Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
In the late summer of 1996 Iraqi troops moved into the Kurdish
“safe
haven” in Northern Iraq, thereby triggering a crisis of national
security
for the United States. Unsurprisingly, this incident led to speculation
in
the media about the nature of President Clinton's response. Would
he be
able to meet this test of his leadership? What form would any military
action take? Would it be strong enough, or would it be an overreaction?
In the event, the president ordered two cruise missile strikes against
Iraqi
defence installations and substantially extended the no-fly zone in
Southern Iraq set up after the Gulf War. These actions were the subject
of debate in the United States Senate and, after some partisan wrangling,
and a few rumbles of complaint about inadequate consultation, a non-binding
resolution endorsing the missile strikes was approved by a vote
of 96–1. But, as was noted by the press, “none of this really
mattered
because such ‘sense of the Senate’ resolutions have no binding
effect and
are largely ignored, even inside the Beltway.”
What was striking about this incident was that throughout the crisis
the
United States Congress was little more than a bystander. Inevitably all
eyes turned to the president. It was he and not the national legislature
that
became the focus of public and media attention. Does he have the
mettle
needed? What will he do, and will his actions be sufficient
to deal with the
situation? These were the sort of questions being debated on the talk
shows and in the press. To put it bluntly, at this moment, there was little
interest in what the legislature might say or do, the mighty Congress,
at
this point at least, was reduced to a role comparable, dare it be said,
to that
of the British House of Commons. The situation called for leadership and
decisive action and no one was under any illusion that the legislature
could provide either, only the president was in a position to meet these
needs. When it comes to the making of foreign policy, and particularly
when crises of national security arise, the president, it seems, is inevitably,
the main player, the senior partner.
