Cameroon's emergency powers: a recipe for (un)constitutional dictatorship?

Abstract

The need for governments to be given the powers to meet future emergencies, whether man-made or natural, with speed and effectiveness is widely recognized. However, because of the frequent violations of human rights committed by states under the pretext of overcoming emergencies and restoring order, there has always been a need for the exercise of these emergency powers to be strictly controlled to prevent their abuse.

This article reviews the current state of emergency powers in Cameroon in the light of the 1996 amendment to the Constitution and emerging international standards regulating the declaration of a state of emergency. It argues that emergency powers are only consistent with a democratic system of governance when there are effective controls to check against their abuse. It concludes that the expansion of presidential powers, with wide-ranging and vague powers to deal with emergencies, combined with the absence of any effective legislative oversight or judicial control raises serious doubts about the country's transition from the numbing years of authoritarian dictatorship to a fully fledged constitutional democracy.