With the emergence of new information and communication technologies, scholars and politicians view the Internet as a means both to govern and to bring citizens, especially younger generations, closer to the political process. Given the tremendous impacts of the Sunflower Movement on Taiwanese politics, this paper sets out to dynamically examine whether and to what extent the Internet inspired offline electoral and non-electoral participations of Taiwanese young adults. While the younger generation's Internet usage for political causes significantly encouraged their voting turnout in the 2014 election, a similar effect was not detected in either the 2012 or 2016 presidential and legislative elections. The estimated statistics not only show the particular effect of the Sunflower Movement on young adults' voting turnout and participation in self-help activities in the 2014 election, but also reveal that the fast-changing and diverse Internet domain did not have a long-lasting influence on young citizens' political engagement in the offline world.

In this study, we examine whether strategic voting – in which a voter seeks to maximize the expected payoff from casting a ballot – occurred among late voters in the 2018 Taipei City mayoral election. This multi-candidate mayoral contest was noteworthy because ballot-counting started before all the votes had been cast, with preliminary results being leaked to the media. Theoretically, having access to real-time updates of voting figures could have influenced the decision of voters who were still in line waiting to cast their ballots. Analysis and reconstruction of aggregate polling data, however, demonstrate that there was very little (if any) strategic voting among these late voters on election day, even if they had information that might have induced them to vote strategically.

This article proposes an analysis of changes implemented during Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's administration (2003–09), using the theoretical framework commonplace in studies on conservatism. Based on the premise that transformations in conservative polities are prone to producing conflict, the dynamics of conflict situations during Abdullah's checkered Premiership is foregrounded. As we apply the main criteria defining conservatism to regime behaviour in Malaysia, it becomes clear that such criteria are stoutly held by the regime's elites in their quest for social harmony and political stability. Regime maintenance then finds justifications in such seemingly sublime ends, thereby self-perpetuating Malaysian conservatism. Such despondency prevailed during Mahathir Mohamad's administration (1981–2003), which displayed bias against changes and introduced schemes to justify the systems it upheld. Transmutations wrought during Abdullah's tenure may have been neither substantial nor totalizing, but within the conservative paradigm which had long gripped national politics, Abdullah's deviations were significant nevertheless.

The aim of this short essay is to further reflect on sociology in Japan by supplementing discussions on the three sociological papers compiled in this volume and adding critical perspectives. Discussions, and arguments, will be provided on the three thematic categories, namely, ‘international sociology’, sociology of culture as well as language use, and the global academic market, the latter addressing not merely sociology but also other social sciences.

One year ago I entitled my review of Japanese elections ‘Time for a Change?’. Candidates running against the establishment were defeating candidates who had until recently appeared unbeatable. Most notably, outsider candidates were defeating ainori (supported by all major parties) candidates in gubernatorial elections. A prime example of an outsider candidate defeating the establishment was Prime Minister Koizumi, who defeated the LDP establishment to win the leadership of the LDP. Koizumi's election and subsequent popularity appears to have dampened the trend. Most notably, a well-qualified challenger failed to unseat the incumbent in the Shizuoka gubernatorial election. Once Koizumi's popularity faded, however, the trend in favour of outsiders reappeared. Given an attractive alternative, establishment candidates continue to find themselves in trouble. The clearest recent example comes from the Yokohama mayoral election.

Although preceding studies on Japan's foreign aid tend to report that Japan's aid policy is receptive to US pressure, it remains unclear which direction the US wishes Japan to assist its aid programs and how bureaucratic politics of Japan reduces the magnitude of US influence. This paper pursues the first attempt to provide a theoretical framework for the direction of US influence on Japan's aid provision and to explore whether its impact varies across different types of aid. I utilize a new dataset on Japan's Official Development Assistance from 1971 to 2009 and employ both ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regressions to handle the issues of reverse causality and joint decision-making. The combined results of quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the US tends to urge Japan to complement its aid efforts rather than to substitute them as substitution will allow Japan to increase its clout in strategically important recipients and the US attempts to minimize this risk by asking Japan to disburse aid in tandem. I also find that the allocation of Japanese grants is more receptive to US pressure than that of loans because the former is left to the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that uses external pressure to win bureaucratic turf wars, whereas loans are determined through consultations among multiple agencies with constituencies that prioritize Japan's domestic interests. The findings are robust across different model specifications and different samples.

The positive influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries' economic growth has been widely debated. Given the mixed empirical evidence, scholars have sought to find the economic preconditions under which FDI spillovers are likely to occur and facilitate economic growth in the host countries. Those preconditions are not exogenously dictated but largely shaped by governments' policy preferences. Particularly in autocracies, an autocrat's policy preferences are the driving force that determines whether a host country is likely to be equipped with growth-friendly institutions and policies. We argue that such economic institutions and policies are dependent on the time horizons of autocrats in power. Our empirical analysis covering 64 autocratic countries from 1970 to 2005 supports our main argument that FDI has a positive effect on growth when autocratic time horizons are sufficiently long, and positive FDI spillovers mainly occur through the protection of property right institutions.

Elections to Japan's upper house, the House of Councillors, are ‘secondary’ elections, that is, elections that do not choose the government. Among the implications of this secondary status is that the party system is primarily determined elsewhere, by the system used in the general elections that do choose the government. From 1947 through 1993 the system used in general elections fostered a multiparty system that did not sit easily with the many single-member districts of the House of Councillors. Since 1996 general elections use a system based primarily on single-member districts, which is fostering a two-party system. As a two-party system emerges, we should expect the single-member districts of the upper house to become more and the multi-member districts to become less congruent with the party system. The 2004 House of Councillors election presented us with our first example of what two-party elections might look like in future upper house elections. The overall results do indeed indicate the advent of the two-party system with the major parties winning 96% of the seats in the district tier and 71% in the PR tier.

In the post-Cold War era, instead of peace and stability, we have witnessed many instances of regional conflict, domestic chaos, and civil strife. Moreover, economic globalization and the growing importance of transnational institutions have eroded traditional bases of political power. As such, emerging patterns of governance should be seen as ‘institutional responses to rapid changes in the state's environment’ (Pierre 2000: 3). Governance is carried out by many economic and political actors at a variety of levels, encompassing national government, regional institutions, and networks of non-state actors.

Empowering the rank and file members in choosing a party leader has become an increasing trend in parliamentary democracies. This study examines the process of adopting more inclusive methods to choose a party leader in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. The LDP introduced a national primary to elect a leader in 1978. However, this first attempt to open up the party leadership selection was soon replaced by traditional coalition-making politics. In this regard, the LDP is different from most of the Westminster parties that followed a smooth linear process of transferring more power to the rank and file members. This article identifies a ‘swing-back’ effect between 1980 and 1990 in the democratization process of party leadership selection. Working like a pendulum, the LDP did not resume a primary until 1991. It was in 2003 that a nationwide primary became a regular way. This article argues that the discontinuity of reformist actors caused this uncommon swing-back effect. The reformist split in 1976, the sudden death of Masayoshi Ohira, and Kanemaru mediation in 1984 stalled the reforms. Although one finds a similar trend in democratizing party leadership selection outside Europe, the LDP presented an abnormal inactivity and time-lag differences.

This paper analyzes voter choice in selected House of Representatives elections during the past 30 years. I estimate multinomial probit models using data from the Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai (Society for the Promotion of Clean Elections) surveys and use qualitative data gathered in focus groups. I argue that no gender gap exists in the votes garnered by the main parties because, first, influential people are not simply able to ‘deliver’ votes from their networks — most accounts of voter choice fail to discuss gender, an oversight considering that most networks are gender-based — and, second, ‘women's issues’ have no special relevance to women in their vote choice. Instead, women and men vote for the Liberal Democratic Party because they associate the Party with stability and increased standards of living, including substantial social provisions.

This study examines the process by which the concept of quality of life has been increasing in importance as the key to ASEAN's socio-cultural integration. This study also focuses on the current trend that emphasizes subjective quality of life and clarifies that ASEAN has been moving toward including this perspective. Then, it analyzes the subjective quality of life of people in ASEAN in terms of self-assessment and the multidimensional World Health Organization Quality of Life metric by using data from the ASEAN Barometer 2009.

After the end of World War II, East Asia gradually formed what can be referred to as a quasi-anarchical regional order. The quasi-anarchy system is defined by the anarchy system associated with a sub-hierarchical system, so this system possesses the characteristics of both anarchy and hierarchy in terms of security relations among states. The states in a quasi-anarchical order can be differentiated into three types according to the method through which they seek security. They comprise that of self-help states, the state that provides security guarantees to client states (security guarantor), and states that receive security protection from the security guarantor (client states) within the quasi-anarchy. The standard security relationship between states consists of two types: the first is a competitive security relationship; the second is a security-dependent relationship. The quasi-anarchical order in East Asia has restricted the continuance and positive effect of a rising China's reassurance policy through three mechanisms: dependence, reliance on support, and imitation.

What determines whether interest groups choose to contact politicians or bureaucrats? Despite the importance of this question for policymaking, democracy, and some prominent principal-agent understandings of politics, it is relatively unexplored in the literature. We argue that government stability plays a major part in interest groups’ decisions. That is, central to interest groups’ decisions is their assessment of the likelihood that politicians currently in power will continue to be in the future. We deduce logical, but totally contrasting hypotheses, about how interest groups lobby under such conditions of uncertainty and then test these using a heteroskedastic probit model that we apply to a unique longitudinal survey of interest groups in Japan. We find that when it is unclear if the party controlling the government will maintain power in the future, interest groups are more likely to contact the bureaucracy. When it is believed that the party in power will retain control for a considerable period, interest groups are more inclined to contact politicians. In addition, during times of government uncertainty, interest groups that are supportive of the governing party (or parties) are more likely to contact politicians and those that are less supportive will be more likely to contact bureaucrats.

Documenting how the Japanese state responded to increasing social discontent during initiation of unpopular welfare reforms, this study examines the factors that hindered the political empowerment of civil society despite the timely introduction of participatory policymaking institutions. The Japanese government opted in the early 2000s to introduce a participatory method to initiate the unpopular pension reform. Deliberation councils were established to encourage open discussions among government policymakers and committee members, including citizen representatives. The final outcomes of the deliberations, however, were mostly about parametric adjustments and did not adequately consider the urgent demand of the general public. The participatory measure did not significantly improve the public's trust in the pension programs, but it did justify the government's reform initiatives. The welfare bureaucracy that set the goal, defined the scope of the agenda, and steered the discussions toward technical issues structurally restricted the voices of the citizen members in the deliberation councils. The lack of citizen advocacy groups, which could otherwise have effectively supported the citizen members on the committee, contributed to the limited roles and influences of the citizens. It is argued that the traditional conservative corporatism of Japan was reinforced during this time period, despite the introduction of the idea of participatory governance.