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Conditions for evolutionarily stable strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Andris Abakuks
Andris Abakuks*
Affiliation:
Birkbeck College
*
∗Postal address: Department of Statistics, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet St., London WCIE 7HX.
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Abstract

It is pointed out that the conditions given by Haigh (1975) for finding evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to a given matrix are sufficient, but not always necessary. An example is given, and an amended version of the necessary and sufficient conditions is stated.

Keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY
Type
Short Communications
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 559 - 562
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1980 

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References

Bishop, D. T. and Cannings, C. (1976) Models of animal conflict (abstract). Adv. Appl. Prob. 8, 616–621.Google Scholar
Haigh, J. (1975) Game theory and evolution. Adv. Appl. Prob. 7, 8–11.Google Scholar
Maynard Smith, J. (1974) The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. J. Theoret. Biol. 47, 209–221.Google Scholar