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Toward a Reexamination of the Economic History of Tokugawa Japan, 1600–1867

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 May 2010

Kozo Yamamura
Kozo Yamamura
Affiliation:
University of Washington
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Increasing our knowledge of Tokugawa economic history is important for a better understanding of the causes of the rapid Japanese industrialization which followed, but as yet no attempt has been made to provide a theoretical framework with which to analyze the Tokugawa economy. The cost of neglecting to work out a new economic history of Tokugawa Japan is high. Many Western historians, economic as well as others, continue to make use of findings and interpretations provided by Japanese economic historians, most of whom are Marxist in their ideological and methodological orientations. Presented with the force of ideological conviction and repeated in book after book, the Marxist view of Tokugawa economic history is so deeply rooted in Japanese literature that it can claim many followers who make use of its interpretations and views without suspecting the ideological and methodological framework upon which they rest. Another increasingly serious cost is that many of the research findings contributed recently by a few Western scholars and a small group of Japanese economic historians continue to remain disjointed findings in search of an analytical framework which can accommodate them into a meaningful whole.

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Articles
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The Journal of Economic History , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 1973 , pp. 509 - 546
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Copyright © The Economic History Association 1973

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References

This essay is a highly condensed version of a part of a work on Tokugawa economic and demographic history currently being undertaken by Susan B. Hanley and the author. The project was supported by the National Science Foundation and the East-West Population Institute. This essay benefited from Susan Hanley's detailed criticisms and suggestions, and comments by William J. Duffy and Robert P. Thomas. Criticism and guidance provided by the editor of this Journal, Nathan Rosenberg, were invaluable in improving the manuscript. In dealing with such a large subject in an article, the author was unable to present all the necessary evidence and elaborations required. He will welcome any inquiries and requests for further evidence and references cited in footnotes. A glossary of Japanese terms is added at the end of this article.

1 Those familiar with the Japanese literature will note that this section follows closely the view of the Kōza-ha, the dominant among the competing Marxist schools. Given the number of works on this subject, a listing of the Japanese sources consulted in preparation for writing this section is too long to be produced here. A listing of about 120 books examined can be provided upon request.

2 The “zero-sum” view is evident, for example, in the essays included in Kenkyū-kai, Rekishigaku and Kenkyū-kai, Nihonshi, ed., Kōza Nihon-shi (Lectures on Japanese History), Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. In particular, the essays by Oguchi Yujirō, Yamada Tadao, and Hatanaka Seiji (pp. 169–256) leave little doubt as to the importance of this assumption in their analyses. Another example which succinctly spells out the gist of the Marxist view of Tokugawa economic history and the role of the zero-sum assumption, is Shinzaburō, Oishi, et al. , Nihon Keizaishi-ron (A study on Japanese Economic History), (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1967), pp. 94–98Google Scholar, the section entitled “The Characters of Disintegration of the Peasant Class.” For an example of a work which does not explicitly contain this assumption, but in which the increased use of money by peasants is seen as the cause of their impoverishment and the collapse of Tokugawa feudalism, see Endō, Moto'o, et al. , Nihonshi tsūron (A General History of Japan), (Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 1969), pp. 164–167Google Scholar. Because of this wide acceptance of the zero-sum view, Miyamoto was driven to say: “As commerce develops, the merchants perform the role of risk bearers. I believe that [Japanese economic] historians place unwarranted emphasis on the merchant exploitation of peasants. I doubt the validity of arguments based on the belief that in feudal society the principle of trading two equal values is violated” Mataji, Miyamoto, ed., Kinai nōson on chitsujo to henbō (The [Social] Order and Transformation of the Villages in Kinai), (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1957), p. 8Google Scholar. To cite only one example among many of a reflection of the zero-sum view appearing in English, a well known historian wrote in his widely-used college text book on Tokugawa history: “The merchants fixed the price they were willing to pay at such a low level that the peasants for the most part found that the more they produced, the less they earned in terms of cash.” See Sansom, George, A History of Japan 1615–1867 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 183Google Scholar.

3 Not all honbyakushō owned land in the strictly legal sense of private ownership. Some owed labor services to the initial landholders who provided them with land. However, labor dues gradually declined during the seventeenth century and more rapidly at the beginning of the following century. For further discussion, see: K. Yamamura, “An Economic Analysis of Changes in Landholding Patterns in Tokugawa Japan” to be published by the Institute of Comparative and Foreign Area Studies, University of Washington. A mimeo version is available upon request.

4 In Marxist writings, the word “contradiction” (mufun) is used frequently and at times loosely. At one level, mujun can mean contradictions in the abstract Hegelian sense and at another—and in a more economic sense—merely an element or a factor which causes a going economic system to collapse because of the inherent nature of the element or factor to work against the functioning of the system.

5 The Japanese word used is teitai. This expression, frequently used by Japanese scholars, connotes the failure of the population to increase chiefly because of increasing economic difficulties.

6 Keiji, Nagahara, ed., Nihon keizai-shi (An Economic History of Japan), (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1971), p. 144Google Scholar.

7 The daimyo in Region II, mostly located far from Edo, faced even larger expenses related to the sankin kōtai and many were forced to levy taxes higher than those levied by the daimyo in Region I.

8 Because the administrative enforcement costs of the kemi system (annual assessment of yield) was high, and for other political reasons, the jōmen system was gradually adopted in the early decades of the eighteenth century, first in the tenryō and then in the various domains. As with many statements made in this section, this observation refers to the main trend and there were many exceptions.

9 This also means that income remained more in the hands of the part of the population which attempted to save and reinvest rather than in the consuming samurai class.

10 A manuscript, available upon request, has been completed on several han in northern Kyūshu and Sendai han in the Tōhoku region. For evidence supporting the framework from other regions, see Hanley, Susan B., “Towards an Analysis of Demographic and Economic Change in Tokugawa Japan: A Village Study,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXXI (May 1972), 515–537Google Scholar.

11 For a bibliographical article summarizing such recent studies, see: Hanley, S. and Yamamura, K., “A Quiet Transformation in Tokugawa Economic History, Journal of Asian Studies, XXX (February, 1971), 373–384Google Scholar.

12 Numerous sources used to gather these observations on Kinai are contained in the bibliography of the article cited in footnote 11.

13 This perhaps is one of the least controversial points established in the Japanese literature.

14 For examples of the recent studies which provide empirical evidence in support of this observation, see essays by Yoshiko, Nakabe, Shigeji, Takeyasu, and Sugio, Mori in Takeo, Kimura, ed., Kinsei Osaka heiya no sonraku (Villages in the Osaka Plain During the Tokugawa Period), (Tokyo: Mineruva Shobō, 1970)Google Scholar.

15 See the sources cited in the preceding footnote and in Hanley and Yamamura, “A Quiet Transformation in Tokugawa Economic History.”

16 For more recent quantitatively oriented studies of highly commercialized villages, see: Akihiro, Yagi, Kinsei no shōhin ryūtsū (Commerce in Tokugawa Japan), (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1962)Google Scholar.

17 Increases in the size (measured by employment and output) of the industries mentioned and higher wages (relative to agriculture and small-scale operations) paid by the larger establishments within these industries can easily be demonstrated from numerous examples cited in the sources listed in footnotes 14 and 16 and in such standard sources as Kōta, Kodama, ed., Sangyōshi (A History of Manufacturing Industries), (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1965), Vol. IIGoogle Scholar.

18 See the sources cited in footnote 17, and discussions and sources in Yamamura, Kozo, “The Increasing Poverty of the Samurai in Tokugawa Japan, 1600–1868,” The Journal of Economic Histohy, XXXI (June 1971), 378–406Google Scholar.

19 A recent author went as far as to say: “Commercial crops were cultivated and agricultural productivity rose by means of the intensive application of labor. While productivity rose, the amount of tax paid to lords remained virtually unchanged. This meant that the tax burden on peasants declined and a surplus was increasing in the hands of peasants.” Hiroshi, Shirnpō, Hōkenteki shōnōmin no bunkai katei (The Process of Disintegration of Feudal Small Peasants), (Tokyo: Shinseisha, 1967), p. 110Google Scholar. Also see: Smith, Thomas C., “The Land Tax in the Tokugawa Period,” Journal of Asian Studies, XVIII (Nov. 1958), 3–19Google Scholar; Smith, T. C., “Farm Family Byemployments in Preindustrial Japan,” The Journal of Economic History, XXIX (Dec. 1969), 687–715Google Scholar; and Yamamura, cited in thepreceding footnote.

20 Akihiro, Yagi, Hōken shakai no nōson kōzō (The Structure of Agricultural-Villages in the Feudal Society), (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1955), pp. 184–7Google Scholar.

21 The author believes that sufficient evidence exists to show that: (i) depending on the relative value of rice and money, peasants often successfully petitioned to alter the cash-rice mix of rent; (ii) landholders were forced to absorb more of the losses resulting from crop failures and poor harvests; (iii) inflation, which became manifest after the 1820's, tended to lower, by delayed adjustments in the terms of rent agreements, the effective rate of land rent paid in cash; and, (iv) delays in the renegotiation of contracts and/or the landlords' inability to change the contracts to accurately reflect increased yields tended to reduce rent which was a given proportion of the total yield. There are many cases of declines in nominal rates as well. See the works cited in Hanley and Yamamura, “A Quiet Transformation in Tokugawa Economic History”; Yamamura, “An Economic Analysis of Changes in the Landholding Patterns in Tokugawa Japan”; and the manuscript cited in the following footnote.

22 A chapter on Kinai which elaborates on many points made in this section has been completed by the author as a part of the current research. A mimeo version of the chapter is available upon request.

23 The analytical framework presented here does not include the mechanism relating to the settlement of the interregional balance of payments. However, interested readers are referred to Crawcour, E. Sydney and Yamamura, K., “The Tokugawa Monetary System: 1787–1868,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, XVIII (July 1970), 489–518Google Scholar.

24 This section is a highly condensed version of a completed study on Morioka han. For detailed accounts of economic change during the seventeenth century and many points made in this section, the original version is available upon request. The major source used for Morioka han is Kahei, Mori, Nihon hekichi no shiteki kenkyū (A Historical Study of Remote Regions in Japan), Vols. I and II, (Tokyo: Hōsei University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. This 2,650-page work incorporates most of Mori's findings from his life-long study, many of which were previously published in numerous articles. Except for the first 130 pages for the pre-Tokugawa period and occasional references to neighboring han, both volumes are devoted to economic aspects of Morioka han and Hachinohe han (a branch han of Morioka han) during the Tokugawa period. Approximately 20 percent of the contents consists of original sources. Mori also edited the useful fifth volume of Iwate kenshi (The History of Iwate Prefecture), (Morioka: Iwate Prefecture, 1963)Google Scholar, which allocated approximately 1,100 pages out of the total of 1,590 pages to discussions of the economic and demographic aspects of Morioka and Hachinohe han. Both Mori's volumes and Iwate kenshi are, in effect, compedia of historical facts, documents, and observations. While Mori makes occasional efforts at interpretation within the Marxist framework, few such references are to be found in the Iwate kenshi. Since these three volumes represent the most complete collection of data and economic information on Morioka, and since these are the sources most frequently used by Japanese scholars, they have been consulted here as an alternative to the impossible task of original data collection or to referring to articles based on this same evidence in which the authors are primarily concerned with subtle differences in interpretation. In the following footnotes, Mori's two volume study will be denoted as MKI and MK1I, and the history of Iwate prefecture as Iwate kenshi.

25 Nobuo, Watanabe, Bakuhansei kakuritsuki no shōhin ryūtsū (Commodity Flows During the Period of the Formation of the Bakuhan System), (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1966), p. 113Google Scholar.

26 Iwate kenshi, p. 1218.

27 Ibid., p. 730.

28 Ibid., p. 733.

29 Ibid., p. 716 and p. 733.

30 The moyohi saving amounted to at least 1,000 ryō per year. Ibid., p. 731. If we assume that the economizing daimyo took 300 samurai (about one-tenth of all retainers during this time) and that each of them spent, on the average, 25 ryō, the total expenditure would have been 7,500 ryō. Since it is well-known that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, many daimyo spent all of their income on the sankin kōtai, and many samurai undoubtedly spent more than 25 ryō, the data in this paragraph should be considered only “guesstimated” minimum expenditures.

31 A total taxable yield of 230,000 koku for the mid-seventeenth century could be expected to contribute about the same value in cash if we use the convention that one koku equals one ryō. Though the total value contributed by all other economic activities (non-rice agricultural output, commerce, and manufacturing) is next to impossible to estimate, the best “guesstimate” which we can make on the strength of tax records, descriptive evidence, and educated deductions is that the contribution was greater than that of rice and possibly in excess of 300,000 ryō. Given fluctuations in prices and harvests and the incomplete descriptions of some economic activities, this estimate is offered only as a very crude approximation.

32 Iwate kenshi, p. 938.

33 The price of rice, as a trend, declined after the 1720's, and the trend was reversed only after the 1830's. See MKI, p. 483, on peasants becoming wage laborers.

34 Iwate kenshi, pp. 1033–44, and MKI, pp. 482–3.

35 Iwate kenshi, pp. 1129.

36 MKI, p. 369.

37 MKII, p. 283.

38 Ibid., pp. 460–467, and pp. 607–8.

39 ibid., p. 622 and p. 629.

40 Ibid., p. 608 and p. 721.

41 Ibid., p. 603.

42 Ibid., pp. 603–4.

43 Ibid., p. 603.

44 About a dozen large mines were known to have employed a total of 15,000 persons, and many others from 300 to 500 persons. Judged from output, the average number of employees in the 89–90 mines which were in operation must have been around 300. Thus, the total number of persons in the iron industry must have been about 50,000. Though the productivity of labor rose, total output also increased, that is, a net reduction in labor was unlikely. I must also add at least a few thousand more persons who were employed in the lead mining operations to obtain a total for the mining industry as a whole. If we assume that the total population of the han at the end of the Tokugawa period was in the neighborhood of 350,000, the 50,000 plus figure yields the 15 percent. For scattered data on employment in the mining industries, see MKII, pp. 552–604.

45 Otsuchi-chō (the town office of Otsuchi), Otsuchi-chō-shi (A History of the Town of Otsuchi), (Morioka: Otsuchi-chō, 1966), p. 844Google Scholar.

46 Iwate kenshi, p. 1149.

47 Yoshiteru, Iwamoto, Kinsei gyoson kyōdōtai no hensen katei (The Process of Transformation of Fishing Village Communities During the Tokugawa Period), (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1970), p. 186Google Scholar.

48 Isaba-donya, for example, paid as much as 1,000 kan by the 1780's. One kan was 4,000 mon and the average daily wage of the period was around 150 mon per day. Iwate kenshi, p. 1151.

49 MKII, p. 29, and Otsuchi-chō, p. 973.

50 MKII, p. 71.

51 Otsuchi-chō, p. 980.

52 Iwate kenshi, p. 1155 and p. 1030.

53 Ibid., p. 1161.

54 Ibid., pp. 1011–15.

55 MKI, p. 1113.

56 Iwate kenshi, p. 1064.

57 Ninohe District (Ninohegun), Ninohe gunshi (A History of the Ninohe District), (Morioka: Ninohe District, 1968), pp. 337–8Google Scholar.

58 Ibid., p. 376.

59 MKI, p. 376.

60 Ibid., p. 374.

61 Ibid., p. 954.

62 Ibid., p. 950 and p. 960.

63 When the han government shifted to unjō-kin (thank-money) imposed on a lump sum basis because of the difficulties involved in enforcing its tax rule (ten percent of sales value) and subsequently sales continued to rise, the effective tax rate declined.

64 MKI, p. 961.

65 Ibid., p. 968.

66 Iwate kenshi, pp. 676–677. The authors of the kenshi noted this increase which was “not possible to explain and suggested an in-migration from cities” as a possible cause. The suggestion, of course, is contrary to many known facts.

67 MKI, pp. 536–540.

68 Ibid., p. 524 and p. 572.

69 Ibid., p. 550.

70 Ibid., p. 519.

71 Nago were marginal peasants who cultivated small plots of land owned by landholders and lived in independent dwellings made available to them by the landholders. In exchange for the land and dwellings, nago provided labor services to the landholders.

72 Iwate kenshi, pp. 787–9.

73 See Yamamura, “The Increasing Poverty of the Samurai in Tokugawa Japan: 1600–1868.”

74 Iwate kenshi, pp. 787–9.

75 Nobuo, Watanabe, “Murakata jinushi no seritsu to sono kōzō” (The Formation and Structure of Village Landholders), Kiyō (of Tōhoku University), Vol. 2, (March, 1960), p. 79Google Scholar.

76 Iwate kenshi, p. 660.

77 MKI, p. 824.

78 Ibid., p. 817.

79 Ibid., p. 856.

80 For a detailed discussion and evidence, see the manuscript referred to in footnote 10.

81 See Smith's articles cited in footnote 19. Smith's The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1959)Google Scholar also contains many analyses which anticipate the analytical framework suggested in this essay.

82 Crawcour, E.S., “Changes in Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period,” Journal of Asian Studies XXII (December 1963)Google Scholar; and, “The Development of a Credit System in Seventeenth-century Japan,” The Journal of Economic History, XXI (September, 1961)Google Scholar.

83 Cited in footnote 11.

84 Hane, Mikiso, Japan: A Historical Survey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 227Google Scholar.

85 Iwate kenshi, p. 675.

86 Ibid., p. 676.

87 Ibid., pp. 675–6.

88 Ibid., pp. 676 and 712.

89 Takahashi, III, p. 125.

90 Ibid., p. 149.

91 Iwate kenshi, p. 707.