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Budget Review in the National Assembly of Democratic Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Chan Wook Park
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Extract

Although Korea has made significant strides to strengthen its democratic system since the successful transition in the late 1980s as part of the “third wave” of global democratization, a look into the process of making budgetary policy in the National Assembly would suggest that Korean democracy is far from consolidation. Korean politics has shed itself for the most part of its authoritarian past, when the military was the main conduit of action and oppression. The principle of free, regular, and fair competition has taken root as the procedural norm in both national and local elections. Korean citizens enjoy civil liberties to a degree unprecedented in the authoritarian era, and civil society transformed into an increasingly open, transparent, and pluralistic field of political action.

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Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , September 2003 , pp. 493 - 521
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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

The author would like to acknowledge the sponsorship of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development for the research on the role of the National Assembly in economic policy making. Doh Chull Shin, Chan Wook Park, and Jong-Bin Yoon jointly carried out this larger project, from which this article derived. He also appreciates valuable suggestions made by two anonymous referees for revising an earlier draft.Google Scholar

1. The concept of electoral democracy is elaborated by Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 8–10.Google Scholar

2. Schedler, Andreas, Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., eds., The Self-Restraining State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).Google Scholar

3. In this article, I use the term “government” mostly in a rather narrow sense, meaning the executive branch, including the president, cabinet, ministries, and administrative agencies. Also, technically speaking, the budget per se passed by the National Assembly does not attain the status of a formal law. For this reason, I use the term “budget proposal” instead of “budget bill.” Google Scholar

4. The National Assembly has two types of committees: standing and special. In the Sixteenth Assembly, there exist seventeen standing committees: the House Steering Committee plus sixteen subject-matter committees. The House Steering Committee has jurisdiction over the organization and operation of the National Assembly, whereas the latter standing committees have jurisdiction parallel to specific government ministries and agencies. These subject-matter committees are: Legislation and Judiciary; National Policy; Finance and Economy; Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade; National Defense; Government Administration and Local Autonomy; Education; Science, Technology, Information, and Telecommunication; Culture and Tourism; Agriculture, Forestry, Maritime Affairs, and Fisheries; Commerce, Industry, and Energy; Health and Welfare; Environment and Labor; Construction and Transportation; Intelligence; and Women. For a detailed discussion, see Park, Chan Wook, “The Organization and Workings of Committees in the Korean National Assembly,” Journal of Legislative Studies 4, No. 1 1998): 206–224.Google Scholar

5. Special committees are appointed to examine such specific matters as the National Assembly deems necessary. A special committee can be a temporary or permanent one. A temporary special committee is dissolved automatically when the plenary session arrives at a decision on the matter concerned. In the Sixteenth Assembly, several temporary special committees were organized and later disbanded for dealing with natural disaster control, world exposition, political reform, and the legislature's investigative activity. But a permanent special committee has an established status like a standing committee deliberating matters under its jurisdiction on a continual basis. Another example of the permanent special committees in the Sixteenth Assembly is the Special Committee on Ethics.Google Scholar

6. The National Assembly meets either in the regular or extraordinary session. The regular session opens annually on September 1 (September 10 before the current Sixteenth Assembly) or the next day if the day is a public holiday. The duration of this session may not exceed 100 days. An extraordinary session may be convened at the request of the president or at least one-fourth of the total membership. Its duration is limited to thirty days (constitution, Article 47; National Assembly Law, Article 4).Google Scholar

7. Once the budget proposal is submitted to the National Assembly, the prime minister on behalf of the president delivers the budget statement in its plenary session. Korea has a presidential system with some elements of a parliamentary cabinet system. The president appoints the prime minister, but the appointee is subject to confirmation by the National Assembly. Strictly speaking, this is not a dual executive system. The president is both head of the state and sole chief executive.Google Scholar

8. At the committee meeting, the ministers or agency heads state their policy directions for the next year and explain their budget proposal. Also, a senior committee staff person reports to the committee members the results of the committee staff's examination about the relevant budget proposal. Next, committee members raise questions about the budget proposal, and the ministers or agency heads respond to them. Then the subcommittees of the standing committee look closely at the further divided portions of the budget and adjust budget figures. After the subcommittees' review report, the full standing committee decides upon the budget under its jurisdiction.Google Scholar

9. Once the budget is referred to the Budget and Accounts Committee, the minister of planning and budget first gives a briefing on the major features of the budget, and the special committee considers an examination report on the budget from a senior committee staff person. The committee members seek further explanation by asking the minister of planning and budget about the budget.Google Scholar

10. A subcommittee meeting should be held in an open session unless the subcommittee decides otherwise (National Assembly Law, Article 57, clause 5). A subcommittee may decide to keep minutes on its proceedings by making a note of the gist only instead of recording on a verbatim basis (National Assembly Law, Article 69, clause 4). A full committee or a subcommittee may hold public hearings in order to deliberate matters of great significance or requiring expertise, either by its decision or at the request of a third or more of its total members (National Assembly Law, Article 64, clause 1).Google Scholar

11. The last time the special committee's report underwent amendment was in 1968, when the budget for the fiscal year of 1969 was slightly changed and then passed by the National Assembly.Google Scholar

12. Lee, Jaewon, “A Study on the Decision Making Process of State Budget Proposal and Examination of Settlement of Accounts During the First Half (2000–2001) of the 16th Korean National Assembly,” Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 8, No. 1 2002): 97–98 [in Korean].Google Scholar

13. These respondents include 19 MDP members, 21 GNP members, and 3 United Liberal Democrats; 42 males and 1 female; and 39 district and 4 nationwide at-large members. They are all college-educated and their age ranges from 32 to 63.Google Scholar

14. For supplementary discussion on the constitutional backgrounds, electoral and party dynamics, and organizational features concerning the National Assembly, see Park, Chan Wook, “The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea,” Journal of Legislative Studies 4, No. 4 1998): 66–82; and Park, Chan Wook, “Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Reform: Toward the Institutionalization of the Korean National Assembly,” in Shin, Doh C. and Diamond, Larry, eds., Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1999), pp. 73–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. Refer to http://www.assembly.go.kr/assembly/menu2-index.html.Google Scholar

16. Park, Chan Wook, “Legislators and Their Constituents in South Korea,” Asian Survey 28, No. 10 1988): 1049–1065; Park, Chan Wook, “Constituency Representation in Korea: Sources and Consequences,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1988): 225–242; Yoon, Jong-Bin, “Legislator-Constituency Links: Constituency Service in South Korea,” Ph. D. diss., University of Missouri (1999); and the author's interview with Assemblyman Moon Soo Kim on May 2, 2003.Google Scholar

17. Park, Chan Wook, “Elections in Democratizing Korea,” in Hsieh, Fuh-sheng and Newman, David, eds., How Asia Votes (New York: Chatham House, 2002), pp. 118–146.Google Scholar

18. An intraparliamentary bargaining group or legislative party group, which is called kyosop danche in Korean, is formally established within the National Assembly. This group can be formed whenever a political party has secured at least twenty seats.Google Scholar

19. Mezey, Michael L., Comparative Legislatures (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), pp. 133–138.Google Scholar

20. Park, Chanpyo, National Assembly and Democracy in Korea: In Comparative Perspective (Seoul: Oruem, 2002), p. 55; Lee, , “A Study on the Decision Making Process of State Budget Proposal,” p. 96 [all sources in Korean].Google Scholar

21. Membership assignment to the Budget and Accounts Committee is made based on two criteria. First, the composition is proportional to the strength of each interparliamentary bargaining group or legislative party group. Second, it should be also proportional to the membership size of each standing committee (National Assembly Law, Article 45, clause 2). The membership of this special committee is not exclusive and seeks a balance in terms of the members' standing committee affiliation. On the other hand, membership in the fourteen standing committees (all of the standing committees but House Steering; Intelligence; and Women) is exclusive, which means that there is no concurrent membership among these fourteen standing committees. Since a legislative member's sitting on the Budget and Accounts Committee gives him or her significant leeway in allocating public funds, members are eager to be assigned to this committee. Although legislative members' preference for this special committee is elicited beforehand, party leadership's political consideration is largely decisive in the assignment process.Google Scholar

22. Refer to Ministry of Planning and Budget, An Introduction to the National Budget for Fiscal Year 2001 (Seoul: Ministry of Planning and Budget, 2001).Google Scholar

23. Chosun Ilbo, September 27, 2000.Google Scholar

24. Chosun Ilbo, November 20, 2000.Google Scholar

25. Chosun Ilbo, December 4, 2000.Google Scholar

26. Chosun Ilbo, December 22, 2000.Google Scholar

27. Chosun Ilbo, December 27, 2000.Google Scholar