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Growing into Trouble: Institutions and Politics in the Thai Sugar Industry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Richard F. Doner  and
Ansil Ramsay
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Why do some economies grow for several years and then stall? One obvious answer is that these economies have “overheated.” Another is that foreign demand for their products has dried up. This article explores a longer-term explanation—namely, that the institutions favorable for one stage of economic growth are less suitable for a subsequent stage. This idea of “growing into trouble” is consistent with Dani Rodrik's argument that the institutions required to stimulate growth may not be sufficient to sustain growth. We push this idea further by exploring the different requirements of structural change versus upgrading. Structural change connotes an economy's diversification through new investments, often producing real income growth. But economies can diversify without being more efficient, or their initial competitiveness can be based largely on transient factor endowment advantages. Upgrading refers to the competitiveness of these diverse activities achieved through locally based productivity improvements.

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Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 2004 , pp. 97 - 138
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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

We would like to thank Dan Slater, Greg Noble, and two anonymous readers from the Journal of East Asian Studies for very helpful comments.Google Scholar

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37. Christensen, and Akin, , “Exit, Voice,” pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

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39. This process can be seen in the careers of the founders of two major groups of mills. Suree Atsadathorn, founder of the Thai Roong Ruang group of mills, was one of the first entrants into the modern sugar business. He gained familiarity with the industry through his machinery repair business, and in the early 1950s he saw good prospects for sugar sales, especially after the creation of the Thai Sugar Corporation (TSC). Suree found supporters among officials in the TSC in 1953, and when General Sarit Thanarat seized power in 1957 and placed his own men on the TSC board, Suree was quick to cultivate ties with them. Throughout his years in the business Suree shrewdly used political specialists (nakkanmuang) to act on his behalf in the policy struggles affecting the industry. Other entrepreneurs soon followed Suree into the business by finding their own political connections. Chuan Chinthamit, one of the other early founders of a major milling group, got his start in the industry by selling sugar. He developed his own links to powerful military men, especially General Prasert Thammasiri. Other milling families used similar means to build their groups. Warin, “The Relationship,” p. 5; Phiphatseritham, Krirrkiat and Yoshihara, Kunio, Business Groups in Thailand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), p. 4.Google Scholar

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41. Phitsanes, , A History of Sugar Policies in Thailand , p. 29.Google Scholar

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43. Ibid., p. 51.Google Scholar

44. Interview with Pichai Kanivichaporn, Bangkok, August 3, 1998.Google Scholar

45. Ammar, and Suthad, , Agricultural Pricing Policies in Thailand , p. 93. An initial step was the creation, by millers and government officials, of a cartel of sugar mills that would sell all of their sugar to the Thai Sugar Corporation. The TSC would in turn use its monopoly profits from domestic sugar sales to subsidize sugar exports. The effort failed because some of the larger sugar mills refused to join.Google Scholar

46. Ibid., p. 94. Information on the R&D component of the 1961 act from Phitsanes, A History of Sugar Policies in Thailand , pp. 52–63.Google Scholar

47. Abdulbhan, Pakorn and Suksupha, Khubbol, “Growth and Structure of the Sugar Industry in Thailand,” International Sugar Journal 78 (1976): 266.Google Scholar

48. Phitsanes, , A History of Sugar Policies in Thailand , p. 193, from which the rest of this paragraph is drawn.Google Scholar

49. Ammar, and Suthad, , Agricultural Pricing Policies in Thailand , p. 88. The Thai Roong Ruang group built three new mills in Kanchaburi Province between 1967 and 1970, and the Mitr Kaset group built one new mill in 1971 and another in 1973. These developments are covered in Sayon Inson, “Anachak Thai Rung Ruang” [The Thai Rung Ruang Kingdom], p. 123; Phikunsri, Buntham, “Tuktalomluk: Wongthengpo,” Phuchatkan 7, no. 75 (December 1989), p. 112.Google Scholar

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51. Also contributing to associational growth was the high concentration of sugarcane farmers in only four provinces near Bangkok.Google Scholar

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53. Interview with Pichai Kanivichaporn, August 3, 1989.Google Scholar

54. Such a game is a “coordination” game in which the parties, although starting from different points, are all interested in reaching a deal and, once a deal is reached, have no interest in defecting. More accurately, the conflict can be described as “dividing the dollar,” in which players bargain over the division of some units with transferable utility. And whereas “battles of the sexes” are usually understood to have self-reinforcing equilibriums, the fact that global sugar prices shift has meant that the game between growers and millers must be replayed every year. We are grateful to Cliff Carruba for clarification. See also the discussion of the Rubenstein Bargaining Model in Morrow, James D., Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

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56. Interview with Sompob Manarangsan, Bangkok, July 13, 1989.Google Scholar

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58. Pasuk, and Baker, , Thailand: Economy and Politics , p. 344.Google Scholar

59. Available online at www.ocsb.go.th/sugar2001/caneco/sugar_planters.Google Scholar

60. In addition, distributional differences made sugar politics a contentious and sometimes dangerous proposition: Chirayu's main adviser, representing the sugarcane planters, was assassinated in Bangkok during the 70:30 negotiations.Google Scholar

61. Ramsay, , “The Political Economy of Sugar in Thailand,” pp. 248–270.Google Scholar

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63. Vietnam has displaced Thailand as the largest sugar exporter to Indonesia and Singapore. Santivimolnat, Santan, “Sugar Milling Empire 30 Years in the Making.” In the mid-1990s, Thai cane yields were below those of fifty-nine other countries; see Nipon, and Viroj, , Khrongkanwichai. This review draws extensively on Viroj, “The Thai Sugar Industry: Crisis and Opportunities,” p. 1.Google Scholar

64. Viroj, , “The Thai Sugar Industry: Crisis and Opportunities,” p. 4.Google Scholar

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66. Ibid., pp. 2, 4.Google Scholar

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