On June 28, 1978, the Israeli Knesset passed a Law which changed the age of criminal responsibility of juveniles, raising the threshold from 9 years of age to 13 years of age. This Law, known as the Penal Law (Amendment no. 3) 1978, is popularly called the “Yitzhaki Law”, after MK Yitzhak Yitzhaki (Likud) who initiated the Law.

From a practical point of view, the Amendment means that police interrogators may not interrogate minors under the age of 13, nor may they open criminal files on such minors or prosecute them. When and if the police are confronted with juveniles suspected of delinquent behaviour the police may take their testimony, and may refer them to the welfare officers, who, operating by virtue of the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960, are authorized to decide whether the minor requires care, and if so, the kind of care he is to receive.

The following observations exclude from their scope two questions that are customarily brought into the discussion whenever the problem of self-determination is analyzed, namely:

1) Is self-determination to be equated necessarily with independence or are there any other conceivable models of self-determination?

2) What is a “people” for the purpose of exercising this right and where is the borderline to be drawn between peoples entitled to invoke this right and other entities not so entitled?

It is suggested that for the purposes of these brief observations it be assumed that self-determination is indeed to be equated with political independence and that there exists a way of establishing what group of persons qualifies for the term “people” and which entities do not.

The origin of the comparative study of Talmudic law lies in the Talmud itself, where we find instances in which the Sages formulated their halakhot in comparative terms, or took cognizance of non-Jewish legal positions.

There are two aspects to comparative legal studies in modern Talmudic research: first, that of pinpointing the influence of one system upon another; and second, that of obtaining a clearer and deeper understanding of each system by emphasizing the common and the unique elements in each. The first aspect is very much a matter of chance, and even when it is applicable, the results often constitute details which are not capable of being formulated in general terms. The second aspect—that of mutual clarification—is, however, generally applicable, and may be employed with profit in numerous instances.

The case of the Canadian ambassador's residence has been the subject of several court decisions at various instances in Israel. These decisions (as well as others relating to the doctrine of sovereign immunity) have been reviewed in former issues of this section. On June 3, 1997, the Supreme Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, gave its judgment in this case and delineated the application of the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity in Israeli law. In a different case decided on the last day of 1996, the Tel-Aviv District Court was required to rule on the applicability of this doctrine to a civil suit brought against the government of the United States of America. This District Court decision now needs to be examined in light of the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the Edelson case.

This article examines the separation of boys and girls in religious schools in Israel and the current Israeli policy that aims to balance the right of equality with the right of denominational education in state-funded, religious schools. It draws on the legacy of the case of United States v Virginia and the subsequent regulations published by the United States Department of Education in 2006 in order to determine when single-sex education may be compatible with equality. It then examines both the relevance and the application of the criteria developed in the United States to religious schools in Israel.

The article reviews and examines the two main justifications for single-sex education: cultural/religious and feminist. The right to establish single-sex educational institutions is perceived to be part of a minority group's right to culture. In conservative cultures, separation between men and women is often justified as a means of preserving modesty and as a necessity in order to educate and train men and women towards their respective social roles. More often than not, their justifications are incompatible with liberal notions of gender equality and dignity.

Separation of men and women in the area of education is often also justified, however, from a feminist standpoint, which is rooted in pedagogical theories. Proponents of single-sex education argue that women-only educational institutions circumvent the inherent bias against women prevalent in coeducational schools, relying on research that indicates that girls perform better in girl-only schools, and attributing this both to the method of study and the educational environment of girl-only schools. They argue that, while separation in other areas of life may be humiliating, in education it has the potential of being empowering.

The goal of this article is to examine how the two types of justification come into play in single-sex religious education in Israel. The article claims that where separation between boys and girls is justified by cultural and religious arguments, it must withstand the tests developed in the case law for the legality of practices that are incompatible with equality. It also argues that even where separation is permissible, the manner in which it is carried out should be regulated and supervised to ensure the minimum violation of equality.

Modern equality as derived from the Enlightenment has always had problems with difference. Whereas feudalism set inequality as the baseline, modern society sets equality as the baseline, but allows for unequal treatment based on differences. Thus, differences among the sexes have been invoked to treat women as inferiors and racial differences to deprive racial minorities of equal treatment. Liberalism has countered these moves by promoting a conception of equality as identity according to which race or gender-based differences are irrelevant for purposes of political participation or employment. More recent claims for equality based on identity politics which call for a type of equality that accounts for differences pose vexing problems for liberalism. How should liberalism handle this? By creating exceptions to generally applicable laws? By promoting group-based autonomy and self-government at the risk ofbalkanizing the polity? Or, on the contrary, by rejecting demands for recognition of differences and reinforcing equality as identity? After analyzing the dialectic of equality, this Article argues that, based on commitment to the premise that all human beings share an equal status for possessing the same capacity for moral choice, pluralism offers a better framework than liberalism for the best possible reconciliation of identity and difference. This implies a departure from the monolithic nation-state toward multi-layered interconnected centers of collective autonomy and self-government.

It is a great pleasure and honour for us to present to Professor Nathan Feinberg on his 80th birthday, as a token of admiration and affection, this issue of the Israel Law Review, which marks the conclusion of the first ten years of publication.

As teachers and students of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University, we are grateful to him for the leading role he played in the creation of that Faculty. As jurists we admire his undisputed mastery of international law, and as Jews and Israelis we are indebted to him for the service he has rendered to the entire Jewish people, to the Zionist cause and to the State of Israel.

Nathan Feinberg was born in Kovno on June 6, 1895. His aptitude for learning was such that the severe numerus clausus did not prevent his admission to the Russian high school, from which he graduated with distinction in 1914. At the same time he was given a Jewish and Hebrew education privately. He then proceeded to the Faculty of Law of the University of Zurich, from which he graduated magna cum laude in 1918.

The British strategy to tame the Palestine press was to be implemented through a sophisticated masterplan. The Press Bureau was reorganized and explicitly directed to woo journalists and thereby achieve press cooperation. Simultaneously, the iron fist of the Press Ordinance was cast, to be used in case gentle handling failed to bear the desired cooperation.

The British analyzed the pitfalls on the road to cooperation correctly. As early as 1932 the Press Officer observed that the “deep-seated antipathy of Arabs and Jews as represented by their respective presses” and “the fundamental opposition of all Arab press to the Mandate” might undermine the entire plan. But even this sober analysis could not foresee the dimensions of the coming crisis.

As Jewish immigration to Palestine and the economic prosperity of the country increased, the Arabs anxiety about their political future in Palestine intensified. In 1936, Arab tensions exploded in the Arab rebellion. Widespread terror, arson and general strikes engulfed the country, and this time they were directed not only against the Jews but also against the British Government. Under these circumstances, the British came to the conclusion that they could no longer support the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In 1939, the White Paper, expressing a shift in policy, was issued. His Majesty's Government rejected the idea that Palestine should become a Jewish State and announced that hereinafter, Jewish immigration to Palestine would be limited and Jewish purchase of Arab lands prohibited.