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The Presidential Political Business Cycle of 1972
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2009
Abstract
Previous studies of the political business cycle have examined time series data to determine whether a pattern of pre-election boom and post-election slump exists. The studies do not investigate the behavior and mechanisms by which a politician may effectuate a political business cycle. We focus on one time period, 1969 to 1972, and conclude that President Nixon's personality and operating environment explain why he manipulated the economy for political gain. The mechanisms he utilized to improve macroeconomic conditions before the 1972 election include monetary policy, fiscal policy, and wage-price controls.
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- Papers Presented at the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association
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- Copyright © The Economic History Association 1984
References
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