This paper explores the linkage between electoral systems and candidate selection methods (CSMs) by analyzing two innovations of CSMs in Taiwan and Japan: polling primary and kobo, respectively. With an assumption that parties’ CSMs reflect their strategies to win elections, this article offers the rationale behind why and how major parties in Taiwan and Japan adjusted their CSMs to meet the challenges posed by the transition of electoral rules in each country from single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems to mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. We argue that a party's choice of CSMs reflects its rationale for maximizing the prospects of winning under the given electoral rule, which counters the ‘no-finding’ conclusion in some previous large-N studies on the linkage between electoral systems and choices of CSMs. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of institutional factors, such as electoral systems, in explaining CSM reforms in a comparative perspective.

Changes to the institutional structure of trade policymaking are important to understanding why Japan remained largely on the sidelines of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) negotiations in 2010-2012. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) embarked on a series of changes to policymaking institutions, which initially empowered the prime minister and cabinet at the expense of pro-agriculture backbenchers in the ruling party. However, the potential for a breakthrough on farm trade substantially diminished as the institutional reforms were reversed, allowing political supporters of domestic farm interests once more to assert their voice and influence in trade policymaking. Tracing the process of DPJ government decision-making on the TPP reveals that ‘bringing the party back in’ was a major factor in preventing Japan's formally joining the TPP negotiations, despite the strong pro-TPP sentiments of DPJ prime ministers, thus limiting prospects for agricultural trade liberalization.

The bilateral relationship between China and Myanmar is important and intricate despite being asymmetrical in China's favour. Whereas most observers regard the relationship as being heavily weighted in China's favour, Myanmar does have a fair amount of latitude within the relationship that is informed by historical, economic, and strategic considerations. The nationalism and xenophobia present in the attitudes of elite from the Myanmar military junta is both recognized and understood by China that is keen to have a stable peripheral environment. There are also important security issues such as the ethnic armies that currently have a ceasefire arrangement with the junta along the border areas that need to be resolved in a coordinated fashion to prevent negative spillage into China. In light of such special idiosyncratic and terrain considerations, Myanmar wields relative independence within this asymmetrical relationship.

Granting foreign permanent residents the right to vote in local elections in Japan was one of the Clean Government Party (CGP)'s major policy priorities during its 11 years governing in coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). While the CGP proposed several bills that would have done this, none of those bills came close to passing. Why not? Conventional wisdom about Japanese conservatism suggests that the LDP would not support such a bill because the party is uniformly committed to the idea that Japan is a one-ethnicity country, and thus the party is hostile to proposals that would grant those without Japanese ethnicity a role in Japanese society. However, I argue that Japanese conservatives in general, and LDP politicians in particular, have major disagreements about the appropriate role of foreign residents in Japanese society. Moreover, I argue that LDP politicians did not support the CGP's proposal to grant foreign permanent residents the right to vote in local elections in Japan because this proposal did not appeal to politicians from either of the dominant conservative schools of thought about foreign residents in Japan.

Regime change often exacerbates ethnic conflict. This article examines the curious case of Myanmar, where a 2021 military coup was met, on the surface, with broad-based resistance across a divided society. An important question that therefore arises is whether, below the surface, this unity also took a more positive form of national solidarity. Were deep ethnic cleavages intensified or alleviated by the 2021 coup? This question bears theoretical relevance for the study of ethnic conflict and has social relevance for a nation marked by a long history of civil war and a recent experience of genocide against Rohingya Muslims. The article engages in a systematic examination of 180 social media posts uploaded in Burmese by key opinion leaders both before and after the coup. A qualitative analysis of major positive and negative themes indicates a shift in attitudes. The quantitative analysis shows that ethnic relations, measured by a change in themes, ratings and virality, improved significantly in the immediate aftermath of Myanmar's 2021 coup.

Within a one-dimensional spatial framework, we deduce that parties’ incentives ‘to go negative’, by blaming alleged insufficiencies of the rival concerning commonly shared values, increase with their ideological proximity. We test our hypothesis by considering the long period of no-cabinet alternation that characterized both Italy and Japan. In particular, we focus on the (spatial) incentives of the Italian Communist Party and of the Japanese Socialist Party to emphasize on a particular topic related to negative campaigning, i.e. political corruption issues. The status of the perennial opposition held by both parties, together with the existence of several political corruption scandals during the period considered, makes the Italian and the Japanese political systems particularly apt to test our hypothesis. The results, based on data derived from electoral programs, support our theoretical insights.

Why do Japan–South Korea relations remain tense despite repeated efforts to overcome the past? Elite narratives in Japan and South Korea reify the bilateral relationship as a difficult problem. For the Japanese policy elites, the difficulty is due to South Korean unwillingness to embrace a future-oriented relationship; whereas for the South Korean policy elites, the source of the problem is the unwillingness of the Japanese to sincerely address past wrong-doing. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy of an intractable mutual misapprehension, suggesting that the difficult relationship is here to stay. I analyse pronouncements by both the Japanese and South Korean policy elites appearing in official documents and media reports for clues into the manner in which the bilateral relationship is reified into a difficulty purportedly due to the recalcitrance of the neighbour. The narratives consistently show that both the Japanese and South Korean policy elites consider the onus of improvement lies with the troublesome/insincere neighbour. In short, the bilateral relationship is a clash of realities, with the logical conclusion being that the difficult relationship will persist for the foreseeable future.

In this article, we have examined how Japan has supported ASEAN's economic integration through ODA and other diplomatic measures, and showed how Japan's engagements in ASEAN economic integration evolved over time. In addressing these issues, we took into account the growing influence of China's ascent in Southeast Asia, and assumed that Japan's China policy of mixed ‘accommodation and balance’ became explicit in Japan's ASEAN policy. The pronouncement of support for ASEAN integration, disbursement of aid to the region, forging of bilateral and regional FTAs/EPAs with ASEAN, and its recent initiatives and proactive involvement in the Mekong regional development are indicative of Japan's reactive posture on China's growing influence in the region. Japanese diplomatic initiatives in ASEAN are intended, in part, to accommodate and balance China's increasing prominence in Southeast Asia. This explains the simultaneous existence of competitive and cooperative initiatives of the two countries with ASEAN.

After the collapse of the Cold War system, Japan became more active in contributing to international peace and security. Especially under the Koizumi administration, Japan successfully passed major pieces of national security legislation, such as the 2001 Anti-Terrorism and the 2003 Iraq Special Measure Laws, in a timely manner. A changing international security environment in the Cold War transformed Japan's media and public opinion to a more realistic one, which supported Koizumi's active national security policy and changed the dynamics of party politics. In order to prove this, this study first explores the influence of the Japanese media, especially the press. Next, it presents the opinion of major newspapers and the public on individual national security issues. Finally, it analyzes the press's influence on public over the issue of constitutional revision.

This paper aims to apply the methodology used in Inoguchi's former paper (2004c) and build on to the findings concerning social capital in Asia. The previous paper used ten Asian countries from the AsiaBarometer 2003 survey; this time we are using the 14 Central and South Asian countries – Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Mongolia, Nepal, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – from the AsiaBarometer 2005 survey.

The 3/11 triple disaster, comprising the powerful earthquake, devastating tsunami, and nuclear meltdowns at the Fukushima nuclear power complex, has drawn worldwide attention to Japan's crisis management capabilities. This article lays out key concepts used in analyzing crises and addresses major trends in contemporary crisis management endeavors. It then turns to the Japanese case, identifying six key themes in the debates about the country's crisis management capabilities. In tracing and exploring past reform efforts, the article assesses characteristics and highlights perceived deficiencies in Japan's approach. The final part provides a brief overview of the case studies presented in this special issue, pinpointing recurrent themes and enduring problems observed in recent crisis management efforts.

This article describes public attitudes toward government spending in Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, the six major economies of the Asia-Pacific region. An analysis of the 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey data shows that ordinary citizens of the sample countries favored increased, rather than reduced, government spending on a wide range of policy programs. It is also found that support for state activism was stronger in former state socialist countries than in market capitalist ones. Although economic interests, symbolic predispositions, and social positions influenced spending preferences to varying degrees, left–right ideology was particularly conspicuous in most countries surveyed. It is evident that the mass publics of the major economies of the Asia-Pacific region did not strongly endorse state contraction or retrenchment, even in the wake of economic globalization and the neoliberal reform movement.

Japan and the Republic of Korea have been going through a painful process of reconciliation since World War II. But with the momentum created by the FIFA World Cup and the high popularity of Korean pop culture in Japan, the trend shifted and the two countries seem to be enjoying a more amicable relationship. This paper aspires to understand when and how the steps toward reconciliation were taken between the two countries. The overarching research questions are: what steps were taken, and what channels of communication contributed to or hindered the process of reconciliation? Section 1 first lays the historical context of the dispute, and Section 2 assesses the diplomatic steps taken toward reconciliation by applying Assefa's reconciliation model, which leads to an analysis of discrepancy between the governments and the civil societies. Section 3 considers the impact of the FIFA World Cup in 2002, when momentum for friendship was reinforced by the various exchange activities at civil society level, as well as the Korean pop culture. The in-depth interview adds insights and public opinion polls clarify the perceived status of reconciliation. Section 4 concludes by returning to the more generalized issue of how communication between the two nation states has changed with the information technology, which is key to understanding the dynamism of the lingering reconciliation process.

International relations (IR) is both a science and an art, i.e. the unity of object and subject. Traditional international relations theories (IRT) have probed the laws of IR, in an attempt to become the universal science. IRT have developed into a class doctrine that defends the legitimacy of the western international system as a result of proceeding from the reality of IR, while neglecting its evolving process, and overlooking the meaning of art and the presence of multi-international systems. In other words, IRT have turned into what Karl Marx might have deemed as the vulgar international relations theories (VIRT). For this reason, we declare the end of international relations theories. This phenomenon can only be negated by the so-called Chinese School, which will set the sustainable and harmonious relations among nations, between state and non-state actors, and within states and non-state actors (in one word ‘global-society’) in five life-forces of economy, politics, military, culture, and religion. Consequently, this will bring about a real regression of nationality and compatible development of various international systems.

After being at the periphery for decades, India's proactive engagement with East and Southeast Asia has gradually transformed it into an active participant in Asian regional organizations and multilateral processes. This paper examines early Indian attempts at forging pan-Asian unity and assesses the motivations and impact of its Look East Policy. It evaluates India's changing role towards regional cooperation in South Asia and sub-regional groupings, the impact of domestic politics, and discusses how China has influenced Indian perceptions and strategy towards Asian regionalism. After a long gap, India is again contributing ideas on Asian integration and stresses that the broader East Asian integration process should remain open and inclusive.

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze people's confidence in political institutions in the so-called BRICS countries, that is, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. I argue that the quality of macroeconomic indicators cannot explain the variation in political confidence between the five most dynamic new emerging economies, and that there is no substantial difference among the young, middle-aged, and senior-aged groups. By combing data from the Asia Barometer Survey and the World Value Survey, I provide two complementary approaches, one sociocultural and the other micropolitical, to reveal the factors that influence people's confidence in four major political institutions. The explanatory effects of these two approaches are mixed. Political identity and values, in most cases, have a significant impact on political confidence. On the other hand, high levels of interpersonal social trust, individual happiness, and satisfaction with living standards also show positive influences.

On 30 June 1994 the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, formerly the Japan Socialist Party) joined its historic enemy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to form a coalition government in a Japanese equivalent of Italy's ‘historic compromise’. Competition between the conservative LDP and the progressive socialists had defined the Japanese party system since 1955. In this paper we analyze voter reactions to this and other confusing events surrounding the end of the LDP's 38-year dominance. We find, first, that the Japanese electorate was able to make sense of these events. The political space reflected in public opinion mapped the political space reflected in the mass media remarkably well. Secondly, our findings support the idea that attitudes toward political parties are endogenous to the political process: strategic moves by political actors alter the political space within which they maneuver. Coalitions of strange bedfellows force voters to revise their perceptions of political space and reevaluate their attitudes toward the actors involved. Strange bedfellows seemed less strange, friendlier after they had been seen in bed together.

In profiling Asian societies, such classical authors as Hegel, Marx, and Wittfogel have had considerable influence on the subject. They adopted power-centered approaches in characterizing Asian societies. This manuscript adopts the evidence-based approach with a bottom-up angle in constructing a people-centered typology of Asian societies. People's daily life satisfaction in 29 Asian societies is factor-analyzed with varimax rotation, society by society. Using the first two dimensions of factor analysis for each society, five types of Asian society are constructed: Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, and Ca, where A means materialism in the primary, b means postmaterialism in the secondary, B means postmaterialism in the primary, a means materialism in the secondary, c means public sector dominance in the secondary, and C means public sector dominance in the primary. Ab societies include: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Japan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ac societies include: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Mongolia. Ba societies include: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgyzstan. Bc includes Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan. Ca societies include: Singapore and the Maldives. Responses to questions about lifestyle priorities are also provided to corroborate and reinforce the above typology. Applicability of this method is open to non-Asian as well as Asian societies.

Authoritarian deliberation has been used widely to describe the specific form of deliberation developed in China. However, whether its practice will strengthen authoritarianism or lead to democratization remains unknown. In this study, we examine this question from the perspective of participants in public deliberation. Surveying the participants in participatory pricings held in Shanghai over the past 5 years, we find that participants’ perception of deliberative quality has a statistically significant negative impact on their level of political activism, while their level of empowerment has a moderating effect on this negative relationship. In this light, Chinese deliberative practices characterized by high-quality deliberation and low-level empowerment are likely to have a demobilization effect; thus, they reinforce the authoritarian rules.

This paper compares Japanese and Chinese infrastructure development strategies in post-Soviet Central Asia (CA) by analyzing the similarities and differences in the approaches of the two Asian economic powers. This paper develops several arguments with respect to the Japanese and Chinese approaches to infrastructure development in CA. This paper argues that the discourse of mutually exclusive interests in China and Japan's development of various infrastructure-related projects in CA is empirically unproven. Most of the Chinese engagements emphasize the creation of energy and transportation infrastructure (construction), while Japan's main areas of focus are the maintenance, modernization, and rehabilitation of current infrastructure. Thus, this paper suggests that China positions itself as CA's leading economic partner, while Japan is CA's leading assistance provider. These two roles have different implications. Furthermore, the current infrastructure engagements of Japan (from assistance to partnership) and China (from exploitation to contribution to the region) in CA demonstrate both countries’ attempts to adjust and search for new opportunities.