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The U.S.–South Korean Alliance: Anti-American Challenges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Byung-Kook Kim
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Extract

December 2002 shook up South Korea's conservative establishment and its U.S. ally. Five days before the South Korean presidential election, with a quarter of the electorate still remaining undecided, leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious activists staged a massive candlelight vigil in front of Seoul's city hall to protest against “unequal” provisions in South Korea's Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with its U.S. ally. The political rally drew some 40,000 protestors from all walks of life. Moreover, it was only one among many climaxes in a long mobilization drive launched by NGOs and “netizens” since June, when a U.S. armored vehicle driven by Sergeant Fernando Nino and Mark Walker ran over two teenage girls during a military exercise in Hyochonli. That month saw some thirty NGOs establish a national umbrella organization to demand the trial of Nino and Walker under South Korean law. Then, in December, the Catholic, Buddhist, and Protestant religious orders joined in to lend their authority to the protestors by collectively calling for the revision of SOFA to give South Korea “primary jurisdiction” over criminal cases. The radical hanchongryon university students, too, showed up in protest sites to stir up and escalate anti-American sentiments, regularly raiding U.S. military bases in Uijongbu and Yongsan and even breaking into the U.S. Embassy compound in November. But unlike the past, this intrusion of radical hanchongryon activists did not drive away presumably conservative middle-class groups from political rallies. On the contrary, the call for a SOFA revision grew louder after the U.S. military court judged Nino and Walker not guilty of negligent homicide.

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Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , May 2003 , pp. 225 - 258
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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

1. Twice revised in February 1991 and January 2001 since its original signing in July 1967, the Status of Forces Agreement defines the legal status—that is, legal rights and responsibilities—of United States Forces in Korea (USFK) and its “civilian component … in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying” it over a wide range of issues ranging from facility and land grant to taxation, custom duties, immigration, and criminal jurisdiction. See www.korea.army.mil/sofa/sofa1966_ui1991.pdf and www.korea.army.mil/sofa/2001sofa_english%20text.pdf for “Basic Agreement,” “Agreed Minutes,” and other related documents.Google Scholar

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36. The U.S. Army's Second Division, with 13,800 personnel, was headquartered in Dongduchon, where 73,502 people lived as residents in 2000. The Second Division also maintained three camps in Uijongbu, another prospering satellite city near Seoul with 355,380 inhabitants, as reported by the national census. The situation was equally problematic in Camp Walker, where 7,800 soldiers gave a logistic support for the USFK. With the residents growing from 919,953 in 1970 to 2,480,578 by 2000, Daegu literally grew over Camp Walker, establishing the Dalsong District in 1981 and Dalso District in 1987, both south of Camp Walker. What had been the outskirts of Daegu became a central district of the city in a mere seventeen years.Google Scholar Then there were three U.S. military training grounds and shooting ranges in Paju, Maehyangli, and Pochon—respectively 28.0, 7.6, and 5.1 million pyong in size, taking up much available land in each city, town, or county. Moreover, Paju and Pochon had a sizeable population of 178,434 and 138,654 in 2000. See Joongang Ilbo, July 19, 2001, for information on the location and size of U.S. military bases in South Korea. The resident size of the cities surrounding U.S. military bases and training grounds is compiled from Korea National Statistics Office, National Census, 1970, 1980, and 2000.Google Scholar

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