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Regulatory Diversity as Key to the “Myth” of Drug Patenting in Sub-Saharan Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2010

Poku Adusei
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Abstract

This article critiques the subject of patent protection of drugs in the light of the threat posed by HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. It contends that the basis for sustaining the prevailing international patent system in developing countries is a “myth”: one of deception. This “myth” is validated by highlighting the dysfunctions associated with the prevailing international patent system. The article proposes the adoption of diverse patent systems that would suit the cultural and human development needs of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Such diversity implies a drug patent model that meets human needs and shows respect for communal interests, a model that permits differences and is amenable to change in the light of socio-economic needs, a model that confronts “unfreedoms” which constrain human development, and a model that ensures respect and protection for the fundamental right to health care.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , April 2010 , pp. 26 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 2010

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References

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