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Executive Leadership and Fiscal Discipline: Explaining Political Entrepreneurship in Cases of Japan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

NAOFUMI FUJIMURA
NAOFUMI FUJIMURA*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Yosidahonmachi, Sakyo-Ku, Kyoto, Japanfujimurana@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article discusses the effects of executive leadership on fiscal policies and performance. I propose that executive leadership, as a political entrepreneur who provides collective goods for organization, has incentives to maintain fiscal discipline so that he or she can stay in office by developing his or her party's reputation and leading party legislators to electoral success. This article argues that executive leadership with stronger public support is more likely to restrain fiscal expenditure and maintain fiscal discipline. I demonstrate this argument by showing that the prime minister who receives higher public support is more likely to restrain fiscal expenditure in Japan.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , August 2009 , pp. 175 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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