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The Crisis of 1900 in Yunnan: Late Ch'ing Militancy in Transition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

H. Michael Metzgar
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Extract

Most writers on the Sino-foreign crisis of 1900 have agreed that it marked the end of an era. This perspective has developed out of their focus on north China. Pro-Boxer bureaucrats there were—in most cases—unrealistic reactionaries whose simplistic approach to Sino-foreign relations was terminated by the Allied intervention. Their removal reflected the end of Chinese reaction and of the Confucian state and society.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , February 1976 , pp. 185 - 201
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Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1976

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References

1 For a good summary of the literature up to the late 1960s see Victor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1963), pp. vii–ix.

2 The term militancy is used here to describe the late nineteenth-century current of Chinese thought that advocated violent resistance to foreign encroachment. It does not connote any particular attitude toward domestic reform. As Yen-p'ing Hao points out, there was a broad spectrum of militant views on the latter issue as early as the 1880s. Hao, Yenp'ing, “A Study of the Ch'ing-liu tang: ‘Dis-interested’ Scholar-Official Group (1875–1884),” in Papers on China 16 (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Dec 1962), p. 47Google Scholar.

3 For the two most important studies of the origins of militancy in the 1880s see: Hao, cited in note 2; and Eastman, Lloyd, Throne and Mandarins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

4 More recently, studies by John Schrecker and Roger Des Forges have thrown new light on militancy in the last two decades of the dynasty. See Schrecker, John, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Forges, Roger Des, Hsi Liang and the Chinese National Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973)Google Scholar, passim.

5 Reinach, Louis de, Recueil des traites conclus par la France en Extrême-Orient (1684–1902) (Paris: E. Leroux, 1902), pp. 332–333Google Scholar, 375–376. Ministere des Affaires Étrangères, Documents diplomatiques Chine 1894–1901 [hereafter referred to as DDC], Section I, 1894–1898 [hereafter dates will not be repeated] (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale 1898, 1901), p. 38.

6 Reinach, pp. 332–333.

7 Michel Brugière, “Le Chemin de fer du Yün-nan. Paul Doumer et la politique d'intervention française en Chine (1889–1902),” in Revue d'histoire diplomatique, Apr-June 1963, pp. 137–138, 160–161; Jul-Sept 1963, p. 257.

8 Ibid., Jul-Sept 1963, p. 275. Ministère des Affaires Étrangeres, nouvelle serie, Chine [hereafter referred to as MAE], (deposited at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris), vol. 232, p. 1; vol. 441, pp. 1346–135 (Meng-tzu Consul Francois to Foreign Minister Delcasse, 20 Sept 1899). Documents diplomatiques français [hereafter referred to as DDF], lère série (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1871–1914), vol. 16, pp. 407–408 (Governor-General Paul Doumer to Minister of Colonies Decrais, 18 Aug 1900).

9 Brugière, Apr-June 1963, p. 148.

10 The sources do not reveal the relationships among secret societies, local elites, and officials during the period of the crisis.

11 Ting was to return as Yun-kwei Governor General between 1903 and 1907. Li later was appointed Governor and remained in that post until 1903. He became the last Ch'ing Governor-General from 1910 until the revolution of 1911. I am presently pursuing a study of the careers of these two men in Yunnan in this period.

12 Ch'ing Kuang-hsü ch'ao Chung-fa chiao-she shih-liao (Peking: Palace Museum; 1932), ts'e 3, chüan 5, pp. 43b-44b (Ting Ch'en-to to Throne, 13 Sept 1883); chüan 6, p. 21 (Ting to Throne, 29 Sept 1883).

13 DDC, Section 11, Jul 1899-Oct 1900 [hereafter dates will not be repeated], p. 242 (François to Delcassé, 27 Dec 1899); Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (Tokyo, 1937–1938; reprinted Taipei, 1964), vol. 90, P. 4320.

14 Li Hung-chang, Li Wen-chung kung ch'uen chi (Shanghai: reprinted by the Commercial Press, 1921), ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, p. 22b.

15 DDC, Section III, June-Oct 1901 [hereafter dates will not be repeated], p. 10 (François to Delcassé, 21 June 1901).

16 Ibid., Section II, p. 254 (François to Delcassé, 23 May 1900).

17 Davies, Major H. R., Yunnan the Link between India and the Yangtze (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1909), p. 132Google Scholar; China Mail (Hong Kong: 9 Feb 1900).

18 MAE, vol. 231 [hereafter always vol. 231, unless otherwise noted), p. 55b (Franois to Delcassé, 28 Apr 1900). Wai-chiao tang-an, Chiao-an, (deposited at Nan-kang, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History) no. A-5–4, unpaged [hereafter referred to as WCTA-C], (Tsung-li Yamen to Minister to Peking Pichon, 25 May 1900; Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

19 MAE, pp. 29–29b (François to Delcassé, 1 Apr 1900.

20 Ibid., p. 47 (Minister to Peking Pichon to Foreign Minister Delcass´e, 24 Apr 1900); China Mail, 20 Apr 1900, p. 2.

21 China Mail, 25 Apr 1900.

22 Schrecker, pp. 36, 94.

23 MAE, pp. 50–52 (François to Delcassé, 27 Apr 1900); DDC, Section II, p. 24 6 (Pichon to Delcasse, 24 Apr 1900).

24 MAE. p. 53b (François to Delcassé, 27 Apr 1900).

25 MAE, p. 82b (François to Delcassé, 19 May 1900); Wai-cbiao tang-an, K'uang-wu (deposited at Nan-kang, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History) no. A-2–5, unpaged [hereafter referred to as WCTA-K], states that “several thousand magazine rides … were in the hands of the people at this time.” (unsigned, undated enclosure of 1900).

26 He was later to blame popular pressures entirely, in his memorials on the crisis. WCTA-C (Tsung-li Yamen to Minister to Peking Pichon, 26 May 1900).

27 Chinese and French accounts of the voyage to Yunnan-fu and the likin bureau incident can be found in WCTA-C (Tsung-li Yamen to Minister to Peking Pichon, 25 May 1900); MAE, pp. 82b-85 (François to Delcassé, 19 May 1900); DDC, Section II, pp. 254–255 (François to Delcassé, 23 May 1900).

28 WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900); DDC, Section II, p. 255 (François to Delcassé, 23 May 1900).

29 Ibid.

30 For the above account of the anti-imperialist movement in Yunnan-fu see DDC, Section II, pp. 254–258 (François to Delcassé, 23 Ma y 1900); MAE, pp. 85b-88 (François to Delcassé, 19 May 1900); WCTA-C (Chinese summary of François wire to Pichon forwarded to Tsung-li Yamen, 29 May 1900); Ibid. (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

31 In his memorials, Ting gives the appearance of having been far more conciliatory to the French than he actually was. For example, he claimed to have told François that once he and the arms had been withdrawn, the railroad project could be resumed at once. The early Yunnan-fu agitation was never reported to Peking at all. Ting's cover-up was probably due to his need to hide this failure from a government that was already moving away fro m its own disastrous policy of militancy. WCVA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

32 DDC, Section II, p. 249 (Delcasse to Pichon, 17 May 1900); WCTA-C (Tsung-li Yamen to Pichon, 26 May 1900); (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

33 MAE, pp. 91b, 102b (Delcassé to Pichon, 13 May 1900; Doumer to Pichon, 19 May 1900).

34 Ibid., pp. 102b, 110, 125–126, 129.

35 DDC, Section II, p. 257 (François to Delcassé, 23 May 1900).

36 Shina Shóbetsu Zenshi Kankōkai. ed., Shinshū Shina shōbetsu zenshi (new and revised ed., Shanghai, 1942), vol. 3, pp. 443–448. Hosie, who visited this region in the mid-1890s, gives a vivid description of a rag-clad peasantry living in hovels. Hosie (London, 1897 ed.), vol. 2, p. 61.

37 MAE, pp. m-ii3b (François to Delcassé, 29 May 1900).

38 Ibid., pp. 124–124b (Pichon to Delcassé, 25 May 1900). A communication from Pichon to the Tsung-li Yamen dated May 30, however, states that the French were still intent on withdrawal at this time but unable to move because of Ting's refusal to guarantee their security. WCTA-C (Pichon to Tsung-li Yamen, 30 May 1900). This contradiction can perhaps be explained by a desire on the part of the French to keep Peking on the defensive and establish the principle of a secure withdrawal in case it should become necessary.

39 DDC, Section II, p. 258 (François to Delcassé, 23 May 1900).

40 MAE, p. 114 (François to Delcassé, 23 May 1900).

41 DDC, Section II, pp. 261–262 (Meng-tzu Acting Consul Sainson to Delcassé. 11 June 1900); WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

42 For an excellent study of the shift from artti-dynastic to anti-imperialist movements among the secret societies in the 1880s and 1890s, see Wang T'ien-chiang, “Shih-chiu shih-chi hsia-pan chih Chung-kuo te pi-mi hui-she,” Li-shih yen-chiu no. 2 (1963). As the evidence here suggests, this trend only shifted the focus of agitation led by the secret societies for a time without destroying their fundamentally anti-dynastic and revolutionary character.

43 WCTA-K (unsigned, undated enclosure of 1900).

44 Wetting the lips with blood was a Triad ritual. Jean Chesneaux, Feiling Davis, and Nguyen Nguyet Ho, eds., Mouvement spopulaires et sociétés secrètes en Chine dux XIXe et XXe Siècles (Paris: François Maspero, 1970), p. 136. Drinking the blood of a slain cock was part of the ritual of the Kolao hui. Ibid., p. 281.

45 WCTA-K (unsigned, undated enclosure of 1900). On the other hand, the author of this document wryly anticipates that French troops would find themselves equally unable to control the people. This suggests the dilemma of the militants, who were torn between bellicose anti-imperialism and the need to maintain control.

46 WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

47 In his self-justifying memorial of August, Ting claimed that he had earlier forbidden the gentry and militia to “congregate and cause disturbances,” while ordering that foreign buildings be locked and permanent guard be thrown around them. The lack of corroborating evidence, the ease with which pillage occurred, and the striking contrast between the abortive first attempt at evacuating the French and the successful second effort all suggest that this statement, along with many others in the same memorial that portray Ting as a moderate, are fiction, WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, II Aug 1900).

48 Ting estimated the size of the crowd at over ten thousand. Ibid.

49 Ibid.; Li Hung-chang, ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, p. 23b (Li Ching-hsi to Li Hung-chang, 12 July 1900); MAE, pp. 144–148 (François to Delcassé, 12 June 1900); DDC, Section II, p. 268 (François to Delcassé, undated report on disturbances of May-July 1900).

50 WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900); DDC, Section II, pp. 274–276 (correspondence between François and British missionary Reverend Harding, 13–18 June 1900 in Annex to François to Delcassé, undated report on disturbances of May-Jul 1900).

51 Ting memorialized that, after having deployed the regular and irregular water forces, he had barely one thousand troops remaining in the city. After deputing “several hundred” to protect the French compound, the rest, had to be divided among sixteen or seventeen foreign churches and homes, plus key government installations. WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, n Aug 1900).

52 It may be significant that, in his memorials to the partly pro-Boxer court, Ting never mentioned secret societies but blamed the agitation on t'u-fei (local bandits).

53 MAE, p. 133b (François to Delcassé, 7 Jun 1900).

54 DDC, Section II, p. 267; WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

55 MAE, p. 133b (Doumer to Ministry of Colonies, 12 June 1900); Li Hung-chang, ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, pp. 23b-24 (Li Ching-hsi to Li Hung-chang, 12 Jul 1900); WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

56 Morse, H. B., The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1910–1918Google Scholar; Taipei re-print, 1962), vol. 3, pp. 227–228; Chang Chih-tung, Chang Kung-hsiang kung-chuan chi (1928; Taipei reprint, 1963), vol. 5, p. 2953.

57 For Chinese policy in this two-week period see DDC, Section II, pp. 268–273 (François to Delcassé, undated report on disturbances of May-Jul 1900); WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

58 For reports on the flighrfrom Yunnan-fu to the frontier, see Li Hung-chang, ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, p. 25 (Li Hung-chang to Ting. Ch'en-to, 12 Jul 1900); DDC, Section II, pp. 272–273 (François to Delcassé, undated report on disturbances of May-Jul 1900).

59 WCTA-K (Unsigned, undated enclosure of 1900); China Mail, 20 Apr 1900, p. 2.

60 MAE, pp. 150, 173, 184 (Meng-tzu Acting Consul Sainson to Delcasse, June 12, 20, an d 26).

61 For accounts of this incident, see Brugière, Apr-June 1963, p. 273; DDC, Section II, p. 274 (François to Delcassé, undated report on disturbances of May-Jul 1900); MAE, vol. 232, p. 1 (François to Delcassé, 9 Jul 1900).

62 Shu Shih-ch'eng says that Yunnan-fu knew Doumer planned to intervene, from a wire from him to François which it intercepted. He does not indicate whether his reference is to this incident. Shih-ch'eng, Shu, Chung-fa wai-chiao shih (Shanghai: Shang-wu Yin-shu Kuan, 1928), pp. 60–61Google Scholar.

63 MAE, p. 191 (Ting Ch'en-to to Yü Keng, delivered to Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 26, 1900); WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

64 Ibid. Ting even took it upon himself to restore their ranks temporarily.

65 Li Hung-chang, ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, p. 23b (Li Ching-hsi to Li Hung-chang, 10 Jul 1900).

66 Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu, vol. 90, pp. 4266, 4320. WCTA-C (Tingg to Throne, 11 Augg 1900).

67 Li Hung-chang, ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, pp. 14–15. In his August memorial to the Throne, Ting claims to have sent his own emissaries to Tonkin to learn French intentions. He makes no mention of the appeals to other provinces. WCTA-C (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900). Ting's comment that the court might have to flee Peking suggests that he had at least some knowledge of the situation in the North.

68 Liui Ch'un-lin, comp., Chang Wen-hsiang kung chuan-chi (Peking: Wen-hua chi-k'an, 1930), ts'e 82, chuan 162, pp. 33–34.

69 Fei Hsing-chien, Chin-tai ming-jen bsiao-chuan, no. 78 of Yün-lung, Shen, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an (Taipei: Wen-hai Ch'u-pan She, 1965), p. 231Google Scholar.

70 For the mediation of Li Hung-chang, see his ts'e 90, tien-k'ao 23, pp. 14–14b, 22b-25b; for Ting's reference to the French suggestion on railroad construction, see WCTA-C, (Ting to Throne, 11 Aug 1900).

71 DDC, Section II, pp. 279, 281.

72 The studies by Schrecker and Des Forges have demonstrated the complexities of the late nineteenth-century militant tradition. While Schrecker emphasizes the role of ch'ing-i in the intellectual formation, both of the 1898 reformers and the militant reactionaries in Shantung, Des Forges finds no link between Hsi Liang and the ch'ing-i tradition. Both the reformers and militants described by Schrecker and Des Forges' Hsi Liang, however, played militant roles. Schrecker, pp. 45, 56; Des Forges, p. xvi. Schrecker's militants rejected diplomacy in favor of officially supported mass action by popular militia against the missionaries as symbols of Western cultural influence. Des Forges, on the other hand, portrays Hsi Liang in 1900 as an advocate of using regular troops to resist the Allied intervention and a protector of missionaries and converts. Schrecker, pp. 91–111; Des Forges, pp. 17–22. Both authors agree on the strong elements of continuity in the militant tradition as expressed in foreign policy before and after 1900.

73 Schrecker, pp. 36, 94.

74 Yen-p'ing Hao has pointed out the flexibility of some militants on the issue of economic development in the 1880s. Yen-p'ing Hao, p. 47. The most well- known example, which Hao does not mention, is Chang Chih-tung.

75 Schrecker, pp. 36, 94.

76 Schrecker discusses the ideological similarities between the reformers of 1898 and the militants, and speculates on the possibility that links in personnel may also have existed (Schrecker, pp. 55–59). Although there is no evidence that Ting or Li supported the reform, their policies indicate that some militants were already abandoning ideological conservatism before the debacle of 1900. This suggests that by the late 1890s the two groups were beginning to fuse.