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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
In his review of Mr. Chiang Yung-ching's Bo-lot'ing yü Wu-Han cheng-ch'üan [Borodin and the Wu-Han Regime], Professor C. Martin Wilbur has said that “the Chung-shun Gunboat Incident of March 20, 1926, is treated hastily and categorically, simply as a plot of the Communists involving Wang Ching-wei. This is, of course, a delicate subject.” Because of the highly controversial nature of the event, as it involved Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists, no serious and scholarly study on the subject has ever been undertaken in either Mainland China or Taiwan. Historians in the West are generally interested in the event because it was pivotal to Chiang's ascendancy, and Chiang's career is a part of modern Chinese history. Except for the study of the Soviet advisers' view on the Incident, a thorough investigation of the various aspects of the event and all the parties concerned is still wanting.
1 The Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 4 (August, 1965), p. 687Google Scholar. The March aoth coup of Chiang Kai-shek was preceded by the S. S. Chung-shan Incident which occurred on March 18 and 19. They can be regarded as two separate events, but historians sometimes use them interchangeably or simply as one event.
2 Kai-shek, Chiang, Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng—Min-kuo shih-wu nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng (Mr. Chiang Kai-shek—Mr. Chiang Kai-shek before 1926)Google Scholar. Ed. Ssu-ch'eng, Mao, n.p., n.d. (The editor's postscript is dated October, 1936), XV, 38Google Scholar. Cited hereafter as Chiang Diaries. This statement was made by Chiang in a speech entitled “An Address on the Chung-shan Gunboat Incident Delivered before the Whole Group of Party Representatives on April 20, 1926.” The same speech is also reprinted in Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Chieh-shih tsui-chin chih yen-lun (Recent speeches of Chiang Kai-shek). Ed. Hsu-mei. n.p., Wu, Kai-ming Hsueh-she, April, 1927, pp. 1–14Google Scholar; Kai-shek, Chiang, Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun (Recent speeches of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek) (Peking: Min She, September, 1926), pp. 18–30.Google Scholar
3 Tai published two works in June and July, 1925: the first, Sun Wen chu-i chih che-hsüeh chi-ch'n (Philosophical foundations of Sunyatsenism), basically a study of Sun's Principle of People's Livelihood and Communism; his other important work, Kuo-min ko-ming yü Chung-fao Kuo-min-tang (The national revolution and the Kuomintang). This second work rapidly gained popularity; it was soon banned in the territories of the Canton government, and thousands of copies of it were burned by order of the KMT headquarters.
4 At first, Chiang still hoped that compromise might have been reached through the mediation of Chang Ching-chiang. As the opening of the Second National Congress of the KMT was drawing near, all hope of compromise vanished. Chiang, though exonerated from attack, was unable to keep silent any longer. To clarify his position, he issued a statement entitled “Admonishment to the KMT Comrades,” in which he elucidated the questions of Soviet alliance and the KMT-CCP (Chinese Communist Party) relations and defended the roles of Borodin and Wang Ching-wei. For the statement, see Chiang, , Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun, pp. 1–6Google Scholar; Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng chiang-yen chi (Collected speeches of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek) (Peking: The Executive Headquarters of the KMT Central Executive Committee, January 1, 1926) pp. 53–58. An almost full text is also given in Chiang's diary except the part concerning Borodin (Chiang Diaries, XIII, 42–45Google Scholar).
5 For instance, on October 3, 1925, Li Kung-hsia, a chief political commissar of the First Division of the First Army, together with more than ten Whampoa cadets, reported to Chiang concerning the infiltration of the Communists into the army. See Chiang Diaries, XII, 2Google Scholar. According to Edgar Snow, Ch'en Keng, a Communist and one of the cadets closest to Chiang, said to him: “One day when he [Ch'en Keng] was in Chiang's room he found on his desk a list of Whampoa cadets and leaders of the revolution. Beside the name of each Communist was a red circle. By his name was a note: this man is a Communist; not to be entrusted with field command. At this time he began to suspect Chiang's intention.” See Snow, , Random Notes on Rea China, 1936–1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 On January 25, 1925, a Young Serviceman's Club (Ch'ing-nien chün-jen she) was organized (Chiang Diaries, IX, 16aGoogle Scholar; Kai-shek, Chiang, Soviet Russia in China [New York, 1957], p. 35Google Scholar). Apparently after expansion, the Club changed its name to the League of Military Youth. The Sunyatsenist Society was established on December 29, 1925 (Chiang Diaries, XIII, 57Google Scholar), but its unofficial existence must have begun in early November, 1925, or even earlier (Chiang Diaries, XII, 82Google Scholar). However, on January 2, 1926, in speaking to the field officers, Chiang said that the official recognition of the League and the Society had to be postponed for the time being (ibid.). On February 2, 1926, Chiang called a joint meeting of the League and the Society, at which a series of resolutions to govern the two organizations was adopted (ibid., XIV, 57). This could be the official recognition, so far as the Whampoa Academy was concerned.
7 Kao Yü-han, after his return from Germany, was elected member of the Supervisory Committee of the KMT at the Second National Congress of the KMT. See Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang ti erh chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wet-yüan hui tsung pao-kao fuchten (Attached documents of the general report of the Second Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang) n.p., March, 1928, p. 1Google Scholar; Yung-ching, Chiang, Bo-lot'ing yü Wu-Han cheng-ch'üan (Borodin and the Wu-Han Regime) (Taipei, 1963) p. 10.Google Scholar
8 Chiang, , Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun, p. 23Google Scholar; “Letter of Tsou Lu to Chiang Kai-shek,” dated May 9, 1926Google Scholar, as reprinted in Ch'ing-tang shih-lu (Authentic records of Party purification). Ed. Cheng, Ch'ü, n.p., 1928, p. 309.Google Scholar
9 Besides Chou En-lai who headed the political department of the First Army, four out of five KMT representatives attached to the divisions of the First Army were Communists. Later, the political departments of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Armies were all headed by the Communists, Li Fu-ch'un, Chu K'o-ching, Lo Han, and Lin Tsu-han respectively. Li Chih-lung headed the political department of the Navy Bureau and concurrently acted as Deputy Chief of the Bureau. Ch'en Kung-po, chief of the political department of the Military Council, records that all three sections of his department were headed by Communists. See Ch'en Kung-po, “The Communists and I,” Ku-chin pan-yüeh k'an (Past and present semimonthly), No. 36 (December, 1943), pp. 3–11Google Scholar; Kuo-fu, Ch'en, “A Reminiscence of Engaging in Party Work in 1926 and 1927,” Ch'en Kuo-fu hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi (Collected works of Ch'en Kuo-fu). Hongkong, 1952, pp. 72–75.Google Scholar
10 Chiang, , loe. cit., p. 20Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XV, 46.Google Scholar
11 Generals Yang Hsi-min of Yunnan and Liu Chen-huan of Kwangsi, who drove Ch'en Ch'iung-ming out of Canton and invited Sun Yat-sen to return, had no interest in revolution and opposed military reform. The constant presence of their troops at Canton became a menace to the government. After two days' fighting on June 11 and 12, 1925, Chiang drove them out of Canton and dispersed their troops.
12 The Hongkong-Canton strike began with the Shameen Incident at Canton on June 23, 1925, a sequence to the May 30th Incident in Shanghai, and lasted for sixteen months.
13 Implicated in the assassination of Liao were a group of militarists and some KMT rightists such as Hu I-sheng, a cousin of Hu Han-min; Lin Chih-mien, one-time secretary to Sun Yat-sen; Chu Tso-wen, Wei Pang-p'ing, Liang Hung-k'ai, and Chao Kung-pi. This list of names is given by Ho Hsiang-ning (Mrs. Liao Chung-k'ai), but confirmed by other sources. Liao Ch'eng-chih, son of Liao Chung-k'ai, in his interview with Nym Wales also described the circumstances under which his father was assassinated. See Hsiang-ning, Ho, Hui-i Sun Chung-shan ho Liao Chung-k'ai (Reminiscences of Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai) (Peking: Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien Press, 1957), p. 34Google Scholar; Wales, Nym [Helen Snow], Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1952), pp. 30–31Google Scholar. Loh, Pichon P. Y., in his recent article, “The Politics of Chiang Kai-shek,” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXV, No. 3 (May, 1966), p. 634Google Scholar, writes: “Acting in concert with Wang Ching-wei, he [Chiang Kai-shek] set about to look for the assassins, a search that led him conveniently to the house of Hu Han-min and the headquarters of Hsü Ch'ung-chih.” Apparently this is incorrect. Prof. Loh writes further: “Hu was charged with complicity in the affair, but in view of his past service to the party was allowed to go to the Soviet Union as a special envoy on a ‘mission of investigation.’” He gives as his source Chiang Kai-shek's diary (Chiang Diaries, XII, 1a, 25bGoogle Scholar). In fact, no charge against Hu has ever been made; nor has evidence been established that Hu connived with the plotters in the assassination. Chiang shot one of the assassins, a certain Ch'en Shun, on the spot. Later Lin Chih-mien was arrested, but in the trial Lin said that he only heard of the rumor of assassination from another KMT leader Teng Tse-ju. All other plotters were in flight and the case was virtually dropped, when Lin was released two years later. Hu Han-min gives a full account of the case in Hu Han-min hsien-sheng cheng-lun hsüan-chi (Selected political writings of Mr. Hu Han-min). Canton: Hsien-tao She, 1934, pp. 578–80Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XI, 65Google Scholar; The Hongkong Telegraph (Hongkong), August 28, 1925Google Scholar. The credibility of Hu's foreknowledge of the plot is probably well founded insofar as he was in intimate association with his cousin, Hu I-sheng, and had shown much fear for his safety at the time.
14 Prof. Loh is mistaken when he tries to associate the dismissal of General Hsü Ch'ung-chih with the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai (Loh, loc. cit.). On the day of Liao's death, a special committee was organized at the suggestion of Borodin. A triumvirate was formed within the special committee of which Wang, Hsü, and Chiang were members. This triumvirate lasted exactly a month. On September 20, 1925, Chiang's First Army and the Whampoa cadets disarmed Hsü's main force outside Canton. On the same day, Hsu was relieved of his duty by the Political Council. Hsü was charged with having reached a secret agreement with Ch'en Ch'iung-ming. Whether the charge is well founded or not is still difficult to decide. For one thing, Hsü's chief lieutenants, Liang Hung-k'ai and Wei Pang-P'ing, were all working to over throw the KMT regime at Canton. According to Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang Diaries, X, 90–91Google Scholar), Hsu had reached an agreement with Ch'en Ch'iung-ming as early as June 1925. In answer to Chang Chi, one of the KMT leaders in opposition to Canton, Chiang wrote on June 6, 1926, referring to General Hsu: “Had he not left Kwangtung, the rebellious generals in the southern part of the province would have never been liquidated; the unified finances would have never been realized.” See Chiang, , Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun, p. 69Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XVI, 45Google Scholar. General Hsu's misconduct is attested by another important source. Teng Chung-hsia, a Communist leader, in a speech delivered on September 27, 1925, said: “Liao Chung-k'ai desired to liquidate the counterrevolutionaries, but he was required to appropriate the half million dollars needed for getting the army into action. Liao at once forwarded a quarter of a million dollars to Commander-in-Chief Hsü, but the army was never moved.” See Teng, , Pa-kang ti cheng-t'seGoogle Scholar (Policy of strike). Propaganda Department of the Hongkong-Canton Strike Committee, n.d., but apparently compiled in October, 1925, p. 11.
15 Chiang, , Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun, pp. 15–17Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XII, 50–52 and XV, 60.Google Scholar
16 Ibid., p. 21; Chiang Diaries, XV, 46.Google Scholar
17 At least on two occasions, Chiang said: “Comrade Borodin was especially invited to be the political adviser by the Director-General [Sun Yat-sen] who instructed me: ‘The opinion of Borodin is my opinion; in matter pertaining to political problems his opinion should be accepted.’” See Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Tsung-chih-hui tsai tsung-pu yen-hut hsi chien yen-shou shih (Speech of Commanding-General Chiang at the banquet at headquarters). Political Department of the Commanding-General's Head quarters of the National Revolutionary Eastern Expeditionary Army, December 3, 1925, p. 4; Chiang, , “Admonishment to the KMT Comrades,” loc. cit.Google Scholar
18 After his return from Russia, Chiang wrote to Liao Chung-k'ai on March 14, 1924: “According to my observation, the Russian Communist Party is not to be trusted. I told you before that only 30 per cent of what the Russians say may be believed. That was really an overstatement…. The Russian Communist Party, in its dealings with China, has only one aim, namely to remade the Chinese Communist Party in its own image. It never believes that our KMT can really cooperate with it to the end for the sake of ensuring success for both parties. …” The translation is taken from Chiang's Soviet Russia in China, p. 23Google Scholar; the underlined passages are the writer's translation based upon the original text as reprinted in Chia-Iun, Lo (ed.), Ko-ming wen-hsien (Revolutionary literature). Taipei, 1957, IX, 67–71.Google Scholar
19 See “The Report by Blücher,” dated September, 1925Google Scholar, in the J. C. Huston Collection as cited in Brandt, Conrad, Stalin's Failure in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 117, 210Google Scholar. A Soviet diplomat, Bessedovsky, Gregory, in his Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat (London, 1931), p. 153Google Scholar, also relates Borodin's betrayal of Chiang Kai-shek.
20 Wilbur, C. Martin, and How, Julie L. Y. (eds.), Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China (New York, 1956), December 16, p. 197.Google Scholar
21 Degras, Jane, Communist International (London, 1956), II, 276Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, “My Reminiscences,” Ming-pao yueh-k'an (Ming-pao monthly), II, 4 (April, 1967), pp. 96, 99n.Google Scholar
22 Wilbur, and How, , loc. cit., pp. 190, 196.Google Scholar
23 Chiang Diaries, XIV, 68–69Google Scholar; Ch'ih, Liu, “Memoirs of An Old Soldier,” Tzu-yu t'an (The Rambler), XIII, 4 (April, 1962), p. 41Google Scholar. Liu succeeded Wang as the commander of the 2nd Division.
24 “Stepanov's Report to a Meeting of the Soviet Group at Canton,” in Wilbur, and How, , December 24, p. 258.Google Scholar
25 Chiang Diaries, XIV, 72.Google Scholar
26 Ibid., p. 78. Tien-feng, Cheng, in his History of Sino-Russian Relations (Washington, D. C., 1957), p. 133Google Scholar, relates a similar story which Ch'en Li-fu told him.
27 The story reconstructed here is based upon Chiang's own account as recorded in Chiang Diaries, XV, 45–46Google Scholar and Soviet Russia in China, p. 39Google Scholar; the Soviet adviser's account, “Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Coup d'État,” in Wilbur, and How, , December 23, pp. 248–49Google Scholar; and Li Chih-lung's own account in “A Full Account of Chairman Wang Ching-wei's Forced Resignation,” included in Kuo-kung ho-tso ch'ing-tang yün-tung chi kung-nung yün-tung wen-ch'ao (A collection of writings and documents on the cooperation and split between the Kuomintang and the Communists and on the workers' and peasants' movement). Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace.
28 Li was a graduate of the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy and a Communist. Before he entered Whampoa, he had graduated from the Naval Academy at Yentai, Shantung. At the time of the Incident, Li held the highest rank among the Whampoa graduates.
29 This quotation is taken from Li Chih-lung's article supported by “Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Coup d'État.” According to Chiang's version, when Li was asked on whose order he dispatched the ship to Whampoa he failed to answer (Soviet Russia in China, p. 39).Google Scholar
30 This account is also based upon Li's article supported by “Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Coup d'État.”
31 Both Chou En-lai and Teng Chung-hsia were at Canton at the time, but were not arrested. See Ivanovskii's interview with the reporter of Hsiang-tao chou-pao (Guide weekly) as reprinted in Chung, Chih, “A Study of the Canton Coup d'État,” Hsiang-tao chou-pao, No. 148 (April 3, 1926)Google Scholar. Ivanovskii was a member of the Soviet inspection team which arrived at Canton on March 13 and left on the 24th.
32 “Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Coup d'État,” pp. 249–50Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XIV, 81.Google Scholar
33 Ibid., p. 250; Chiang Diaries, XV, 36.Google Scholar
34 Concerning Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's role in the March 20th Incident, Prof. Loh writes (loc. cit., p. 436): “Li Chih-lung was accordingly released, and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Commissioner of Police in Canton who had effected the arrest on Chiang's order, was himself arrested on charges of indiscretion.” This is incorrect. Li was not arrested by the police, but by the soldiers of the 20th Division. Wu was not dismissed until April 24, 1926, and his arrest was not made until May 30. In a letter to Chang Chi, dated June 6, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek explained why he arrested Wu: “T'ieh-ch'eng, in handling the case of the assassination of Liao, was suspected to have left a loophole for the criminals. Last month, he instigated the Whampoa cadets to stir up financial crisis, attempting to overthrow the government…. His arrest … was made with great reluctance.” Chiang's allegation was borne out by Wu's own words. See Chiang, , Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun, pp. 69–70Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XVI, 45Google Scholar; Chih-lung, Li, loc. cit., pp. 10–11Google Scholar; T'ieh-ch'eng, Wu, Szu-shih nien lai chih Chung-kuo yü wo—Wu T'ieh-ch'eng hsien-sheng hui-i lu (Forty years of China and I: memoirs of Mr. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng) (Taipei, 1957) pp. 86–87.Google Scholar
35 The negotiation started by Chang Kuo-t'ao representing the CCP was taken over by Borodin after his return to Canton on April 29. See Kuo-t'ao, Chang, loc. cit., p. 95Google Scholar; II, 5 (May, 1967), pp. 91–95.
36 The Soviet inspection team visited Peking first and then came to Canton. After the March 20th coup, one of its members, Ivanovskii, took part in negotiations with Chiang, and later he held a press conference, dismissing the magnitude of the coup. See Chung, Chih, loc. cit.Google Scholar; Lu-yin, Liu, “Revolution and Counterrevolution,”Google Scholar originally published in Chung-yang pan-yüeh k'an (Central semi-monthly), No. 13 (December, 1927)Google Scholar as reprinted in Ko-ming yü fan ko-ming (Revolution and counterrevolution). Ed. Hsing-shih, Lang. Shanghai: Min-chih Bookstore, 1928, p. 490Google Scholar; Tu-hsiu, Ch'en, Kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu (A letter to all comrades of the Party), n.p., December, 1929, p. 3Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XIV, 76.Google Scholar
37 The two reports are included in the minutes of the Congress, as reprinted in Ch'ing-tang shih-lu pp. 159, 175Google Scholar. The Western Hills group, refusing to participate in the Second National Congress of the KMT held at Canton in January, 1926, convened its own congress on March 29, 1926.
38 ibid., p. 299.
39 At the Eighth ECCI (Executive Committee of the Comintern) Plenum convened in May, 1927 Zinoviev's thesis, submitted in writing and defended by Trotsky, demanded immediate Communist withdrawal from the KMT Left and the formation of soviets. Stalin, in his June 1, 1927, telegram to the CCP, ordered it to unleash the peasant movement, to form a Red Army, and to seize the leadership of the KMT. See Degras, Jane, II, 336, 382–83Google Scholar; Trotsky, Leon, Stalin School of Falsification (New York 1937), II, 125Google Scholar; Trotsky, , Problem of the Chinese Revolution (New York, 1932)Google Scholar, Appendix; Eudin, Zenia J. and North, Robert C., Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford 1957). pp. 303–304.Google Scholar
40 Chung, Chih, loc. cit., p. 1381.Google Scholar
41 ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Wilbur, and How, , December 24, p. 255Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, II, 4 (April, 1967), p. 95Google Scholar; Hao, Huang, “A True Picture of the S.S. Chung-shan Incident,” Hsien-tai shih-liao (Materials of modern history). Shanghai, 1934–1935. II. p. 102.Google Scholar
44 Hsiang-tao chou-pao, No. 150 (April 23, 1926)Google Scholar; cf. Isaacs, Harold, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (2d ed.Stanford, 1961), p. 100.Google Scholar
45 Hsiang-tao chou-pao, No. 156 (June 4, 1926), pp. 1526–29Google Scholar; Kuo-kao, Chang, loc. cit., p. 97.Google Scholar
46 Ch'en Tu-hsiu's report as quoted by Pavel Mif in Chin-chi shih-ch'i chung ti Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang (The Chinese Communist Party in critical days) (Moscow, 1928) pp. 24–26Google Scholar. Mif was one of the Comintern representatives in China in 1927 and later the President of the Sun Yat-sen University. He returned to China with the so-called “twenty-eight returned students” during the Li Li-san controversy in 1930.
47 Wilbur, and How, , op. cit., pp. 191–93, 252, 269.Google Scholar
48 Ibid., p. 263; “Tsou Lu's Letter to Chiang Kai-shek,” Ch'ing-tang shih-lu, p. 309Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, “History of Party Opportunism,” Ch'ih-se tang-an (The Red documents). Ed. Min-hun, Li (Peking, 1928) p. 49.Google Scholar
49 Typical of this kind of interpretation, and probably the earliest, is an article entitled “The Outbreak of the S.S. Chung-shan Incident, the Ignition for the Overthrow of Wang, and the Reactionary Record of Chiang Kai-shek,” in Kuo-kung ho-tso ch'ing-tang yün-tung chi kung-nung yün-tung tuen-ch'ao, I, art. iii, 2–3Google Scholar. In later years, this interpretation with slight variations is generally followed by Communist historians, notably Hua Rang and Hu Hua. See Kang, Hua, 1925–1927 Chung-kuo ta ko-ming shih (History of the Great Chinese Revolution 1925–1927) (Shanghai, 1932) pp. 234–36Google Scholar; Hua, Hu, Chung-kuo hsin-min-chu chu-i ko-ming shih (A history of the new democratic Chinese revolution), ad ed. (Canton: New China Bookstore, 1951) p. 74.Google Scholar
50 Ch'en Li-fu was secretary to Chiang at the Whampoa Military Academy during the March 20th Incident. He, upon the request of the writer, read Li's article and gave generous comments.
51 Ch'en Yen-nien, who was a returned student from France and had an interview with Lenin, was transferred from Canton to Shanghai after the April 12th coup of Chiang Kai-shek. He was arrested and executed on June 29, 1927.
52 The first report of Stepanov as cited (supra, note 26) was partially translated in Mitarevsky, N., World Wide Soviet Plots (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 22–23Google Scholar. His second report under the title of “Stepanov's Report of Meeting of the Soviet Group at Canton” was translated by Wilbur and How as cited, supra, note 24.
53 Wilbur, and How, , Doc. 23, p. 248.Google Scholar
54 Ibid., p. 349.
55 The Hongkong Telegraph, March 25, 26, 1926.Google Scholar
56 Wilbur, and How, , loc. cit., p. 250.Google Scholar
57 Ibid., p. 249; “An Account of Chairman Wang's Departure from China and His Return,” in Kuo-kung ho-tso ch'ing-tang yün-tung chi fang-aung yün-tang wen-ch'ao, I, art. ii, p. 3.Google Scholar
58 To handle the Chinese question, a special commission under the politburo of the CPSU was set up with Trotsky as chairman in early 1926. For the commission's report, see Degras, Jane, loc. cit., p. 307Google Scholar; Brandt, Conrad, op. cit., pp. 73–74.Google Scholar
59 Hu Han-min (1879–1936) joined Sun Yat-sen's party in Japan in 1903. Sun delegated his authority to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Canton government during Sun's trip to Peking in November, 1924. Hu had been the strong man in Kwang-tung politics until the reorganization of the Canton government on July 1, 1925, with the assumption of power by the Left Wing, at which time he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, an insignificant post at that time. Hu himself denied that he was the leader of the KMT Right Wing (Hu, , loc. cit., p. 274).Google Scholar
60 The Hongkong Telegraph, May I, 5, and 7, 1926Google Scholar; Chiang Diaries, XV, 53, 61Google Scholar; Wilbur, and How, , Doc. 25, pp. 266–67.Google Scholar
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64 Ching-wei, Wang, “On Separating the Communists from the KMT at Wuhan,”Google Scholar a speech delivered at Canton University on November 5, 1927, as reprinted in Ko-ming yu fan-ko-ming, p. 559.Google Scholar
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66 Chiang Diaries, XIV, 88.Google Scholar
67 Tang-kuo ming-jen chung-yao shu-tu, loc. cit., pp. 81–82.Google Scholar
68 Chang Ching-chiang (d. 1951), an ardent supporter of Sun Yat-sen and a mentor of Chiang Kai-shek, had played a role of mediator between the Western Hills group and the KMT Left Wing and was still respected by both the KMT members and the Communists at the time. In the newly-reorganized KMT Central Headquarters following the March 20th coup, he served as chairman of the CEC. After the revolution reached the Yangtze, he was soon denounced as “old, rotten, unenlightened, and incompetent element” by the Left Wingers at Wuhan.
69 Chiang Diaries, XV, 46Google Scholar. (This portion of speech is deleted in Chiang, Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun, supra, note 2.)
70 Typical of Chiang's charges are those found in his “Circular Letter to the Whole Corps of Officers and Soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army,” in April, 1927, as reprinted in Tang-kuo ming-jen chung-yao shu-tu, Pt. I, p. 3Google Scholar; Ch'ing-tang yün-tung kai-lun (General discussions on party purification movement). Shanghai: Chung-shan Bookstore, June, 1927, p. 155Google Scholar; “Chiang Kai-shek's Declaration on Resignation,” in August, 1927, in Tang-kuo ming-jen chung-yao shu-tu, Pt. II, p. 6Google Scholar; Chung-cheng, Chiang (Chiang Kai-shek), San-nien lai ti kuo-min ko-ming chün (Three years of the National Revolutionary Army) (Shanghai: Kuang-ming Bookstore, 1929) pp. 25–26.Google Scholar
71 It may be suggested that a political conspiracy like this is sometimes too subtle to be proved by documentation. For instance, Wang Ching-wei was shot and severely wounded at the Fifth Plenum of the CEC of the KMT in November, 1935. Up until now, neither Chiang nor Wang has ever suggested who might have been behind the assassin.
72 Li Chih-lung, in his article (loc. cit., pp. 4, 7), mentions that the rightists plotted against Wang Ching-wei and against him. He also reported to Wang that Ou-yang Ko must be arrested.
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