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Three characterizations of population strategy stability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

W. G. S. Hines
W. G. S. Hines*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
*
∗Postal address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ont., Canada N1G 2W1.
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Abstract

In addition to the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), developed specifically for considering intraspecific conflicts, concepts such as the Nash equilibrium from game theory and the attractor or sink from dynamical systems theory appear relevant to the problem of characterizing populations of stable composition. The three concepts mentioned are discussed for one simple standard population model. It is found that evolutionarily stable strategies of one type are necessarily Nash equilibrium strategies, although the converse is not true. The dynamical systems characterization is found to provide a model for populations susceptible to invasion by ‘co-operative' strategies, but capable of evolving back in average to the original equilibrium.

Keywords

ATTRACTORS IN GAME THEORYCO-OPERATIVE STRATEGIESEVOLUTION OF BEHAVIOUREVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGYINTRASPECIFIC CONFLICT MODELSN-PERSON GAMESNASH EQUILIBRIUM
Type
Research Papers
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 333 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1980 

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Footnotes

Research supported by NRC Operating Grant A6187.

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