopted by the Council, not by the Congress itself.
10 This was not the first attempt to “freeze” the composition of the Congress. In the 27th Congress (1968) no elections took place. Instead, the 27th Congress had the same composition as its predecessor. Encyclopaedia Judaica, supra n. 1.
11 Cited in the Tribunal's decision of 31 Oct. 1976, pp. 1–2 (Hebrew).
12 In a letter to the Tribunal, dated 23 Sept. 1976, the Executive confirmed that it had decided to support the Council's resolution and would not support the position of the Attorney. Tribunal's decision cit. supra n. 11, p. 2.
13 The other members were: Dr. D. Mertz, Mr. J. Yanus, Dr. J. Schechter and Mr. M. Silverston. For details concerning the Tribunal see Chapter Two V, W.Z.F. Constitution.
14 Supra n. 12.
15 Mr. Zvi Klemantinovski.
16 Art. 49 (1)(b) provides that the Tribunal is competent to determine the legality of decisions “whether in connection with a dispute or upon the proposal of the Executive or the Attorney…” (emphasis added).
17 Bickel, , The Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962) 113–16.Google Scholar
18 It is particularly curious that Landau J. adhered to this view, since he is one of Israel's leading opponents to judicial review on the ground that it might politicise the Court. See his article “A Constitution as a Supreme Law for Israel” (1971) 27 HaPraklit 30.
19 (1969) (I) 23 P.D. 693, where the Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law, 1969 which provided for election financing of the incumbent political parties only, was declared unconstitutional as being in violation of sec. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset which specifies that the elections shall be “equal”. For an English translation of this decision see (1969) 4 Is.L.R. 559.
20 Author's translation. Tribunal's decision, supra n. 11, at 11.
21 For an extensive discussion see Klein, , “A New Era in Israel's Constitutional Law (1971) 6 Is.L.R. 376.Google Scholar
22 Supra n. 19.
23 The bench was composed of five Justices: Agranat P., Sussmann J., Landau J., Berinson J., and Mani J.
24 Klein, “Special Majority and Implicit Amendment”, infra n. 33, at 569.
25 Knesset Elections (Amendment No. 4) Law, 1973 (27 L.S.I. 106). For a discussion of the Election Laws in Israel see Likhovski, , Israel's Parliament (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971) 48–73.Google Scholar
26 Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 3) 13 L.S.I. 228.
27 Kantel v. Minister of Finance (1973) (I) 27 P.D. 794.
28 (Author's translation). Professor Kaniel also offered the interpretation that an implicit amendment would be valid if passed by a “special law”. Id., p. 796. But this suggestion is not clear.
29 Supra n. 11, at 8. ( (Author's translation).
30 Supra text at n. 13.
31 Supra nn. 19 and 27 respectively. In addition to Landau J., the Bench in the Kaniel decision included Agranat, P. and Berinson, J. (Both retired this year).
32 See his article cit. supra n. 18.
33 Klein, , “Special Majority and Implicit Amendment” (1972) 28 HaPraklit 563.Google Scholar
34 Supra n. 11, at 8. 35 Supra n. 26.
36 Supra n. 33, at 568, and references there.
37 There is no explanation for it in the Parliamentary records and debate concerning sec. 46, (1959) 27(1) Divrei Haknesset.
38 Supra n. 33, at 569–574.
39 Draft Basic Law: Legislation (1975) H.H. no. 1221.