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Reassessing the Eagle and the Lion
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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2017
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In June 2013, Iran surprised many observers by electing the moderate, but still firmly establishment, cleric Hassan Rouhani as President. Following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's eight years in office, few analysts predicted Rouhani's victory. It was expected that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, would oversee the election of a more controllable conservative politician than Ahmadinejad had turned out to be. Instead, the array of hard-line candidates presented to the electorate on polling day split the conservative vote, resulting in an overwhelming victory for Rouhani.
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- Review Essay
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- Journal of American Studies , Volume 51 , Special Issue 4: Exploring the Global History of American Evangelicalism , November 2017 , pp. 1267 - 1274
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press and British Association for American Studies 2017
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