Until his untimely death Zvi Griliches was an important contributor to the measurement and interpretation of productivity growth in the United States and elsewhere. Economists working in this area have been principally concerned with trends in two key measures of productivity: labor productivity, or output per hour, and multifactor or total factor productivity (MFP). Growth in labor productivity is the growth in real output less growth in hours, and multifactor productivity growth is the growth in real output less a weighted average of growth of inputs conventionally measured, with the weights corresponding to shares of factors in national income. The former measure is the most important determinant of growth in our material standard of living as measured by growth in per capita real output. The latter variable, subject to some qualifications, gives us some measure of the impact on economic growth of scientific and technical progress in different periods. The two are closely related, since growth in labor productivity can be decomposed into a portion accounted for by capital deepening (rise in the ratio of capital services per labor hour) and the “residual” contributed by growth in MFP.

The integration of women into formal labor markets was one of the most salient changes of the twentieth century. The “female century,” in the words of The Economist, witnessed an extraordinary transformation of women's opportunities and outcomes both in and outside the household. My dissertation explores both the causes and the consequences of women's move from home to market in the United States during three episodes of rapid change. It begins by documenting demand-side shifts during the 1940s that increased the earnings and occupational choices of African-American women; then demonstrates the impact of contraceptive technology on the extent and intensity of women's participation in the formal labor market after 1960; and, finally, estimates the consequences of shifts in women's labor supply for the growth of earnings inequality in the United States during the 1980s.

When imported slaves were first sold in New Orleans, buyers were unaware of the slaves’ unobservable characteristics. In time, the new owners learned more about their slaves and may have resold the “lemons.” Previous research suggests that buyers anticipated such adverse selection and reduced their bids for these slaves. Consequently, we should observe lower prices for resold slaves. We test this proposition by linking the sequential sales records of 568 slaves. Through a comparison of initial and resale prices, we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that adverse selection lowered the price of resold slaves.

This study looks at the valuation of U.K. investment trusts for the 50 years following their appearance as companies in the 1880s. Based on a large and unique dataset compiled from primary sources, our calculations reveal a huge variation between the ordinary share prices of investment trusts and their underlying net asset “fundamental” values. This mismatch is a well-known puzzle in modern financial markets and has attracted a large volume of research because it casts doubt on the concept of market efficiency. We investigate possible explanations for this pricing puzzle and shed light on U.K. investor behavior before the 1930s.

The discussion of the rationalization wave in German industry (1924–1929) still lacks proper industry-level estimates of the rate of technological progress. To close part of this gap, this article investigates total factor productivity (TFP) growth in hard coal mining over the extended period 1913–1938. Stochastic Frontier Analysis is applied to a sample of firms from the Ruhr coal district. TFP grew positively overall and specifically from 1924–1929. Surprisingly, however, TFP growth was even faster from 1933–1938, suggesting that the Nazi economy heavily capitalized on the Weimar rationalization movement, the effects of which are usually not traced beyond 1932.

External revenues blunt investments in fiscal capacity. But how do external revenues affect investments in legal capacity? In a simple model of state capacity investment, external revenues should be positively correlated with investments in legal capacity. But this implication could flip if fiscal capacity lowers the cost of legal capacity investments. I test the model by looking at Haiti in 1942 when U.S. mobilization caused a negative shock to external revenues. Contrary to the basic model, the shock led to an increase in legal capacity. This puzzle is explained by institutions that tied fiscal and legal capacity investments.

Vote trading among lawmakers (logrolling) can enable political rent-seeking but is difficult to identify. To achieve identification, we explore the rules governing voting for railway projects in the U.K. Parliament during the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Parliamentary rules barred MPs from voting directly for their interests. Even so, they could trade votes to ensure their interests prevailed. We find that logrolling was significant, accounting for nearly one-quarter of the railway bills approved. We also quantify a negative externality to society from logrolling ranging from 1/3 to 1 percent of contemporary GDP.

This article analyzes the connection between investment decisions and financing arrangements in the nineteenth-century American whaling industry. Managers of whaling ventures shared their risks by selling some equity claims but retained a substantial portion due to moral hazard considerations. As a result, they had little incentive to consider the covariance between their own returns, and those of others, in planning their voyages. This stifled diversity in whaling voyages and increased industry-wide risk. The analysis suggests a link between financial market development, or the extent of risk sharing in financial markets, and the range of economic activities pursued.

In the June 1977 issue of this Journal, Lewis R. Jones criticized my analysis of the diffusion of mechanical reaping and mowing machinery. Jones attempts to revive the threshold argument popularized by Paul David. In doing so Jones either confuses or ignores the main points I raised while concentrating on a peripheral issue of little significance.

I raised three major issues. First, and of least importance, I revised the values of some of the parameters David used to estimate the threshold acreage. Jones correctly notes that I erred by reporting that the revised threshold was more than twice as large as that previously estimated; the correct calculation is about 93 percent, as Jones notes. If I were to write the paper again, I would correct this mistake. Nonetheless, my major conclusions on this issue are unaltered. Revising two of the parameters used to calculate the threshold acreage so that they better conform with the actual historical situation generates a threshold about twice as large as that previously estimated. I felt this discrepancy was sufficient to cast reasonable doubt on previous estimates, and I noted that similar revisions could be made of most of the parameters and variables used for such estimations (p. 333). Anyone who doubts this assertion should see Robert Ankli's excellent work on the subject.

My object in this article is to use the historical evidence of one man's life to raise questions concerning the way we have come to understand our technological history. Inventors and mechanicians have long occupied a prominent place in American history. However, the bases for selecting and certifying these national heroes have resulted in a curious record of achievement and considerable distortion in our understanding of the development of American manufacturing technology. The principal historical perspective that enshrined the names of Evans, Whitney, Perkins, etc. has been first, the emphasis on originality of invention or “dramatic newness,” and, secondly, the attempt by historians to confine mechanical genius or creativity within national boundaries—Slater and DuPont, of course, being the exceptions to this generalization. Thus we speak quite naturally of American inventors, British inventors, and so on.

Forecasting developments in firm and industry studies during the next decade is a risky business. Students of firms and industries ask widely different questions about the causes, processes, and/or results of change, and they employ an equally wide variety of methodologies in seeking answers. As a result, objectives are more surrounded and enveloped than taken in accordance with a widely accepted and nicely articulated battleplan. This paper, then, is not offered as a battleplan for the next decade but as a survey of the fronts where the possibilities of advance seem most promising, with some effort to suggest targets and weaponry that are or might become relevant.

It is generally recognized that the Dutch played a major part in financing British government deficits from the 1720s to the late 1770s. This article argues that even though the Dutch continued to hold large amounts of British debt after 1780, they stopped supplying new capital to the British and started a modest repatriation of some of their previous investments. A comparative econometric study of 3 percent consol yields during the two deficit-inducing wars Britain fought between 1750 and 1795 shows that as a result British interest rates became much more sensitive to increases in government borrowing.